Background Advance Care Planning via Group Visits (ACP-GV) is a patient-centered intervention facilitated by a clinician using a group modality to promote healthcare decision-making among veterans. Participants in the group document a “Next Step” to use in planning for their future care needs. The next step may include documentation of preferences in an advance directive, discussing plans with family, or anything else to fulfill their ACP needs. This evaluation seeks to determine whether there are identifiable subgroups of group participants with (...) differing needs prior to delivery of the ACP-GV program and, if so, to use information about the subgroups to enhance the program offered to veterans in United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) healthcare settings. Methods We conducted a secondary analysis of national data from a quality improvement evaluation. Patient- and provider-level data from administrative healthcare records for VA users in all 50 states, territories, and the District of Columbia provides data on veterans attending ACP-GV during federal fiscal years 2018–2022 (N = 26,857). Latent class analysis seeks to identify the various subgroups of veterans based on their level of ACP self-efficacy before attending ACP-GV and any demographic differences across the resulting subgroups of veterans attending ACP-GV. ACP self-efficacy is derived from seven items obtained from a participant worksheet used during the group. Results Analysis revealed two distinct groups of veterans, distinguishable by their pre-ACP-GV levels of one aspect of ACP self-efficacy: prior knowledge of ACP. Veterans with higher prior knowledge of ACP are associated with an identified next step focused on checking their current AD status and updating it, and veterans with lower ACP prior knowledge are associated with identifying a next step to discuss ACP more fully with family. Differences in age, sex, race, ethnicity, and marital status exist across subgroups of veterans. Conclusion Greater attention must be paid to ACP and veterans’ prior knowledge of ACP to consistently encourage annual review and status updates. (shrink)

In this précis of The Practical Origins of Ideas: Genealogy as Conceptual Reverse-Engineering (OUP 2021), I summarize the key claims of the book. The book describes, develops, and defends an underappreciated methodological tradition: the tradition of pragmatic genealogy, which aims to identify what our loftiest and most inscrutable conceptual practices do for us by telling strongly idealized, but still historically informed stories about what might have driven people to adopt and elaborate them as they did. What marks out this methodological (...) tradition, I argue, is that it synthesizes two genres of philosophical genealogy that are standardly set against each other: state-of-nature fictions on the one hand and patiently documentary historiography on the other. These two genres of genealogy are usually taken to be mutually exclusive and to answer to radically different philosophical interests and temperaments. But I offer a systematic account of a tradition that combines both genres into a single genealogical method, augmenting genealogy’s power and range by harnessing the strengths and possibilities of both genres. (shrink)

Why did such highly abstract ideas as truth, knowledge, or justice become so important to us? What was the point of coming to think in these terms? This book presents a philosophical method designed to answer such questions: the method of pragmatic genealogy. Pragmatic genealogies are partly fictional, partly historical narratives exploring what might have driven us to develop certain ideas in order to discover what these do for us. The book uncovers an under-appreciated tradition of pragmatic genealogy which cuts (...) across the analytic-continental divide, running from the state-of-nature stories of David Hume and the early genealogies of Friedrich Nietzsche to recent work in analytic philosophy by Edward Craig, Bernard Williams, and Miranda Fricker. However, these genealogies combine fictionalizing and historicizing in ways that even philosophers sympathetic to the use of state-of-nature fictions or real history have found puzzling. To make sense of why both fictionalizing and historicizing are called for, the book offers a systematic account of pragmatic genealogies as dynamic models serving to reverse-engineer the points of ideas in relation not only to near-universal human needs, but also to socio-historically situated needs. This allows the method to offer us explanation without reduction and to help us understand what led our ideas to shed the traces of their practical origins. Far from being normatively inert, moreover, pragmatic genealogy can affect the space of reasons, guiding attempts to improve our conceptual repertoire by helping us determine whether and when our ideas are worth having. (shrink)

In ‘What Has Philosophy to Learn from Tort Law?’, Bernard Williams reaffirms J. L. Austin’s suggestion that philosophy might learn from tort law ‘the difference between practical reality and philosophical frivolity’. Yet while Austin regarded tort law as just another repository of time-tested concepts, on a par with common sense as represented by a dictionary, Williams argues that ‘the use of certain ideas in the law does more to show that those ideas have strength than is done by the mere (...) fact that they are part of the currency of common sense’. But what does it mean to show that ideas or concepts ‘have strength’? How does conceptual strength relate to the distinction between practical reality and philosophical frivolity? And what special features of the law are supposed to make it a better test of conceptual strength than common sense? In this chapter, I reconstruct and develop Williams’s answers to these questions. I show why Williams believes that we need to test the concepts forming the currency of common sense against practical reality as embodied by legal practice; I identify seven features of tort law that make it particularly suitable to act as such a test; I distinguish three respects in which concepts can show strength, and unpack Williams’s metaphor of microwave-resistant concepts: concepts capable of holding and presenting material for intense critical scrutiny without succumbing to it themselves; lastly, I show how philosophy can learn to identify systematically weak concepts, and the limits of otherwise valuable concepts, by considering which concepts fail the test. (shrink)

Ce livre que je présente à nouveau aujourd'hui, dans une édition qui évoque publiquement ses origines, n'a pas une histoire comme les autres. Jamais il n'aurait vu le jour sans une étonnante rencontre avec François Mitterrand, dans la Creuse, au début des années quatre-vingt, qui fut suivie d'autres entretiens. Une rencontre sur le ton de la confession, inhabituelle et directe, une conversation surprenante. Une sorte de dialogue contemporain entre celui qui penche vers l'absurde et celui qui croit au mystère. Ensemble, (...) nous reprenions l'éternel débat sur le sens de la vie et la destinée de l'homme. Mais, tous deux, nous mettions Dieu au centre de nos réflexions. J'ai pris conscience du mystère Mitterrand, des secrets de cet homme obsédé par la mort, l'au-delà, les fins dernières, la vie éternelle. Ce texte n'a pas vieilli, garde sa saveur de testament spirituel et dévoile une part de la personnalité de mon visiteur. Fruit du dialogue entre un philosophe et un politique, cet ouvrage reparaît donc plus d'un an après la mort de ce président qui continue d'habiter la mémoire des Français. A un moment où les Français eux-mêmes se posent des questions sur l'avenir et la religion. Puissent-ils trouver des réponses dans ce que j'ai dit au premier d'entre eux : François Mitterrand. (shrink)

There is an under-appreciated tradition of genealogical explanation that is centrally concerned with social functions. I shall refer to it as the tradition of pragmatic genealogy. It runs from David Hume (T, 3.2.2) and the early Friedrich Nietzsche (TL) through E. J. Craig (1990, 1993) to Bernard Williams (2002) and Miranda Fricker (2007). These pragmatic genealogists start out with a description of an avowedly fictional “state of nature” and end up ascribing social functions to particular building blocks of our practices (...) – such as the fact that we use a certain concept, or live by a certain virtue – which we did not necessarily expect to have such a function at all. That the seemingly archaic device of a fictional state-of-nature story should be a helpful way to get at the functions of our actual practices must seem a mystifying proposal, however; I shall therefore endeavor to demystify it in what follows. My aim in this chapter is twofold. First, by delineating the framework of pragmatic genealogy and contrasting it with superficially similar methods, I argue that pragmatic genealogies are best interpreted as dynamic models whose point is to reveal the function – and non-coincidentally often the social function – of certain practices. Second, by buttressing this framework with something it notably lacks, namely an account of the type of functionality it operates with, I argue that both the type of functional commitment and the depth of factual obligation incurred by a pragmatic genealogy depend on what we use the method for: the dynamic models of pragmatic genealogy can be used merely as heuristic devices helping us spot functional patterns, or more ambitiously as arguments grounding our ascriptions of functionality to actual practices, or even more ambitiously as bases for functional explanations of the resilience or the persistence of practices. By bringing these distinctions into view, we gain the ability to distinguish strengths and weaknesses of the method’s application from strengths and weaknesses of the method itself. (shrink)

Can genealogical explanations affect the space of reasons? Those who think so commonly face two objections. The first objection maintains that attempts to derive reasons from claims about the genesis of something commit the genetic fallacy—they conflate genesis and justification. One way for genealogies to side-step this objection is to focus on the functional origins of practices—to show that, given certain facts about us and our environment, certain conceptual practices are rational because apt responses. But this invites a second objection, (...) which maintains that attempts to derive current from original function suffer from continuity failure—the conditions in response to which something originated no longer obtain. This paper shows how normatively ambitious genealogies can steer clear of both problems. It first maps out various ways in which genealogies can involve non-fallacious genetic arguments before arguing that some genealogies do not invite the charge of the genetic fallacy if they are interpreted as revealing the original functions of conceptual practices. However, they then incur the burden of showing that the conditions relative to which practices function continuously obtain. Taking its cue from the genealogies of E. J. Craig, Bernard Williams, and Miranda Fricker, the paper shows how model-based genealogies can avoid continuity failures by identifying bases of continuity in the demands we face. (shrink)

J'ai choisi comme sujet de cours, en cette seconde année de captivité, de dresser un tableau de la pensée française de 1870 à 1940, c'est-à-dire entre deux grands désastres pour la France. Il m'a semblé que cette époque avait été en philosophie une grande époque, non seulement parce qu'elle avait été marquée par de très grands noms et de très hardis efforts, mais encore parce que la philosophie, à l'inverse de ce qui se passait auparavant, avait pénétré dans des domaines (...) qui jusqu'ici ne recevaient qu'un éclairage indirect - je songe à la littérature, l'art, la politique, la religion, la mystique. J'ai pensé qu'après la secousse si douloureuse de 1940, et avant que notre patrie retrouve sa place dans le concert intellectuel des nations, il était nécessaire que nous prenions conscience de notre tradition présente, du mouvement des esprits et des directions vers lesquelles ce mouvement tend. Ces tableaux synthétiques des efforts, ces bilans sont utiles à tous les temps, soit pour faire comprendre aux esprits la valeur respective des diverses pensées, soit pour leur permettre de se mieux saisir en se situant à leur exacte latitude, soit enfin pour faire saisir les lacunes et faire surgir des vocations précises. Le Rapport inimitable de Ravaisson est le modèle du genre, et c'est à lui que nous nous référons, c'est de lui que nous partons. Mais un tableau de ce genre est plus utile encore après les grandes crises. Il n'est pas rare, dans l'histoire, de voir les périodes qui suivent les désastres être fécondes dans le domaine des idées. Le relèvement de l'Allemagne après 1806 s'est fait par l'entremise de Fichte et du réveil simultané de la tradition philosophique et de la tradition nationale. Ce sont les fils de ceux qui avaient souffert en 1870 qui ont fait la France nouvelle ; il est frappant de voir quelle sève montait dans ses hommes qui sont nés autour de 1870, qu'ils s'appellent Poincaré, Pétain, Foch, Clemenceau, ou Barrès, Bergson, Boutroux, Blondel. Là se vérifie encore le mot de Pascal, qu'il faut s'offrir par les humiliations aux inspirations, qui seules font le vrai et salutaire effet. (shrink)

Phil : Pourquoi la terre est ronde, Socrate? Socrate : Tu aimes les choses rondes? Phil : Je n'aime pas les choses pointues... Socrate : Qu'est-ce qu'elles ont, les choses pointues? Phil : Elles blessent! Socrate : Tu n'aimes pas les choses qui blessent? Phil : J'ai horreur du conflit, c'est toujours inutile! Socrate : Quelle question pourrais-tu avoir alors? Phil : Pourquoi ai-je horreur du conflit? Socrate : Tu as vu la vitesse avec laquelle nous avons accouché d'une belle (...) question? Phil : Etonnant! Cet ouvrage, sous forme de dialogues, nous initie à la pratique joyeuse de la sagesse de Socrate. La confrontation à notre propre parole et à celle de l'autre nous engage à mourir à nos opinions, avec exigence et humour. Le dialogue socratique nous apprend à penser à travers l'Autre et à devenir ce que nous sommes. (shrink)

Cycling in traffic requires a combination of motor and perceptual skills while interacting with a dynamic and fast-changing environment. The inferior perceptual-motor skills in individuals with developmental coordination disorder may put them at a higher risk for accidents. A key skill to navigate in traffic is to quickly detect hazardous situations. This perceptual-cognitive skill was investigated in young adults with DCD using simulated traffic situations in a hazard perception test in cycling. Nine individuals with DCD and nine typically developing individuals (...) participated in the study and completed the test while their gaze was tracked using a remote eye tracking device. A questionnaire was used to determine cycling experience and the perception of cycling and anticipation skill in traffic. Despite a longer period to master the motor skill of cycling, individuals with DCD reported to be able to safely cycle in traffic around the same age as TD young adults. In the hazard perception test, individuals with DCD fixated the hazards later, less frequently and for a shorter duration than the TD participants, however, the participants with DCD did not wait longer to react to the hazard than the TD participants. Interestingly, individuals with DCD rated the traffic situations in the test as significantly more dangerous than the TD participants. In conclusion, the differences exposed in the hazard perception test may imply an increased risk of accidents in individuals with DCD. In further research and practice it is recommended that both the motor and the perceptual aspects of cycling are addressed. (shrink)

This paper examines three reasons to think that Craig's genealogy of the concept of knowledge is incompatible with knowledge-first epistemology and finds that far from being incompatible with it, the genealogy lends succour to it. This reconciliation turns on two ideas. First, the genealogy is not history, but a dynamic model of needs. Secondly, by recognizing the continuity of Craig's genealogy with Williams's genealogy of truthfulness, we can see that while both genealogies start out from specific needs explaining what drives (...) the development of certain concepts rather than others, they then factor in less specific needs which in reality do not come later at all, and which have also left their mark on these concepts. These genealogies thereby reveal widespread functional dynamics driving what I call the de-instrumentalization of concepts, the recognition of which adds to the plausibility of such instrumentalist approaches to concepts. (shrink)

Cross-education is the phenomenon in which repeated practice of a unilateral motor task does not only result in performance improvement of the trained limb, but also in the untrained contralateral limb. The aim of this study was to test whether cross-education or positive transfer of learning is also achieved for tasks in which both limbs contribute in different ways by using modified equipment that switches the limbs’ role. To this end, a reverse field hockey stick was used that requires a (...) mirroring of arm and hand use and dominance. Two groups of young skilled female field hockey players participated in a crossover-design, in which participants received four training sessions with a reverse hockey stick followed by four training sessions with a regular hockey stick, or vice versa. In a pre-test, intermediate test, a post-test and a retention test, participants’ performance on a field hockey skill test with a regular hockey stick was measured. The results revealed that training with the reversed hockey stick led to significantly increased improvements compared to training with a regular hockey stick. We conclude that modified equipment can be used to exploit positive transfer of learning by switching the limbs’ roles. The findings are discussed by referring to the symmetry preservation principle in dynamic systems theory and have clear practical relevance for field hockey trainers and players seeking to further improve field hockey skills. (shrink)

The paper deals with the life and work of an outstanding Christian French philosop_her of the XXth century Jean Guitton . First, the author exa_mines Guitton's relationships with the important Christian thinkers of the XXth century, in particular with M. Blondel and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. He focuses on three of Guitton's works, namely Temporal existence , Purgatory: A Deep Mystery and Silence about the Essential . In the first of these three books he points out to (...) the originality of Guitton's understanding of time, which enabled him, drawing from Blondel, to develop further the ontology of activity in the evolutionary dynamics of being. Next, he sheds light on Guitton's new understanding of purgatory in his second of the above mentioned works, inspired mainly by the visions of St. Catharine of Genoa. In his third work he focuses on a topical problem of tolerance and truth in the context of the internal Christian dialogue. (shrink)

Three major reshuffles delineate two families within the manuscript tradition of the Commentary on Matthew by Hilary of Poitiers. In the first two cases, J. Doignon in his critical edition favored the text of the α family, judging that the β family generally attests to numerous revisions intended to suppress difficult lectiones. In the third case, on the other hand, he adopted the short text of the β family, thus demoting two short passages in 33, 5 specific to the α (...) family. This article shows that on the one hand the language of these passages is attributable to Hilary and on the other their content fits perfectly with his exegesis. It thus argues for their authenticity. (shrink)

PREFACEProf. Göran Sundholm of Leiden University inspired the group of Logic at Lille and Valparaíso to start a fundamental review of the dialogical conception of logic by linking it to constructive type logic. One of Sundholm's insights was that inference can be seen as involving an implicit interlocutor. This led to several investigations aimed at exploring the consequences of joining winning strategies to the proof-theoretical conception of meaning. The leading idea is, roughly, that while introduction rules lay down the conditions (...) under which a winning strategy for the Proponent may be built, the elimination rules lay down those elements of the Opponent's assertions that the Proponent has the right to use for building winning strategy. It is the pragmatic and ethical features of obligations and rights that naturally lead to the dialogical interpretation of natural deduction.During the Visiting Professorship of Prof. Sundholm at Lille in (2012) the group of Lille started delving into the ways of implementing Per Martin-Löf's Constructive Type Theory with the dialogical perspective. In particular, Aarne Ranta's (1988) paper, the first publication on the subject, was read and discussed during Sundholm’s seminar. The discussions strongly suggested that the game-theoretical conception of quantifiers as deploying interdependent moves provide a natural link between CTT and dialogical logic. This idea triggered several publications by the group of Lille in collaboration with Nicolas Clerbout and Juan Redmond at the University of Valparaíso, including the publication of the book (2015) by Clerbout / Rahman that provides a systematic development of this way of linking CTT and the dialogical conception of logic. However the Clerbout / Rahman book was written from the CTT perspective on dialogical logic, rather than the other way round. The present book should provide the perspective from the other side of the dialogue between the Dialogical Framework and Constructive Type Theory. The main idea of our present study is that Sundholm's (1997) notion of epistemic assumption is closely linked to the Copy-Cat Rule or Socratic Rule that distinguishes the dialogical framework from other game-theoretical approaches. One way to read the present book is as a further development of Sundholm’s extension of Austin's (1946, p. 171) remark on acts of assertion to inference. Indeed, Sundholm (2013, p. 17) gave the following forceful formulation: When I say therefore, I give others my authority for asserting the conclusion, given theirs for asserting the premisses.Per Martin-Löf, in recent lectures, have utilized the dialogical perspective on epistemic assumptions to get out of a certain circle that threatens the explanation of the notions of inference and demonstration. A demonstration may be explained as a chain of (immediate) inferences starting from no premisses. That an inference J1... Jn—————Jis valid means that the conclusion J can be made evident on the assumption that J1, …, Jn are known. The notion of epistemic assumption thus enters in the explanation of valid inference. We cannot, however, in this explanation understand 'known' in the sense of demonstrated, for then we are explaining the notion of inference in terms of demonstration, whereas demonstration has been explained in terms of inference. Martin-Löf suggests that we here understand 'known' in the sense of asserted, so that epistemic assumptions are judgements others have made, judgements for which others have taken the responsibility; that the inference is valid then means that, given that others have taken responsbility for the premisses, I can take responsibility for the conclusion:The circularity problem is this: if you define a demonstration to be a chain of immediate inferences, then you are defining demonstration in terms of inference. Now we are considering an immediate inference and we are trying to give a proper explanation of that; but, if that begins by saying: Assume that J1, …, Jn have been demonstrated – then you are clearly in trouble, because you are about to explain demonstration in terms of the notion of immediate inference, hence when you are giving an account of the notion of immediate inference, the notion of demonstration is not yet at your disposal. So, to say: Assume that J1, …, Jn have already been demonstrated, makes you accusable of trying to explain things in a circle. The solution to this circularity problem, it seems to me now, comes naturally out of this dialogical analysis. […]The solution is that the premisses here should not be assumed to be known in the qualified sense, that is, to be demonstrated, but we should simply assume that they have been asserted, which is to say that others have taken responsibility for them, and then the question for me is whether I can take responsibility for the conclusion. So, the assumption is merely that they have been asserted, not that they have been demonstrated. That seems to me to be the appropriate definition of epistemic assumption in Sundholm's sense. One of the main tenets of the present study is that the further move of relating the Socratic Rule rule with judgemental equality provides both a simpler and more direct way to implement the constructive type theoretical approach within the dialogical framework. Such a reconsideration of the Socratic Rule, roughly speaking, amounts to the following. 1.A move from P that brings-forward a play-object in order to defend an elementary proposition A can be challenged by O. 2.The answer to such a challenge, involves P bringing forward a definitional equality that expresses the fact that the play-object chosen by P copies the one O has chosen while positing A. For short, the equality expresses at the object-languaje level that the defence of P relies on the authority given to O to be able to produce the play-objects she brings forward. More generally, according to this view, a definitional equality established by P and brought forward while defending the proposition A, expresses the equality between a play-object (introduced by O) and the instruction for building a play-object deployed by O while affirming A. So it can be read as a computation rule that indicates how to compute O's instructions. Let us recall that from the strategic point of view, O's moves correspond to elimination rules of demonstrations. Thus, the dialogical rules that prescribe how to introduce a definitional equality – correspond – at the strategic level – to the definitional equality rules for CTT as applied to the selector-functions involved in the elimination rules. So, what we are doing here is extending the dialogical interpretation of Sundholm's epistemic assumption to the rules that set up the definitional equality of a type.The present work is structured in the following way:•In the Introduction we state the main tenets that guide our book•Chapter II contains a brief overview of Constructive Type Theory penned by Ansten Klev with exercises and their solutions. •Chapter III offers a novel presentation of the dialogical conception of logic. In fact, the first two sections of the chapter provide an overview of standard dialogical logic – including solved exercises, slightly adapted to the content of the present volume. The rest of the sections develop a new dialogical approach to Constructive Type Theory. •Chapters IV and V contain the main body of our study, namely the relation between the Socratic Rule, epistemic assumptions, and equality. The chapter provides the reader with thoroughly worked out examples with comments. •After the Final Remarks the book containsa.An appendix containing a an overview of all the rules for the new formulation of dialogical approach to constructive type theory developed in the book; b.a brief outline of Per Martin-Löf's informal presentation of the demonstration of the axiom of choice.c.two examples of a tree-shaped graph of an extensive strategy. Acknowledgments: Many thanks to Mark van Atten (Paris1), Giuliano Bacigalupo (Zürich), Charles Zacharie Bowao (Univ. Ma Ngouabi de Brazzaville, Congo), Christian Berner (Lille3), Michel Crubellier (Lille3), Pierre Cardascia (Lille3), Oumar Dia (Dakar), Marcel Nguimbi ((Univ. Marien Ngouabi de Brazzaville, Congo), Adjoua Bernadette Dango (Lille3 / Alassane Ouattara de Bouaké, Côte d'Ivoire), Steephen Rossy Eckoubili (Lille3), Johan Georg Granström (Zürich), Gerhard Heinzmann (Nancy2), Muhammad Iqbal (Lille3), Matthieu Fontaine (Lille3), Radmila Jovanovic (Belgrad), Hanna Karpenko (Lille3), Laurent Keiff (Lille3), Sébastien Magnier (Saint Dennis, Réunion), Clément Lion (Lille3), Gildas Nzokou (Libreville), Fachrur Rozie (Lille3), Helge Rückert (Mannheim), Mohammad Shafiei (Paris1), and Hassan Tahiri (Lisbon), for rich interchanges, suggestions on the main claims of the present study and proof-reading of specific sections of the text. Special thanks to Gildas Nzokou (Libreville), Steephen Rossy Eckoubili (Lille3) and Clément Lion (Lille3), with whom a Pre-Graduate Textbook in French on dialogical logic and CTT is in the process of being worked out – during the visiting-professorship in 2016 of the former. Eckoubili is the author of the sections on exercises for dialogical logic, Nzokou cared of those involving the development of CTT-demonstrations out of winning-strategies. Special thanks also to Ansten Klev (Prague) for helping with technical details and conceptual issues on CTT, particularly so as author of the chapter introducing CTT. (shrink)

A journey through sound, memory, and landscapes, questioning the origins, perception, and cultural implications of music. A lifelong relation to sound and music underlies Latifa Echakhch’s work. On the occasion of her representation of the Swiss Pavilion for the 59th Venice Biennale, she has edited a volume on sound, memory, and perception. In the book, images of her installation in the Swiss Pavilion, The Concert, accompany her own writings along with this by Alexandre Babel and Francesco Stocchi, the co-curators of (...) the pavilion. The volume also includes interviews with and collected texts by François J. Bonnet, Emanuele Quinz, Maxime Guitton, Alvin Curran, Salomé Voegelin, Antoine Chessex, Jonathan Sterne, Juliette Volcler, and Raphaël Brunner. Confronting knowledge, reflection, and intuition, their combined concert of thoughts confirms how sound and music—and their absence—play a crucial role in our physical and cultural perception of the world, and how they allow us to expand our bodily and cognitive experience. This book is one of the three parts of the Swiss Pavilion; the other two are the installation and a vinyl edition of the piece composed by Alexandre Babel. (shrink)

In the paper I offer a brief sketch of one of the sources of utilitarianism. Our biological ancestry is a matter of fact that is not altered by the way we describe ourselves. With philosophical theories it is otherwise. Utilitarianism can be described in ways that make it look as if it is as old as moral philosophy – as J. S. Mill thought it was. For my historical purposes, it is more useful to have an account that brings out (...) what is specific about Benthamism and its descendants. Let us try to make do with the following. First, utilitarianism asserts that the fundamental requirement of morality is that we are to maximize good, for everyone and not just for the agent. This basic principle presupposes that it makes sense to think of aggregating goods to make a total, and of comparing amounts of good thus aggregated. Second, the good to be brought about is located in feelings of pleasure, and the evil to be avoided in feelings of pain. These feelings have inherent value or disvalue regardless of how they are caused to exist and regardless of their own consequences. Third, all moral principles can be derived from the requirement that good be maximized. The principles involved in evaluating agents as well as in giving moral direction to action are nothing but applications of the basic principle. (shrink)

Research questions in mainstream epistemology often take for granted a cognitive internalist picture of the mind. Perhaps this is unsurprising given the seemingly safe presumptions that knowledge entails belief and that the kind of belief that knowledge entails supervenes exclusively on brainbound cognition. It will be argued here that the most plausible version of the entailment thesis holds just that knowledge entails dispositional belief. However, regardless of whether occurrent belief supervenes only as the cognitive internalist permits, we should reject the (...) idea that dispositional belief supervenes only in cognitive internalist-friendly ways. These observations, taken together, reveal two things: first, that a cognitive internalist picture of the mind is much more dispensable in epistemology than has been assumed and, second, that pursuing questions in extended epistemology need not involve any radical departure from the commitments of more traditional epistemological projects. (shrink)

Ethical consumerism is the thesis that we should let our values determine our consumer purchases. We should purchase items that accord with our values and refrain from buying those that do not. The end goal, for ethical consumerism, is to transform the market through consumer demand. The arm of this movement associated with food choice embraces the slogan “Vote with Your Fork!” As in the more general movement, the idea is that we should let our values dictate our choices. In (...) this paper, I offer a critique of the Vote with Your Fork campaign (hereafter VWYF) that focuses on the agency of individuals. For VWYF to be effective, minimally, individuals must act _intentionally_ when making food choices. In the ideal case, individuals adopt and endorse the values implicit in VWYF and exhibit _autonomous agency_ when they purchase and consume food. The problem, though, is that a number of things can go wrong along the way. I argue that very few of us are in the position to exhibit autonomous agency with respect to our food choices. Because of this, VWYF could very well undermine its own goals. (shrink)

Even the simplest known living organisms are complex chemical processing systems. But how sophisticated is the behaviour that arises from this? We present a framework in which even bacteria can be identified as capable of representing information in arbitrary signal molecules, to facilitate altering their behaviour to optimise their food supplies, for example. Known asion/Representation theory, this framework makes precise the relationship between physical systems and abstract concepts. Originally developed to answer the question of when a physical system is computing, (...) AR theory naturally extends to the realm of biological systems to bring clarity to questions of computation at the cellular level. (shrink)

Professor Lewis and I have some important differences of opinion regarding the identity and distinctness of conscious persons, which it will be well to try to clarify on the present occasion, first of all by enumerating a number of points on which we are, I think, in agreement. Both of us believe in the existence of individual persons, each of whom can be said to live in a ‘world’ of his own intentional objectivity, a world ‘as it is for him’, (...) which differs in a considerable extent, both in content and emphasis, from the world as it is for anyone else. Both of us further believe that all these intentionally objective worlds for a large part coincide in content, and are in fact excerpted from a more comprehensive real world which is common to us all, and which, in addition to in some sense including all such intentionally objective worlds, also includes many real material objects which exist regardless of our intentionality, and which further includes our own material bodies, which appear in so central a manner in each of our intentionally objective worlds. Both of us believe in matter as a transcendent reality, as well as an intentional object, and are content to accept the dicta of science as to the most probable view of its structure. We are in fact quite Cartesian and Lockean in our belief in the primary and secondary qualities of matter. We believe further that our intentional subjectivity is geared causally into our material objectivity, and that the gearing takes place, in some inscrutable manner, in our nervous systems. We both also believe that our intentional subjectivity transcends bodily mechanisms and instrumentalities, and can be liberated from the latter, but that, when thus liberated, our subjectivity may still affect some sort of an intentionally objective material body such as we wear in dreams, a body in which it will manifest itself to itself and to others much as we do in our dreams and fantasies. (shrink)

O objetivo deste ensaio é examinar a proposta de Sandy Goldberg, segundo a qual há divisão de trabalho epistêmico em certos processos de aquisição de conhecimento – ao menos em se tratando de conhecimento testemunhal. Goldberg propõe mostrar a veracidade desta alegação salientando a nossa dependência epistêmica em relação a outros indivíduos, ou mesmo comunidades inteiras. Nós, então, vamos propor o tratamento de um famoso caso tipo-Gettier que, segundo Gilbert Harman, revelaria algumas dimensões sociais do conhecimento. Por fim, nós esperamos (...) tirar algumas lições da explicação oferecida por Goldberg, dentre as quais a mais importante a ser tomada é que, havendo tal divisão de trabalho epistêmico em processos de aquisição de conhecimento, muitas vezes, não são apenas as propriedades epistêmicas do sujeito que determinam a sua posse de conhecimento ou ignorância, de modo que o conhecimento é mais social do que individual em se tratando de uma ampla gama de casos. (shrink)

Aristotle and the sea battle, by G. E. M. Anscombe.--Aristotle's different possibilities, by K. J. J. Hintikka.--On Aristotle's square of opposition, by M. Thompson.--Categories in Aristotle and in Kant, by J. C. Wilson.--Aristotle's Categories, chapters I-V: translation and notes, by J. L. Ackrill--Aristotle's theory of categories, by J. M. E. Moravcsik.--Essence and accident, by I. M. Copi.--Tithenai ta phainomena, by G. E. L. Owen.--Matter and predication in Aristotle, by J. Owens.--Problems in Metaphysics Z, chapter 13, by M. J. Woods.--The meaning (...) of agathon in the Ethics of Aristotle, by H. A. Prichard.--Agathon and eudaimonia in the Ethics of Aristotle, by J. L. Austin.--The final good in Aristotle's Ethics, by W. F. R. Hardie.--Aristotle on pleasure, by J. O. Urmson.--Bibliography (p. 335-41). (shrink)

Why is there a 'hard problem' of consciousness? Why do we seem unable to grasp intuitively that physical brain processes can be identical to experiences? Here I comment on the 'meta-problem' (Chalmers, 2018), based on previous ideas (Storm, 2014; 2018). In short: humans may be 'inborn dualists' ('neuroscepticism'), because evolution gave us two (types of) brain systems (or functional modes): one (Sp) for understanding relatively simple physical phenomena, and another (Sm) specialized for mental phenomena. Because Sp cannot deal with the (...) immense complexity of the brain processes underlying consciousness, it represents them as fundamentally different from nonmental physical phenomena (dualist intuition), using 'simulations' to produce 'Sm-type understanding'/predictions that seems radically different from 'Sp-type understanding'. (By analogy, different sensory modalities, handled by distinct brain systems, evoke qualitatively different experiences.) Brain systems for Sp representations of our brain processes never evolved, because they would be useless. When lacking a single 'template' matching different aspects of reality (objective vs. subjective = simulated), complementary 'models' are needed ('neuro-complementarity'), like the wave–particle duality in quantum mechanics. Thus, it seems plausible that Sp and Sm evolved because they were needed to cope with different challenges, and that 'problem intuitions' are side effects of these useful but different brain systems. (shrink)

By the death, last summer, of Jack Robson, the world of utilitarian studies and a wider world of scholarship on both sides of the Atlantic lost one of their most distinguished figures. It would not be appropriate here, even if it were possible now, to attempt a full and measured assessment of his work. Writing only a few months after the news of his death, while the sense of loss is still so sharp for all his many friends, two things (...) are possible. Something can and should be said to acknowledge and celebrate Robson's achievement as a scholar; and to this can be added some personal recollections of one whose human qualities were as outstanding as his scholarship. (shrink)

El objetivo de este artículo es definir la concepción del acto involuntario de Francisco Suárez y mostrarla como un medio que permite comprender y profundizar en su teoría de la acción humana. En esta cuestión, el Doctor Eximio parte de presupuestos elaborados por Tomás de Aquino que amplía y adapta siguiendo sus propias tesis metafísicas y teológicas sobre la relación entre Dios y las creaturas. Mostraremos cómo Suárez vincula el verdadero involuntario con el _simpliciter_, lo forzado, necesario e indeseado, dejando (...) al _secundum quid_ como un acto mixto en el que la libertad y la voluntad, pese a las injerencias externas, no quedan anuladas. Por último, subrayaremos las consecuencias de la definición suareciana de lo involuntario sobre la noción de libertad, haciendo patente que tanto una como otra serían imposibles fuera del marco teórico que él sustenta, caracterizado por la eficiencia humana (y su dependencia de la divinidad) y no por la premoción física. (shrink)

First published in 1952, British Empirical Philosophers is a comprehensive picture of one of the most important movements in the history of philosophic thought. In his introduction, Professor A. J. Ayer distinguishes the main problems of empiricism and gives a critical account of the ways in which the philosophers whose writings are included in this volume attempted to solve them. Editors Ayer and Raymond Winch bring together an authoritative abridgement of John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding ; Bishop George Berkeley’s (...) Principles of Human Knowledge ; almost the entire first book of David Hume’s Treatise Concerning Human Nature ; and extracts from Thomas Reid’s Essay on the Intellectual Powers of Man and John Stuart Mill’s Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy. (shrink)