Much work on intellectual humility has focused on its epistemic benefits. We suggest that displaying (or failing to display) intellectual humility also has effects on how others perceive us and that, as a result, intellectual humility can serve reputation management purposes, in at least four ways: (i) Intellectual humility can be used to signal we are a good source of information; (ii) Intellectual humility can be used to signal we are competent through countersignaling; (iii) Intellectual humility can be used to (...) make sure others do not believe we are overclaiming superiority; (iv) lack of intellectual humility (or intellectual arrogance) can be used to signal dominance. The evidence suggests that intellectual humility (or lack thereof) can have each of these effects. Seeing intellectual humility as (inter alia) a reputation management tool predicts that people will be more or less likely to display intellectual humility in some contexts. For instance, people in a position of power might stand to lose less if they fail to be intellectual humble; accordingly, evidence suggests that they tend to display less intellectual humility. In conclusion, we speculate that understanding intellectual humility as reputation management could help construct environments more conducive to displays of intellectual humility. (shrink)

Michael Ridge presents an original expressivist theory of normative judgments--Ecumenical Expressivism--which offers distinctive treatments of key problems in metaethics, semantics, and practical reasoning. He argues that normative judgments are hybrid states partly constituted by ordinary beliefs and partly constituted by desire-like states.

Background: Moral Case Deliberation is one form of clinical ethics support described as a facilitator-led collective moral reasoning by healthcare professionals on a concrete moral question connected to their practice. Evaluation research is needed, but, as human interaction is difficult to standardise, there is a need to capture the content beyond moral reasoning. This allows for a better understanding of Moral Case Deliberation, which may contribute to further development of valid outcome criteria and stimulate the normative discussion of what Moral (...) Case Deliberation should contain. Objective: To explore and compare the content beyond moral reasoning in the dialogue in Moral Case Deliberation at Swedish workplaces. Methods: A mixed-methods approach was applied for analysing audio-recordings of 70 periodic Moral Case Deliberation meetings at 10 Swedish workplaces. Moral Case Deliberation facilitators and various healthcare professions participated, with registered nurses comprising the majority. Ethical considerations: No objection to the study was made by an Ethical Review Board. After oral and written information was provided, consent to be recorded was assumed by virtue of participation. Findings: Other than ‘moral reasoning’ (median (md): 45% of the spoken time), the Moral Case Deliberations consisted of ‘reflections on the psychosocial work environment’ to a varying extent (md: 29%). Additional content comprised ‘assumptions about the patient’s psychosocial situation’ (md: 6%), ‘facts about the patient’s situation’ (md: 5%), ‘concrete problem-solving’ (md: 6%) and ‘process’ (md: 3%). Conclusion: The findings suggest that a restorative function of staff’s wellbeing in Moral Case Deliberation is needed, as this might contribute to good patient care. This supports outcome criteria of improved emotional support, which may include relief of moral distress. However, facilitators need a strategy for how to proceed from the participants’ own emotional needs and to develop the use of their emotional knowing to focus on the ethically difficult patient situation. (shrink)

What we might usefully call “playing full-stop” and playing games plausibly figure in a well-lived life. Yet there are reasons to worry that the two not only do not naturally go hand in hand, but are in fact deeply opposed. In this essay I investigate the apparent tension between playing full-stop and playing competitive games. I argue that the nature of this tension is easily exaggerated. While there is a psychological tension between simultaneously engaging in earnest competitive game play and (...) playing fullstop, there is no logical contradiction between the two. Somewhat surprisingly, seeing how this tension is best understood teaches us something about the nature of willing an end and the “guise of the good.” With a resolution of the apparent tension between playing full-stop and playing competitive games, I turn to the practical worry that playing competitive games is destructive precisely for the very reasons it is opposed to playing full-stop. Here I develop a positive proposal to mitigate the tension between playing full-stop and playing competitive games. This proposal draws on the idea of “striving play” as recently developed by Thi Nguyen and some ideas from classical Stoicism. (shrink)

BackgroundThere is a lack of empirical research regarding the outcomes of such clinical ethics support methods as moral case deliberation (MCD). Empirical research in how healthcare professionals perceive potential outcomes is needed in order to evaluate the value and effectiveness of ethics support; and help to design future outcomes research. The aim was to use the European Moral Case Deliberation Outcome Instrument (Euro-MCD) instrument to examine the importance of various MCD outcomes, according to healthcare professionals, prior to participation.MethodsA North European (...) field survey among healthcare professionals drawn from 73 workplaces in a variety of healthcare settings in the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. The Euro-MCD instrument was used.ResultsAll outcomes regarding the domains of moral reflexivity, moral attitude, emotional support, collaboration, impact at organisational level and concrete results, were perceived as very or quite important by 76%–97% of the 703 respondents. Outcomes regarding collaboration and concrete results were perceived as most important. Outcomes assessed as least important were mostly about moral attitude. ‘Better interactions with patient/family’ emerged as a new domain from the qualitative analysis. Dutch respondents perceived most of the outcomes as significantly less important than the Scandinavians, especially regarding emotional support. Furthermore, men, those who were younger, and physician-respondents scored most of the outcomes as statistically significantly less important compared with the other respondents.ConclusionsThe findings indicate a need for a broad instrument such as the Euro-MCD. Outcomes related to better interactions between professionals and patients must also be included in the future. The empirical findings raise the normative question of whether outcomes that were perceived as less important, such asmoralreflexivity andmoralattitude outcomes, should still be included. In the future, a combination of empirical findings (practice) and normative reflection (theories) will contribute to the revision of the instrument. (shrink)

What is it for a speech-act to be sincere? A very tempting answer, defended by John Searle and others, is that a speech-act is sincere just in case the speaker has the state of mind it expresses. I argue that we should instead hold that a speech-act is sincere just in case the speaker believes that she has the state of mind she believes it expresses (Sections 1 and 2). Scenarios in which speakers are deluded about their own states of (...) mind play an important role in arguing for this account. In the course of developing this account I also explore how it might make good use of the often neglected distinction between insincerity and mere non-sincerity (Section 2). After defending and developing my positive proposal, I explore its implications for debates over expressivism in meta-ethics (Sections 3 and 4). (shrink)

The basic idea of rule-utilitarianism is that right action should be defined in terms of what would be required by rules which would maximize either actual or expected utility if those rules gained general acceptance, or perhaps general compliance. Rule-utilitarians face a dilemma. They must characterize 'general acceptance' either as 100% acceptance, or as something less. On the first horn of the dilemma, rule-utilitarianism in vulnerable to the charge of utopianism; on the second, it is open to the charge of (...) arbitrariness and lack of philosophical depth. I press this objection, and develop and defend an alternative version of rule-utilitarianism which can evade the dilemma. I call this new version 'variable-rate rule-utilitarianism'. (shrink)

Clinical ethics support, in particular Moral Case Deliberation, aims to support health care providers to manage ethically difficult situations. However, there is a lack of evaluation instruments regarding outcomes of clinical ethics support in general and regarding Moral Case Deliberation (MCD) in particular. There also is a lack of clarity and consensuses regarding which MCD outcomes are beneficial. In addition, MCD outcomes might be context-sensitive. Against this background, there is a need for a standardised but flexible outcome evaluation instrument. The (...) aim of this study was to develop a multi-contextual evaluation instrument measuring health care providers’ experiences and perceived importance of outcomes of Moral Case Deliberation. (shrink)

The notion of harm has been a recurring and a significant notion in the characterization of mental disorder. It is present in eminent diagnostic manuals such as DSM and ICD, as well as in the discussion on mental disorders in philosophy of psychiatry. Recent demotion of harm in the definition of mental disorders in DSM-5 shows a general trend towards reducing the significance of harm when thinking about the nature of mental disorders. In this paper, we defend the relevance of (...) the notion of harm in the characterization of mental disorder against some of these attacks. We approach this issue by using the method of conceptual explication pioneered by Rudolf Carnap. Within this framework, we argue that keeping the notion of harm not only helps to discriminate what is pathological from the nonpathological but also prevents potential misuses of psychiatric authority. (shrink)

Mandalas in the Making: The Visual Culture of Esoteric Buddhism at Dunhuang, by Michelle C. Wang. Leiden: Brill, 2018. xviii + 318 pages. Hb. $147.00, ISBN-13: 9789004357655; Ebook $25.00, ISBN-13: 9789004360402.

Moral philosophy has long been dominated by the aim of understanding morality and the virtues in terms of principles. However, the underlying assumption that this is the best approach has received almost no defence, and has been attacked by particularists, who argue that the traditional link between morality and principles is little more than an unwarranted prejudice. In Principled Ethics, Michael Ridge and Sean McKeever meet the particularist challenge head-on, and defend a distinctive view they call "generalism as a (...) regulative ideal.". (shrink)

Une nouvelle écrite pour l’anthologie Octavia’s Brood: Science Fiction Stories from Social Justice Movements [enfants d’Octavia: des histoires SF tirées des mouvements de justice sociale], éditée par adrienne maree brown et Walidah Imarisha. L’histoire parle d’un futur dans lequel toutes les personnes handicapées (appelées I. P. ou ImParfait·es) ont été envoyées sur une autre planète où, débarrassées des soldats envoyés pour les surveiller, ielles se sont créé une vie faite d’entraide. Cette vie est menacée par les Parfait·es, qui s’apprêtent à (...) revenir prendre le contrôle et créer une nouvelle dystopie pour eux. (shrink)

Meta-ethical non-cognitivism makes two claims—a negative one and a positive one. The negative claim is that moral utterances do not express beliefs which provide the truth-conditions for those utterances. The positive claim is that the primary function of such utterances is to express certain of the speaker's desire-like states of mind. Non-cognitivism is officially a theory about the meanings of moral words, but non-cognitivists also maintain that moral states of mind are themselves at least partially constituted by desire-like states to (...) which moral utterances give voice. Non-cognitivists need a plausible account of what distinguishes whims, addictions and cravings from genuinely moral judgments. For while non-cognitivists maintain that in a suitably broad sense moral judgments just are constituted by desire-like states they also insist that not any old desire constitutes a genuinely moral judgment. Since the challenge is to demarcate what is distinctive about moral attitudes we might usefully call this the demarcation challenge. (shrink)

This paper contends that a Kantian universalizability constraint on theories of practical reason in conjunction with the possibility of collective rational agents entails the surprisingly strong conclusion that no fully agent‐relative theory of practical reason can be sound. The basic point is that a Kantian universalizability constraint, the thesis that all reasons for action are agent‐relative and the possibility of collective rational agents gives rise to a contradiction. This contradiction can be avoided by either rejecting Kantian universalizability, the possibility of (...) collective rational agents, or the tenability of a fully agent‐relative theory of practical reason; we cannot have all three. (shrink)

Quasi-realists aspire to accommodate core features of ordinary normative thought and discourse in an expressivist framework. One apparent such feature is that we can be more or less confident in our normative judgments—they vary in credence. Michael Smith has argued that quasi-realists cannot plausibly accommodate these distinctions simply because they understand normative judgments as desires, but desires lack the structure needed to distinguish these three features. Existing attempts to meet Smith’s challenge have accepted Smith’s presupposition that the way to meet (...) the challenge is to show that normative judgments have more structure than they initially seem to have. I argue that accepting this presupposition is accepting too much. The orthodox view of certitude, insofar as there is one, understands certitude very roughly in terms of counterfactual betting behaviour. Counterfactual betting behaviour, though, is not in any useful sense a structural feature of a given judgment. It is rather a more holistic feature of a given agent’s cognitive system. Insofar as it can meet the other challenges it faces, quasi-realism can characterize credences in terms of counterfactual betting behaviour and effectively say exactly what many realists will want to say about credences, thus meeting Smith’s challenge much more directly. (shrink)

Despite societal concerns about the welfare of commercial laying hens, little attention has been paid to the welfare implications of the choices made by the genetics companies involved with their breeding. These choices regarding trait selection and other aspects of breeding significantly affect living conditions for the more than 7 billion laying hens in the world. However, these companies must consider a number of different commercial and societal interests, beyond animal welfare concerns. In this article we map some of the (...) relevant dilemmas faced by genetics companies in order to outline the scope of opportunities to improve welfare under current market conditions. This includes identifying cases where different animal welfare concerns conflict. We discuss the moral responsibility of laying hen genetics companies and the welfare implications that derive from the choices they make and the policies they follow. In addition to evaluating a selection of predominant current practices and breeding goals, we outline different angles from where to assess the moral legitimacy of various industry practices and policies. We discuss specific issues such as injurious pecking, bone health, induced moulting, chick culling and the circumstances of breeding stock. (shrink)

Developing countries need to reform legislation to ensure the global supply firms in ready-made garment industry is adequately addressing obligations of social responsibility. Literature typically focuses on strategies for raising responsible standards in global buying firms within the RMG industry, but fails to focus on implementing strategies for suppliers in developing countries. This article addresses this gap by specifically focusing on the RMG industry in Bangladesh, the home of the third largest RMG supplier in the world. It concentrates on analysing (...) how and to what extent the law can assist in developing social responsibility performance of the RMG manufacturing firms in developing countries. It ultimately concludes that a new governance approach in laws can effectively increase the social responsibility practice standards of an industry where global buying firms are profit-driven and governmental agencies are either inadequate or corrupt. (shrink)

Constitutivism is best understood as a strategy for meeting a set of related metanormative challenges, rather than a fully comprehensive metanormative theory in its own right, or so many have plausibly argued. Whether this strategy succeeds may depend, in part, on which broader metanormative theory it is combined with. In this paper I argue that combining constitutivism with expressivism somewhat surprisingly provides constitutivists with their best chances for success, and that this combination of views has some surprising benefits for both (...) parties. (shrink)

In an era where autonomous technologies are progressively taking over more complex tasks and decision-making previously done by humans, the mastering of paradox-based skills and effectively reconciling paradoxical situations in everyday life will become increasingly important. This paper asserts that understanding and living with paradox is not only necessary for the future of work but also for human flourishing. While work is the primary means by which humans flourish in the traditional sense, there are deeper and more holistic understandings of (...) human flourishing which requires the acceptance and learning of paradoxical realities. Those who are steeped in the understanding and reality of paradox in everyday life can also be more open to these deeper and more holistic understandings of human flourishing. (shrink)

This chapter investigates medieval Sweden and its iconography of justice. The Swedish lay judges were without university education, and especially the commoners had few opportunities of seeing images of justice on artefacts or in secular buildings. Yet, the ecclesiastical imagery in churches was seen and understood by all, thanks to the Church’s teaching. Based on surveys of justice-related iconography in medieval Swedish and Finnish churches, the chapter argues that the scope of these motifs was very limited. Images of the Last (...) Judgment and Saint Michael weighing souls predominate, while some churches had murals with Moses receiving the Tables of the Law, Solomon’s justice, or truth- or justice-related Biblical verses in Latin. No images of Lady Justice or other justice-related representations came up. Even only a fraction of the Finnish churches had a Last Judgment or Saint Michael to adorn them. However, these two images together, with images of devils tempting people to sin and perdition, were visualisations that had practical meaning in the Swedish legal culture. The practices of justice and judging were popular and daily reiterated, making each sworn oath a step towards either heaven or hell. (shrink)

The chapter discusses the limits of testamentary freedom in medieval Swedish law. Last wills, testaments and donations for pious causes were introduced in Sweden in the twelfth century. Some thirteenth-century papal decretals indicate that according to Swedish law, the consent of relatives was required to valid deathbed donations. This was condemned as a “perverse custom” by the popes, advocating testamentary freedom. However, both these decretals and the Swedish thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century provincial laws provide evidence of the tensions between ecclesiastical (...) authorities and Swedish lay society. The provincial laws limited testamentary freedom regarding various aspects: requiring the consent of the heirs, the timing of the bequest, the proportion of the donation vis-à-vis the whole property of the donor, and type of property. With the free assent of one’s closest heirs, all and any restrictions of testamentary freedom could be overcome. In legal practice, donators often sought to ensure the consent of their heirs in advance. They used them as witnesses and signatories, they used redemption clauses or bought off relatives with claims to the property. Acquiring the consent of heirs to wills and donations of land became customary practice in later medieval Sweden. (shrink)

BackgroundBesides balancing burdens and benefits of intensive care, ethical conflicts in the process of decision-making should also be recognised. This calls for an ethical analysis relevant to clinicians. The aim was to analyse ethically difficult situations in the process of deciding whether a patient is admitted to intensive care unit.MethodsAnalysis using the ‘Dilemma method’ and ‘wide reflective equilibrium’, on ethnographic data of 45 patient cases and 96 stakeholder interviews in six UK hospitals.Ethical analysisFour moral questions and associated value conflicts were (...) identified. Who should have the right to decide whether a patient needs to be reviewed? Conflicting perspectives on safety/security. Does the benefit to the patient of getting the decision right justify the cost to the patient of a delay in making the decision? Preventing longer-term suffering and understanding patient’s values conflicted with preventing short-term suffering and provision of security. To what extent should the intensivist gain others’ input? Professional independence versus a holistic approach to decision-making. Should the intensivist have an ongoing duty of care to patients not admitted to ICU? Short-term versus longer-term duty to protect patient safety. Safety and security were key values at stake in the ethical conflicts identified. The life-threatening nature of the situation meant that the principle of autonomy was overshadowed by the duty to protect patients from harm. The need to fairly balance obligations to the referred patient and to other patients was also recognised.ConclusionProactive decision-making including advance care planning and escalation of treatment decisions may support the inclusion of patient autonomy. However, our analysis invites binary choices, which may not sufficiently reflect reality. This calls for a complementary relational ethics analysis. (shrink)

An important worry about what Simon Blackburn has called ‘quasi-realism’ is that it collapses into realism full-stop. Edward Harcourt has recently pressed the worry about collapse into realism in an original way. Harcourt presents the challenge in the form of a dilemma. Either ethical discourse appears to ordinary speakers to express representational states or not. If the former then expressivism means that this appearance is not saved after all, in which case quasi-realism fails in its own terms. If the latter, (...) then we lose our grip on the idea that ordinary descriptive utterances are somehow paradigmatic assertions of fact and with it our ability to explain why such utterances really do express representational states. Finally, Harcourt argues that the expressivist’s only hope for meeting these concerns relies on a distinction between states of mind with a ‘world-directed’ direction of fit and those with a ‘state-directed’ direction of fit, the thesis that no state of mind has both directions of fit, and the thesis that a state-directed direction of fit entails no truth-conditions. Previous critics have attacked and, but Harcourt takes a novel turn and attacks. The challenge is a bracing one. If Harcourt is right, then the quasi-realist project inevitably destroys the very distinction in terms of which his position is cast – roughly, the distinction between beliefs and desires. I argue that Harcourt’s challenge can be met. To anticipate, I argue that Harcourt’s critique presumes that the quasi-realist’s fundamental distinction is best understood semantically, whereas I shall argue that it is better understood functionally. (shrink)

Most discussions of discourse about welfare and discourse about prudence are a “package deal” when it comes to their normativity—either both or neither are normative. In this paper I argue against this conventional “package deal” assumption. I argue that discourse about welfare is not normative in one useful sense of that term, but that prudential discourse is normative. My argument draws in part on ideas from Derek Parfit’s account of personal identity. I then offer a novel positive account of the (...) meaning of ‘welfare’. On the proposed account, the concept of welfare is not itself normative, in the sense of functioning directly to settle the thing to do. Even a global nihilist can coherently make claims about welfare. However, the concept of welfare is in a sense I will articulate “conditionally normative,” and this merely conditional normativity explains many of the data points which might seem to imply that welfare discourse is normative. (shrink)

Based on a case study of a large multinational group, this paper addresses the way in which social and environmental reporting systems were changed and the consequences and controversies associated with this change. Drawing on Power’s work on the processes by which things are made auditable via underlying systems, we focus on how and why a specific programme with auditability as its ultimate aim changed the basis on which the external social and environmental report was prepared. Our analysis demonstrates that (...) the perceived alignment with the financial report preparation and the explicit pursuit of auditability legitimized SER and paved the way for data systems to be changed. The programme borrowed authority from financial accounting technologies not only to make a system change but also to push SER internally, as we suggest that an intraorganizational group used the programme to ensure the existence and organizational status of SER. However, we also illustrate some of the practical challenges associated with this change, which include issues related to internal control and the establishment of organizational boundaries. (shrink)

Disagreement holds the key: the possibility of agreeing or disagreeing with a state of mind makes that state of mind act logically like accepting a claim. Charles Stevenson was quite right to begin his presentation of emotivism with disagreement.—Allan Gibbard.

In this paper I argue that so-called “Relaxed Realism” of the sort defended by T. M. Scanlon fails on its own terms by failing to distinguish itself from its putative rivals—in particular, from Quasi-Realism. On a whole host of questions, Relaxed Realism and Quasi-Realism give exactly the same answers, and these answers make up much of the core of the view. Scanlon offers three possible points of contrast, each of which I argue is not fit for purpose. Along the way (...) I argue that Quasi-Realists can provide a better account of practical rationality than Relaxed Realists can, so insofar as they are distinct Quasi-Realism is superior. (shrink)

There may be as much philosophical controversy about how to distinguish naturalism from non-naturalism as there is about which view is correct. In spite of this widespread disagreement about the content of naturalism and non-naturalism there is considerable agreement about the status of certain historically influential philosophical accounts as non-naturalist. In particular, there is widespread agreement that G.E. Moore's account of goodness in.

Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView.

Early expressivists, such as A.J. Ayer, argued that normative utterances are not truth-apt, and many found this striking claim implausible. After all, ordinary speakers are perfectly happy to ascribe truth and falsity to normative assertions. It is hard to believe that competent speakers could be so wrong about the meanings of their own language, particularly as these meanings are fixed by the conventions implicit in their own linguistic behavior. Later expressivists therefore tried to arrange a marriage between expressivism and the (...) truth-aptness of normative discourse. Like many arranged marriages, this has not been an entirely happy one. In particular, the marriage has seemed to depend on so-called deflationist theories of truth, and these may well turn out to provide at best a shaky foundation for any marriage. Before advising the parties to file for divorce, though, we should first see whether expressivism itself has not been misunderstood. I argue that the marriage of expressivism to the truth-aptness of normative discourse can indeed be saved, though only in the context of a version of expressivism I call “Ecumenical Expressivism.”. (shrink)