O pensamento de Hume pode ser comparado ao dos céticos modernos em muitos aspectos. Com relação ao tópico da racionalidade dos animais, Hume parece seguir de perto a leitura de alguns céticos modernos e se afastar consideravelmente da de Descartes. Por outro lado, diferente de filósofos como Montaigne, Charron e La Mothe Le Vayer, Hume não tinha por finalidade colocar a racionalidade humana num nível próximo dos animais para apenas provar a fraqueza do intelecto diante do desconhecido, mas intentava comparar (...) o nosso modo de proceder ao do animal para avaliar, com mais precisão, as suas teorias acerca da natureza humana. Neste artigo analiso o modo como os primeiros céticos da modernidade trataram da questão da razão dos animais e o comparo com as ideias de Hume sobre o assunto, sem deixar de mencionar as contribuições de Descartes e de Pierre Bayle. (shrink)

In having an experience one is aware of having it. Having an experience requires some form of access to one's own state, which distinguishes phenomenally conscious mental states from other kinds of mental states. Until very recently, Higher-Order (HO) theories were the only game in town aiming at offering a full-fledged account of this form of awareness within the analytical tradition. Independently of any objections that HO theories face, First/Same-Order (F/SO) theorists need to offer an account of such access to (...) become a plausible alternative. My aim in this paper is twofold. In the first place, I wish to widen the logical space of the discussion among theories of consciousness by offering a distinction, orthogonal to that between F/SO and HO theories, between what I will call 'Self-Involving' (SI) and 'Mental-State-Involving' (MSI) theories and argue in favor of the former one. In the second place, I will present the basics of a characterization of such a Self-Involving theory in Same-Order terms. (shrink)

In developing a theory of consciousness, one of the main problems has to do with determining what distinguishes conscious states from non-conscious ones—the delimitation problem. This paper explores the possibility of solving this problem in terms of self-awareness. That self-awareness is essential to understanding the nature of our conscious experience is perhaps the most widely discussed hypothesis in the study of consciousness throughout the history of philosophy. Its plausibility hinges on how the notion of self-awareness is unpacked. The idea that (...) consciousness involves self-awareness has been understood in two different ways: either as awareness of oneself—the subject of experience—or as awareness of the conscious episode itself. In this paper I argue (i) that every experience concerns the subject in a very specific way, involving what I will call ‘perspectival de se representation’, and (ii) that there is no need to appeal to the experience itself in order to characterize the awareness within that experience. The view I articulate explains the subjective nature of experience without over-intellectualizing it, accommodates the phenomenology of experience, and dispels any doubt about the need to find the self in introspection. (shrink)

It is often claimed that a minimal form of self-awareness is constitutive of our conscious experience. Some have considered that such a claim is plausible for our ordinary experiences but false when considered unrestrictedly on the basis of the empirical evidence from altered states. In this paper I want to reject such a reasoning. This requires, first, a proper understanding of a minimal form of self-awareness – one that makes it plausible that minimal self-awareness is part of our ordinary experiences. (...) I will argue that it should be understood as Perspectival First-Person Awareness : a non-conceptual identification-free self-attribution that defines the first-person perspective for our conscious experience. I will offer a detailed characterization of PFP-Awareness in semantic and epistemological terms. With this tool in hand, I will review the empirical literature on altered states. I will focus on psychedelics, meditation and dreams, as they have been claimed to present the clearest cases in favor of a radical disruption of self-awareness. I will show that the rejection of the idea that minimal self-awareness is constitutive of our experience on the basis of this evidence is unfounded, for two main reasons. First, although there are good grounds to think that some forms of self-awareness that typically accompany our ordinary experiences are compromised, they do not support the claim that PFP-Awareness is absent. Secondly, the reports that could make us think of a radical disruption of self-awareness are most probably due to a confirmation bias – and hence we should mistrust them – derived from the expectations and metaphysical views of their subjects. (shrink)

Cognitive theories claim, whereas non-cognitive theories deny, that cognitive access is constitutive of phenomenology. Evidence in favor of non-cognitive theories has recently been collected by Block and is based on the high capacity of participants in partial-report experiments compared to the capacity of the working memory. In reply, defenders of cognitive theories have searched for alternative interpretations of such results that make visual awareness compatible with the capacity of the working memory; and so the conclusions of such experiments remain controversial. (...) Instead of entering the debate between alternative interpretations of partial-report experiments, this paper offers an alternative line of research that could settle the discussion between cognitive and non-cognitive theories of consciousness. Here I relate the neural correlates of cognitive access to empirical research into the neurophysiology of dreams; cognitive access seems to depend on the activity of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. However, that area is strongly deactivated during sleep; a period when we entertain conscious experiences: dreams. This approach also avoids the classic objection that consciousness should be inextricably tied to reportability or it would fall outside the realm of science. (shrink)

In this paper I investigate which of the main conditions proposed in the moral responsibility literature are the ones that spell trouble for the idea that Artificial Intelligence Systems could ever be full-fledged responsible agents. After arguing that the standard construals of the control and epistemic conditions don’t impose any in-principle barrier to AISs being responsible agents, I identify the requirement that responsible agents must be aware of their own actions as the main locus of resistance to attribute that kind (...) of agency to AISs. This is because this type of awareness is thought to involve first-person or de se representations, which, in turn, are usually assumed to involve some form of consciousness. I clarify what this widespread assumption involves and conclude that the possibility of AISs’ moral responsibility hinges on what the correct theory of de se representations ultimately turns out to be. (shrink)

Higher-order thought theories of consciousness attempt to explain what it takes for a mental state to be conscious, rather than unconscious, by means of a HOT that represents oneself as being in the state in question. Rosenthal Consciousness and the self: new essays, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) stresses that the way we are aware of our own conscious states requires essentially indexical self-reference. The challenge for defenders of HOT theories is to show that there is a way to explain (...) the required reference-fixing mechanisms that is compatible with the theory. According to Rosenthal, the reference to oneself as such is grounded in the disposition to identify the individual the HOT refers to as the individual who has that HOT. I argue that this leads to a vicious infinite regress on the more than plausible assumption that our cognitive capacities are limited. This leaves such theories without a foundation, since self-reference is thought essential to consciousness. (shrink)

"... a real philosophical page-turner, a book that is difficult to put down, even given the complexity of its issues." —Jeffrey Powell "This is a fine addition to existing books on Heidegger’s thought.... The author has both a command of Heidegger and of how best to elucidate him to a contemporary audience." —David Wood In Thinking with Heidegger, Miguel de Beistegui looks into the essence of Heidegger’s thought and engages the philosopher’s transformative thinking with contemporary Western culture. Rather than (...) isolate and explore a single theme or aspect of Heidegger, de Beistegui chooses multiple points of entry that unfold from the same question or idea. De Beistegui examines Heidegger’s translations of Greek philosophy and his interpretations and displacements of anthropology, ethics and politics, science, and aesthetics. Thinking with Heidegger proposes fresh answers to some of philosophy’s most fundamental questions and extends Heideggerian discourse into philosophical regions not treated by Heidegger himself. (shrink)

This essay suggests that atheists endorse a range of naturalistic beliefs, such as belief in progress and in science. Social-psychological evidence for this belief replacement hypothesis, where naturalistic beliefs take the place of supernatural ones, is reviewed. Atheists seem to implicitly use their naturalistic beliefs to alleviate feelings of uncertainty, anxiety and stress, a psychological function which, until recently, had only been reported for religious beliefs. The second part of the essay focuses on motivational implications of being an atheist. Here, (...) it is argued that atheists are particularly driven by a desire for self-mastery and, secondarily, by a sensation seeking need to engage in intense and pleasurable activities. A number of sociological, social-psychological, narrative, and sexual-behavioural studies are reviewed to support this idea. The essay concludes by highlighting the human need to believe and the importance of studying the process, rather than the content, of beliefs. (shrink)

Representations are not only used in our folk-psychological explanations of behaviour, but are also fruitfully postulated, for example, in cognitive science. The mainstream view in cognitive science maintains that our mind is a representational system. This popular view requires an understanding of the nature of the entities they are postulating. Teleosemantic theories face this challenge, unpacking the normativity in the relation of representation by appealing to the teleological function of the representing state. It has been argued that, if intentionality is (...) to be explained in teleological terms, then the function of a state cannot depend on its phylogenetical history, given the metaphysical possibility of a duplicate of an intentional being that lacks an evolutionary history. In this paper, I present a method to produce, according to our current knowledge in genetic engineering, human-like individuals who are not the product of natural selection in the required sense. This variation will be used to shed light on the main replies that have been offered in the literature to the Swampman thought experiment. I argue that these replies are not satisfactory: representations should better not depend on natural selection. I conclude that a non-etiological notion of function is to be preferred for characterizing the relation of representation. (shrink)

In this article we aim to support the thesis that Nietzsche, from his first work The Birth of Tragedy, to his last texts, such as Twilight of the Idols, in What I owe to the ancients, proposes a radical transvaluation of the meaning of suffering human. He adopts a completely different perspective from Western metaphysical and religious conceptions, which considered suffering as an objection to life, arising from faults, failures, “sins”, which must be expiated through countless constraints, until inexorable death. (...) The nietzschean transvaluation, with its unique tragic perspective, inaugurated in The Birth of Tragedy and sustained throughout his entire work, far from considering suffering as an objection or imperfection of existence, values it and even exalts it as another modality of becoming. vital, consubstantial and inherent in every affirmation, every pleasure, every possibility of joy. (shrink)

When reasoning about dependence relations, philosophers often rely on gradualist assumptions, according to which abrupt changes in a phenomenon of interest can result only from abrupt changes in the low-level phenomena on which it depends. These assumptions, while strictly correct if the dependence relation in question can be expressed by continuous dynamical equations, should be handled with care: very often the descriptively relevant property of a dynamical system connecting high- and low-level phenomena is not its instantaneous behaviour but its stable (...) fixed points (those in the vicinity of which it spends most of the time, after comparatively short transitory periods), and stable fixed points can change abruptly as a result of infinitesimal changes of the low-level phenomenon. We illustrate this potential gradualist trap by showing that Chalmers’ fading qualia argument falls into it. (shrink)

LetA≤Bbe structures, and${\cal K}$a class of structures. An elementb∈BisdominatedbyArelative to${\cal K}$if for all${\bf{C}} \in {\cal K}$and all homomorphismsg,g':B → Csuch thatgandg'agree onA, we havegb=g'b. Our main theorem states that if${\cal K}$is closed under ultraproducts, thenAdominatesbrelative to${\cal K}$if and only if there is a partial functionFdefinable by a primitive positive formula in${\cal K}$such thatFB(a1,…,an) =bfor somea1,…,an∈A. Applying this result we show that a quasivariety of algebras${\cal Q}$with ann-ary near-unanimity term has surjective epimorphisms if and only if$\mathbb{S}\mathbb{P}_n \mathbb{P}_u \left( {\mathcal{Q}_{{\text{RSI}}} } \right)$has (...) surjective epimorphisms. It follows that if${\cal F}$is a finite set of finite algebras with a common near-unanimity term, then it is decidable whether the (quasi)variety generated by${\cal F}$has surjective epimorphisms. (shrink)

In this essay we discuss recent attempts to analyse the notion of representation, as it is employed in cognitive science, in purely informational terms. In particular, we argue that recent informational theories cannot accommodate the existence of metarepresentations. Since metarepresentations play a central role in the explanation of many cognitive abilities, this is a serious shortcoming of these proposals.

This paper takes an organicist perspective of W. Harvey’s conception of epigenesis in his work Exercitationes de generatione animalium (1651). In line with this reading, I provide a critical assessment of the different interpretations (mechanistic or vitalist) of Harvey’s idea of epigenesis. The English physician develops his conception of embryogenesis as a process that cannot be understood from the categories of human art, as is apparent in his criticisms towards his teacher, Fabricius. Nor is it accurate to say that his (...) position is animistic. An immersion in this last question will show us his organic conception of the soul, as an extension of the Aristotelian-Galenic tradition. (shrink)

We show that certain type of tree forcings, including Sacks forcing, increases the covering of the strong measure zero ideal \. As a consequence, in Sacks model, such covering number is equal to the size of the continuum, which indicates that this covering number is consistently larger than any other classical cardinal invariant of the continuum. Even more, Sacks forcing can be used to force that \<\mathrm {cov}<\mathrm {cof}\), which is the first consistency result where more than two cardinal invariants (...) associated with \ are pairwise different. Another consequence is that \ in ZFC where \ denotes Marczewski’s ideal. (shrink)

Linguistic phenomena of tense and aspect have been investigated in a great deal of theoretical work in linguistics, philosophy and computer science. Modern tense logics, established by Prior, are part of this effort. Point tense logics offer an intuitive representation of tense but lack the expressiveness to represent many aspectual structures. Interval tense logics offer more expressiveness but in the general case can be computationally intractable. From a linguistic perspective there is the problem of precisely how to formalise the aspectual (...) structures, such as a culmination and a culminated process. In this paper we define a computationally tractable augmented fragment of Halpern and Shoham's interval tense logic HS and apply it to represent a core set of aspectual structures, which are incorporated into a temporal semantics of a simple fragment of English. We model the logic fragment using timelines and define two procedures, one for constructing the minimal timelines that satisfy a formula and one for checking semantic entailments between one formula and another by comparing their timelines. The former is applied to compute models of temporal readings and the latter to check entailments between them. Possible extensions to the logic fragment and timeline models are discussed as ways of accounting for a wider range of linguistic behaviour. (shrink)

La amenaza del terrorismo y la radicalización son desafíos que trascienden las fronteras internacionales, por sus consecuencias negativas para nuestra sociedad. España fue uno de los países europeos más afectados por los atentados terroristas. Ejemplo de ello fueron los firmados años de liderazgo de la banda terrorista ETA (1961-2010); el 11M (2005), que sacudió no solo a Madrid, sino a toda Europa; y los atentados de Barcelona y Cambrills (2017), todos los cuales dieron la voz de alarma sobre la necesidad (...) de detectar y prevenir la radicalización, ya que aparentemente se trataba de jóvenes integrados en la sociedad. El sufrimiento, el dolor y la muerte tangible del terrorismo hacen de la pedagogía de la muerte la mejor manera de abordar la educación del terrorismo desde un enfoque radical e inclusivo holístico, un estudio de la educación que la ve como antesala de una formación profunda por interiorización. Se basa en varios enfoques didácticos y formativos: (1) enfoque de acompañamiento educativo, desde el que se ofrecen respuestas eficaces a situaciones de duelo vivenciadas por algún miembro de la comunidad educativa; (2) un enfoque curricular centrado en promover la conciencia de la finitud en la educación y su tratamiento normalizado; (3) Un enfoque evolutivo fenomenológico entendido a partir de la teoría evolutiva desde la conciencia donde el nacimiento y la muerte no definen claramente el antes y el después. (4) Un enfoque meditativo vacío de la inexistencia. A partir de ahí, se hace referencia a la meditación para alcanzar la plena conciencia. Pues bien, en esta contribución científica se propone cómo trabajar con aplicar cada uno de estos enfoques en una Didáctica del Terrorismo que tenga un cuenta un enfoque radical e inclusivo. (shrink)

The non-transitivity of the relation looks the same as has been used to argue that the relation has the same phenomenal character as is non-transitive—a result that jeopardizes certain theories of consciousness. In this paper, I argue against this conclusion while granting the premise by dissociating lookings and phenomenology; an idea that some might find counter-intuitive. However, such an intuition is left unsupported once phenomenology and cognitive access are distinguished from each other; a distinction that is conceptually and empirically grounded.

This work is an introduction on Polo's criticism of Saint Anselm's argument, showing that this argument is inefficient with respect to Polo's comprehesion of the intellect and Polo's study of the existence.

La teoría de la lógica mental no acepta una regla correcta en el cálculo proposicional estándar: la regla de introducción de la disyunción (esto es, la regla que permite inferir, por ejemplo, p o q de p). Esto es un problema porque esa misma teoría admite otro esquema en el que la regla está realmente implicada. Es cierto que, como ha mostrado López-Astorga, la teoría de la lógica mental puede ser actualizada de acuerdo con resultados empíricos recientes y que tal (...) actualización puede ayudar a la teoría a resolver algunas de sus dificultades. No obstante, la actualización de López-Astorga no afronta los desafíos directamente planteados por la regla de introducción de la disyunción y este trabajo pretende proceder en esa dirección. En concreto, mi tesis aquí es que todas las dificultades de la mencionada regla pueden desaparecer si no es considerada un Esquema Núcleo de la sintaxis del pensamiento humano, sino un Esquema Alimentador de la misma. (shrink)

Alleged self-evidence aside, conceivability arguments are one of the main reasons in favor of the claim that there is a Hard Problem. These arguments depend on the appealing Kripkean intuition that there is no difference between appearances and reality in the case of consciousness. I will argue that this intuition rests on overlooking a distinction between cognitive access and consciousness, which has received recently important empirical support. I will show that there are good reasons to believe that the intuition is (...) misguided—at least on the reading that the conceivability arguments require—and hence that the arguments are unsupported. This, in turn, alleviates the Hard Problem but leaves us with what I think is a not easy problem. (shrink)

Most people think indexical thought has special content (_de se_ content). However, it has been acknowledged that classical examples, such as those offered by Perry and Lewis, are insufficient to establish this conclusion. Ongoing discussions typically focus on first-person beliefs and their relationship to the explanation of successful behavior and linguistic practices. Instead, I want to direct attention to the phenomenal content of our conscious experiences and the largely neglected contribution that its comprehension can make to the way in which (...) first-person representation is understood. This paper offers a novel argument for both the existence and a specific interpretation of the essential indexicality thesis based on widely accepted assumptions regarding the relation between phenomenology and representation. Specifically, I will argue that if (i) two different individuals can have token experiences with the same phenomenology and ii) two token experiences of ordinary subjects with the same phenomenology have the same phenomenal content, then phenomenal content is_ de se _content of a particular kind: _perspectival de se_ content. (shrink)

The generation of the 98 (specially Miguel Unamuno) initiates in Spain the rupture with the modern philosophy following a scheme similar to the Hegel’s Fenomenology of Spirit. They present a spiritualist philosophy, that defends the concrete, vital and historical reality of the man similarly to Simmel, Bergson, etc. in Europe.

The adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMBs) has emerged as a key strategy for improving quality management. This article discusses the main benefits and challenges of implementing AI in this context. A systematic review of the academic literature and relevant business reports was carried out, in order to collect and analyze empirical evidence on the application of AI in the quality management of SMEs, obtaining as results that the main benefits of the implementation of AI (...) in the quality management of SMEs include: Improved data-driven decision-making, process automation and error reduction, early detection of quality issues, customization of products and services, and resource optimization and cost reduction. On the other hand, the main challenges were: Lack of knowledge and skills in AI, high implementation costs, concerns about data security and privacy, resistance to cultural change, and integration of AI with existing systems and processes, concluding that the implementation of AI in SMB quality management offers significant benefits, but it also entails challenges that must be addressed strategically. SMEs that manage to overcome these challenges will be able to take advantage of the competitive advantages offered by AI, improving their efficiency, quality and adaptability in an increasingly dynamic business environment. (shrink)

Some philosophers, like David Chalmers, have either shown their sympathy for, or explicitly endorsed, the following two principles: Panpsychism—roughly the thesis that the mind is ubiquitous throughout the universe—and Organizational Invariantism—the principle that holds that two systems with the same fine-grained functional organization will have qualitatively identical experiences. The purpose of this paper is to show the tension between the arguments that back up both principles. This tension should lead, or so I will argue, defenders of one of the principles (...) to give up on the other. (shrink)

It has been widely acknowledged that indexical thought poses a problem for traditional theories of mental content. However, recent work in philosophy has defied this received view and challenged its defenders not to rely on intuitions but rather to clearly articulate what the problem is supposed to be. For example, in “The Inessential Indexical”, Cappelen and Dever claim that there are no philosophically interesting or important roles played by essential indexical representations. This paper assesses the role of essential indexicality in (...) understanding the content of perception and argues that, if the perceptual experiences of different subjects can have the same phenomenology, and thus share a representational content (phenomenal content)—assumptions shared by a well-established research project, including a wide variety of theories—, then phenomenal content exhibit a particular kind of essential indexicality (perspectival). I also discuss how the argument is immune to Cappelen and Dever’s objections to the idea that the content of perceptual experiences is essentially indexical. (shrink)

There is a substantive disagreement with regard to the characterization of pre-reflective self-awareness despite the key role that is supposed to play for the distinction between conscious and unconscious states. One of the most prominent ones—between egological and non-egological views—is about the role that the subject of experience plays.I show that this disagreement falls short to capture the details of the debate, as it does not distinguish phenomenological and metaphysical disputes. Regarding the former, the contenders disagree on whether pre-reflective self-awareness (...) concerns the subject of experience or the experience itself. I first argue that such an awareness has to be indexical—de se or de mentis respectively—, and then show that de se awareness can straightforwardly address classical objec­tions against egological views, whereas de mentis awareness fails to support epistemological arguments in favor of non-egological ones. The metaphysical commitments of a phenomenologically egological view depend on what the corresponding de se awareness demands from reality. I consider two alternatives, the structural and the representational approach and offer some consid­erations in favor of the later and its prima facie neutrality with regard to the metaphysical dispute. (shrink)

This article outlines the theoretical developments experienced in historical studies over the last two decades. As a consequence of the growing critical reconsideration of some of the main theoretical assumptions underlying historical explanation of individuals' meaningful actions, a new theory of society has taken shape among historians during this time. By emphasizing the empirical and analytical distinction between language as a pattern of meanings and language as a means of communication, a significant group of historians has thoroughly recast the conventional (...) notions of society, experience, interests, culture, and identity, and has developed a new concept of social action. Thus, historiographical debate seems to have started to transcend, for the first time, the longstanding and increasingly futile contest or dilemma between objectivism and subjectivism, between materialism and culturalism, between social and intentional explanation, or between social constraints and human agency. The groundwork has now been laid for an alternative to the declining paradigm of social history that does not entail a revisionist return to idealist history but opens a quite different path. (shrink)

Kai kurios šiuolaikinio kognityvinio mokslo teorijos teigia, kad žmogaus prote veikia dvi sistemos: sistema, vykdanti greitą intuityvų mąstymą, bei sistema, vadovaujanti lėtam logiškam mąstymui. Būtų galima manyti, kad šių sistemų egzistavimą patikrinti sudėtinga. Šiame straipsnyje pateikiamas būdas palaipsniui patvirtinti šių dviejų sistemų egzistavimą. Pasitelkiamas dviejų sistemų, pasireiškiančių per mentalinių modelių teoriją, principas. Be to, laikantis Carnapo redukcijos idėjos, straipsnyje aprašomos dvi procedūros, kuriomis hipotezė patvirtinama palaipsniui. Viena iš jų tyrinėja, kaip žmogaus protas nagrinėja žmogaus proto veiklą darant išvedimus pagal modus (...) tollendo tollens. Kita hipotezė tyrinėja išvedimus iš griežtosios disjunkcijos su trimis disjunktais. (shrink)

Carnap and Popper proposed ways scientists have to work. According to Carnap, they should look for confirmations for hypotheses. In Popper‘s view, what is important is to try to falsify hypotheses. Cognitive science seems to prove that, in real scientific research, both activities play a role. First, people attempt to confirm hypotheses. Second, they seek examples refuting those hypotheses. This paper is intended to show that the theory of mental models can describe the mental processes involved in both tasks: confirmation (...) and falsification. It addresses the mental possibilities individuals consider in both cases. In addition, the paper reveals that, in accordance with both Carnap‘s framework and Popper‘s approach, both mental activities are related to conditional reasoning. (shrink)

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to present a case study of the creation of a Knowledge Zone in Curaçao to provide an insight into how a Knowledge Zone is established. After devising a vision, strategic alliances were formed. This created synergy and momentum, giving the project and process a life of their own.Design/methodology/approachThe project of creating a K‐Zone is based on a theoretical framework which draws upon the notion of a creative class, and how it can be attracted to (...) a specific location. It also deploys change management methodology, which describes how change is implemented. The theory states that creativity will drive the economy in the future and that societies that are able to attract the creative class will excel. It is not clear what attracts the creative class but it is believed that a certain life style, concentrations of peers and virtual and physical connectivity are essential. To create these conditions some changes must be implemented and these changes are often resisted in the beginning.FindingsKnowledge Zones can be created if there is a clear shared vision, leadership and alliances that forge synergies. The project was started in 2010 by the UNA under the presidency of Dr Miguel Goede, the Rector Magnificus of the University of the Netherlands Antilles. With the support of the Board of Supervisors, the UNA entered/sought alliances with the nearby Carmabi Research Institute and the neighbouring school for nurses, which opened a new school building within the designated zone. The UNA also provided the impetus to start a campaign to construct a new hospital that was planned for the area neighbouring the university and to start a school of medicine. But the breakthrough came when the local telecom provider, United Telecommunication Services, decided to provide the university with dedicated internet connections that were capable of the highest speed available on the island.Originality/valueThe paper contributes to a framework for understanding the creative economy of Small Islands Developing States in the Caribbean and how change can be implemented in these settings. (shrink)

Many philosophers and scientists have argued that the difference between phenomenally conscious states and other kind of states lies in the implicit self-awareness that conscious states have. Higher-Order Representationalist theories, attempt to explain such a self-awareness by means of a higher-order representation. Consciousness relies on our capacity to represent our own mental states, consciousness depends on our Theory of Mind. Such an ability can, at least conceptually, be decomposed into another two: mindreading and metacognition. In this paper I will argue (...) that consciousness cannot depend on mindreading. The tenability of HOR theories depends, therefore, on the relation between mindreading and metacognition. I analyze several views on such a relation and argue that none of them seem to be a plausible option for HOR theories. (shrink)

El presente estudio se propone, a lo largo de dos entregas consecutivas, evaluar cuál sea el estatuto a un tiempo hierofánico y cosmológico, ontológico y antropológico, que la noción de Belleza reviste en la mística especulativa del andalusí MuhyÌ al-DÌn Ibn ÿArabÌ (1165-1240), conocido asimismo como "el más grande de los maestros" en materia de espiritualidad islámica. Y ello en confrontación con las teorías al uso de la estética y la filosofía islámicas, a través del esclarecimiento de un vocabulario denso (...) en sugerencias poliédricas, y de la presentación de la doctrina relativa a la facultad creadora de una imaginación de la que se indagará, en fin, su valor noético y sagrado. (shrink)