The teacher’s role in the university classroom has traditionally been to present the syllabus to listening students. In Norway new rules have been introduced for the activity in this classroom. The overarching goal for the teaching is to organize a learning situation that makes the students active learners. The article deals with the teacher as a researcher, and focuses on how innovative actions can be implemented by the teacher and studied from a researcher point of view. The text presents cultural (...) historical activity theory (CHAT) as both the theoretical framework for the organized actions in the classroom and as an approach for studying the classroom processes. The article gives an overview over a material that can be gathered in a classroom characterized by student activity. It ends by reflections on how development in one classroom can be transferred to other classrooms.  . (shrink)

Background: Our theoretical perspectives direct our research processes. The article contributes to the debate on Cultural Historical Activity Theory (CHAT) and Dewey’s idea-based social constructivism, and to the debate on methodology and how the researcher’s theoretical stance guides the researcher in his or her work. Purpose: The article presents fundamental ideas within CHAT and Dewey’s idea-based social constructivism. The purpose of the text is to discuss and examine how ideas in these two theories guide educational research conducted within the framework (...) of these two approaches. Furthermore, the article aims to contribute to the discussion on CHAT and Dewey’s theory. Sources of evidence: Ideas based on Vygotsky’s theories, represented mainly by James Wertsch, Michael Cole, Barbara Rogoff and Yrjö Engeström, and Dewey’s ideas, are examined and discussed in relation to educational research. Furthermore, statements made by Mietinnen, Garrison and Rorty are taken into account in the discussion on the two outlined theories. Main argument: When CHAT and Dewey’s theory guide researchers in their work, they have to take the context or situation into consideration. Artefacts are treated as part of this context, and therefore have to be a focal point of the research. In educational research the classroom and the teacher are also central parts of the learning environment or context. The teacher is the one to form the learning environment in which the pupils think and act, and therefore, the teacher’s role in the classroom is important. If researchers are to manage to focus on pupils’ learning, they must direct their research focus both on the teacher as an organizer of the activities and on the collaborating and supporting processes between the teacher and the pupils, and between the pupils. This means that the research focus has to include both activity and dialogue, which includes processes in all their complexity. Conclusions: Mediating artefacts play a central role both in CHAT and Dewey’s theory. If the researcher is to ascertain what the pupils learn when using specific artefacts, he or she will have to study the activities or processes within which these learning aids are used. This indicates that the researcher has to study learning processes in progress. Garrison states that Dewey’s approach is a philosophy of cultural development. Miettinen finds that Dewey’s theory does not serve as the foundation for both historical and cultural analyses of action. I disagree with Rorty and Mietinnen, and rather follow Garrison’s lead. In both theories, social, cultural and historical factors are, in my opinion, viewed as decisive factors intertwined in what happens here and now. Therefore the setting that frames the activity with its social, cultural and historical aspects also has to be brought into focus in one’s research activity. (shrink)

Different paradigms or perspectives function as the point of departure and framework for research. In this article ethical issues in the positivist and constructivist paradigms are presented. The article points out that more or less the same ethical codes are used in these paradigms, but with some nuanced interpretations. CHAT (cultural historical activity theory) is presented as a third paradigm. While conducting research, one intention within this paradigm is to change and improve practice. This means that the researcher and the (...) research participants during the research process together set the goals for the work and try to change practice en route to these goals. The relation between the researcher and the research participants is different than in the other two presented paradigms. This means that research in the CHAT paradigm also needs to be guided by different ethical codes. The purpose of this article is to show how some of the traditional ethical codes which direct research both in the positivist and constructivist paradigm change and are also inadequate in the CHAT paradigm. The article presents and discusses ethical codes that challenge the researchers’ communicative, social and knowledge competence. (shrink)

Children who experience well-being are engaging more confidently and positively with their caregiver and peers, which helps them to profit more from available learning opportunities and support current and later life outcomes. The goodness-of-fit theory suggests that children’s well-being might be a result of the interplay between their temperament and the environment. However, there is a lack of studies that examined the association between children’s temperament and well-being in early childhood education and care, and whether this association is affected by (...) ECEC process quality. Using a multilevel random coefficient approach, this study examines the association between toddlers’ temperament and well-being in Norwegian ECEC and investigates whether process quality moderates this association. Results reveal an association between temperament and well-being. Staff-child conflict moderates the association between shyness and well-being, and between activity and well-being. Moreover, high emotional behavioral support moderates the association between activity and well-being. Extra attention should be paid by the staff to these children’s needs. (shrink)

The meaning of being a middle‐aged close relative of a person who has suffered a stroke, 1 month after discharge from a rehabilitation clinicThe sudden and unexpected impact of stroke may have a stressful affect on close relatives. To illuminate the essential meaning in the lived experience of a middle‐aged close relative of a person who has suffered a stroke, narrative interviews were conducted with 10 close relatives of people who had suffered their first stroke where both parties were aged (...) over 18 and under 65. A phenomenological‐hermeneutic interpretation of the narratives was then conducted. Three intimately intertwined themes emerged during the analysis: ‘being called to mission’, ‘feeling lost and set adrift’ and ‘struggling to keep going’. The middle‐aged close relatives felt unreflectively duty bound. There was a struggle with suffering and enduring the process of coping with life and overcoming a feeling of helplessness. Life turned out to be a struggle with overwhelming feelings. They felt alienated in a restricted life situation, disconnected from themselves and others, and from a world that supports feelings of being lost and set adrift (i.e. feeling homeless). Strength was found in moments when the situation improved, in being related to oneself and others, and when feelings of normality were regained. (shrink)

Background On a daily basis, healthcare professionals deal with various ethical issues and it can be difficult to determine how to act best. Clinical ethics support (CES) has been developed to provide support for healthcare professionals dealing with complex ethical issues. A long-term perspective of participating in inter-professional dialogue and reflective-based CES sessions is seemingly sparse in the literature. Research aim The aim was to describe experiences of impact of Inter-professional Ethics Communication in groups (IEC) based on Habermas’ theory of (...) communicative actions, after 6 months from the perspective of an inter-professional team. Research design A qualitative inductive approach was chosen, and individual interviews ( n = 13) were conducted. Interview data were analysed using qualitative content analysis. Participants The participants, 10 females and two males, represented assistant nurses, registered nurses, physicians, occupational therapists, physiotherapists, welfare officers and psychologists. Each had attended at least four IEC sessions. Ethical considerations The study was approved by the Regional Ethical Review Board in Umeå, Sweden, and it has been undertaken in accordance with the Helsinki Declaration. Findings Overall, the descriptions expressed a perceived achievement of a deepened and integrated ethical awareness that increased the participants’ awareness of ethically difficult situations as well as their own ethical thinking, actions and approaches in daily work. Perspectives were shared and the team become more welded. They carried the memories of the reflections within them, which was perceived as supportive when encountered new ethically situations. Discussion Putting words to unarticulated thoughts may stimulate repeated reflections, leading to new insights and alternative thoughts. Conclusion The outcome of IEC sessions 6 months following the last session can be described as an incorporated knowledge that enables actions in ethically difficult situations based on an ethical awareness both at a ‘We-level’ and an ‘I-level’. (shrink)

This paper takes its departure from a cluster of approaches to Intentionality that could be headed under the title “Naturalizing Intentionality.” The author groups them into two different arguments: The defenders of the Original-Derived Intentionality argument hold that while there may be such a thing as originalintentionality understood in Brentano’s sense which applies to the mental, we usually extend this intentionality to processes, machines and all sorts of other things. The defenders of the Basic-Higher Order Intentionality argument on the other (...) hand claim that it is physical objects that display basic intentionality, while the human mind has intentionality of a higher order. For both approaches the aim is to show that intentionality can be understood as something exhibitedby non-mental items and thus it can be claimed that what thoughts or bits of language are about is physical in the last instance. The author argues that both arguments are merely inversions of each other and cannot successfully naturalize the phenomenon of intentionality as about-ness of physical items. Furthermore it is exactly the cooperation between the mental and the physical and no reduction of one to the other that can explain the phenomenon of intentionality. Subsequently the author will discuss John McDowell’s Kantian approach to intentionality, which may at first look like a version of the Basic-Higher Order argument, since McDowell distinguishes first and second nature. However, the author shows that already McDowell’s first nature is imbued with conceptuality in that he starts with receptivity in operation. For McDowell, not intentionality of the mind is naturalized, but nature is always already intellectualized or intentionalized. (shrink)

Philosophers have often misunderstood Kierkegaard's views on the nature and purposes of God due to a fascination with his earlier, pseudonymous works. We examine many of Kierkegaard's later works with the aim of setting forth an accurate view on this matter. The portrait of God that emerges is a personal and fiercely loving God with whom humans can and should enter into relationship. Far from advocating a fideistic faith or a cognitively unrestrained leap in the dark, we argue that Kierkegaard (...) connects this God-relationship to (a particular kind of) evidence and even knowledge. However, such evidence and knowledge – and hence God himself – may remain hidden from many individuals due to misconceptions of God and misuses of the human will. (shrink)

The evolutionary origins of deception and its functional role in our species is a major focus of research in the science of human origins. Several hypotheses have been proposed for its evolution, often packaged under either the Social Brain Hypothesis, which emphasizes the role that the evolution of our social systems may have played in scaffolding our cognitive traits, and the Foraging Brain Hypothesis, which emphasizes how changes in the human dietary niche were met with subsequent changes in cognition to (...) facilitate foraging of difficult-to-acquire foods. Despite substantive overlap, these hypotheses are often presented as competing schools of thought, and there have been few explicitly proposed theoretical links unifying the two. Utilizing cross-cultural data gathered from the Human Relations Area Files (HRAF), we identify numerous (n = 357) examples of the application of deception toward prey across 145 cultures. By comparing similar behaviors in nonhuman animals that utilize a hunting strategy known as aggressive mimicry, we suggest a potential pathway through which the evolution of deception may have taken place. Rather than deception evolving as a tactic for deceiving conspecifics, we suggest social applications of deception in humans could have evolved from an original context of directing these behaviors toward prey. We discuss this framework with regard to the evolution of other mental traits, including language, Theory of Mind, and empathy. (shrink)

There is an as yet unacknowledged and incomparable contribution to the philosophical debates about know-how to be found in the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein. It is sourced in his investigations into knowledge and certainty in On Certainty, though it is not limited to these late passages. Understanding the ramifications of this putative contribution (even if one does not agree with it) highlights the extent to which (i) there is now a new range of issues pertaining to know-how which no future (...) philosophical consideration of the topic can ignore, except on pain of failing to engage comprehensively with the subject; (ii) the topic of know-how has been inappropriately marginalised by naturalized epistemology, and may well be as central to epistemology as the propositional knowledge which currently dominates epistemology’s attention; and (iii) any engagement with these potential Wittgensteinian contributions will need to be conducted in tandem with a reflection on the meta-philosophy of epistemology, since their potential impact extends to epistemology’s main methodology, i.e., naturalized reflective equilibrium. These three conclusions, together with a diagnosis of where and why all the current intellectualist accounts of know-how are either internally inconsistent, or irreconcilably flawed on their own terms, provide the motivation and the opportunity for a New Epistemology of Know-How. These conclusions established, I offer one possible Wittgensteinian-orientated version of the New Epistemology of Know-How, providing the first example of a non-naturalized philosophical approach to the topic since Gilbert Ryle. (shrink)

Parental age at offspring conception often influences offspring longevity, but the mechanisms underlying this link are poorly understood. One mechanism that may be important is telomeres, highly conserved, repetitive sections of non‐coding DNA that form protective caps at chromosome ends and are often positively associated with longevity. Here, the potential pathways by which the age of the parents at the time of conception may impact offspring telomeres are described first, including direct effects on parental gamete telomeres and indirect effects on (...) offspring telomere loss during pre‐ or post‐natal development. Then a surge of recent studies demonstrating the effects of parental age on offspring telomeres in diverse taxa are reviewed. In doing so, important areas for future research and experimental approaches that will enhance the understanding of how and when these effects likely occur are highlighted. It is concluded by considering the potential evolutionary consequences of parental age on offspring telomeres. (shrink)

Any philosophical position can be approached in two different ways which may be termed the historical approach and the analytical approach. While dealing with a certain philosophical doctrine, we may put the main emphasis on tracing its sources and comparing the doctrine with others known in the history of philosophy. On the other hand, it is possible to direct our attention mainly towards a critical analysis of the notions and propositions on which this philosophy is based, and to examine them (...) without being much interested in the historical aspect of the problem. (shrink)

Given my dilemma, then, we should think twice before following Putnam away from metaphysical realism. Internal realism can offer only a false sense of philosophical security. And now we may doubt that it can offer even that.

It's unnerving, isn't it? When our faith feels ungrounded, untethered... unreal. When our certainty is adrift, as though an undercurrent has pulled us away from shore into the deep, into the darkness. This is disillusionment. This is spiritual pain. And if this is you, please know that you are not alone. (And you are not as far away from safety as you may feel or fear.) Though faith shines best in full sun, it grows depth in the dark. The night (...) is not your enemy. In fact, the night is necessary. In The Night Is Normal, revered author, speaker, and mentor Dr. Alicia Britt Chole offers a groundbreaking perspective that reveals spiritual disillusionment as an unexpected friend. Within these sacred pages, you'll explore how night-faith develops within your soul something far more satisfying than understanding and far more powerful than peace. Whether you're disillusioned with God, yourself, or others, Alicia offers practical and soul-full tools to help you navigate the night and find your way to a livable and love-saturated hope. Your night will not last forever. Within it, there is priceless treasure (that's simply too weighty to be sourced in sunshine). (shrink)

In many areas of scientific inquiry, the phenomena under investigation are viewed as functions on the real numbers. Since observational precision is limited, it makes sense to view these phenomena as bounded functions on the rationals. One may translate the basic notions of recursion theory into this framework by first interpreting a partial recursive function as a function on Q. The standard notions of inductive inference carry over as well, with no change in the theory. When considering the class of (...) computable functions on Q, there are a number of natural ways in which to define the distance between two functions. We utilize standard metrics to explore notions of approximate inference — our inference machines will attempt to guess values which converge to the correct answer in these metrics. We show that the new inference notions, NV∞, EX∞, and BC∞, infer more classes of functions than their standard counterparts, NV, EX, and BC. Furthermore, we give precise inclusions between the new inference notions and those in the standard inference hierarchy. We also explore weaker notions of approximate inference, leading to inference hierarchies analogous to the EXn and BCn hierarchies. Oracle inductive inference is also considered, and we give sufficient conditions under which approximate inference from a generic oracle G is equivalent to approximate inference with only finitely many queries to G. (shrink)

J Britt Holbrook - Lyotard and Greek Thought: Sophistry - Journal of the History of Philosophy 44:4 Journal of the History of Philosophy 44.4 676-677 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Reviewed by J. Britt Holbrook University of North Texas Keith Crome. Lyotard and Greek Thought: Sophistry. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. Pp. x + 186. Cloth, $68.00. Caveat lector: this deceptively short work presents an exercise in genre-bending that may leave one's head spinning, particularly if one's acquaintance (...) with the thought of Jean-François Lyotard is not quite up to snuff. One may perhaps take the appearance of such a work—written by a Lyotard scholar for Lyotard scholars—as a sign that Lyotard has finally arrived... (shrink)

I investigate patterns of usage of thanking formulae in the closing section of a corpus of 94 telephone calls made by tenants to a UK housing association. The data suggest that unilateral thanking is the norm when calls are institutionally and interactionally unmarked. In contrast, mutual thanking correlates mainly with the presence of interactional problems of various kinds, or, in a few cases, with features that are not problematic as such, but simply interactionally marked given the nature of the activity. (...) When initiated by agents rather than by callers, thanking is frequently hearable as conveying an apologetic stance. Participants thus seem to orient to different thanking patterns as devices which may be used either to mark the preceding interaction as an instance of ‘business-as-usual’ or, if such is not the case, to restore interpersonal harmony or index awareness that aspects of the preceding interaction have otherwise deviated from situational expectations. (shrink)

What, if anything, has Jesus to do with philosophy? Although widely neglected, this question calls for attention from anyone interested in philosophy,whether Christian or non-Christian. This paper clarifies how philosophy fares under the teaching of Jesus. In particular, it contends that Jesus’slove (agape) commands have important implications for how philosophy is to be done, specifically, for what questions may be pursued. The paper,accordingly, distinguishes two relevant modes of being human: a discussion mode and an obedience mode. Philosophy done under the (...) authority ofJesus’s love commands must transcend a discussion mode to realize an obedience mode of human conduct. So, under Jesus’s teachings, we no longer have business as usual in philosophy. The discipline of philosophy then takes on a purpose foreign to philosophy as we know it, even as practiced by Christian philosophers. Under the authority of Jesus, philosophy becomes agape-oriented ministry in the church of Jesus and thus reflective of Jesus himself. In this respect, Jesus is Lord of philosophy. (shrink)

SummaryThis paper defends the philosophical importance of analyticity against the influential objections raised by W. V. Quine. It characterizes analyticity in a way that is nonepistemic, avoids Quine's objections and fits his general strictures, and explains the epistemological importance of analyticity. It also explains why even proponents of Quine's naturalized epistemology should value the epistemological importance of analyticity, in connection with questions about the correctness of their epistemic principles. Given these considerations, this paper may be regarded as having rescued analyticity (...) from the throes of suspicion and myth, as set by “Two Dogmas of Empiricism.”. (shrink)

We study the formal first order system TIND in the standard language of Gentzen's LK . TIND extends LK by the purely logical rule of term-induction, that is a restricted induction principle, deriving numerals instead of arbitrary terms. This rule may be conceived as the logical image of full induction.

The acknowledgement of basic human vulnerability in relationships between mental health service users and professionals working in community-based mental health services (in Norway) was a starting point. The purpose was to explore how users of these services describe and make sense of their meetings with other people. The research is collaborative, with researcher and person with experienced-based knowledge cooperating through the research process. Data is derived from 19 interviews with 11 people who depend on mental health services for assistance at (...) least three times a week. Data is analysed according to the Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). Results confirm that reciprocity is fundamental for relationships, and that recognizing the individual entails personal involvement. The participants describe a struggle, and recognizing this struggle may help the professional to achieve a deeper understanding of the individual. (shrink)

The will theory of rights has so far been considered incapable of capturing individual rights under criminal law. Adherents of the will theory, therefore, have defended the claim that criminal law does not assign rights to individuals. In this article I argue first, that criminal law does assign individual rights and second, that the will theory of rights may enhance our understanding of these rights. The two major implications of the account are: a volenti non fit iniuria principle for criminal (...) law, and a theoretical framework for an idea of punishment as restitution. (shrink)

Recently, economic studies on labor market developments have indicated that there is a potential threat of technological mass unemployment. Both smart robotics and information technology may perform a broad range of tasks that today are fulfilled by human labor. This development could lead to vast inequalities. Proponents of an unconditional basic income have, therefore, employed this scenario to argue for their cause. In this chapter, the author argues that, although a basic income might be a valid answer to the challenge (...) of technological unemployment, it fails to account for some ethical problems specific to future expectations of mass unemployment. The author introduces the proposal of an unconditional basic capital and shows how it can address these problems adequately and avoid objections against a basic income. However, the basic capital proposal cannot replace all redistributive social policies. It has to be interpreted as a supplement to either a basic income or more traditional redistributive policies. (shrink)

Background: As part of an ongoing Scandinavian project on the dignity of care for older people, this study is based on ‘clinical caring science’ as a scientific discipline. Clinical caring science examines how ground concepts, axioms and theories are expressed in different clinical contexts. Central notions are caring culture, dignity, at-home-ness, the little extra, non-caring cultures versus caring cultures and ethical context – and climate. Aim and assumptions: This study investigates the individual variations of caring cultures in relation to dignity (...) and how it is expressed in caring acts and ethical contexts. Three assumptions are formulated: (1) the caring culture of nursing homes influences whether dignified care is provided, (2) an ethos that is reflected on and appropriated by the caregiver mirrors itself in ethical caring acts and as artful caring in an ethical context and (3) caring culture is assumed to be a more ontological or universal concept than, for example, an ethical context or ethical person-to-person acts. Research design: The methodological approach is hermeneutic. The data consist of 28 interviews with relatives of older persons from Norway, Denmark and Sweden. Ethical considerations: The principles of voluntariness, confidentiality and anonymity were respected during the whole research process. Findings: Three patterns were revealed: dignity as at-home-ness, dignity as the little extra and non-dignifying ethical context. Discussion: Caring communion, invitation, at-home-ness and ‘the little extra’ are expressions of ethical contexts and caring acts in a caring culture. A non-caring culture may not consider the dignity of its residents and may be represented by routinized care that values organizational efficiency and instrumentalism rather than an individual’s dignity and self-worth. Conclusion: An ethos must be integrated in both the organization and in the individual caregiver in order to be expressed in caring acts and in an ethical context that supports these caring acts. (shrink)

Background: Physical impairment and dependency on others may be a threat to dignity. Research questions: The purpose of this study was to explore dignity as a core concept in caring, and how healthcare personnel focus on and foster dignity in nursing home residents. Research design: This study has a hermeneutic design. Participants and research context: In all, 40 healthcare personnel from six nursing homes in Scandinavia participated in focus group interviews in this study. Ethical considerations: This study has been evaluated (...) and approved by the Regional Ethical Committees and the Social Science Data Services in the respective Scandinavian countries. Findings: Two main themes emerged: dignity as distinction (I), and dignity as influence and participation (II). Discussion: A common understanding was that stress and business was a daily challenge. Conclusion: Therefore, and according to the health personnel, maintaining human dignity requires slow caring in nursing homes, as an essential approach. (shrink)

This article asks how contexts are made in science as well as in social science, and how the making of contexts relates to political agency and intervention. To explore these issues, it traces contexting for foot-and-mouth disease and the strategies used to control the epidemic in the United Kingdom in 2001. It argues that to depict the world is to assemble contexts and to hold them together in a mode that may be descriptive, explanatory, or predictive. In developing this argument, (...) it explores how contexts are assembled in a series of different descriptive and explanatory narratives in epidemiology, policy, critical social science, and social studies of science. (shrink)

Neuropsychiatric disorders introduce distinct challenges to clinical decision-making. Affected patients often experience impairments or absences in rationality, lucidity and cogni-emotional capacities, rendering it difficult for them to engage in the decision-making process. In turn, dynamics of the patient-physician relationship become strained, including when physicians employ bioethical principlism or moral case deliberation to arrive at ethically justified courses of action–both of which require sufficient communication and rationality that may be impaired or altogether absent in the presence of psychopathology. The complexity of (...) neuropsychiatric conditions therefore compels interrogation towards how ethics consultations are currently constructed and conducted when full communication or rational decision-making cannot be assumed. Delany et al, for example, present a robust, methodical framework for ethical deliberation.1 Such methodologies for facilitating ethical decision-making, although valuable in predominant contexts, assume full participant engagement and decision-making capacities (eg, independent moral agency). Neuropsychiatric disorders complicate this assumption, making it difficult for patients with limited decision-making capacity to engage meaningfully in proposed ethics consultations.2 This paper will explore how neuropsychiatric disorders complicate the assumptions of full participant engagement underlying ethical frameworks. It will argue that, by adapting ethics consultations to function as a ‘mental prosthesis’, clinicians can better navigate the ethical challenges posed by neuropsychiatric disorders, helping to ensure that patient autonomy is upheld even in cases of impaired cognitive …. (shrink)

Background: Ethical problems are a universal phenomenon but rarely researched concerning patients dying from acute stroke. These patients often have a reduced consciousness from stroke onset and thereby lack ability to convey their needs and could be described as ‘incompetent’ decision makers regarding their own care. Objective: The aim of the study was to deepen the understanding of stroke team members’ reasoning about truth-telling in end-of-life care due to acute stroke. Research design: Qualitative study based on individual interviews utilizing combined (...) deductive and inductive content analysis. Participants and research context: A total of 15 stroke team members working in stroke units of two associated county hospitals in western Sweden participated. Ethical considerations: The study was approved by the Regional Ethics Review Board, Gothenburg, Sweden. Findings: The main findings were the team members’ dynamic movement between the categories ‘Truth above all’ and ‘Hide truth to protect’. Honesty was highly valued and considered as a reason for always telling the truth, with the argument of truth as common morality. However, the carers also argued for hiding the truth for different reasons such as not adding extra burden in the sorrow, awaiting a timely moment and not being a messenger of bad news. Withholding truth could both be seen as a way of protecting themselves from difficult conversations and to protect others. Discussion: The results indicate that there are various barriers for truthfulness. Interpreted from a virtue of ethics perspective, withholding of truth might also be seen as an expression of sound judgement to put the patient’s best interest first. Conclusion: The carers may need support in the form of supervision to be given space to reflect on their experience and thereby promote ethically justified care. Here, the multi-professional team can be of great value and contribute through inter-professional sharing of knowledge. (shrink)

Moser’s dismissal of natural theology as a matter of “spectator” evidence is questioned, as is Moser’s reservations about the possibility of impartial philosophical inquiry. Some assistance from natural theology can help Moser meet some of his critics’ objections. A worry that is noted concerns whether Moser’s stress on the centrality of personal repentance and transformation in religious epistemology may blur the line between philosophy and apologetics.

Aus dem Inhalt: Views from the North: Hans Petter Graver: Law, Justice and the State: Nordic Perspectives u Jacob Dahl Rendtorff: The Danish Welfare State: Philosophical Ideals and Systemic Reality u Sigri!Dur *orgeirsdottir: Feminist Ethics and Feminist Politics u Kuellike Lengi: The Situation of Human Rights in Estonia u Einar Palsson: Pythagoras and Early Icelandic Law u Law, Discourse and Rationality: Mats Flodin: Internal and External Rationality of Legal Systems u Logi Gunnarsson: A Discourse About Discourse u Hjordi!s Hakonardottir: Legal (...) Language: A Tool of Justice u Ghita Holmstrom-Hintikka: On the Use of Expert Witness in Legal Reasoning and Inquiry u Law, State and Nation: Agust H. Ing*orsson: Democracy, Bureaucracy and Marginalization of the State u Aleksander Peczenik: Law-State, Legal Certainty and Legitimacy of Law u Ove K. Pedersen/Sverre Raffnsoe: Reorganizing Society u Juha Raikka: Mill on National Sentiment u Pall Skulason: Concepts of the State and Classes of Value u Problems of Law and Rights: Britt-Mari Blegvad: How to Cope With Uncertainty: Trust and Law u Jon Wetlesen: Animal Rights or Human Duties?. (shrink)

Inspired by Paul Moser's recent work, this paper presents a new parable on the topic of belief and unbelief in the tradition of Wisdom, Flew and Mitchell. -/- This paper was read at the annual POH Symposium at Lake Wenatchee, WA in May, 2010. An edited version of this paper has appeared in the second issue of the Seattle Critical Review (online).

Knitter asks Moser if the soteriological inclusivism he is proposing for our understanding of God can also be extended to our understanding of Christ: Christ’s death and resurrection do not constitute or bring about saving grace; they reveal it, thus leaving room for the possibility of other revealers. For Yandell, Knitter first clarifies that the necessary conditions for dialogue are not established before but in the dialogue. He then urges an epistemic humility for all Christian philosophers in view of (...) the ineffable Mystery of God—a Mystery that may well include, to the philosopher’s consternation, a “coinciding of opposites.”. (shrink)

The current technoscientific progress has led to a sectorization in the philosophy of science. Today the philosophy of science isn't is informal interested in studying old problems about the general characteristics of scientific practice. The interest of the philosopher of science is the study of concepts, problems and riddles of particular disciplines. Then, within this progress of philosophy of science, neuroscientific research stands out, because it invades issues traditionally addressed by the humanities, such as the nature of consciousness, action, knowledge, (...) normativity, etc. As a result, the new area of interdisciplinary study of neuroscience and philosophy arises: neurophilosophy. This emerging area applies neuroscientific concepts to traditional philosophical questions, limiting their responses to neuroscientific revelations about nervous systems. Neurophilosophy research focuses on problems related to the indirect nature of mind and brain, computational or representative analysis of brain process, relationships between psychological and neuroscientific research, adequate adaptations of physical and philosophical concepts in neuroscience and the place of cognitive functions. Now, the temporal representation of conscious experience and the types of the neural architecture to represent objects in time have aroused scientific interest. Under these interests, we focus on the studies on the temporary triadic structure of phenomenological consciousness in Dan Lloyd and Rick Grush. From Grush’s studies, the importance of Kantian ideas for cognitive neuroscience emerges, due to the active way in which Kant conceived space and time as forms of intuition, within which the mind interprets its experience. Under this perspective, the theoretical arguments of Dennett-Kinsbourne and Eagleman-Sejnowski represent winks in the direction of Kant-Husserl within the neuroscientific goal while considering that the contents provided by the mind included space, objects and perception of causal relationships. Then, theories of cognitive neuroscience are beginning to suggest that these elements are also, as Kant argued, interpretative elaborations provided by mind / brain, and not only content received from outside. In other words, current cognitive neuroscientific theories try to pass from its Humean phase to a Kantian phase. So, the challenge has been to explain that these elements are provided by the mind and the world itself, and how they have the content they have come from. These are lacking in current studies. Filling this gap helps to involve the analysis of the scientist’s experience in his theoretical attitude. In this sense, an investigation under the Kantian-Husserlian approach that involves pure intuitions a priori with the experience of the scientific and neuroscientific concepts represents a ground-breaking. At present, a neurophilosophical study about this does not exist. In this sense, one feasible proposal for research would be based on the application of neuroscientific results of Moser-Britt to philosophical problems of foundational notions in relativistic physics: space, time, space-time, field, etc., under the Kantian-Husserlian approach, which allows to demonstrate the multidisciplinary link between neurophilosophy and physics. This represents a ground-breaking area in current interests in scientific research, with a positive impact in the field of neuroscience, and contributing to the study of abstraction emphasizing the importance of Kant’s Copernican turn and Husserl’s phenomenological ideas in the construction of physical theories. -/- . (shrink)

FENOMENOLOGIA Y FISICA EN HUSSERL, WEYL Y NEELAMKAVIL: MATERIA-CAMPO BASADO EN EXTENSIÓN-CAMBIO Castillo Ochoa, Ruth Transferencias Interculturales e Históricas de la Europa Medieval Mediterránea RESUMEN La historia de la terminología científica posibilita dar cuenta de 'cambios lingüísticos' o contingencia de términos en Ciencia. La Fenomenología de Husserl resulta un marco filosófico completo para elucidar significados en terminología científica enfatizando el carácter a priori de conceptos fundacionales, su aspecto contingente (lenguaje), intersubjetividad, sujeto transcendental y epojé. En tal sentido, soportar las nociones (...) fundacionales en física bajo las categorías universales Extensión-Cambio de Neelamkavil contribuye al ideal husserliano. Aún no se llega a una imagen adecuada de las intricadas relaciones entre Filosofía y Ciencia. Sin embargo, los hallazgos científicos de Moser-Britt (2014) soportan posiciones kantianas y husserlianas en torno a los términos a priori que fundamentan las teorías físicas. Como consecuencia, los resultados han despertado el interés de filósofos y científicos hacia las ideas husserlianas en tanto terminología lingüística y comprensión aprioricista del mundo. De esta forma, dentro del estado actual del arte, P. Berghofer y H. Wiltsche (2018) abordan el rol de fenomenología en Filosofía de la Física; mientras J. Drummond (2019) en "Husserl: German Perspectives" analiza el rol de la fenomenología en Ciencia. R. Neelamkavil (2018) da cuenta de un nuevo conjunto de categorías en física que comulgan con las ideas de Husserl. La comprensión de los términos Masa y Campo en física, se aborda el estudio de H. Grelland "Husserl, Einstein y Weyl and Concepts of Space, Time and Space-Time" y H. Weyl, "Space, Matter and Time". Un análisis metalingüísitico entre términos científicos y fenomenológicos no se ha realizado aún. La intención de la propuesta es abordar este punto ciego. -/- PALABRAS CLAVE Extensión, Cambio, Masa, Campo, Esencia . (shrink)

Crispin Sartwell ingeniously defends the provocative thesis that mere true belief suffices for knowledge. In doing so, he challenges one of the most deeply entrenched epistemological tenets, namely that knowledge must be more than mere true belief. Particularly interesting is the way he defends his thesis by appealing to considerations adduced by such prominent epistemologists as William Alston, Laurence BonJour, Alvin Goldman and Paul Moser, each of whom denies that knowledge is merely true belief. In this paper, I argue (...) that the case Sartwell presents for his thesis fails. However, by examining why it fails, we may derive at least four important epistemological lessons: being justified does not entail being able to give a justification; we should distinguish between epistemic justification conceived of as intrinsically conducive to truth and conceived of as extrinsically conducive to truth; we should distinguish between epistemic justification conceived of as an essential criterion of knowledge and conceived of as an accidental criterion of knowledge ; and epistemologists need to specify how the telos of inquiry involves more than the acquisition of true beliefs.Socrates: Then tell me: what definition can we give with the least risk of contradicting ourselves? (shrink)

We shall formulate an analysis of the ordinary notion of intentional action that clarifies a commonsense distinction between intentional and nonintentional action. Our analysis will build on some typically neglected considerations about relations between lucky action and intentional action. It will highlight the often- overlooked role of evidential considerations in intentional action, thus identifying the key role of certain epistemological considerations in action theory. We shall also explain why some vagueness is indispensable in a characterization of intentional action as ordinarily (...) understood. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 139 twenty years ago has slowly given way to an awareness that cross-cultural differences are real enough to call for different rules of behavior and different sets of values. Several possibilities are still open to the ethicist concerned with the problem of relativism. We may want to reconsider more carefully than ever before the connotations of "relative," of "action" and of "culture" in the context of those (...) anthropologists whose claims are said to be detrimental to ethics. Of these terms so crucial for what Moser calls relativism of right, only the first has been analyzed from opposite perspectives by Stevenson and Berlin. So far as I know, no one has treated "relative" as a relational term in the fruitful way suggested by Berlin.19 We may also come to realize that the issue of relativism is too much imbedded in historical and metaphysical tenets and thus is not amenable to the ahistorical treatment of the logical status of moral judgment. Thus we may want to rewrite its whole history by exploiting one of the best facets of Moser's essay. That is, a comparative study of the sociology of knowledge with the organic model of cultural anthropology. Lastly we may agree with A. Edel and consider the whole issue a closed chapter in the history of philosophy, and move on to the philosophically more fruitful investigation of the why and wherefore of moral change between generations and between historical periods. L. M. PALMER University of Delaware Ernst Cassirer: Scientific Knowledge and the Concept of Man. By Seymour W. Itzkoff. (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971. Pp. xi +286. $9.95) There is a sense in which the title of this book is misleading. To be sure, Dr. Itzkoff does deal with Cassirer and with Cassirer's neo-Kantian conception of scientific knowledge and of man. But there is more to the book than this. The first seven chapters are, in effect, a demonstration that "Cassirer left us with a difficult theoretical dilemma: the existence of two contrasting and opposed views of human nature" (p. 172). The last two chapters (pp. 172-252) are the author's attempt to bring those two views into harmony within the framework of contemporary science and philosophical analysis. The first two chapters (pp. 1-37) trace briefly the development of philosophical thought from the time of "the intellectual revolution set in motion by Galileo" to Kant's "Copernican revolution"--to the Kantian thesis, that is, that "the fundamental act of perception and the structuring of experience itseLf depend upon... 'transcendental apperception' as a 'condition of the possibility of perception itself'" (p. 27). It is the concern with "form and function" rather than with "substance and reality," which the Marburg neo-Kantians, and with them Cassirer, accepted as the lasting achievement of Kant's "critical philosophy." But Cassirer found in Kant also a "parallel concern... for humanistic disciplines" (p. 33) and, as "a central theme," the assertion of the "autonomy of human nature" (p. 35). The survey is suggestive but, in some respects, it is also inaccurate. For example, Kant's presumed "lapse into a radical subjectivism" cannot be justified by the reference, in passing, as it were, to the Opus postumum (p. 29)--although the fault is here perhaps that of Norman Kemp Smith rather than that of the author. A more ~o I. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford, 1969), pp. 96-106. 140 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY serious misrepresentation of Kant may be found in the author's acceptance of T. D. Weldon's statement that "the categories... supply principles which are... essential to the existing of a unitary self-consciousness" (p. 32), for this is precisely the reverse of the Kantian position. Also, it is hardly accurate to speak of "Kant's postulation of laws of ethical behavior" (p. 36), for, surely, the various formulations of the categorical imperative are not "laws of ethical behavior" but criteria of such laws. Chapters 3 and 4 (pp. 38-98) are devoted to discussions of the nature of scientific knowledge. Kant's initial commitment to Newtonian mechanics is, of course, a wellknown fact; but Professor Itzkoff quite correctly points out... (shrink)

On the surface, it seems intuitively plausible that if an agent luckily manages to perform a desired action (e.g., rolling a six with a fair die or winning the lottery), the performance of which is not the result of any relevant skill on her part, we should not say that she performed the action intentionally. This intuition suggests that our concept of intentional action is sensitive to considerations of skill, luck, and causal control. Indeed, some philosophers have claimed that in (...) order for an action to be performed intentionally it must be performed with a relevant amount of skill or control - i.e., an intentional action cannot simply be the result of luck. On this view, skill and control are necessary conditions of our everyday concept of intentional action. In this essay, I discuss empirical evidence that challenges this claim. After briefly setting the stage, I examine Al Mele and Paul Moser's thorough analysis of intentional action - paying particular attention to some of the interesting scenarios they offer in support of their position. Next, I discuss the results of some simple psychological experiments that show that people's judgments concerning whether actions are intentional can often be affected by the moral features of these actions - features that may trump considerations of skill, luck, and control. Finally, I conclude that if this is correct, philosophers who claim that skill and control are necessary conditions of the folk concept of intentional action appear to be mistaken. One can test attempted philosophical analyses of intentional action partly by ascertaining whether what these analyses entail about particular actions is in line with what the majority of non-specialists would say about these actions if there is a widely shared concept of intentional action, such judgments provide evidence about what the concept is, and a philosophical analysis of intentional action that is wholly unconstrained by that concept runs the risk of having nothing more than a philosophical fiction as its subject matter. (Mele, 2001, p. 27). (shrink)

The emergence of the field of health care at a distance, or “telehealth,” has been embedded within discourses of high ambition about health improvement, seamless services, empowerment, and independence for patients. In this article, the authors examine how telehealthcare technologies assume certain forms of patients—or “telepatients”—who can be mobilized and combined with images and artifacts that speak for them in the clinical encounter. Second, a tentative intervention is made in these emerging identities in the form of facilitating some alternative discourses (...) about telehealthcare. The aim is to stimulate debate by presenting and contrasting these different approaches to technology development. Such differences take material and discursive shape in the making and unmaking of telepatients, showing important interferences in the shaping of identity and possibilities for governance and participation. (shrink)

This research investigates 3- and 5-year-olds' relative fairness in distributing small collections of even or odd numbers of more or less desirable candies, either with an adult experimenter or between two dolls. The authors compare more than 200 children from around the world, growing up in seven highly contrasted cultural and economic contexts, from rich and poor urban areas, to small-scale traditional and rural communities. Across cultures, young children tend to optimize their own gain, not showing many signs of self-sacrifice (...) or generosity. Already by 3 years of age, self-optimizing in distributive justice is based on perspective taking and rudiments of mind reading. By 5 years, overall, children tend to show more fairness in sharing. What varies across cultures is the magnitude of young children's self-interest. More fairness (less self-interest) in distributive justice is evident by children growing up in small-scale urban and traditional societies thought to promote more collective values. (shrink)

_Heidegger's Hidden Sources_ documents for the first time Heidegger's remarkable debt to East Asian philosophy. In this groundbreaking study, Reinhard May shows conclusively that Martin Heidegger borrowed some of the major ideas of his philosophy - on occasion almost word for word - from German translations of Chinese Daoist and Zen Buddhist classics. The discovery of this astonishing appropriation of non-Western sources will have important consequences for future interpretations of Heidegger's work. Moreover, it shows Heidegger as a pioneer of comparative (...) philosophy and transcultural thinking. (shrink)

This essay argues that political, economic, and cultural developments have made the twentieth century disciplinary approach to philosophy unsustainable. It (a) discusses the reasons behind this unsustainability, which also affect the academy at large, (b) describes applied philosophy as an inadequate theoretical reaction to contemporary societal pressures, and (c) proposes a dedisciplined and interstitial approach??field philosophy??as a better response to the challenges facing the twenty-first century philosophy.

Preface By William Van O'Connor And Frederick J. Hoffman.