From a feminist perspective, unlimited procreative liberty risks treating children as property, distorts understanding of the family, and neglects moral concerns about how we reproduce.

Soprattutto a seguito dell'esplosione del fenomeno dei social network, la socialitÀ č divenuta una sorta di nuovo paradigma che orienta i comportamenti individuali e la comunicazione pubblica. Dopo gli anni dell'enfasi sull'individuo, stiamo assistendo a un ritorno al passato? In realtÀ, il significato del termine č oggi assai lontano da quello affermatosi nel corso del Novecento, avendo perso ogni riferimento collettivo. I social network sono l'espressione emblematica delle nuove forme di socialitÀ: aggregazioni sociali non progettuali, ma quotidiane ed empatiche proiettate (...) alla ricerca di nuovi punti di equilibrio tra relazioni e libertÀ individuale. Con quali implicazioni? (shrink)

Human genetics has uncovered a vast trove of medically relevant changes in our genomes—variants and mutations that are both far more common and difficult to interpret than experts anticipated. What will this mean as we move into an era of genomic or “precision” medicine? For over a century the overriding goal of human genetics was to explain the inheritance of traits and conditions that hailed from disciplines like medicine, psychology, and criminology. Yet today, genomics research is calling prevailing categories of (...) human illness and difference into question. Genetic mutations are increasingly used to reclassify disease, disability, and developmental difference—a process I call genomic designation. In recent decades, this has led to the formation of support groups, foundations, specialist clinics, and dedicated literatures for genomically designated conditions like the XXX, NGLY1, Fragile X, and 1p36 Deletion Syndromes. Drawing heavily on the case of 22q11.2 Deletion Syndrome, this paper explains how a genetic test result can radically alter the way a patient is understood and treated. Finding a 22q11.2 microdeletion can lead patients, parents, and caregivers to recast other diagnoses as mere symptoms of an underlying genetic disorder. A 22q11.2DS diagnosis can also redirect medical judgment and practice towards evaluations and even interventions that were not clinically indicated. Finally, a genomically designated diagnosis like 22q11.2DS can realign the very boundary between the normal and the pathological, leading experts and caregivers to reframe clinically nonsignificant findings like an IQ of eighty-seven as the symptom of a genetic disorder. In this way, the growing avalanche of positive genetic test results is disrupting classification and practice in a wide range of disciplines, bringing new populations under the gaze of medical genetics in the process. I conclude by discussing a few salient implications for bioethics and the social studies of science and medicine. (shrink)

This interdisciplinary and ecumenical collection of essays honors the transformative work of Margaret A. Farley, Gilbert L. Stark Professor of Christian Ethics at Yale Divinity School, using it as a starting point for reflection on the contribution of feminist method to theology and ethics. Through a variety of perspectives, contributors show that by resisting classical oppositions between “interpersonal” and “social” ethics and by insisting that social, economic, and political realities be taken seriously in considerations of justice, feminist concerns challenge the (...) very categories of Christian ethics. With essays ranging from sexual ethics to human rights, medical ethics to freedom, _A Just and True Love_ offers a broad perspective on the last twenty-five years of feminist innovation in Christian ethics and a glimpse of its global future, particularly in continents such as Africa. “This book brings together a number of the most prominent thinkers in Christian theology and ethics today in a justly deserved tribute to the work and influence of Margaret Farley. The essays explicitly acknowledge and engage Farley in various degrees; one comes away appreciating both the integrity of her work and its versatility.” —_Darlene Fozard Weaver, Villanova University _ “Inevitably while listening to or reading Margaret Farley, we find her refrain, ‘I want to ask all over again.’ Reexamining, reframing, and rethinking is Farley’s method of engaging anew human experience and relationality. The authors of these essays capture that method as they reconsider feminism and sexuality, love and freedom, justice and truth, contraception and women’s rights. Like her own work, they reset the ethical agenda to recapture a more loving truth. A very successful collection for a most admired colleague. Ryan and Linnane are to be congratulated!” —_James F. Keenan, S.J., Boston College_ “In_ A Just and True Love,_ a host of distinguished scholars consider fundamental themes of feminist theological ethics and their significance for global justice, the meaning of Christian love, creative casuistry, and truthful life in the Church. I can imagine no higher praise than to affirm that these authors have succeeded marvelously in doing exactly what they set out to do: to produce a volume worthy of the theological work and wisdom of Margaret Farley.” —_William Werpehowski, Villanova University_. (shrink)

Cochran has argued that Catholic health care occupies a “unique place on the border of public and private life”. Catholic health care is accountable to both its religious and sacramental traditions and its public responsibilities. It is inevitable that “border skirmishes” will arise. Yet there is no single formula for suggesting what public-private collaboration should comprise or how conflicts between values ought to be resolved. It may be, as Cochran suggests, that increasingly bitter conflicts over widely valued services such as (...) sterilization, combined with market pressures to conform to for-profit trends in health care, will make divestiture of faith-based hospitals in favor of other types of church-community partnerships the best course for the future. (shrink)

There are few, if any, other educational philosophers that have left their mark internationally as John Dewey has. Author of 40 books and no less than 700 articles that appeared in over 140 journals, Dewey's work has been translated into at least 35 languages. His landmark Democracy and Education - published over a century ago in 1916 - is one of the most cited educational texts ever. Dewey has inspired educators and provoked controversies in his day, and still does so (...) today. This volume sets out to engage with Dewey's educational thought, especially as it relates to its circulation in the countries bordering on the Mediterranean. Authors consider his enduring influence, and reflect on the 'push' and 'pull' forces that served to anchor progressivism, in its multiple manifestations, in the region. The notion of a unidirectional force - personified by Dewey - that is somehow absorbed by the 'receiving' country is problematised by most if not all chapters in this volume. Rather, contributors carefully show how context affects a process marked by active appropriation, re-interpretation, adaptation, as well as resistance. (shrink)

In some ways, someone suffering from the delusion that his or her spouse has been kidnapped and replaced with an imposter appears to believe that he or she eats dinner with an imposter every night. But the imperviousness of delusions to counter-evidence makes it hard to classify them as beliefs, and easier to classify them as imaginings. Bayne and Pacherie want to use Schwitzgebel’s dispositional account of belief to restore confidence in the doxastic character of delusion. While dispositionalism appears to (...) allow us to classify delusions as beliefs, this allowance isn’t a robust vindication of doxasticism. The significance of the allowance can be increased by emphasizing the role of folk-psychological norms in individuating propositional attitudes. But letting those norms play a large role in the individuation of belief makes it hard to count as believers the deluded subjects who violate most such norms. Dispositionalism about belief can’t defend doxasticism about delusion. (shrink)

Published in the American Journal of Bioethics.

Current art world statistics demonstrate that the fight for gender and race equality in the art world is far from over: only sixteen percent of this year's Venice Biennale artists were female; only fourteen percent of the work displayed at MoMA in 2016 was by nonwhite artists; only a third of artists represented by U.S. galleries are female, but over two-thirds of students enrolled in art and art-history programs are young women. Arranged in thematic sections focusing on feminism, race, and (...) sexuality, Curatorial Activism examines and illustrates pioneering examples of exhibitions that have broken down boundaries and demonstrated that new approaches are possible, from Linda Nochlin's 'Women Artists' at LACMA in the mid-1970s to Jean-Hubert Martin's 'Carambolages' in 2016 at the Grand Palais in Paris. Including interviews with pioneering curators such as Okwui Enwezor, Linda Nochlin, Jean-Hubert Martin, and Nan Goldin, this volume is both an invaluable source of practical information for those who understand that institutions must be a driving force in this area and a vital source of inspiration for today's expanding new generation of curators. Preface by Lucy R. Lippard. (shrink)

Literature in the epistemology of disagreement has focused on peer disagreement: disagreement between those with shared evidence and equal cognitive abilities. Additional literature focuses on the perspective of amateurs who disagree with experts. However, the appropriate epistemic reaction from superiors who disagree with inferiors remains underexplored. Prima facie, this may seem an uninteresting set of affairs. If A is B’s superior, and A has good reason to believe she is B’s superior, A appears free to dismiss B’s disagreement. However, a (...) closer look will show otherwise. I first distinguish competent from incompetent inferiors and then argue that disagreement from the former often gives superiors reason to adjust credence and reevaluate belief. In other words, epistemic inferiority alone is insufficient grounds for dismissing opinion. More nuanced difficulties arise with incompetent inferiors. When superiors disagree with incompetents, this might provide evidence to bolster belief credence; however, agreement from incompetents can defeat justification. In either instance, inferior opinion carries epistemic weight. Yet, this fails to cover all ground; at times, superiors learn nothing from inferior disagreement. I finish by exploring these uninformative disagreements, how to distinguish them from the informative cases, and the proper epistemic reactions thereof. (shrink)

When a wrongdoing occurs, victims, barring special circumstance, can aptly forgive their wrongdoers, receive apologies, and be paid reparations. It is also uncontroversial, in the usual circumstances, that wronged parties can aptly blame their wrongdoer. But controversy arises when we consider blame from third-parties after the victim has forgiven. At times it seems that wronged parties can make blame inapt through forgiveness. If third parties blame anyway, it often appears the victim is justified in protesting. “But I forgave him!” In (...) other cases, however, forgiveness seems irrelevant: B can forgive A, but it can still seem that third parties can aptly blame A for the wrong against B. This perplexity adds a dimension to ongoing discussion regarding criteria for apt blame and the related issues of standing and fittingness. This paper explores the status of third party blame after forgiveness. I argue that while post forgiveness blame is often inapt, in many other cases forgiveness is irrelevant. This difference is explained by appeal to the various relationships third parties might have to wronged parties, and how these differences affect the ways we blame and thereby blame’s aptness. (shrink)

Bortolotti argues that the irrationality of many delusions is no different in kind from the irrationality that marks many non-pathological states typically treated as beliefs. She takes this to secure the doxastic status of those delusions. Bortolotti’s approach has many benefits. For example, it accounts for the fact that we can often make some sense of what deluded subjects are up to, and helps explain why some deluded subjects are helped by cognitive behavioral therapy. But there is an alternative approach (...) that secures the same benefits as Bortolotti’s account while bringing additional benefits. The alternative approach treats both many delusions and many of the non-pathological states to which Bortolotti compares them as in-between states. Subjects in in-between states don’t fully believe the beliefs which it is sometimes convenient to ascribe to them. This alternative approach to belief and belief-ascription fits well with an independently attractive account of the varied purposes of our ordinary attitude ascriptions. It also makes it easier to make fine-grained distinctions between intentional attitudes of different kinds. (shrink)

Situations in which patients lack medical decision-making (MDM) capacity raise ethical challenges, especially when the patients decline care that their surrogate decision makers and/or clinicians agree is indicated. These patients are a vulnerable population and should receive treatment that is the standard of care, in line with their the values of their authentic self, just as any other patient would. But forcing treatment on patients who refuse it, even though they lack capacity, carries medical and psychological risks to the patients (...) and the hospital staff. It is also often impractical to force some treatments, especially in the long term. For example, independent of the ethical “should” question, how would one force hemodialysis for the rest of a patient’s life, or force a surgery that requires weeks of post-operative physical therapy? In this article we present a novel algorithm that can help clinicians with ethical and practical decision making, with the goals of achieving the best outcomes for patients and reducing moral distress for their caretakers and clinicians. (shrink)

Conversations with patients and families about the allow-natural-death (AND) order, along with the standard do-not-resuscitate (DNR) order during end-of-life (EOL) decision-making, may create engagement and understanding while promoting care that can be defended using enduring notions of autonomy, beneficence, and professional duty. Ethical, legal, and pragmatic issues surrounding EOL care decision-making seem to suggest discussion of AND orders as one strategy clinicians could consider at the individual practice level and at institutional levels. A discussion of AND orders, along with traditional (...) DNR orders is presented. This is followed by argument and counter-argument focused on ethical, legal, and practical issues germane to EOL care decision-making associated with use of AND orders. (shrink)

The introduction describes the monographic section of Scienza & Politica dedicated to the innovations which postcolonial and feminist studies in Latin America are introducing in the history of political thought as a whole. The fundamental concepts of the following essays are presented here to introduce their historic and critic analysis. It is also highlighted the specific character of continental laboratory which the historic and political reflection is assuming in South American continent and the connections which are occurring with other countries (...) in the global South. (shrink)

Après le 11 septembre 2001, un ressort essentiel des politiques américaines de renforcement de la « sécurité nationale » a pris la forme d’une insistance quasi paranoïaque sur les menaces potentiellement catastrophiques constituées par le cyber-terrorisme. Un grand nombre de commentateurs politiques, militaires ou économiques, ainsi que d’universitaires et de journalistes, ont envahi..

Possiamo ipotizzare che le reti sociali sollecitino nuove forme di collaborazione tra gli individui? Di che natura č la collaborazione che si realizza nelle reti? Il web 2.0 cambia radicalmente il modo in cui gli individui accedono alle risorse informative, per la facilitÀ dell'accesso alle stesse, la velocitÀ, la pluralitÀ delle fonti, ma soprattutto per il loro crescente intreccio con gli scambi interpersonali. Il filtro soggettivo carica ogni informazione di un forte contenuto emotivo, ne stabilisce una particolare veritÀ, quella, appunto, (...) attribuita al messaggio dal soggetto che lo utilizza. La testimonianza in prima persona diventa la chiave attorno a cui si organizzano le informazioni. Partendo dall'analisi delle pagine create su Facebook nella fase successiva ad un evento traumatico come il terremoto, argomentiamo come la collaborazione nelle reti si realizzi a partire dalla condivisione emotiva dell'esperienza e dal peculiare intreccio tra informazione e comunicazione. (shrink)

A-consciousness may be regarded as the visibility of information that is the output of a process within a community of other processes. The most prominent function of “public” dissemination of information is giving access to it to processes whose relevance is not clear at the moment of dissemination. The function of P-consciousness may be outside the realm of cognition.