Results for 'Mental Property'

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  1.  30
    ""Platonic Dualism, LP GERSON This paper analyzes the nature of Platonic dualism, the view that there are immaterial entities called" souls" and that every man is identical with one such entity. Two distinct arguments for dualism are discovered in the early and middle dialogues, metaphysical/epistemological and eth.Aaron Ben-Zeev Making Mental Properties More Natural - 1986 - The Monist 69 (3).
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  2.  32
    Attributing Mental Properties to Wide Subjects.Evan Butts - unknown
    Rob Wilson claims that mental properties are not attributable to wide subjects, despite the claims of authors like Clark and Chalmers. I examine Wilson's objection and endeavor to demonstrate that Clark and Chalmers' account does support the attribution of mental properties to wide subjects.
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  3.  46
    Are Mental Properties Causal Efficacious?Pierre Jacob - 1991 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 39 (1):51-73.
    In respect of the question whether mental properties, i.e. contents of mental states, are causally relevant the distinction between type and token physikalism and externalism and their consequences concerning the problems of property dualism and content epiphenomenalism are sketched. Fodor's theory - a functionalist version of token physikalism - is presented and criticized. Distinguishing between naming a causally relevant property and quantifying over it a solution to the threat of epihenomenalism is suggested, and finally Davidson's Anomalous (...)
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  4.  26
    Are Mental Properties Causal Efficacious?Pierre Jacob - 1991 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 39 (1):51-73.
    In respect of the question whether mental properties, i.e. contents of mental states, are causally relevant the distinction between type and token physikalism and externalism and their consequences concerning the problems of property dualism and content epiphenomenalism are sketched. Fodor's theory - a functionalist version of token physikalism - is presented and criticized. Distinguishing between naming a causally relevant property and quantifying over it a solution to the threat of epihenomenalism is suggested, and finally Davidson's Anomalous (...)
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  5.  91
    Making Mental Properties More Natural.Aaron Ben-Zeev - 1986 - The Monist 69 (3):434-446.
    The broad, ancient notion of the “soul” was replaced by Descartes with a more narrow notion of the “mind.” As well as limiting the scope of the soul, Descartes separated it from the body, giving the soul a substantive status. These two features gave rise to severe conceptual problems which remain unsolved till the present day. I believe that retaining some features of the ancient notion of the “soul”—particularly those found in Aristotle’s view—may resolve many of these problems. As an (...)
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  6. Mental properties.John Heil & David Robb - 2003 - American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (3):175-196.
    It is becoming increasingly clear that the deepest problems currently exercising philosophers of mind arise from an ill-begotten ontology, in particular, a mistaken ontology of properties. After going through some preliminaries, we identify three doctrines at the heart of this mistaken ontology: (P) For each distinct predicate, “F”, there exists one, and only one, property, F, such that, if “F” is applicable to an object a, then “F” is applicable in virtue of a’s being F. (U) Properties are universals, (...)
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  7. Mental Properties, Functionalism and Reductionism.Luca Malatesti - 1999 - Anthropology and Philosophy 3 (1).
  8. Mental properties and levels of properties.Chhanda Chakraborti - 2005 - Metaphysica 6 (2):7-24.
     
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  9. Emergent Mental Properties are Not Just Double-Preventers.Andrei A. Buckareff & Jessica Hawkins - 2023 - Synthese 202 (2):1-22.
    We examine Sophie Gibb’s emergent property-dualist theory of mental causation as double-prevention. Her account builds on a commitment to a version of causal realism based on a powers metaphysic. We consider three objections to her account. We show, by drawing out the implications of the ontological commitments of Gibb’s theory of mental causation, that the first two objections fail. But, we argue, owing to worries about cases where there is no double-preventive role to be played by (...) properties, her account, which solely affords mental properties a double-preventive role, is incomplete and vulnerable to a causal exclusion objection. We propose a friendly modification to her theory of mental causation that is consistent with her theory’s ontological commitments. Specifically, we sketch an account on which mental properties have a more pronounced causal-structuring role that is not exhausted by the role Gibb assigns them as double-preventers. The result is a novel emergentist theory of mental causation. (shrink)
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  10. Mental properties.George Bealer - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):185-208.
    It is argued that, because of scientific essentialism, two currently popular arguments against the mind-body identity thesis -- the multiple-realizability argument and the Nagel-Jackson knowledge argument -- are unsatisfactory as they stand and that their problems are incurable. It is then argued that a refutation of the identity thesis in its full generality can be achieved by weaving together two traditional Cartesian arguments -- the modal argument and the certainty argument. This argument establishes, not just the falsity of the identity (...)
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  11. Mental causation and mental properties.Michael Esfeld - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (1):5-18.
    The aim of this paper is to defend the causal homogeneity of functional, mental properties against Kim’s attack. It is argued that (a) token identity is sufficient for mental causation, that (b) token identity implies a sort of functional reduction, but that (c) nonetheless functional, mental properties can be causally homogeneous despite being multiply realizable: multiple composition is sufficient for multiple realizability, but multiple composition does not prevent the realizers from having their pertinent effects in common. Thus, (...)
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  12. Defending naïve realism about mental properties.Eric Marcus - manuscript
    _metaphysically transparent_: we do not arrive at a better understanding of the realm of facts that make such talk true or false when we abandon ordinary mental concepts in favor of naturalistic concepts—or, for that matter, in favor of supernaturalistic concepts, although _super_naturalism will not be my concern here. Rather, it is ordinary mental concepts themselves that provide the best framework for understanding the metaphysics of mind. In this essay, I will be concerned just with naïve realism about (...)
     
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  13.  96
    Are Mental Properties Causally Relevant?Paul Raymont - 2001 - Dialogue 40 (3):509-528.
    Nonreductivist physicalists are increasingly regarded as unwitting epiphenomenalists, since their refusal to reduce mental traits to physical properties allegedly implies that even if there are mental causes, none of them produces its effects by virtue of its being a type of mental state. I examine and reject a reply to this concern that relies on the idea of ​​"tropes". I take the failure of the tropes-based model of causal relevance to illustrate a confusion at the heart of (...)
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  14. Nagel’s Argument That Mental Properties Are Nonphysical.Richard Double - 1983 - Philosophy Research Archives 9:217-22.
    One of Thomas Nagel’s premises in his argument for panpsychism is criticized. The principal criticisms are: Nagel has failed to provide a clear sense in which mental properties are nonphysical. Even within the framework of Nagel’s argumeent, there is no strong reason to think that the psychological lies outside the explanatory web of physical properties. This is because certain reducing properties common to both the psychological and nonpsychological may well be physical.
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  15. Multiple realization, reduction and mental properties.Max Kistler - 1999 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13 (2):135 – 149.
    This paper tries to remove some obstacles standing in the way of considering mental properties as both genuine natural kinds and causally efficacious rather than epiphenomena. As the case of temperature shows, it is not justified to conclude from a property being multiply realizable to it being irreducible. Yet Kim's argument to the effect that if a property is multiply realizable with a heterogeneous reduction base then it cannot be a natural kind and possesses only derivative “epiphenomenal” (...)
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  16. XIII*—Essentialism, Mental Properties and Causation1.Frank Jackson - 1995 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95 (1):253-268.
    Frank Jackson; XIII*—Essentialism, Mental Properties and Causation1, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 95, Issue 1, 1 June 1995, Pages 253–268, ht.
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  17.  63
    Program explanations and the causal relevance of mental properties.Sven Walter - 2005 - Acta Analytica 20 (3):32-47.
    Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit have defended a non-reductive account of causal relevance known as the ‘program explanation account’. Allegedly, irreducible mental properties can be causally relevant in virtue of figuring in non-redundant program explanations which convey information not conveyed by explanations in terms of the physical properties that actually do the ‘causal work’. I argue that none of the possible ways to spell out the intuitively plausible idea of a program explanation serves its purpose, viz., defends non-reductive physicalism (...)
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  18.  40
    The First-Person Perspective Is Not a Mere Mental Property.Angus Menuge - 2018 - Philosophia Christi 20 (1):67-72.
    Lynne Rudder Baker maintained that persons are essentially constituted by a first-person perspective. But she argued that this perspective is only an emergent property: it does not require a mental substance. In this paper, I argue that the first-person perspective cannot be a mere mental property, because it presupposes the existence of a mental substance. This makes it incoherent to claim that possession of a first-person perspective is what makes an individual a person. And, intentionality, (...)
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  19.  80
    The causal relevance of mental properties.Ausonio Marras - 1997 - Philosophia 25 (1-4):389-400.
    I argue that (strong) psychophysical supervenience, properly understood as a metaphysical dependence or determination relation, helps to account for the causal/explanatory relevance of mental properties because (1) it blocks a standard epiphenomenalist objection to the effect that an event's mental properties are 'screened off' by their physical properties: (2) it accounts for the _causal (and not merely _normative or merely _nomological) status of commonsense psychological generalizations; (3) it accounts for the _nonredundancy and _irreducibility of psychological explanations.
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  20. The properties of mental causation.David Robb - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):178-94.
    Recent discussions of mental causation have focused on three principles: (1) Mental properties are (sometimes) causally relevant to physical effects; (2) mental properties are not physical properties; (3) every physical event has in its causal history only physical events and physical properties. Since these principles seem to be inconsistent, solutions have focused on rejecting one or more of them. But I argue that, in spite of appearances, (1)–(3) are not inconsistent. The reason is that 'properties' is used (...)
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  21.  99
    Powerful Qualities for Strongly Emergent Mental Properties.Joaquim Giannotti - manuscript
    Strong emergentists about mental properties of conscious experience typically hold that these are ontologically “over and above” and distinct in kind as compared to physical properties. Powers-based account of strong emergence offer a promising framework for elucidating the ontological “over and above”-ness of strongly emergent properties. However, they do not automatically ensure the desired non-physicality. In this paper, I argue that a conception of properties as powerful qualities has in-built resources for capturing both the ontological “over and above”-ness and (...)
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  22. Levels, orders and the causal status of mental properties.Simone Gozzano - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):347-362.
    In recent years Jaegwon Kim has offered an argument – the ‘supervenience argument’ – to show that supervenient mental properties, construed as second- order properties distinct from their first-order realizers, do not have causal powers of their own. In response, several philosophers have argued that if Kim’s argument is sound, it generalizes in such a way as to condemn to causal impotency all properties above the level of basic physics. This paper discusses Kim’s supervenience argument in the context of (...)
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  23. Autonomy, reduction and the artificiality of mental properties.Francis X. Williamson - 1998 - South African Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):1-7.
  24.  75
    Rationalizing explanation and causally relevant mental properties.Jonathan Barrett - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 74 (1):77-102.
  25. Epiphenomenal Minds and Philosophers’ Zombies: Where do mental properties originate?George Aulisio - 2022 - National Taiwan University Philosophical Review 64 (Special Issue on Self and Other):267-312.
    Property dualism [PD], when adopted by physicalists, is the view that mental properties are irreducible and joined to the physical. Many property dualists who subscribe to physicalism hold epiphenomenalism—the view that the mind does not have a causal role in affecting physical events (e.g., bodily movements).1 In this paper, I examine two possible origins of mental properties and the entailments of those origins if one is committed to physicalism. First, mental properties have a generative origin (...)
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  26. Multiple Realizability, Projectibility, and the Reality of Mental Properties.Louise M. Antony - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 26 (1-2):1-24.
  27. Tropes: Properties, Objects, and Mental Causation.Douglas Ehring - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Properties and objects are everywhere, but remain a philosophical mystery. Douglas Ehring argues that the idea of tropes--properties and relations understood as particulars--provides the best foundation for a metaphysical account of properties and objects. He develops and defends a new theory of trope nominalism.
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  28. Going Mental: Why Physicalism Should Not Posit Inscrutable Properties.Liam D. Ryan - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (8).
    Some philosophers argue that mental properties are ontologically distinct from physical properties and that, therefore, physicalism ought to be rejected. There are philosophers who feel the force of this challenge but who wish to maintain their physicalism. They suggest that mentality is grounded in inscrutable properties or ‘incrutables’: properties that are not revealed through physical enquiry but that do not violate physicalism. Our analysis reveals that appealing to inscrutables is not a successful strategy for these physicalists, for the following (...)
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  29. Is Psycho-Physical Emergentism Committed to Dualism? The Causal Efficacy of Emergent Mental Properties.Godehard Brüntrup - 1998 - Erkenntnis 48 (2-3):133-151.
  30.  44
    Race. By JOHN R. BAKER. Pp. xviii+ 625.(Oxford University Press, London, 1974.) Price£ 6.50. This book is an account of the races of man based on comparative anatomy but ex-tended, owing to the author's scholarly interests and analytical bent of mind, to cultural and mental properties and their genetical interpretation. The breadth. [REVIEW]John Scott Price - forthcoming - Journal of Biosocial Science.
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  31. Intersubjective properties by which we specify pain, pleasure, and other kinds of mental states.Irwin Goldstein - 2000 - Philosophy 75 (291):89-104.
    By what types of properties do we specify twinges, toothaches, and other kinds of mental states? Wittgenstein considers two methods. Procedure one, direct, private acquaintance: A person connects a word to the sensation it specifies through noticing what that sensation is like in his own experience. Procedure two, outward signs: A person pins his use of a word to outward, pre-verbal signs of the sensation. I identify and explain a third procedure and show we in fact specify many kinds (...)
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  32. Mental causation as joint causation.Chiwook Won - 2021 - Synthese 198 (5):4917-4937.
    This paper explores and defends the idea that mental properties and their physical bases jointly cause their physical effects. The paper evaluates the view as an emergentist response to the exclusion problem, comparing it with a competing nonreductive physicalist solution, the compatibilist solution, and argues that the joint causation view is more defensible than commonly supposed. Specifically, the paper distinguishes two theses of closure, Strong Closure and Weak Closure, two causal exclusion problems, the overdetermination problem and the supervenience problem, (...)
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  33. Mental lexicon and machine lexicon: Which properties are shared by machine and mental word representations? Which are not.Jean-Francois le Ny - 1995 - In Patrick Saint-Dizier & Evelyn Viegas (eds.), Computational lexical semantics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
     
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  34.  82
    Mental images and pictorial properties.Stewart Candlish - 1975 - Mind 84 (April):260-2.
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  35. Mental causation and higher-order properties.David Robb - 2023 - In A. R. J. Fisher & Anna-Sofia Maurin (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Properties. London: Routledge.
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  36. Mental causation, determinables, and property instances.Douglas Ehring - 1996 - Noûs 30 (4):461-80.
  37.  68
    Tropes: Properties, Objects, and Mental Causation by Douglas Ehring. [REVIEW]Anna-Sofia Maurin - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (2):111-115.
  38. Tropes: Properties, Objects, and Mental Causation. By Douglas Ehring. [REVIEW]Tuomas E. Tahko - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (251):379-382.
    Book review of 'Tropes: Properties, Objects, and Mental Causation' (2011, OUP). By DOUGLAS EHRING.
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  39. Mental causation and the paradoxes of explanation.Karsten R. Stueber - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (3):243-77.
    In this paper I will discuss Kims powerful explanatory exclusion argument against the causal efficacy of mental properties. Baker and Burge misconstrue Kims challenge if they understand it as being based on a purely metaphysical understanding of causation that has no grounding in an epistemological analysis of our successful scientific practices. As I will show, the emphasis on explanatory practices can only be effective in answering Kim if it is understood as being part of the dual-explanandum strategy. Furthermore, a (...)
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  40.  52
    Reduction Without Elimination: Mental Disorders as Causally Efficacious Properties.Gottfried Vosgerau & Patrice Soom - 2018 - Minds and Machines 28 (2):311-330.
    We argue that any account of mental disorders that meets the desideratum of assigning causal efficacy to mental disorders faces the so-called “causal exclusion problem”. We argue that fully reductive accounts solve this problem but run into the problem of multiple realizability. Recently advocated symptom-network approaches avoid the problem of multiple realizability, but they also run into the causal exclusion problem. Based on a critical analysis of these accounts, we will present our own account according to which (...) disorders are dispositional properties that are token-identical to physical properties. More specifically, they are analyzed as dispositions to cause the specific set of symptoms. We argue that our account is not only able to account for multiple realizability without running into the causal exclusion problem, but that it also allows for the integration of very different factors into the description and explanation of mental disorders, such as neurological and neurochemical factors on the one side and social and cultural factors on the other. It thereby gives the psychiatric level of causal explanation autonomy while securing the causal efficacy of mental disorders in a causally closed physical world. (shrink)
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  41.  88
    Mental Causation: The Mind-Body Problem.Anthony Dardis - 2008 - Columbia University Press.
    Two thousand years ago, Lucretius said that everything is atoms in the void; it's physics all the way down. Contemporary physicalism agrees. But if that's so how can we—how can our thoughts, emotions, our values—make anything happen in the physical world? This conceptual knot, the mental causation problem, is the core of the mind-body problem, closely connected to the problems of free will, consciousness, and intentionality. Anthony Dardis shows how to unravel the knot. He traces its early appearance in (...)
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  42. The problem of mental causation and the nature of properties.S. C. Gibb - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):464-75.
    Despite the fact that the nature of the properties of causation is rarely discussed within the mental causation debate, the implicit assumption is that they are universals as opposed to tropes. However, in recent literature on the problem of mental causation, a new solution has emerged which aims to address the problem by appealing to tropes. It is argued that if the properties of causation are tropes rather than universals, then a psychophysical reductionism can be advanced which does (...)
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  43. Mental Health Measurement in a Post Covid-19 World: Psychometric Properties and Invariance of the DASS-21 in Athletes and Non-athletes. [REVIEW]Robert S. Vaughan, Elizabeth J. Edwards & Tadhg E. MacIntyre - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
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  44.  11
    Tropes: Properties, Objects, and Mental Causation. [REVIEW]John Heil - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):604-607.
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  45. Mental causation and Shoemaker-realization.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (2):149 - 172.
    Sydney Shoemaker has proposed a new definition of `realization’ and used it to try to explain how mental events can be causes within the framework of a non-reductive physicalism. I argue that it is not actually his notion of realization that is doing the work in his account of mental causation, but rather the assumption that certain physical properties entail mental properties that do not entail them. I also point out how his account relies on certain other (...)
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  46. Part-whole physicalism and mental causation.Douglas Ehring - 2003 - Synthese 136 (3):359-388.
    A well-known ``overdetermination''argument aims to show that the possibility of mental causes of physical events in a causally closed physical world and the possibility of causally relevant mental properties are both problematic. In the first part of this paper, I extend an identity reply that has been given to the first problem to a property-instance account of causal relata. In the second, I argue that mental types are composed of physical types and, as a consequence, both (...)
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  47.  18
    Douglas Ehring, Tropes: Properties, Objects, and Mental Causation. Reviewed by.Eric Weislogel - 2016 - Philosophy in Review 36 (3):100-102.
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  48.  80
    Tropes: Properties, Objects, and Mental Causation, by Douglas Ehring: New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, viii + 250, £37.50.John Heil - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):604 - 607.
  49. Fundamental mentality in a physical world.Christopher Devlin Brown - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2841-2860.
    Regardless of whatever else physicalism requires, nearly all philosophers agree that physicalism cannot be true in a world which contains fundamental mentality. I challenge this widely held attitude, and describe a world which is plausibly all-physical, yet which may contain fundamental mentality. This is a world in which priority monism is true—which is the view that the whole of the cosmos is fundamental, with dependence relations directed from the whole to the parts—and which contains only a single mental system, (...)
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  50. Intralevel mental causation.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2011 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):402-425.
    This paper identifies and critiques a theory of mental causation defended by some proponents of nonredutive physicalism that I call “intralevelism.” Intralevelist theories differ in their details. On all versions, the causal outcome of the manifestation of physical properties is physical and the causal outcome of the manifestation of mental properties is mental. Thus, mental causation on this view is intralevel mental to mental causation. This characterization of mental causation as intralevel is taken (...)
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