Meta-arguments are arguments about one or more arguments, or argumentation in general. They contrast to ground-level arguments, which are about natural phenomena, historical events, human actions, abstract entities, etc. Although meta-arguments are common in all areas of human cognitive practice, and although implicit studies of them are found in many works, and although a few explicit scholarly contributions exist, meta-argumentation has never been examined explicitly, directly, and systematically in book-length treatment. This lacuna is especially unfortunate because such treatment can offer (...) not only an understanding of a special class of arguments, but also a promising way of doing logic and argumentation theory. This is the first book that attempts a systematic treatment of meta-arguments, providing both an illustration of the meta-argumentational approach to logical theory, and an analysis of an especially rich collection of meta-arguments. First, it elaborates an empirical methodology derived partly from a critical appreciation of Stephen Toulmin's applied-logic approach, and partly from a novel application of the author's historical-textual approach. Then it examines theoretical meta-arguments, by such scholars as Tony Blair, Robert Fogelin, Alvin Goldman, Trudy Govier, David Hitchcock, Ralph Johnson, Henry Johnstone, Erik Krabbe, Frans van Eemeren, Carl Wellman, and John Woods, on such topics as defining argument, methods of criticism, deep disagreements, and conductive or pro-and-con arguments. Thirdly, it studies famous meta-arguments by such classics as John Stuart Mill, David Hume, and Galileo Galilei, on such topics as freedom of discussion, women's liberation, the existence of God and intelligent design, and the motion of the earth. (shrink)

Winner of the 1974 National Book Award The product of many years of reflection on phenomenology, this book is a comprehensive and creative introduction to the philosophy of Edmund Husserl. Natanson uses Husserl's later work as a clue to the meaning of his entire intellectual career, showing how his earlier methodological work evolved into the search for transcendental roots and developed into a philosophy of the life-world. Phenomenology, for Natanson, emerges as a philosophy of origin, a transcendental discipline concerned with (...) consciousness, history, and world rather than with introspection and traditional metaphysical warfare. (shrink)

"This volume assembles twelve texts published between 1892 and 1915.... The editors allow one to see the genesis of the ideas of Duhem, philosopher and historian, of the variety of his styles, and sometimes also the limits of his work.... A useful index, probably unique in the field of Duhemian studies, completes the book.... The English-language public may be assured an exemplary translation and a reliable critical apparatus." --Jean Gayon, _Revue d'Histoire des Sciences_.

In this chapter I explore, in some cases for the first time, the significance of the ethical, liberatory dimension of Spinoza’s thought among a number of women philosophers across the long nineteenth century’s German tradition. I begin with brief discussions of Elise Reimarus and Charlotte von Stein. I then proceed to more in-depth treatments of Caroline Michaelis- Böhmer-Schlegel-Schelling and Karoline von Günderrode, stressing not only that we may learn about both in drawing out a link to Spinoza or Spinozism, but (...) likewise that we can deepen our understanding of Spinoza in bringing him into dialogue with each (in particular regarding, respectively, the importance of others for self-expression, as well as the metaphysical and ethical status of death, especially suicide). I conclude with a discussion of the turn-of-the-century thinkers Lou Salomé as well as Resa von Schirnhofer, Anna Tumarkin, and especially Elisabeth Schmitt—some of the first academic women philosophers in the German-language context, all closely engaged with Spinoza’s writings—before presenting final remarks concerning the status of Spinoza’s thought in the present context. (shrink)

In this article, we describe the influence of violations of community standards of fairness on subsequent ethical decision-making and emotions. Across two studies, we manipulated explanations for a common action, and we find that explanations that violate community standards of fairness lead to greater intentions to behave unethically than explanations that are consistent with community standards of fairness. We find that perceptions of justifiability mediate this relationship. We also find that individuals derive significant psychological benefits from engaging in unethical behavior (...) following perceived violations of fairness. (shrink)

We argue in this paper that so-called new wave reductionism fails to capture the nature of the interlevel relations between psychology and neuroscience. Bickle (1995, Psychoneural reduction of the genuinely cognitive: some accomplished facts, Philosophical Psychology, 8, 265-285; 1998, Psychoneural reduction: the new wave, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press) has claimed that a (bottom-up) reduction of the psychological concepts of learning and memory to the concepts of neuroscience has in fact already been accomplished. An investigation of current research on the phenomenon (...) of long-term potentiation reveals that this claim overstates the facts. Both the psychological and the neural concepts involved have not yet stabilized and face further correction under the influence of both bottom-up and top-down selection pressures. In addition, psychological concepts often refer to functions, and functions are indispensable and irreducible. Function ascriptions pick out objective patterns involving historical factors and distal goals. This view of functions implies that psychological facts cannot be simply read off from the neurophysiological facts. Although psychological theorizing is constrained by neurophysiology (and vice versa), psychology remains distinct at least to some degree. (shrink)

Ces textes rédigés pour la radio préfigurent les travaux les plus innovants de la philosophie de Merleau-Ponty.

This book looks at two ‘revolutions’ in philosophy – phenomenology and conceptual analysis which have been influential in sociology and psychology. It discusses humanistic psychiatry and sociological approaches to the specific area of mental illness, which counter the ultimately reductionist implications of Freudian psycho-analytic theory. The book, originally published in 1973, concludes by stating the broad underlying themes of the two forms of humanistic philosophy and indicating how they relate to the problems of theory and method in sociology.

The doctrine of eliminative materialism holds that belief-desire psychology is massively referentially disconnected. We claim, however, that it is not at all obvious what it means to be referentially (dis)connected. The two major accounts of reference both lead to serious difficulties for eliminativism: it seems that elimination is either impossible or omnipresent. We explore the idea that reference fixation is a much more local, partial, and context-dependent process than was supposed by the classical accounts. This pragmatic view suggests that elimination (...) is not the prime model for understanding the complex relations between the mind and brain sciences, and that we have little ground for concluding that in general psychological kinds do not exist. We suggest that reference changes are better seen as continuous rather than completely eliminative. (shrink)

This paper distinguishes the respective aims of Jaspers's and Heidegger's philosophical enterprises with reference to their radically divergent uses of the key terms. It was always been of the essence of Jasper's concept of philosophy that it « appropriate » tradition and validate its own possibilities in « differentiation » from tradition. Accordingly Heidegger is not concerned, as is Jaspers, over the « gold » of the « perennial philosophy » but, against the background of the « question of Being (...) » , over the « destruction » of Western philosophy as such. Jaspers's philosophy attempts to save philosophy in the 20th century in the face of Heideggers's destruction of the ontologicei heritage. Cet article distingue les buts respectifs de Jaspers et de Heidegger en référence à leurs usages divergents des termes clés. Il est de l'essence de la philosophie selon Jaspers de « s'approprier » la tradition et de mettre en évidence ses propres possibilités en se distinguant d'elle. Heidegger n'est pas concerné comine Jaspers par la philosophia perennis mais par la « question de l'être » , par la destruction de la philosophie occidentale. Jaspers tente de sauver la philosophie du XX e siècle face à la destruction par Heidegger de l'héritage ontologique. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 36.2 (2003) 119-134 [Access article in PDF] The Constitution of Rhetoric's Tradition Maurice Charland Rhetoric is not a discipline. That is to say, as a domain of theoretical and practical knowledge, rhetoric is weakly institutionalized, lacking a centralized arbiter and standardized set of procedures for establishing truth claims. It also lacks the basic characteristics that Michel Foucault defines as disciplinary, for while we can identify (...) "groups of objects, methods, their corpus of properties considered to be true, the interplay of rules and definitions, of techniques and tools," these are neither universally admitted, nor do they "constitute a sort of anonymous system, freely available to whoever wishes, or whoever is able to make use of them, without their being any question of their meaning" (1972, 222). On the contrary, despite the fact that rhetoric is usually figured as offering practical and, indeed, positive knowledge, the meaning of its terms is always being questioned and at stake. While we might, by considering terms loosely, seek to identify rhetoric in terms of objects such as "persuasion," or "discourse," these are not exclusively its province. Furthermore, the ends of rhetoric are themselves unclear. Is rhetoric really the art of discovering the available means of persuasion? Or is it an art of citizenship? Or a method of enquiry? It has at times been defined as each. Consequently, none of these methods can fix its identity. At most, we can say that "rhetoric," as a domain of knowledge, signals a commitment to the idea of agency in discourse.Rhetoric, while not disciplinary, nevertheless "hangs together" as a domain of knowledge even though it does not cohere conceptually. It is, or comes close to being, a "discursive formation." That is to say, we can identify a field that produces statements concerning discourse and its operations, which is characterized by certain regularities that articulate with the term rhetoric itself. The first such regularity is the gesture of negation. Rhetoric refuses philosophy (or acts out having been refused by philosophy). [End Page 119] Rhetoric further is defined against other intellectual genres: rhetoric is not poetics, is not political science, is not ethics, though it may "speak" to them. Ultimately, though, this tells us very little about the nature of rhetoric's difference, for while refusal is effective in positing the existence of a boundary between rhetoric and other domains, the location of that boundary and what it contains remains unspecified. Rhetoric must also be attributed an at least provisional sense. This is accomplished by rhetoric's second gesture, which initially appears more substantial. Rhetoric is framed in terms of the positivity of a foundational "tradition." Indeed, the gesture toward tradition is ubiquitous. Consider, for example, both the title and principles of organization of Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg's (1990) anthology, George Kennedy's (1998) recursion to the idea of "tradition" even as he attempts to present rhetoric as a natural and cross-cultural phenomenon, recent feminist works that explicitly address "the tradition," 1 the routine citation of Classical authorities and examples, the recurrence of "new" rhetorics, including Burke's dramatism, Perelman's theory of argumentation, as well as Barthes' semiotics, which are offered as supplements to tradition's lacks, and, finally, the energy devoted to the study of the history of rhetoric. The rhetorical tradition, as something bequeathed or put in play by ancient teachers, appears to offer rhetoric a substance, a literature, and a set of problems, particularly through variants of two other principles of discursive formation identified by Foucault, commentary and the author-function. Even so, the gesture toward tradition does not imply the existence of a historically rooted and fixed corpus or model: "Tradition" is a vague term, there is no unproblematic canon of texts to be commented upon, and tradition itself, rather than Aristotle, Plato, or Cicero, stands as "author." What we debate is the meaning of the "tradition," the uneasy relationship between Socrates and Sophists, Plato and Aristotle, but as positions rather than personae. Furthermore, in the name of rhetoric, ancient and modern texts are often read against the grain, and what is... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 36.3 (2003) 248-263 [Access article in PDF] The Incommensurability Thesis and the Status of Knowledge Maurice Charland The view that inquiry can be understood in terms of rhetorical theory can be traced to Thomas Kuhn's influential work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). Kuhn is often cited by scholars concerned with the discursive strategies by which the natural and social or human sciences justify themselves (...) and their specific claims. Kuhn's legacy is well captured by Nelson, Megill, and McCloskey in the opening essay of The Rhetoric of the Human Sciences (1987) where they link him to Stephen Toulmin and Chaïm Perelman as instigators of the study of the Rhetoric of Inquiry. In their words, Kuhn's landmark classic "challenges philosophy to account for the actual operation of scientific communities—their professional devices of communication and socialization, their political structures, their reliance on aesthetics, and their rhetorical dependence on persuasion" (Nelson, Megill, and McCloskey 1987, 12). Despite this reaction, however, Kuhn's project was in many ways modest. He was not seeking to develop a sociology of science or a rhetoric of inquiry. He sought only to account for the form of modern science's history, which is not marked by linear progress, but by a succession of dominant frameworks, or what he termed paradigms.As I will argue in this essay, Kuhn's conception of paradigms is incompatible with rhetoric, except during scientific revolutions or under conditions of incommensurability. Incommensurability is a problematic category, however, for the opening it affords rhetoric ultimately undermines the very idea of paradigms. Consequently, locating rhetoric within normal science either undermines the very category distinctions that provide science with its specificity, or reduces rhetoric from a particular genre of discourse directed toward human agency to "rhetoricality," an aspect of all discourse. As we shall see, such blurring of genre distinctions is itself fundamentally [End Page 248] problematic, for science and rhetoric as discursive genres and practices are themselves incommensurable, even if not in Kuhn's terms. Rhetoric and revolution Kuhn observed that modern science is characterized by the bracketing of major disagreements regarding basic assumptions except during periods of "crisis." While pre-modern inquiry saw the contemporaneous co-existence of fundamentally incompatible frameworks, each competing for adherents, modern science normally excludes such divisions. Instead, modern science is characterized by a succession of frameworks. Only at periods of transition that are temporally bounded, for which Kuhn coined the term "scientific revolutions," does more than one framework have currency within a given sub-specialty (1962, 10-22).Kuhn accounts for this curious historical phenomenon by arguing that modern science is precisely constituted through an enforced bracketing of debates over first principles. The first principles, or paradigm, of any field are more than a set of epistemological or ontological assumptions. They are the set of rules constitutive of science as an activity. They orient scientists in their work, providing background assumptions, methodological principles, criteria of validity, a research agenda, and so on. The hegemony of a paradigm frees scientists from having to justify their work philosophically, socially, or politically. As Kuhn observes, normally science has the form of puzzle solving (35-42). He even likens it to a game, and like any game the participants need not concern themselves with the extrinsic validity of its rules or of the game itself. As Kuhn notes: Though many scientists talk easily and well about particular individual hypotheses that underlie a concrete piece of current research, they are little better than laymen at characterizing the established bases of their field, its legitimate problems and methods. If they have learned such abstractions at all, they show it mainly through their ability to do research. That ability can, however, be understood without recourse to hypothetical rules of the game. (47) Paradigms render modern science possible by producing practitioners and practices rather than by providing explicit knowledge of the principles such practices instantiate. In Foucault's language, we could say that practices are discursive formations (see Foucault 1972, 31-39). They are productive: [End Page 249] they give to knowledge... (shrink)

(*) Este es el capítulo 16 de su obra monumental titulada Retrying Galileo, 1633-1992, publicado en el 2005 por la University of California Press, Berkeley. Este libro es un examen del affair Galileo desde el momento de la condena del científico toscano por la Inquisición en 1633, hasta su supuesta rehabilitación por el Papa Juan Pablo II en 1992. Su enfoque es en temas tales como: si acaso la condena fue justa, y si probaría la incompatibilidad entre ciencia y religión; (...) pone énfasis en los textos que constituyen las fuentes primarias, y de los cuales emergen los hechos históricos y los distintos temas controversiales. El capítulo 17 del mismo estudio del profesor Finocchiaro, contiene una evaluación precisa, realista y balanceada, de los esfuerzos del Papa Juan Pablo II para poner a la Iglesia al día frente al caso Galileo, conjuntamente con una estimación negativa tanto de la comisión papal encargada de su reexamen, como de su presidente, el Cardenal Paul Pourpard. La traducción es de Hermes H. Benítez, y ha sido expresamente autorizadapor la editorial. (shrink)

In the first volume of his trilogy, noted political philosopher Maurice Cranston draws from original manuscript sources to trace Rousseau's life from his birth in provincial obscurity in Geneva, through his youthful wanderings, to his ...

"Tradition in Social Science is the social philosophy written early in life by the jurisprudent who became the preeminent public law jurist in France in the first quarter of the twentieth century, Maurice Hauriou. His work remains prominent in theorizing European Community as well as in Latin American jurisprudence. His studies concern three areas of research: legal theory, social science, and philosophy. In this book Hauriou first focuses on the object and method of the social sciences in a preliminary (...) chapter. The main text is devoted first to a philosophy of history that uses the growth objectively in fraternity, liberty and equality as the criterion for progress; and next to the subjective elements of progress, namely, the recognition of a "pessimistic individualism" in which failure in conduct is to be expected, but is rectified by social institutions. This part closes with the dynamizing of his philosophy of history by evolution and alternation between two phases of social development, namely, middle ages and renaissances. The second part is the philosophy of social science built around social matter, where the dynamic of imitation is the motive force, and three social networks--positive, religious, and metaphysical--specify its consequences. The last of these, the political fabric, is provided with a final chapter of its own. The main doctrinal device that Hauriou developed for use in law was his theory of the institution; this is developed for the first time in the present work."--Publisher's website. (shrink)

Michael Holland presents an early and little-known article by Maurice Blanchot, whose subject is the memorial concert in honour of Claude Debussy which took place in Paris in June 1932, following the unveiling of a monument to the composer earlier in the day. Blanchot provides a detailed account of the concert, emphasising the international co-operation that lay behind the expression of national pride, and arguing, against the grain of contemporary opinion, that the pure art of music transcends any notion (...) of national genius. (shrink)

Cet article pointe vers les conséquences induites par l’usage d’artifices rhétoriques et l’abus du pouvoir du langage dans l’Église. Ce sont ceux-là même, les responsables d’institutions religieuses, qui censés défendre un service honnête de la Parole, qui souvent laissent se creuser un fossé entre paroles et actions. Une intention louable de servir de manière altruiste autrui est dans ce cas détourné vers des fins égoïstes : comme gagner davantage de notoriété et de moyens financiers ; assouvir un amour immodéré du (...) pouvoir. C’est moins à démasquer des « usurpasteurs » que nous invite l’auteur, mais bien à la relecture patiente des textes. Il n'y a rien de plus beau qu'une bible dont « les pages ont été cornées, marquées et dont la reliure fatiguée raconte l'assidue fréquentation de son propriétaire ». Chaque fois qu'une « bible se détruit par son utilisation, une femme, un homme se construit! ». (shrink)

Ce travail a pour but de fournir des repères permettant d’évaluer dans quelles circonstances une séparation judiciaire parents-enfant doit être décidée. L’auteur, chef de service en psychiatrie de l’enfant au CHU de Saint-Étienne (hôpital Bellevue), décrit quatre profils à haut risque, qui montrent bien comment, quand une séparation est mise en place trop tardivement, ou alors quand elle est mal gérée, avec notamment des contacts parents-enfant insuffisamment protégés, on aboutit à des résultats dont le coût humain, financier, et social est (...) catastrophique : déficience intellectuelle (77 % des enfants adressés au service), échec scolaire, troubles graves du comportement avec violence, etc. Pour aider à y voir plus clair, il propose avec son équipe trois sortes de jalons : les premiers concernent la structuration psychique des parents, les deuxièmes la manière dont la pathologie parentale se manifeste dans l’interaction parents-enfant, et les troisièmes la manière dont l’enfant réagit face à la pathologie parentale. Enfin, il décrit les facteurs qui empêchent l’utilisation de ces jalons, principalement l’ancienneté de la loi de 1970 sur « l’assistance éducative », l’idéologie du lien familial, l’absence d’évaluation des actions menées, et la peur face à certains parents très violents. (shrink)

Un régime civilisationnel et culturel se juge au sort qu’il réserve aux personnes et non aux monuments qu’il laisse à la postérité, souvent construits au détriment des personnes. Celui qui cherche à s’imposer au monde entier et dont la forme la plus radicale inspire principalement la construction européenne, à savoir le libéro-capitalisme, implique l’aliénation de l’homme, au sens où, comme l’a écrit Marx, « l’homme est rendu étranger à l’homme », où la personne n’est plus qu’une chose à ses propres (...) yeux comme à ceux d’autrui, dans le même temps qu’on lui fait croire qu’elle ne s’autorise que d’elle-même, à l’image du Dieu souverain. Une telle notion de la personne se comprend bien si on la confronte avec celles qu’impliquent les deux régimes culturels encore en vigueur en France et dont elle est l’inversion, sinon la perversion, le régime de christianité et le républicanisme laïc. (shrink)

C’est un truisme que de dire que l’interprétation générale du Poème de Parménide soulève toujours de grandes difficultés. L’énoncé du Fragment III, selon lequel penser et être seraient la même chose, en est sans doute l’échantillon le plus représentatif. Mais c’est toute l’économie du Poème qui est en cause, donnant lieu à des interprétations si divergentes et, parfois, si alambiquées, que le lecteur ne sait plus à quoi s’en tenir. La situation n’est peut-être pas irrémédiable, à la condition de commencer (...) par lire le texte dans sa littéralité, qu’une absence de signes diacritiques ne rend sans doute pas évidente, mais que les filtres de nos préconceptions rendent encore plus opaque. Cette lecture délivre une clef qui, si elle n’ouvre pas toutes les portes du Poème, permet d’entrer dans l’une de ses parties essentielles et de révéler le sens général de l’œuvre. (shrink)