In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 187 standing. He picks his way philosophicelly ~darough the many preludes, interludes and epilogues of the long, autobiographical poem, The Prelude. He succeeds in interpreting philosophically.Wordsworth's absorption in "the life of things" and the "immanence of the world soul." These ideas remain, it seems to me, in Wordsworth's mind as well as in.his art primarily "lyrical ballads." But Melvin Rader has given us a thoroughly intelligible (...) account, both historical and philosophical, of both Coleridge and Wordsworth as reflectiveminds, without detracting item them as artists. HERBERTW. SCHNEIDER Claremont Graduate School and Unlver~i~y Center gchelting et la R~alit~ Finis: Essai sur la Philosophic de la Nature et de l'[dentit~. By Judith E. Schlanger. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966. Pp. 162. = Biblioth~que de Philosophie Contemporaine: Histoire de ta Philosophie et Philosophie Gfin6rale. Paper, F. 12.--) L'dtude de Judith E. Schlanger pr~se~te un bref expos6 des th~mes princ~paux de la pens~e philosophlque de Schelling en retra~ant de fa~on plus ou moius syst6matique l'itindraire spirituel de ce grand penseur qui a crd6 les fondsments spdculatifs du romantisme aIlemand. La philosophie de Schelling refl~te une ardeur,constants de recherche toujours progressive miroitant lea rythmes intimes de son articulation/~ la fois subtile et intensive. Nous allons donner en raccourci la principale ligne d'6volution de cette pens~e. L'essai de Schlanger a pour objet propre le probl~me philosophique qui rdsulte de la connexion 6troite de deux th~mes constituant les fondoments de la philosophie schellingienne, notamment le bh6me d'une philosophie concrAte qui rdcupAre intdgralement l'intuition et celui de la simultan6it6 de l'absolu et du finidans une rdalitdqui n'est constitu6e que par des totas diserAtes. Pour Schelling l'absolu n'est autre chose que la rdalitd concrete constitude par l'ensemble des totalitds individuelles et particuli6res qui sent con~ues comme dtant organiques et qui sent intelligibles, c'est-~.dire leur prdsence et leur raison d'etre coincident et ne peuvent ~tre saisiesque par l'immddiatetd de l'intuition intellectuelle et non par une rationslitd ddductive. L'absolu eat organicitd intelligibleau moyen d'un mode de connaissance intdgralement intuitif, done de rationalitd/t dvidence pleine et non de rationalitd ~t mddiation conceptuelle. L'absolu est done un total, une totalitd complexe ~ cause do ses articulations ind6finiment multiples ~tl'intdrieur. La philosophie enest la transposition aussi bien dans son d6veloppement actuel que dans l'embrassement des multiples ddterminations en un totalitarisme du savoir. L'instrument opdrationnel et cognitif capable d'61aborer cette transposition est l'intuition,la "Anschauung". En effet l'intuition joue un r61e capital dans la philosophie de Schelling. Issue directement de l'exp6rience sensible, c'est-~-dire, concrbte et individuelle, ellepermet d'englober dans l'immddiatetd d'une seule dvidence ~ la fois coner ~te et totale la coprdsence et la contemporandit6 de l'absolu et du finien une unit6 positive, non-dialectique, mais organique. Il est vrai que le scheme de l'organisme et de l'organicitd detains la pensde de ScheUing. L'absolu et le finisent en correlation organique. L'actualit6 dvidents de leur opposition manifeste leur copr~ence simultande, ce qui traduit leur unit~ absolue, sous-jacente qui a rendu possible cette opposition. La liaison effective, rdelle,empiriquement constatde des deux termes opposds leur suppose un fondement commun absolu. La dichotomie n'estpas primordiale, l'antith~sea pour support affirmatifun absolu. L'absolu est le lieu de l'identitd des opposds. C'est la coincidence immddiate entre des termes antinomiques qui d6finitl'unitd absolue. Et de cet absolu, la philosophic poss~de un savoir imm6diat, c'est-~dire absolu. II en rdsulte que l'intuitionest le principe m~me de l'intelligibilitd.Le probIAme phUosophique capital qui se pose et que Schlanger dtudie dana l'ceuvre de Schelling depuis les ddbuts de sa pensde en 1794jusqu'au moment o~1la philosophie de l'Identitd eat constitude, en 1804environ s'dnonce comme suit: La vision de l'identit6 immddiate des opposds comme forme de la rdalitd absolue pourra-t-elle s'articuler dans un savoir systdmatique et objective- 188 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY ment communicable de la totalit6... (shrink)

_The Undiscovered Dewey_ explores the profound influence of evolution and its corresponding ideas of contingency and uncertainty on John Dewey's philosophy of action, particularly its argument that inquiry proceeds from the uncertainty of human activity. Dewey separated the meaningfulness of inquiry from a larger metaphysical story concerning the certainty of human progress. He then connected this thread to the way in which our reflective capacities aid us in improving our lives. Dewey therefore launched a new understanding of the modern self (...) that encouraged intervention in social and natural environments but which nonetheless demanded courage and humility because of the intimate relationship between action and uncertainty. Melvin L. Rogers explicitly connects Dewey's theory of inquiry to his religious, moral, and political philosophy. He argues that, contrary to common belief, Dewey sought a place for religious commitment within a democratic society sensitive to modern pluralism. Against those who regard Dewey as indifferent to moral conflict, Rogers points to Dewey's appreciation for the incommensurability of our ethical commitments. His deep respect for modern pluralism, argues Rogers, led Dewey to articulate a negotiation between experts and the public so that power did not lapse into domination. Exhibiting an abiding faith in the reflective and contestable character of inquiry, Dewey strongly engaged with the complexity of our religious, moral, and political lives. (shrink)

In creative cognition research, the Romantic view about creative cognition is traditionally rejected in favor of the modern view. The modern view about creative cognition maintains that creativity is neither mysterious nor unintelligible and that it is indeed susceptible to analysis. The paradigmatic objects of analysis in creative cognition research have been creative output and the creative process. The degree of creativity of an output is assessed in accordance with certain criterial definitions. The degree of creativity of a cognitive process (...) is assessed in accordance with certain models of creative cognition, psychometric test measures, and neuroimaging studies that are grounded in certain criteria for assessment. The reliance on criterial definitions and criteria for assessment in analyzing either the creative output or the creative process suggests that creative cognition researchers remain under the sway of the classical, bundles-of-criteria theory of meaning. In this paper, I will critically evaluate the criterial problems that confront both criterial definitions and criteria for assessment before proposing an alternative theory of meaning. (shrink)

The new economy is characterized in the developing world by open capital markets and coordinated international regulation - neither of which existed in the colonial period.

This book contains new essays in honor of Melvin J. Lerner, a pioneer in the psychological study of justice. The contributors to this volume are internationally renowned scholars from psychology, business, and law. They examine the role of justice motivation in a wide variety of contexts, including workplace violence, affirmative action programs, helping or harming innocent victims and how people react to their own fate. Contributors explore fundamental issues such as whether people's interest in justice is motivated by self-interest (...) or a genuine concern for the welfare of others, when and why people feel a need to punish transgressors, how a concern for justice emerges during the development of societies and individuals, and the relation of justice motivation to moral motivation. How an understanding of justice motivation can contribute to the amelioration of major social problems is also examined. (shrink)

This paper continues my work of [9], which showed there was a broad family of many valued logics that have a strict/tolerant counterpart. Here we consider a generalization of weak Kleene three valued logic, instead of the strong version that was background for that earlier work. We explain the intuition behind that generalization, then determine a subclass of strict/tolerant structures in which a generalization of weak Kleene logic produces the same results that the strong Kleene generalization did. This paper provides (...) much background, but is not self-contained. Some results from [9] are called on, and are not reproved here. [9] Melvin C. Fitting. “A Family of Strict/Tolerant Logics”. In: Journal of Philosophical Logic. Online. Print publication forthcoming. (shrink)

Strict/tolerant logic is a formally defined logic that has the same consequence relation as classical logic, though it differs from classical logic at the metaconsequence level. Specifically, it does not satisfy a cut rule. It has been proposed for use in work on theories of truth because it avoids some objectionable features arising from the use of classical logic. Here we are not interested in applications, but in the formal details themselves. We show that a wide range of logics have (...) strict/tolerant counterparts, with the same consequence relations but differing at the metaconsequence level. Among these logics are Kleene’s K3\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathsf {K_3}$$\end{document}, Priest’s LP\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathsf {LP}}$$\end{document}, and first-degree entailment, FDE. The primary tool we use is the bilattice. But it is more than a tool, it seems to be the natural home for this kind of investigation. (shrink)

A history of disease theory, from Classical Antiquity to modern times, discussing the various supposed causes to which people of different eras attributed disease.

Consider those many-valued logic models in which the truth values are a lattice that supplies interpretations for the logical connectives of conjunction and disjunction, and which has a De Morgan involution supplying an interpretation for negation. Assume that the set of designated truth values is a prime filter in the lattice. Each of these structures determines a simple many-valued logic. We show that there is a single Smullyan-style signed tableau system appropriate for all of the logics these structures determine. Differences (...) between the logics are confined entirely to tableau branch closure rules. Completeness, soundness, and interpolation can be proved in a uniform way for all cases. Since branch closure rules have a limited number of variations, in fact all the semantic structures determine just four different logics, all well-known ones. Asymmetric logics such as strict/tolerant, ST, also share all the same tableau rules, but differ in what constitutes an initial tableau. It is also possible to capture the notion of antivalidity using the same set of tableau rules. Thus a simple set of tableau rules serves as a unifying and classifying device for a natural and simple family of many-valued logics. (shrink)

This volume argues that the commitment to justice is a fundamental motive and that, although it is typically portrayed as serving self-interest, it sometimes takes priority over self-interest. To make this case, the authors discuss the way justice emerges as a personal contract in children's development; review a wide range of research studying the influences of the justice motive on evaluative, emotional and behavioral responses; and detail common experiences that illustrate the impact of the justice motive. Through an extensive critique (...) of the research on which some alternative models of justice are based, the authors present a model that describes the ways in which motives of justice and self-interest are integrated in people's lives. They close with a discussion of some positive and negative consequences of the commitment to justice. (shrink)

Kripke’s work on modal logic has been immensely influential. It hardly needs remarking that this is not his only work. Here we address his pioneering applications of fixpoint constructions to the theory of truth, and related work by others. In his fundamental paper on this he explicitly described a modal version, applying a fixpoint construction world by world within a modal frame. This can certainly be carried out, and doubtless has been somewhere. Others have suggested a variety of other extensions (...) such as using the unit interval as the underlying space of truth values, or using a four valued logic instead of three, or various combinations of these. When many similar formal constructions have been proposed, one naturally asks what is the common core. Is there some setting in which things can be proved once and for all, with the various specific proposals seen as applications of this common core. In fact this is the case, with bilattices providing the desired structure. Much of such a development has already appeared in some form or other. It is the purpose of this article to bring everything together, and also add a few things. We present general results that, more or less, have everything currently in the fixpoint literature as special cases. Fortunately this does not make things more complicated, since the underlying proofs are essentially the same as they have always been. It is just that they are being carried out in generality rather than in specificity. (shrink)

Strict/tolerant logic, ST, evaluates the premises and the consequences of its consequence relation differently, with the premises held to stricter standards while consequences are treated more tolerantly. More specifically, ST is a three-valued logic with left sides of sequents understood as if in Kleene’s Strong Three Valued Logic, and right sides as if in Priest’s Logic of Paradox. Surprisingly, this hybrid validates the same sequents that classical logic does. A version of this result has been extended to meta, metameta, … (...) consequence levels in Barrio et al.. In my earlier paper Fitting I showed that the original ideas behind ST are, in fact, much more general than first appeared, and an infinite family of many valued logics have Strict/Tolerant counterparts. This family includes both Kleene’s and Priest’s logic individually, as well as first degree entailment. For instance, for both the Kleene and the Priest logic, the corresponding strict/tolerant logic is six-valued, but with differing sets of strictly and tolerantly designated truth values. The present paper extends that generalization in two directions. We examine a reverse notion, of Tolerant/Strict logics, which exist for the same structures that were investigated in Fitting. And we show that the generalization extends through the meta, metameta, … consequence levels for the same infinite family of many valued logics. Finally we close with remarks on the status of cut and related rules, which can actually be rather nuanced. Throughout, the aim is not the philosophical applications of the Strict/Tolerant idea, but the determination of how general a phenomenon it is. (shrink)

This is a thorough treatment of first-order modal logic. The book covers such issues as quantification, equality (including a treatment of Frege's morning star/evening star puzzle), the notion of existence, non-rigid constants and function symbols, predicate abstraction, the distinction between nonexistence and nondesignation, and definite descriptions, borrowing from both Fregean and Russellian paradigms.

In this paper, I will identify two problems of trust in an AI-relevant context: a theoretical problem and a practical one. I will identify and address a number of skeptical challenges to an AI-relevant theory of trust. In addition, I will identify what I shall term the ‘scope challenge’, which I take to hold for any AI-relevant theory of trust that purports to be representationally adequate to the multifarious forms of trust and AI. Thereafter, I will suggest how trust-engineering, a (...) position that is intermediate between the modified pure rational-choice account and an account that gives rise to trustworthy AI, might allow us to address the practical problem of trust, before identifying and critically evaluating two candidate trust-engineering approaches. (shrink)

How might we philosophize about the metaverse? It is traditionally held that the four main branches of philosophy are metaphysics, epistemology, axiology, and logic. In this article, I shall demonstrate how virtual walt-fictionalism, a particular version of virtual irrealism, is able to offer a straightforward, internally consistent, and powerful response about the metaphysics, epistemology, and axiology (ethics) of the metaverse. I will first characterize the metaverse in terms of a reality-virtuality (RV) continuum and distinguish between virtual realism and virtual irrealism, (...) before elaborating on the explanatory power and potential of virtual walt-fictionalism relative to the metaphysics, epistemology, and axiology (ethics) of the metaverse. (shrink)

Contrary to the received understanding that Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco Suárez ruled out religious war by grounding just cause in natural law, they supported a robust view of papal authority for war when necessary for the defense of the church against heretics, schismatics, and pagans as well as for the spread of Christianity and Christendom throughout the world. They believed that religious wars were in accord with natural law as a means to its fulfillment in Christianity, as a justification (...) for the defense of the church as the one true faith, and as a moral obligation to provide all of humanity with the opportunity to receive Christian truth and grace. The neo‐Thomists' vigorous support for religious war was in the mainstream of the Christian just war tradition from the time of the wars against pagans in the early middle ages through their own time. This finding and the continuation into the modern era of sanctified patriotism stemming from the mixing of church and state especially during war that began in early Middle Ages, along with the historic roots of the recently prominent presumption against war, argue for a more complex understanding of the normative Christian just war tradition than that found among supporters of the classic interpretation of that tradition. (shrink)

Two things are done in this paper. First, a modal logic in which one can quantify over both objects and concepts is presented; a semantics and a tableau system are given. It is a natural modal logic, extending standard versions, and capable of addressing several well-known philosophical difficulties successfully. Second, this modal logic is used to introduce a rather different way of looking at relational databases. The idea is to treat records as possible worlds, record entries as objects, and attributes (...) as concepts, in the modal sense. This makes possible an intuitively satisfactory relational database theory. It can be extended, by the introduction of higher types, to deal with multiple-valued attributes and more complex things, though this is further than we take it here. (shrink)

We present a logic programming language, which we call Proflog, with an operational semantics based on tableaus, and a denotational semantics based on supervaluations. We show the two agree. Negation is well-behaved, and semantic non-computability issues do not arise. This is accomplished essentially by dropping a domain closure requirement. The cost is that intuitions developed through the use of classical logic may need modification, though the system is still classical at a level once removed. Implementation problems are discussed very briefly (...) — the thrust of the paper is primarily theoretical. (shrink)

The question whether God prevails or not is a vital one for many disciplines that are taught in colleges and universities, as well as for each academician personally and intellectually. In addressing this issue, Our Teleological Economic World takes a pathfinding approach by demonstrating at a scholarly level, that economic science joins physical science in affirming an Intelligent Design of the universe. Throughout the manuscript, extending from classical to advanced microeconomic and macroeconomic analyses, the authors establish correlative correspondences with those (...) of physical science. (shrink)

The genre of the plague treatise, still little studied, testifies to the cultural transformations that swept western Eurasia after the Black Death apocalypse of the mid-fourteenth century, with recurrent outbreaks for centuries thereafter. Ottoman contributions to this genre are exemplary: they allow us to track the emergence of an imperial-scientific early modernity. This article presents the most comprehensive and innovative Islamicate plague treatise extant, Taşköprīzāde Aḥmed’s (d. 1561) Treatise on Healing Epidemic Diseases. Therein the celebrated Ottoman polymath makes a strong (...) case, advanced by arguments both religious and rational, for occult science as the most empirical method for preventing and curing the plague. To this end, he devotes the theoretical first half of the treatise to a critique of fatalist scholars and sufis, who prefer tawakkul to tasabbub, or blind faith to “scientific method”; the practical second half is devoted to what he considers to be the most medically effective scientific discipline of his era, lettrism (ʿilm al-ḥurūf)—a Neopythagorean science encapsulating the new “cosmological imaginary” of Western early modernity generally, wherein the world was seen by many thinkers and doers as a mathematical and hence magically tractable text. Our distaste for occult science notwithstanding, Taşköprīzāde must here be named another early modern empiricist. (shrink)