In den "Meditationes de prima philosophia" (1642) geht es Descartes um eine neue Grundlegung der Metaphysik. Dieser Neuanfang in der Philosophie, den Descartes wie wohl kaum ein anderer propagiert und durchführt, hat jedoch einen konservativen Zug: Gerade Descartes besteht darauf, daß seine Philosophie die älteste ist, die es überhaupt geben kann, und diese Aussage hat nur Sinn, wenn Metaphysik als Rekonstruktion der ursprünglichen Fragen verstanden wird, die anfänglich das philosophische und insbesondere metaphysische Geschäft ins Rollen gebracht hatten.

Rene Descartes Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason, and Seeking Truth in the Sciences by Rene Descartes The Discourse on the Method (French: Discours de la methode) is a philosophical and autobiographical treatise published by Rene Descartes in 1637. Its full name is Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One's Reason and of Seeking Truth in the Sciences (French title: Discours de la methode pour bien conduire sa raison, et chercher la verite dans les sciences). The (...) Discourse on The Method is best known as the source of the famous quotation "Je pense, donc je suis" ("I think, therefore I am"), which occurs in Part IV of the work. Good sense is, of all things among men, the most equally distributed; for every one thinks himself so abundantly provided with it, that those even who are the most difficult to satisfy in everything else, do not usually desire a larger measure of this quality than they already possess. And in this it is not likely that all are mistaken the conviction is rather to be held as testifying that the power of judging aright and of distinguishing truth from error, which is properly what is called good sense or reason, is by nature equal in all men; and that the diversity of our opinions, consequently, does not arise from some being endowed with a larger share of reason than others, but solely from this, that we conduct our thoughts along different ways, and do not fix our attention on the same objects. For to be possessed of a vigorous mind is not enough; the prime requisite is rightly to apply it. The greatest minds, as they are capable of the highest excellences, are open likewise to the greatest aberrations; and those who travel very slowly may yet make far greater progress, provided they keep always to the straight road, than those who, while they run, forsake it. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Concordance to Descartes’ “Meditationes de Prima Philosophia.” by Katsuzo Murakami, Meguru Sasaki, Tetsuichi NishimuraTuomo Aho and Mikko YrjönsuuriKatsuzo Murakami, Meguru Sasaki, and Tetsuichi Nishimura. Concordance to Descartes’ “Meditationes de Prima Philosophia.” Hildesheim: Olms-Weidmann, 1995. Pp. v + 355. Cloth, DM 198.00.This is a product from the Descartes database of Tokyo University scholars. It gives an account of the occurrences and contexts of (...) words in the Meditationes (the main text only), aiming at a complete survey of vocabulary. The work keeps strictly to the form of a lexical concordance; in addition to the word lists, there is only a brief instruction. (A bibliographical note about editions might be useful.) Technical realization is excellent. But concordances like this are big and expensive books; could they possibly be published more easily in electronic format?Most words of Descartes’s text are included in the main concordance. There they are listed following the alphabetic order of standard dictionaries, and in each entry the total amount of occurrences of the word is announced. Then every occurrence is quoted in its context (one line = approximately two in the Adam-Tannery standard edition). Quotes within each entry are arranged and their places identified by digits showing the page and line in AT edition.Some function words and most indeclinables are placed in an index which gives only the numbers and locations of their occurrences. In most cases this is certainly reasonable, but some choices are problematic. For example, why have the 638 + 36 occurrences of qui in its two senses (‘who’, ‘what’; ‘how’, ‘whereby’) been printed with full contexts, while the philosophically interesting adverb plane (‘plainly’, 55 times) is to be found merely in the index?Concordances are uncommon for modern philosophy, but they are familiar and valuable tools in work with ancient texts. Obviously they function in linguistic research, and even the present Descartes book has largely the same goal: to serve the study of neo-Latin language. Undoubtedly, a rigorous case study like this is important for such [End Page 135] investigations. (There remains, however, a difficulty, as the editors point out, because the AT text differs from original editions, mainly in matters of orthography and punctuation.) But also a completely nonlinguistic philosopher can benefit from this material. It is useful to see all occurrences of a word together and at once; many careless generalizations could be avoided by checking from a concordance.One can make amusing observations at random. Thus some terms have remarkably low frequencies (notitia, qualitas occur 4 times; materia 3 times; absolutus, principium 2 times; abstractus, definire, dispositio, species 1 time; intentio, possibile not at all). On the other hand, there is an overwhelming concentration on the semantic family round cogitare, cognoscere, comprehendere, concipere, percipere. Descartes has some idiosyncratic favorites, like advertere/animadvertere. One also notices his strong liking for words of seeing and light (15 arguments from lumen naturale!). It hardly is a surprise that his most cherished favorite is ego (492 times).Tuomo Aho and Mikko Yrjönsuuri University of HelsinkiCopyright © 1998 Journal of the History of Philosophy, Inc... (shrink)

This bilingual edition of Descartes' _Meditations on First Philosophy_ is aimed both specifically at serious students and professors of philosophy, and generally at anyone motivated by a strong philosophical interest.

This bilingual edition of Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy is aimed both specifically at serious students and professors of philosophy, and generally at anyone motivated by a strong philosophical interest.

The article presents one of the lesser known treatise produced within the Polish Socinian movement, written by Johann Ludwig von Wolzogen (ca. 1599-1661), under the title Breves in Meditationes Metaphysicas Renati Cartesii annotationes [Brief Notes on the Metaphysical Meditations of Rene Descartes]. It appeared in print in 1657 in Amsterdam and was ten years later reprinted in the series Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum. In its entirety, the text is intended as a polemic against Descartes's views and written as a detailed (...) commentary on the Meditationes de prima philosophia. Here I intend to demonstrate that Wolzogen's treatise deserves a close scrutiny. First of all, it considerably contributes to our knowledge on the 17th century disputes around the Meditations on First Philosophy. Second, it represents the first substantive and fairly extensive discussion of Descartes's philosophy to appear in the territory of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Third, it is a treatise issued from the milieu of the Polish Socinians (the Polish Brethren) that has been recognized by recent research as having exerted a non-negligible influence upon the development of the progressive European thought of the period, both in the domain of theology and philosophy. (shrink)

Descartes afirma que el cogito se "experimenta en uno" (apud se experiatur)o se "siente en uno mismo" ("il sent in lui-même"), pero también ha señalado que uno no siente sino a través del cuerpo. El problema es que, en las Meditaciones, el cogito fue caracterizado cuando todavía no se había demostrado la existencia del cuerpo. Pese a esto, Descartes parece haberse dejado influir por ciertas sensaciones internas de duda y certeza. En el trabajo se sostiene que esto fue posible porque (...) esas sensaciones internas son efecto de una ratio implícita: la existencia de un Dios no engañador. Descartes states that the cogito is "experienced in oneself" (apud se experiatur) or "felt in oneself" ("il sent en lui-même"), but it has also been pointed out that one only feels through the body. The problem is that, in the Meditations, the cogito was characterized before the existence of the body had been demonstrated. Despite this fact, Descartes seems to have been influenced by certain internal sensations of doubt and certainty. The paper argues that his was possible because those internal sensations are the effect of an implicit ratio: the existence of a non-deceiving God. Descartes afirma que o cogito se "experimenta em si" (apud se experiatur) ou se "sente em si mesmo" ("il sent in lui-même"), mas também sinalizou que um não sente se não por meio do corpo. O problema se deve, nas Meditaciones, a que o cogito tenha sido caracterizado quando ainda não se tinha demonstrado a existência do corpo. Pese a isso, Descartes parece ter se deixado influenciar por certas sensações internas de dúvida e certeza. Neste trabalho, sustém-se que isso foi possível porque essas sensações internas são efeitos de uma ratio implícita: a existência de um Deus não enganador. (shrink)

English summary: This text, compiled in the 19th century, is considered to be the ultimate reference edition of the complete works of Rene Descartes and is the only truly complete edition to date. This work includes all of Descartes correspondence and scientific work, both of which are essential to understanding of the Cartesian enterprise. French description: Sans cesse lu et etudie, Descartes exerca une influence considerable en Europe des le XVIIe siecle. Le projet de l'edition des oeuvres completes de Descartes (...) a ete lance en 1894 par le Ministere de l'Instruction publique, et entrepris par un comite comprenant entre autre Emile Boutroux, Xavier Leon, Louis Liard, Charles Adam et Paul Tannery. Ces deux derniers, veritables maitres d'oeuvre de ce travail, aides par l'editeur, ne negligerent rien pour pouvoir presenter a l'Exposition universelle de 1900, une edition qui fut digne du philosophe et de son pays. Elle est desormais universellement consideree comme l'edition de reference de l'oeuvre cartesienne et est constamment citee dans les travaux d'erudition. Elle est la seule edition veritablement complete a ce jour, et comprend notamment l'ensemble de la correspondance et de l'oeuvre scientifique, toutes deux essentielles a une bonne comprehension de l'entreprise cartesienne. (shrink)

There is a certain ambiguity in Descartes’ Meditations, as there is any great sphere of endeavor. How, after all, does one bridge the gap between the autobiographical “I” of the Discourse and the Meditations, and the world of learned scholarship; the “guardians of tradition”, both religious and temporal? How does one mediate the way in which one is received by the tradition which has so eloquently been put out of play in the pursuit of one’s personal project? In short, how (...) can Descartes ensure that his pioneering work is not misunderstood; that it is not viewed as a threat to religious and national institutions?In reflecting on these questions, I believe Descartes arrived at a concept of community which sought to balance personal autonomy with institutional obligation in such a way that the scientist’s ultimate judgment was preserved, while proximately acknowledgement was made of the prevailing scientific and religious “world picture”, and only challenged obliquely.Thus, there is a certain tension in Descartes’ theorizing about community, a tension which was quite naturally carried over into his practical community relationships. Furthermore, I will argue that Descartes’ “tool” for getting around in these tension filled community situations is what I shall call his doctrine of “order and intention”. Ultimately, it is this reliance upon intentionality which throws his “balance” out of balance, and gives rise to repeated charges of “dissimulation”. How this situation came to pass, and Descartes’ tortuous attempts at resolving the emerging problems, is largely the subject of the following pages. (shrink)

In den Meditationes de prima philosophia (1641) erweist Descartes die Tauglichkeit der von ihm gefundenen erkenntnistheoretischen Methode für die Grundlegung gewisser Erkenntnis. Husserl über das Werk, das die Philosophie der Neuzeit begründete: "Die Cartesianischen Meditationes wollen nicht zufällige subjektive Besinnungen Descartes' sein oder gar eine literarische Kunstform für die Übermittlung der Gedanken des Autors. Vielmehr geben sie sich offenbar als die in der Art und Ordnung ihrer Motivation notwendigen Besinnungen, die das radikal philosophierende Subjekt als solches (...) notwendig durchmachen muß [...] Darin also liegt die Ewigkeitsbedeutung der Cartesianischen Meditationes. Sie zeichnen [...] den notwendigen Stil des philosophischen Anfangens." Die vorliegende deutsche Übersetzung enthält neben dem Haupttext sämtliche Einwände von Caterus, Mersenne, Hobbes u.a. sowie Descartes' Erwiderungen nach der Maßgabe des Textbestandes der lateinischen Erstausgabe von 1641 und der erweiterten zweiten Auflage von 1642. Grundlage für die Übersetzung bildet der lateinische Text in der Standardausgabe von Adam und Tannery, Bd. VII. Vergleichend hinzugezogen wurde die von Descartes selbst durchgesehene französische Übertragung der "Meditations Metaphysiques" von C. Lerselie R. (Paris 1647). (shrink)

컬리는 『회의주의자에 대항한 데카르트』(Descartes against the Skeptics)에서 데카르트의 코 키토 명제에 대해 매우 논쟁적인 주장을 제시한다. 그의 논제는 『성찰』(Meditationes de prima philosophia)의 반론과 답변에서 메르센과 데카르트가 주고받은 반론과 답변을 중심으로 이루어 지고 있지만, 그 범위는 데카르트의 형이상학 전반에 미치고 있다. 그는 메르센의 반론에는 논란 의 여지가 있는 해석을, 데카르트의 답변에는 신랄한 비판을 가한다. 나는 이 논문에서 그의 해 석과 비판이 과연 타당한지를 비판적으로 검토하려고 한다. 우선, 메르센에 대한 컬리의 독해는 “quod sis”를 잘못 이해하고, 이와 아울려 “quod sis (...) res cogitans”를 컬리가 데카르트 코키토 논 증의 소전제로 간주한 “I think”와 동일시한 것이 그의 결정적인 오류라고 생각한다. 그리고 데 카르트에 대한 컬리의 비판은 관점의 편협성과 데카르트의 코키토 명제에 대한 그의 선입견에 서 출발해서, “sed tanquam rem per se notam simplici mentis intuitu agnoscit”에 대한 오독에 서 절정에 도달한다고 생각한다. 이는 메르센과 데카르트가 나눈 문답을 그 자체로 이해하려는 것이 아니라, 자신의 입장에서 재단하려는 그의 접근 태도에 근본적인 원인이 있다고 생각한다. (shrink)

RESUMEN El carácter analítico de Meditationes implica que, por una parte, ninguna verdad puede ser interpretada sin referencia al lugar concreto que ocupa en el orden de razones y, por otra, que no existen en Meditationes ficciones que permanezcan inadvertidamente como tales. Sin embargo, la presencia de algunas pasiones no ha sido justificada, lo que pone en cuestión el carácter analítico de la obra. Proponemos que tales pasiones son efecto de juicios implícitos. Para poner a prueba nuestra hipótesis, (...) hemos elegido un enigmático párrafo que hemos denominado el "texto de la adoración." ABSTRACT The analytical character of Meditationes de Prima Philosophia implies that: a) no truth can be correctly interpreted without reference to the concrete place it occupies in the order of reasons of the text ; b) there are no fictions in Meditationes that remain inadvertently as such. However, the presence of some passions has not been adequately explained, putting into question the truly analytical character of the work. We propose that these passions are effects of true but implicit judgments. To test our hypothesis, we have chosen an enigmatic paragraph called the "text of the adoration.". (shrink)

Os autores pretendem, a partir de exemplos, mostrar que a tradução Méditations métaphysiques de 1647não é uma tradução fiel da primeira edição das Meditationes de prima philosophia de 1641, ainda queseja um texto autenticamente cartesiano.

Daß Descartes – im Anschluß an den "Discours de la méthode" (1637) und die "Meditationes de prima philosophia" (1641) – mit der Veröffentlichung der "Principia" die Zäsur setzte, die seinen Rang als erster Denker der "Philosophie der Neuzeit" begründete, ist ein Topos der Philosophiegeschichte. Uneinigkeit besteht aber bis heute unter den Biographen und Interpreten über die Frage, ob Descartes selbst sich dessen bewußt war, daß alle Aussagen bzw. Erkenntnisse über das Geschehen in der Natur notwendig hypothetisch bleiben (...) (unter metaphysischem Aspekt) und dennoch (sofern methodisch gewonnen) die Wirklichkeit treffen und berechenbar machen. Oder ob er in den "Principia" nur deshalb darauf verfiel, alle seine Aussagen über die Prinzipien der körperlichen Dinge, die sichtbare Welt und die Erde in bloß hypothetischer Form vorzutragen, um der Verfolgung durch die Inquisition zu entgehen. Diese neue, zweisprachige Ausgabe der philosophiegeschichtlich Epoche machenden Schrift bietet neben dem lateinischen Originaltext und der völlig neu erstellten, terminologischen Unterscheidungen genau Rechnung tragenden Übersetzung erstmals auch eine umfassende Erschließung der von Descartes herangezogen Quellen, d. i. der zeitgenössischen Publikationen zur Untersuchung von Naturphänomenen, die wir heute – seit Descartes – als physikalische oder naturwissenschaftliche Untersuchungen einordnen können. (shrink)

This Special Issue of The European Legacy focuses on Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy, first published in Latin as Meditationes de Prima Philosophia in Paris, in 1641. The ten articles ap...

HOME . ABOUT US . CONTACT US HELP . PUBLISH WITH US . LIBRARIANS Search in or Explore Browse Publications A-Z Browse Subjects A-Z Advanced Search University of Cambridge SIGN IN Register | Why Register? | Sign Out | Got a Voucher? prev abstract next Two Approaches to Reading the Historical Descartes A Devout Catholic? Knowledge of The Mental Thought and Language Descartes as A Natural Philosopher Substance Dualism Notes Two Approaches to Reading the Historical Descartes Author: Desmond M. Clarke (...) DOI: 10.1080/09608780902986680 Publication Frequency: 5 issues per year Published in: British Journal for the History of Philosophy, Volume 17, Issue 3 June 2009 , pages 601 - 616 John Cottingham: Cartesian Reflections: Essays on Descartes's Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 40.00 (hb.). ISBN 978-0-19-922697-9 John Cottingham, in a new collection of essays, asks the question: 'what exactly did Descartes himself chiefly take himself to be doing?' (254). 1 While the question is relatively clear, and while it acknowledges implicitly that Descartes was probably doing a range of different things, the answer that is apparently proposed here emerges only on reading the whole collection. Cottingham distinguishes in Chapter 1 - which is a new, synoptic overview of what is discussed in the other chapters, all of which were previously published - between two approaches to reading Descartes. One is to see him as 'a dummy on which to drape various suspect doctrines (such as “Cartesian dualism”)' (3), which contemporary analytic philosophers have shown to be radically mistaken. Another approach is adopted by historians of ideas 'who make it their life's work to pay meticulous scholarly attention to the philosophical works of past ages' (3). Cottingham does not explicitly criticize either of these approaches, but he hints at situating his own as some kind of Aristotelian middle course between the two. Since the two reference points are dangerously close to straw men or what Cottingham calls 'extreme positions', the proposed middle way may simply combine elements of two approaches, each of which is entirely legitimate. I return to this question at the conclusion. In fact, many of these essays were intended to show (rightly!) that Descartes never held the philosophical positions that are often attributed to him. The interpretation of Karol Wojtyla, later Pope John Paul II, provides a good example of how mistaken one can be: The Cogito ergo sum radically changed the way of doing philosophy … After Descartes, philosophy became a science of pure thought: all that is being- the created world, and even the Creator, is situated within the ambit of the Cogito, as contents of human consciousness. Philosophy is concerned with beings as contained in consciousness, and not as existing independently of it. (257) The only way to address such a caricature is to refer back to what Descartes actually wrote. Cottingham does precisely that, often quoting the original Latin or French texts. However, having shown successfully, by a close reading of the texts, that Descartes did not hold many of the views that are attributed to him, it still remains to say what Descartes did hold or teach about various philosophical problems that retain their perennial interest for us. This is how the question arises, intermittently, about what Descartes thought he was 'chiefly' doing, or what was his primary objective, in the course of an intellectual career that spanned three decades. However, the apparently legitimate desire to bring Descartes' intellectual endeavours into sharp focus may be frustrated by the evidence. His life and work manifestly lack the coherence or unity of purpose that one finds, for example, among many of his French or Dutch contemporaries. It is comparatively easy to 'read' the life of Gisbertus Voetius as that of an unwavering Calvinist theologian, to see Antoine Arnauld as a staunch and consistent theological defender of Port Royal, and even to interpret the obviously fragmentary contents of Pascal's unpublished notebooks (subsequently, the Penses) as an extended search for authentic religious faith, in opposition to what he perceived as the corruption of ecclesial structures. In contrast, Descartes' life reveals features that are difficult to integrate into a coherent pattern. He lived and published during a critical juncture in the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century. Although baptized into the Catholic Church soon after his birth in the Loire district of France, he chose to live most of his life in the aggressively Calvinist United Provinces, in which other religious practices were officially (though often ineffectively) banned. Descartes may have adopted the motto from Ovid, at least early in his career: 'bene vixit qui bene latuit' (he lives well who conceals himself well), and he seems genuinely to have wished to avoid theological controversies. However, he engaged in very public controversies with so many of his contemporaries - including Hobbes, Gassendi, the French Jesuits (collectively) and Father Dinet (in particular), Voetius and the University of Utrecht, Regius, Fermat, Roberval, Revius and other theologians at Leiden - that one might conclude that his claimed preference for a quiet life was a disingenuous mask. 2 Descartes published four books during his lifetime, and wrote at least one other that he had intended to publish. The latter was his first major composition, Le Monde, which he suppressed when he heard about Galileo's condemnation by Rome in 1633. This was followed, in 1637, by Descartes' first book (also written in French), which he tried to publish anonymously by withholding his name from the title page: the Discours de la methode pour bien conduire sa raison, & chercher la verit dans les sciences. Plus la dioptrique, les meteors, et la geometrie, qui sont des essais de cete methode. Four years later Descartes published the first edition (in Latin) of Meditationes de prima philosophia, in quibus Dei existentia et animae immortalitas demonstrator, which also included six sets of objections and replies. The Principia philosophiae appeared (in Latin) in Amsterdam in 1644, and was followed five years later by Les Passions de l'Ame (in French). 3 In parallel with these publications, Descartes carried on a very extensive correspondence over a thirty-year period (in both Latin and French), and preserved copies or drafts of his letters with a view to future publication. Given the range and variety of his interests, and the sheer volume of writings, published or otherwise, that have survived from his pen, one may be tempted to engage in a comparative evaluation, as Cottingham does, by selecting one of Descartes' books as his primary contribution to philosophy. Cottingham claims that the Meditations was Descartes''masterpiece' (44), 'the definitive statement of Descartes's philosophy' (45) and the 'definitive statement of his metaphysics' (68). He also describes the Meditations more narrowly as 'his metaphysical masterpiece' (259, 303) and, more broadly, as 'his philosophical masterpiece' (289), and he lists it with the Discours as one of Descartes' two 'masterworks' (280). The Principia offers some competition in this comparative judgement when it is described as 'the canonical presentation of his metaphysical views' (114), while 'the construction of a moral system … was the crowning aim of his philosophy' (231). Having pitched repeatedly for the Meditations as Descartes' primary text, Cottingham claims that its author was 'a devout Catholic' (215), that he was 'a devoutly religious philosopher' (256), and that he could not free himself 'from the influence of the long years of theological study he had dutifully completed at La Flche' (62). Accordingly, the Meditations should be read as 'in essence a work of theodicy' (220); 'what has pride of place in the construction of his philosophical system is … an appeal to God … the nature and existence of the Deity is something that lies at the very heart of his entire philosophical system' (255). Without quite saying so, there are hints here that Descartes was a devout Christian whose primary intellectual contribution was to write a work of metaphysics, in which God is central and in the course of which the author alternates between proving God's existence and contemplating God - the latter a seventeenth-century version of Bonaventure's Journey of the Soul to God. 'Descartes's attraction to a contemplative mode of philosophizing' (305) is reflected, in the Meditations, in 'the language of the soul's coming to rest in adoring contemplation of the light' (306). Cottingham also accepts the overwhelming evidence from Descartes' correspondence that he 'devoted most of his career not to metaphysics but to science' (108), although he quibbles elsewhere with those who adopt the shorthand term 'science' to describe part of what was called 'natural philosophy' in the seventeenth century (282). He also refers to the '(notoriously lame) argument for the essential incorporeality of the thinking self' in one of Descartes' masterworks (60), and he describes the 'strange, seemingly isolated world of his metaphysical meditations' (139), with its 'creaking ontology' (147), when read in isolation from the rest of his work as a natural philosopher. How should we read him, then, in the twenty-first century? A Devout Catholic? That Descartes was a devout Catholic is possible, unlikely and undecidable. He seems not to have studied theology at all while at school at La Flche, although he completed the pre-theology college cycle in the company of Jesuit students who then continued their studies in theology. Descartes consistently attempted to avoid public entanglement with religious and theological controversies, and said so frequently. 4 Given the alignments that prevailed at the time, both in France. (shrink)

According to Descartes ideas are the immediate objects of human mind. In "Meditationes de prima philosophia" there are three groups of ideas: "innatae", "adventitiae", "factae". However, in "Notae in Programma" Descartes says, that all human ideas must be innate. The ideas potentially exist in human mind. Descartes asserts human ideas are some kind of disposition to respond to sensory stimuli in particular way – by perceiving. The senses deliver occasions to actualizing our innate ideas. However, Descartes does (...) not explain the way of actualizing of innate dispositions (ideas). This problem has not been resolved by now. (shrink)

The German philosopher Johannes Clauberg (1622–1665) was the first academic teacher who attempted to put the philosophy of René Descartes (1596–1650) at the basis of all disciplines of the traditional curriculum of studies, that is, to establish a Cartesian Scholasticism. To this aim, he developed a first philosophy, i.e. a metaphysics including rational-theological arguments, which was based on Descartes’s Meditationes de prima philosophia (1641). By it, Clauberg attempted to provide philosophy with a foundation, namely with a demonstration (...) of the reliability of clear and distinct knowledge. Moreover, he elaborated a comprehensive logical theory showing how Descartes’s rules of the method could be completed by a Scholastic-inspired theory of definition, division and syllogism. Nevertheless, Clauberg maintained in the corpus of philosophical disciplines a metaphysics dealing with the meanings of ‘being’. Accordingly, he developed a twofold metaphysics: on the one hand, a discipline concerned with the principles of thought and rational theology, being this a philosophia prima in the order of sciences. On the other hand, a metaphysics dealing with the most abstract notions of being, viz. an ontosophia, to be studied at the end of the philosophical curriculum. Building on the account of Clauberg’s work provided by Massimiliano Savini, in this paper I explore the relations between Clauberg’s philosophia prima and ontosophia: after clarifying the overall plan of his philosophy, and presenting some examples of metaphysical arguments belonging to the philosophia prima, I argue that Clauberg’s ontosophia, despite being conceived as the most abstract of the philosophical sciences, plays a foundational role with regards to metaphysics as philosophia prima by unveiling its conceptual assumptions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Symbolic Mathematics and the Intellect Militant: On Modern Philosophy’s Revolutionary SpiritCarl PageWhat makes modern philosophy different? My question presupposes the legitimacy of calling part of philosophy “modern.” That presupposition is in turn open to question as regards its meaning, its warrant, and the conditions of its applicability. 1 Importance notwithstanding, such further inquiries all start out from the phenomenon upon which everyone agrees: philosophy running through Plato and Aristotle (...) looks significantly different from philosophy running from Descartes to Kant.My concern in this essay is with the phenomenon of the difference itself, rather than with the second-order questions associated with how properly to assign it historical meaning. I take the difference between ancient and modern philosophy to be as significant as differences in philosophy’s history can be: modern philosophy rests on a new interpretation of the nature and fulfillment of human reason, and disputes about the nature of human reason are the ultimate battles of philosophy. But the general thesis is not my main point. 2 The focus of this essay falls on what may be called the integrity of the phenomenon, on the specific interpretation of human reason that lends modern philosophy its peculiar face. [End Page 233]Modern philosophy’s strikingly revolutionary spirit is my point of departure. When Descartes writes in the first of his Meditations that “it was necessary, once in the course of my life, to demolish everything completely and start again right from the foundations if I wanted to establish anything at all in the sciences that was stable and likely to last,” 3 he reveals the same enthusiasm for total reform later found in Kant: “This attempt to alter the procedure which has hitherto prevailed in metaphysics, by completely revolutionizing it in accordance with the example set by the geometers and physicists, forms indeed the main purpose of this critique of pure speculative reason.” 4 How exactly did philosophy become so convinced that its central tradition—a sprawling, disorganized, ugly city, as Descartes has it in the Discourse (I:116)—needed razing to the ground in the interest of some rational town-planning? Moreover, the calls for revolution have not abated, despite contemporary disillusionment with both Cartesian rationalism and Enlightenment philosophy in general; they have grown more shrill. The confidence with which rationalism, foundationalism, universalism, logocentrism, Platonism, and so on are currently set at naught for the sake of contingency, particularity, and difference reveals the same revolutionary and totalizing spirit that marks the earlier phase of philosophy’s modernity. Such enthusiasm is reason’s freedom taken to an extreme. 5 What inspires this march of the intellect militant? What, if anything, justifies its hubristic self-assertions in the domain of philosophy? These are the questions I address.Descartes is commonly identified as the father of modern philosophy. While the full story of modern philosophy’s parentage is more complicated than this, it is fair to say that in Descartes self-consciousness of a new mode of doing philosophy emerges with a focus and revolutionary sense of purpose that caught philosophical imagination in his own time and continues to do so in ours. 6 Motifs of modern philosophy may be found in many places—Machiavelli, Hobbes, Francis Bacon, Nicholas of Cusa, Giordano Bruno, Jakob Boehme—nonetheless, Descartes’s intensely single-minded, even jealous advocacy commends itself to all but the most stubborn antiquarian mentality as modernity’s almost perfect philosophical representative. [End Page 234]That Descartes stands on a remarkable philosophical cusp is apparent in the contrast between the title and the subject matter of his most influential philosophical work: Meditationes de Prima Philosophiae (1641). To that point prima philosophia or First Philosophy had been construed as the metaphysics. It was not concerned with the critical question of how metaphysical sciences are possible and was not directly related to any doctrine of the human soul—except perhaps on the one point of the divinity of nous, the human soul’s highest part. In Descartes’s Meditations, on the other hand, the landscape has altered. Doubt, certainty, knowledge, the ego cogitans and its stream of representations are the new subject matter. What is first in philosophy is no longer what... (shrink)

This article studies the extant class notes of a course on Descartes's Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) and (part of) the Principles of Philosophy (1644), which was given by the reformed theologian Christoph Wittich (1625–1687) at the former Dutch University of Nijmegen (1655–1679). This manuscript contains dictata, taken (presumably in 1664) under the title Observationes in Renati Descartes Meditationes de prima philosophia. Observations in ejusdem Principiorum philosophiae partem primam. This article mainly considers three themes surfacing in Wittich’s (...) classes: (a) doubt and scepticism; (b) “vulgar” and “proper philosophy”; (c) philosophy and Scripture. On the one hand, this study explains how Wittich tried to harmonise Cartesian metaphysics with his Calvinist faith by defining them as two autonomous fields of knowledge. On the other hand, Wittich’s ideas are shown to have met with much resistance on the part of some of his contemporary theologians. The study of Wittich’s course supplies new knowledge concerning the teaching of one of the first theologians to openly seek to combine Descartes's ideas and Copernican astronomy with the Bible. In so doing, this article offers direct insight into the way in which the new philosophy was taught in Nijmegen, and in the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic in general. (shrink)

Unter den griechischen exegetischen Werken zu den Schriften des Aristoteles kommt dem von um 200 n. Chr. wirkenden Alexander von Aphrodisias (Bücher 1-5) und einem byzantinischen Gelehrten des 13. Jahrhunderts, bekannt als Pseudo-Alexander, (Bücher 6--?14) stammenden Kommentar zur Metaphysik des Aristoteles eine überragende Bedeutung zu. Der Wert des durch fundierte Kenntnisse der Philosophie des Aristoteles ausgezeichneten Kommentars ist sowohl für die denkerische Durchdringung der aristotelischen Metaphysik als auch für die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie nicht genug hochzuschätzen. Den Denkern des Mittelalters (...) lag der Text aber nicht vor. Erst im Jahre 1527 machte der berühmte spanische Humanist Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda (1490?-1573) der breiten Öffentlichkeit den Kommentar zur Metaphysik erst zugänglich. Seine immer noch geschätzte, in gewissem Sinne auch unentbehrliche Übersetzung des Kommentars zu den ersten zwölf Büchern erstellte er aufgrund der Kollationierung der ihm zu Gebote stehenden Handschriften mit philologischer Gewissenhaftigkeit und ermöglichte auf diese Weise die immer noch nicht erforschte Rezeption des Textes in den folgenden drei Jahrhunderten bis zur ersten Edition des vollständigen griechischen Originals durch Hermann Bonitz 1847. Ein Nachdruck der 'editio princeps' dieser lateinischen Übersetzung, die 1561 zum fünften und letzten Mal erschienen ist, ist nicht nur ein Akt der antiquarischen Pietät, sondern kommt gerade im digitalen Zeitalter einer Forderung der Forschung nach. (shrink)

L’objectif de cet article est d’évaluer le sens et la portée de la locution autourgous tês philosophias, qui apparaît dans le Banquet I, 5. J’espère montrer que cette locution en dit plus qu’elle n’en a l’air prima facie. Je soutiendrai que l’ensemble du passage dépasse la simple opposition entre la ( philo ) sophia gratuite de Socrate et la sophia non gratuite des sophistes, d’une part, et la richesse de Callias et la pauvreté des socratiques, d’autre part. Mon point (...) de départ sera le prologue du Banquet, suivi d’une analyse des Mémorables I, 6, texte où l’on trouve une conception de philosophia en tant que diaita ; j’analyserai ensuite les textes du corpus xénophontien où figure le mot autourgos, lui aussi associé à la notion de diaita. Ce parcours analytique montrera qu’il y a deux visions de la philosophie en jeu dans le Banquet I, 5 : celle de Callias, qui croit que Socrate et les siens ont les âmes purifiées, mais qui, en même temps, ne comprend pas tout à fait leur pratique philosophique, et celle de Socrate qui, dans sa réplique à la provocation de Callias, lui présente de manière condensée sa vision de la philosophie. (shrink)