Ce texte est tiré de l'admirable site, Le jeu verbal. Nous remercions Michel Bernardy de nous avoir autorisé à le reproduire ici. Dans le cadre du Conservatoire, le cours appelé autrefois de diction semblait superflu à bien des élèves. Ce n'était à proprement parler qu'un cours d'articulation et de respiration, qui permettait aux comédiens de se faire entendre et comprendre dans un théâtre. C'était un cours dit technique, où, par des exercices appropriés, on apprenait à bien placer la (...) voix et à corriger - Danse, théâtre et spectacle vivant – GALERIE – Nouvel article. (shrink)

This introduction diagnoses two tendencies among Foucaultian scholars with regard to Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish: While the book was initially enthusiastically embraced and its central concepts – above all “discipline” and “panopticism” – were used almost too frequently, these very concepts were often thought to be superseded by Foucault’s own development in the governmentality lectures and beyond. The articles in the special issue, however, demonstrate that Discipline and Punish, read carefully with neither uncritical enthusiasm nor progressivist dismissal, has (...) still a lot to offer for today’s critical theory and cultural analysis. (shrink)

This paper explores the intertwinement of ontology and history that happened after the idealist turn of Kantian transcendentalism, particularly in classic German idealism and later in American pragmatism. The paper focuses on the less remarked-upon consequence of this intertwinement, namely the possibility of a new reading of history based on changes in concepts and habitual mentality. The paper proposes a new take on historiography that vindicates Hegel’s insight but changes his approach to a pragmatist one, more apt to face historical (...) changes in a technical way and less easily twistable into ideological frameworks. The paper argues that the notion of habit, as phenomenologically and semiotically described by Peirce, is the fundamental cellule of the pragmatist take on the entanglement of history and ontology. The paper elaborates on the notion of habit, singling out a special form of it called “gesture” that can be a useful tool for reading the history of the human spirit without incorporating Hegel’s dialectic and Absolute. The paper compares the notion of gesture as it originated in the pragmatist tradition with the parallel use of the term in the early studies of Michel Foucault and argues that the notion of gesture is better equipped to tackle a theoretical reading of history. (shrink)

This paper tackles the problem of defining what a cognitive expert is. Starting from a shared intuition that the definition of an expert depends upon the conceptual function of expertise, I shed light on two main approaches to the notion of an expert: according to novice-oriented accounts of expertise, experts need to provide laypeople with information they lack in some domain; whereas, according to research-oriented accounts, experts need to contribute to the epistemic progress of their discipline. In this paper, I (...) defend the thesis that cognitive experts should be identified by their ability to perform the latter function rather than the former, as novice-oriented accounts, unlike research-oriented ones, fail to comply with the rules of a functionalist approach to expertise. (shrink)

Whether the prefrontal cortex is part of the neural substrates of consciousness is currently debated. Against prefrontal theories of consciousness, many have argued that neural activity in the prefrontal cortex does not correlate with consciousness but with subjective reports. We defend prefrontal theories of consciousness against this argument. We surmise that the requirement for reports is not a satisfying explanation of the difference in neural activity between conscious and unconscious trials, and that prefrontal theories of consciousness come out of this (...) debate unscathed. (shrink)

As for most measurement procedures in the course of their development, measures of consciousness face the problem of coordination, i.e., the problem of knowing whether a measurement procedure actually measures what it is intended to measure. I focus on the case of the Perceptual Awareness Scale to illustrate how ignoring this problem leads to ambiguous interpretations of subjective reports in consciousness science. In turn, I show that empirical results based on this measurement procedure might be systematically misinterpreted.

This article introduces an account of moral education grounded in Zagzebski’s recent Exemplarist Moral Theory and discusses two problems that have to be solved for the account to become a realistic alternative to other educational models on the market, namely the limited-applicability problem and the problem of indoctrination. The first problem raises worries about the viability of the account in ordinary circumstances. The second charges the proposed educational model with indoctrinating students. The main goal of this article is to show (...) how an exemplar-based account of moral education can handle both problems without compromising its structure and upshot. (shrink)

This book is an English-language translation of a bestselling book in France that explores the relationship between humans and new technologies.

A phenomenological view of contemplative disciplines is presented. However, studying mindfulness by phenomenology is at odds with both neurobiological and anthropological approaches. It involves the first-person standpoint, the openness of being-in-the-world, the umwelt of the meditator, instead of assessing her neural processes and behaviors from a neutral, distanced, third-person standpoint. It then turns out that phenomenology cannot produce a discourse about mindfulness. Phenomenology rather induces a cross-fertilization between the state of mindfulness and its own methods of mental cultivation. A comparison (...) between the epochè, the phenomenological reduction, and the practice of mindfulness, is then undertaken. (shrink)

In what follows, I examine three main points which may help us to understand the deep nature of Einstein's objections to quantum mechanics. After having played a fundamental pioneer role in the birth of quantum physics, Einstein was, as is well known, far less enthusiastic about its constitution as a quantum mechanics and, since 1927, he constantly argued against the pretention of its founders and proponents to have settled a definitive and complete theory. I emphasize first the importance of the (...) philosophical climate, which was dominated by the Copenhagen orthodoxy and Bohr's idea of complementarity: What Einstein was primarily reluctant to was to accept the fundamental character of quantum mechanics as such, and to modify for it the basic principles of knowledge. I thus stress the main lines of Einstein's own programme in respect to quantum physics, which is to be considered in relation to his other contemporary attempts and achievements. Finally, I show how Einstein's arguments, when dealing with his objections, have been fruitful and some of them still worthy, with regard to recent developments concerning local nonseparability as well as concerning the problems of completeness and accomplishment of quantum theory. (shrink)

Annoncé à grand fracas, le décryptage do génome humain devait nous révéler le secret ultime de la vie et ouvrir la voie à de nouvelles thérapies miracles. Espoirs déçus : à l'ère de la post-génomique, les secrets du vivant sont maintenant recherchés dans les théories de la complexité, dans la convergence des efforts des biologistes, des physiciens et des mathématiciens. Comment comprendre la signification de cette succession rapide d'objectifs apparemment différents, de cette alternance d'espoirs et de désillusions? Dans ce livre (...) novateur, Michel Morange propose une clé pour rendre compte de ces difficultés, et de beaucoup d'autres analogues touchant toutes les branches de la biologie. Les annonces sensationnelles reflètent l'espoir toujours déçu qu'une explication unique pourrait suffire. Or les faits biologiques - comme ceux relevant de bien d'autres disciplines scientifiques -ne peuvent être expliqués par un principe d'intelligibilité unique. Exemples à l'appui et de façon très pédagogique, Michel Morange montre pourquoi des explications différentes doivent être articulées pour décrire le fonctionnement des macromolécules aussi bien que l'évolution humaine ou le développement des cancers. Admettre une idée aussi simple n'est pas évident, car tout scientifique a été formé à privilégier un principe d'intelligibilité particulier. L'articulation entre explications différentes est pourtant indispensable pour le progrès des connaissances ; elle est aussi une exigence éthique ; elle est requise pour que la science conserve sa place dans nos sociétés. (shrink)

Le débat sur l'interprétation de la mécanique quantique est, aujourd'hui, sensiblement différent de ce qu'il était dans la période de «fondation» de cette théorie. Cette modification tient à deux causes : l'ancrage des conceptions quantiques dans la pensée des physiciens, favorisé par l'utilisation systématique et fructueuse de la théorie quantique en physique atomique et subatomique, d'une part et, d'autre part, les développements théoriques et expérimentaux survenus au cours des vingt dernières années, qui ont amené à considérer comme des faits physiques (...) des énoncés qui paraissaient naguère relever davantage de l'interprétation, avec liberté d'options, voire de la spéculation. Quelle est la signification des énoncés et des concepts théoriques de la physique quantique ? et comment celle-ci s'est-elle modifiée ? Qu'entend-on par «interprétation» ? Telles sont les questions qui servent de guide à ce travail. Nous nous proposons de clarifier ce qui, dans les questions de signification, relève respectivement de la physique (essentiellement les contenus conceptuels et théoriques), et de perspectives philosophiques. Cette distinction est plus nette aujourd'hui qu'elle ne l'était au moment de l'établissement de la mécanique quantique, ce qui permet d'approfondir notre compréhension de chacun de ces deux aspects, qui s'enrichissent mutuellement de cette clarification. Nous nous interrogeons, pour terminer, sur ce que peut être une conception réaliste en termes d'un «monde d'objets quantiques». (shrink)

Six arguments against the view that conscious experience derives from a material basis are reviewed. These arguments arise from epistemology, phenomenology, neuropsychology, and philosophy of quantum mechanics. It turns out that any attempt at proving that conscious experience is ontologically secondary to material objects both fails and brings out its methodological and existential primacy. No alternative metaphysical view is espoused (not even a variety of Spinoza’s attractive double-aspect theory). Instead, an alternative stance, inspired from F. Varela’s neurophenomenology is advocated. This (...) unfamiliar stance involves (i) a complete redefinition of the boundary between unquestioned assumptions and relevant questions ; (ii) a descent towards the common ground of the statements of phenomenology and objective natural science : a practice motivated by the quest of an expanding circle of intersubjective agreement. (shrink)

Art historians and philosophers often talk about the interpretive significance of titles, but few have bothered with their historical origins. This omission has led to the assumption that an artwork's title is its proper name, since names and titles share the essential function of facilitating reference to their bearers. But a closer look at the development of our titling practices shows a significant point of divergence from standard analyses of proper names: the semantic content of a title is often crucial (...) to the identification, individuation, and interpretation of its associated artwork. This paper represents a first step towards an empirically centred study of our titling practices. I argue that, in order to accept titles as proper names, we must first recognize the social, rather than the referential, function of naming. (shrink)

This paper draws on the emerging field of innovation ethics to complement the more established field of responsible innovation by focusing on key ethical issues raised by technological innovations. One key limitation of influential frameworks of RI is that they tend to neglect some key ethical issues raised by innovation, as well as major normative dimensions of the notion of responsibility. We explain how IE could enrich RI by stressing the more important role that ethical analysis should play in RI. (...) We focus on two transversal issues of IE: the issue of redrawing conceptual boundaries, especially the topic of the artificialization of the world, and the issue of responsibility, especially the notion of total responsibility. We address these two issues from the thematic perspective of IE, thereby generating lessons learnt for RI. These two examples are taken as illustrations and blueprint of the dialogue that should take place between the two fields. (shrink)

In this reflection on the relation between nature and culture, Michel Serres relates the present environmental catastrophe to pollution generated by humanity's efforts to appropriate.

Allen Buchanan holds that nations do not have a general primary unilateral right to secede. However, nations could legitimately secede if there were a special right to do so, if it were the result of negotiations and, more importantly, if some previous injustice had to be repaired. According to Buchanan, the three kinds of injustice that allow for unilateral secession are: violation of human rights, unjust annexation of territories, and systematic violations of previous agreements on self-government. I agree that nations (...) only have a general remedial right to unilateral secession. But I argue that nations also have a general primary right to self-determination not held by other cultural groups. In virtue of this general primary right, nations also have a primary right to internal self-determination. I will then argue that the "past injustices" should include a failure to comply with internal self-determination. I also want to show that this alternative version of the Remedial Right Only theory meets the constraints, imposed by Buchanan himself, upon any satisfactory institutionalization of the principles governing secession. In the end, it will appear that my own version fares much better than Buchanan's in meeting these constraints. (shrink)

It is often thought that the boundaries and properties of art-kinds are determined by the things we say and think about them. More recently, this tendency has manifested itself as concept-descriptivism, the view that the reference of art-kind terms is fixed by the ontological properties explicitly or implicitly ascribed to art and art-kinds by competent users of those terms. Competent users are therefore immune from radical error in their ascriptions; the result is that the ontology of art must begin and (...) end with conceptual analysis. Against this tendency towards concept-driven ontology, I offer a trio of objections derived from: the cultural and temporal variability of concepts of art, the systematic tendency, on the part of would-be ontological assessors, to err on the side of familiar categories or, conversely, to exaggerate minor differences between familiar and unfamiliar practices, and the influence artworld precedents exert over expert and folk concepts alike. These considerations, I argue, mandate an epistemic humility that is simply unavailable to the concept-descriptivist. (shrink)

Toute science, admet-on, commence par détacher un objet en le rendant indépendant des sujets et des situations. Mais cette conception étroite de la connaissance scientifique laisse subsister des zones d'ombre. La conscience n'est pas un objet. Elle est ce sans quoi rien ne pourrait être pris pour objet. La conscience n'est pas détachable des sujets, car elle s'identifie à ce qui est vécu par un sujet. De façon analogue, en physique quantique, un phénomène n'est pas dissociable de son contexte expérimental, (...) car il s'identifie à ce qui se manifeste à grande échelle au laboratoire. Que faire pour ne pas laisser ces cas extrêmes de côté? Généraliser la méthode scientifique. Ne plus la borner à définir et à caractériser des objets, mais l'étendre à la coordination directe des expériences. Telle est la révolution de pensée qu'il faut accomplir pour résoudre, ou plutôt dissoudre, deux questions-limites de la science : le problème de l'origine de la conscience et le paradoxe du "chat de Schrödinger" en physique quantique. (shrink)

In order to understand the system wherein human resource management practices are determined by the interactions of a complex system of actors, it is necessary to have a conceptual framework of analysis. In this respect, the works of scholars concerning stakeholder theory opened new perspectives in management theory. An organisation is understood as being part of a politico-economic system of stakeholders who interact and influence management practices. Each stakeholder tries to optimise and protect his interests, 61-75). The framework of stakeholder (...) analysis enables escape from a purely instrumental approach to HRM, and avoids reducing our understanding of conflicts within companies to mere antagonism between employees and their employers. It enables us to point out the existence of other stakeholders in the relationship. Notably, it allows for the incorporation into management theory of actors from the sphere of politics as well as their dependent administrations. All these actors are considered to be stakeholders who define the legal framework of firm management and guarantee the application of these laws. (shrink)

Philosophe français spécialiste de logique, Edmond Goblot (1858-1935) est avant tout connu pour un essai de sociologie décapant, La Barrière et le Niveau (1925), qui pose pour la première fois les fondements d'une théorie de la distinction sociale. Délaissant l'analyse matérialiste des classes au profit d'une perspective culturelle originale, Goblot décrypte sans complaisance les moeurs de la bourgeoisie française, monde qu'il connaît d'autant mieux qu'il en est lui-même issu. Condisciple d'Henri Bergson et d'Emile Durkheim à l'Ecole normale supérieure, Goblot ne (...) bénéficiera pas de la même aura que ses deux anciens camarades. L'histoire de leurs relations, et plus généralement de Goblot avec ses collègues philosophes de la IIIe République, n'en constitue pas moins un prisme original pour comprendre les transformations d'une activité, la philosophie, alors en pleine mutation. Portrait sociologique d'un professeur ordinaire, cet ouvrage opte pour un double parti pris. Il met d'abord en évidence les entrelacs entre trajectoire sociale et choix intellectuels, y compris dans un domaine aussi aride que la logique. Il montre ensuite que La Barrière et le Niveau n'est pas un accident de parcours intellectuel mais l'application au monde social des thèses originales défendues en logique par Goblot. L'ouvrage propose en ce sens une nouvelle interprétation de ce grand classique des sciences sociales qu'est devenu La Barrière et le Niveau. (shrink)

This article explains how strong sustainability ethics has emerged and developed as a new field over the last two decades as a critical response to influential conceptions of weak sustainability. It investigates three competing, normative approaches to strong sustainability: the communitarian approach, the Rawlsian approach, and the capabilities approach. Although these approaches converge around the idea that there are critical, non-substitutable natural resources and services, they diverge on how to reconcile human development and environmental protection. The aim of the paper (...) is to provide a critical overview of these three perspectives, but also and mostly to show that when we put them into dialogue with each other, we can clarify the demands of sustainability. The paper concludes that the capabilities approach is the most suitable way to think about sustainability, but only if it goes beyond its dominantly anthropocentric view. (shrink)

Quantum Mechanics has imposed strain on traditional (dualist and representationalist) epistemological conceptions. An alternative was offered by Bohr and Heisenberg, according to whom natural science does not describe nature, but rather the interplay between nature and ourselves. But this was only a suggestion. In this paper, a systematic development of the Bohr-Heisenberg conception is outlined, by way of a comparison with the modern self-organizational theories of cognition. It is shown that a perfectly consistent non-representationalist (and/or relational) reading of quantum mechanics (...) can be reached thus. (shrink)

Michel Chaouli invites novice and expert alike to set out on the path of thinking, with help from Kant’s Critique of Judgment, about the force of aesthetic experience, the essence of art, and the relationship of beauty and meaning. Each chapter unfolds the significance of a key concept for Kant’s thought and our own ideas.

There are two facets to the central dogma proposed by Francis Crick in 1957. One concerns the relation between the sequence of nucleotides and the sequence of amino acids, the second is devoted to the relation between the sequence of amino acids and the native three-dimensional structure of proteins. 'Folding is simply a function of the order of the amino acids,' i.e. no information is required for the proper folding of a protein other than the information contained in its sequence. (...) This protein side of the central dogma was elaborated in a scientific context in which the characteristics and functions of proteins, and the mechanisms of protein folding, were seen very differently. This context, which made the folding problem a simple one, supported the bold proposition of Francis Crick. The protein side of the central dogma was not challenged by the discovery of prions if one adopts the definition of information given by Francis Crick. It might have been challenged by the discovery that regulatory enzymes exist in different conformations, and the evidence for the existence of chaperones assisting protein folding. But it was not, and folding remains what it was for Francis Crick, 'simply a function of the order of amino acids'. But the meaning of 'function' has dramatically changed. It is no longer the result of simple physicochemical laws, but that of a long evolutionary process which has optimized protein folding. Molecular mechanistic explanations have to be allied with evolutionary explanations, in a way characteristic of present biology. (shrink)

Corporate citizenship, social responsibility and sustainability reports could be analyzed from a philosophical viewpoint. In this article, we will use Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutic philosophy to assess the narrativity of such reports. Out of a philosophical viewpoint, our exploratory study analyzes the contents of ten reports: two corporate citizenship reports, three corporate social responsibility reports, and five sustainability reports. Those reports are arising in-time and are thus referring to past corporate events and phenomena. Sometimes such reports introduce a corporate world-dream that (...) could emphasize various issues such as human dignity and inclusiveness/diversity, global health, and planetary stewardship. They could even convey a subversive ideal that could strongly shake the foundations of business. The way business corporations are understanding corporate citizenship and sustainability could, more or less radically, change the way we are doing business. However, those corporate citizenship, social responsibility and sustainability reports do not have any emplotment. They are thus stories that cannot be considered as narratives. We could call them “would-be” narratives. (shrink)