Since its reunification, Berlin has regained its reputation as a sexually liberal European metropolis, offering spaces and infrastructures for non-normative sex to become present in the cityscape. However, with the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic in Germany and the concomitant measures to contain its spread, sexual practices and their open display have become highly contested and subject to increased regulation. In this article, we attend to sex work and casual sex among gay men, who, both historically and at present, have (...) been placed under particular public scrutiny and moralised governance. Yet, non-normative sex did not vanish from the city during the pandemic, but appeared in the form of both moralising media exposure and politically motivated public appearances. Attending to the intersections and divergences within these shifting presences of casual gay sex and sex work, we highlight how the biopolitical governance of pandemic sex has been evaded, contested and incorporated into efforts to normalise certain sexual activities. We therefore conclude that the pandemic had ambivalent effects on non-normative sexual practices in Berlin. It contributed to a further politicisation in the fight for their place in the city and to the emergence of normative assumptions about the respectable sexual subject for and within communities centred around non-normative sexual practices. (shrink)

To write of “the” philosophy of transhumanism is a little daring. The growth of transhumanism as a movement and philosophy means that differing perspectives on it have formed.

In the past, it was possible to approach transhumanism as primarily involving philosophical discussion and technological speculation. While transhumanist goals such as radical life extension, uploading, and cognitive, sensory, and physical enhancement were speculative they were also considered scientifically feasible, even if the technologies to achieve those goals appeared remote.

Dear Mother Nature: Sorry to disturb you, but we humans – your offspring – come to you with some things to say. (Perhaps you could pass this on to Father, since we never seem to see him around.).

Menary OpenMIND, MIND Group, Frankfurt am Main, 2015) has argued that the development of our capacities for mathematical cognition can be explained in terms of enculturation. Our ancient systems for perceptually estimating numerical quantities are augmented and transformed by interacting with a culturally-enriched environment that provides scaffolds for the acquisition of cognitive practices, leading to the development of a discrete number system for representing number precisely. Numerals and the practices associated with numeral systems play a significant role in this process. (...) However, the details of the relationship between the ancient number system and the discrete number system remain unclear. This lack of clarity is exacerbated by the problem of symbolic estrangement and the fact that unique features of how numeral systems represent require our ancient number system to play a dual role. These issues highlight that Dehaene’s From monkey brain to human brain, MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 133–157, 2005) neuronal recycling hypothesis may be insufficient to explain the neural mechanisms underlying the process of enculturation. In order to explain mathematical enculturation, and enculturation more generally, it may be necessary to adopt Anderson’s :245–266, 2010; After phrenology: neural reuse and the interactive brain, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2014) theory of neural reuse. (shrink)

Why did Theodor W. Adorno write Negative Dialectics? In an age where, as Adorno argued in that book, philosophy appears to have become obsolete, answering this question requires reconstructing Adorno's complex views on the role, status, and possibility of philosophical thinking after its “appointment” with its historical hour was missed. This chapter explores this concept of lateness by reconstructing the ways in which Negative Dialectics, indeed all of Adorno's philosophical work, is an exercise in “disappointment.”.

The practice of medicine—and especially the patient-doctor relationship—has seen exceptional shifts in ethical standards of care over the past few years, which by and large originate in occidental countries and are then extrapolated worldwide. However, this phenomenon is blind to the fact that an ethical practice of medicine remains hugely dependent on prevailing cultural and societal expectations of the community in which it serves. One model aiming to conceptualise the dichotomous efforts for global standardisation of medical care against differing sociocultural (...) expectations is the individualism-collectivism model, with the ‘West’ being seen as individualistic and the ‘East’ being seen as collectivistic. This has been used by many academics to explain differences in approach towards ethical practice on key concepts such as informed consent and patient autonomy. However, I argue that this characterisation is incomplete and lacks nuance into the complexities surrounding cross-cultural ethics in practice, and I propose an alternative model based on the ethics of clinical care in Hong Kong, China. Core ethical principles need not be culture-bound—indeed, their very existence mandates for them to be universal and non-derogable—but instead cultural alignment occurs in the particular implementation of these principles, insofar as they respect the general spirit of contemporary ethical standards. (shrink)

Dove and Machery both argue that recent findings about the nature of numerical representation present problems for Concept Empiricism. I shall argue that, whilst this evidence does challenge certain versions of CE, such as Prinz, it needn’t be seen as problematic to the general CE approach. Recent research can arguably be seen to support a CE account of number concepts. Neurological and behavioral evidence suggests that systems involved in the perception of numerical properties are also implicated in numerical cognition. Furthermore, (...) the discovery of associations between spatial and numerical representations also lends independent support to a CE approach. Although these findings support CE in general, certain versions of the theory may need revising in order to accommodate them. In particular, it may be necessary to either jettison Prinz's Modal Specificity Hypothesis or to revise one’s method for individuating modal representational formats. (shrink)

In this chapter the author argues that the desire to improve on the human body and eventually to replace it with post‐biological alternatives does not imply that we loathe the flesh in which we are currently embodied. The appeal of post‐biology lies in the opportunities for expanding not only our cognition and sensory richness and for sculpting and refining our emotions but also for deeper self‐understanding. The chapter points out that post‐biological beings are not truly disembodied. All thinking beings rely (...) ultimately on physical processes, even if those processes are distributed across numerous computational devices. Whatever senses are built into the bodies we choose to inhabit, we will also be able to expand our perceptual range enormously by connecting to external sensors. If we can accomplish the transition to post‐biological being, the result will not be mechanization and restriction; it will be greater richness of being and existential freedom. (shrink)

Pragmatism is a direct response to the notion that some branches of philosophy lead to dead ends or lack practical applications. The Protogen stealth ships provide an interesting example. In The Expanse, the protomolecule disassembles and reassembles human bodies in random and horrific ways. Eros had to be sacrificed to protect the rest of humanity from the threat of the protomolecule. The Eros incident illuminates the way the remorseless logic of utilitarianism can lead to dreadful results. The Expanse allows us (...) to look at different views on the moral limits of science. It also illuminates our shared humanity. The Expanse suggests that when we lose sight of our humanity, even if the goal is to save humanity, we make the wrong decisions. (shrink)

The question at issue is to develop a computational interpretation of Girard's Linear Logic [Girard, 1987] and to obtain efficient decision algorithms for this logic, based on the bottom-up approach. It involves starting with the simplest natural fragment of linear logic and then expanding it step-by-step. We give a complete computational interpretation for the Horn fragment of Linear Logic and some natural generalizations of it enriched by the two additive connectives: and &. Within the framework of this interpretation, it becomes (...) possible to explicitly formalize and clarify the computational aspects of the fragments of Linear Logic in question and establish exactly the complexity level of these fragments. In particular, the simplest natural Horn fragment of Linear Logic is proved to be NP-complete. As a corollary, we obtain the affirmative solution for the problem ): whether the multiplicative fragment of linear logic is NP-complete. (shrink)

This paper defends a novel version of moderate pessimism about moral deference, i.e., the view that we have pro tanto reason to try to avoid moral deference. The problem with moral deference is that it puts one in a bad position to form what I call morally worthy attitudes, i.e., non-cognitive attitudes that have moral worth in the same sense that certain actions have moral worth. Forming morally worthy attitudes requires a special sensitivity to the sufficiency of the moral reasons (...) one has to form these attitudes. However, when one defers about a moral claim, one takes it fully on trust, which entails that one is strongly disposed to not intentionally try to take precautions against believing that moral claim epistemically defectively (e.g., falsely or without sufficient justification). Thus, moral deference makes one strongly disposed to not try to acquire the sensitivity required for forming morally worthy attitudes. However, morally worthy attitudes are more valuable than merely fitting attitudes and plausibly have both final and non-final value. Thus, moral deference interferes with gaining something with final and non-final value. (shrink)

Linear Logic was introduced by Girard as a resource-sensitive refinement of classical logic. In this paper we establish strong connections between natural fragments of Linear Logic and a number of basic concepts related to different branches of Computer Science such as Concurrency Theory, Theory of Computations, Horn Programming and Game Theory. In particular, such complete correlations allow us to introduce several new semantics for Linear Logic and to clarify many results on the complexity of natural fragments of Linear Logic. As (...) a main corollary, any non-deterministic and concurrent computation is proved to be simulated directly within the framework of each of these systems. (shrink)

This article examines the first-century c.e.Laus Pisonis, an anonymous panegyric for a certain Piso that lays particular emphasis on his skill at lyre-playing, ball games and the board game, the ludus latrunculorum. Whereas this focus has often been a cause of consternation among critics, this article argues that play is a crucial element of the poem's poetic and political operations. The first section shows that the poem employs images of poetic maturity and of temporality in order to justify a light (...) or ludic topic for an allegedly young poet. The second section identifies a hitherto unobserved telestich in the passage describing the ludus latrunculorum and argues that this letter game defines a positive period of play within the poem. The third section further demonstrates that this letter game is aimed specifically at the patron Piso as he is represented within the poem. That is, the poet parallels Piso's potential to uncover the telestich in the text and his ability to uncover the poet's hidden talent. The concluding fourth section explores the wider impact of this reinterpretation of the Laus Pisonis for the literary history of the Early Principate. It proposes that the poem's playfulness should not be seen as reflecting the progressive disempowerment of the political elite. Rather, the poem is an early case of Roman political discourse encroaching on the value of the trivial and the boundaries of otium. The Laus Pisonis makes play political. (shrink)

I aim to vindicate the claim that we can owe someone gratitude for believing in us and to show how this seemingly prosaic fact has important upshots for the normativity of gratitude. I start by sketching a novel account of what it is to believe in someone according to which it consists in holding an affective attitude of confident optimism toward their general ability in some domain(s). I then argue that people can deserve gratitude for holding this attitude. I close (...) by showing how the possibility of being gratitudeworthy for believing in someone casts down on three commonplaces about when gratitude is owed. (shrink)

The subjective time of an instrumental action is shifted towards its outcome. This temporal binding effect is partially retrospective, i.e., occurs upon outcome perception. Retrospective binding is thought to reflect post-hoc inference on agency based on sensory evidence of the action – outcome association. However, many previous binding paradigms cannot exclude the possibility that retrospective binding results from bottom-up interference of sensory outcome processing with action awareness and is functionally unrelated to the processing of the action – outcome association. Here, (...) we keep bottom-up interference constant and use a contextual manipulation instead. We demonstrate a shift of subjective action time by its outcome in a context of variable outcome timing. Crucially, this shift is absent when there is no such variability. Thus, retrospective action binding reflects a context-dependent, model-based phenomenon. Such top-down re-construction of action awareness seems to bias agency attribution when outcome predictability is low. (shrink)

This review article provides an overview of important, recent approaches to conceptual history from scholarship on South Asia. While conceptual history is not a consolidated field in South Asia, the colonial encounter has greatly stimulated interest in conceptual inquiries. Recent scholarship questions the uniformity even of well-researched concepts such as liberalism. It is methodologically innovative in thinking about the influence of economic structures for the development of concepts. Rethinking religious and secular languages, scholars have furthermore stressed the importance of smaller (...) communicative units such as genre or hermeneutical practices to shape ideas e.g. of the political. As part of global and imperial formations, scholars are well aware of the link between power and colonial temporalities. Lastly, they have suggested new sources for conceptual history, such as literature, film, and sound. (shrink)

Über den zusammenhang der philosophie mit der zeitgeschichte.--Über das verhältnis des einzelnen zur gemeinschaft.--Die metaphysik in vergangenheit und gegenwart.--Die philosophie des primitiven menschen.--Die psychologie im anfang des zwanzigsten jahrhunderts.--Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz.--Gustav Theodor Fechner.--Die Leipziger hochschule im wandel der jahrhunderte.

CHAPTER I Introduction A. RABBINIC WORSHIP AND HALAKAH Rabbinic worship is personal experience and yet it is governed by Halakah, law. ...

This paper defends a novel version of moderate pessimism about moral deference, i.e., the view that we have _pro tanto_ reason to try to avoid moral deference. The problem with moral deference is that it puts one in a bad position to form what I call morally worthy attitudes, i.e., non-cognitive attitudes that have moral worth in the same sense that certain actions have moral worth. Forming morally worthy attitudes requires a special sensitivity to the sufficiency of the moral reasons (...) one has to form these attitudes. However, when one defers about a moral claim, one takes it fully on trust, which entails that one is strongly disposed to not intentionally try to take precautions against believing that moral claim epistemically defectively (e.g., falsely or without sufficient justification). Thus, moral deference makes one strongly disposed to not try to acquire the sensitivity required for forming morally worthy attitudes. However, morally worthy attitudes are more valuable than merely fitting attitudes and plausibly have both final and non-final value. Thus, moral deference interferes with gaining something with final and non-final value. (shrink)