Concerning the differences between Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger with reference to Descartes one must point out their different ideological-historical and phenomenological approach on the one hand and on the other hand their diverging understanding of history, science and subjectivity. Cassirer and Heidegger agree that Cartesian thought is fundamental to both the contemporary understanding of the self in which man features as an autonomous subject and the contemporary understanding of reality in which being is analysed with the help of modern (...) science. Nevertheless, differences are manifest in the diverging representation of the new image of man and the world. While Heidegger in the revolt of man as subject seeks to get at the root of the existing dominant power relations and the implicit scientific discourse that ultimately excludes from that scope all that cannot be mathematically verified, Cassirer emphasises the nurturing of individuality and autonomy of the human mind. In man‘s successive self-liberation he sees the fundamental principle of anthropological ideal. From Descartes onward, and in particular from the Age of Enlightenment, man has been considered as an end in himself; he may maturely decide on his action, but he must also assume responsibility for it. According to Cassirer, these epistemological and ethical principles constitute the real foundation of our culture. According to him, modern-day progress does not necessarily flow into dominating subjectivism, since responsibility for the wrongful developments of the 20th century does not lie with the inherited models of man and reality, but rather with the disregard of the modern principles such as individuality, freedom and rationality.Anhand der unterschiedlichen Bezugnahmen Ernst Cassirers und Martin Heideggers auf Descartes sollen einerseits die Differenzen zwischen einem ideengeschichtlichen und einem phänomenologischen Zugang und andererseits ein divergierendes Verständnis von Geschichte, Wissenschaft und Subjektivität aufgezeigt werden. Cassirer und Heidegger stimmen darin überein, dass das cartesianische Denken sowohl für unser heutiges Selbstverständnis, in dem der Mensch als autonomes Subjekt fungiert, als auch für die gegenwärtige Wirklichkeitsauffassung, in der das Seiende mittels der modernen Naturwissenschaften analysiert wird, grundlegend wirkte. Die Unterschiede manifestieren sich jedoch in den voneinander abweichenden Auslegungen dieses neuen Menschenund Weltbildes. Während Heidegger im Aufstand des Menschen als Subjekt die Wurzel für die bestehenden Herrschaftsverhältnisse und den darin implizierten Wissenschaftsdiskurs, der letztlich alles mathematisch nicht Verifizierbare aus diesem Bereich ausschließt, festzumachen sucht, legt Cassirer den Akzent auf die Ausbildung der Individualität und Autonomie menschlicher Vernunft. In der sukzessiven Selbstbefreiung des Subjekts erblickt er das Grundprinzip der anthropologischen Ideale. Seit Descartes und insbesondere seit der Aufklärung gilt der Mensch als Selbstzweck, der mündig über sein Tun bestimmen kann, aber für dieses auch Verantwortung übernehmen muss. Diese epistemologischen und ethischen Grundsätze bilden für Cassirer das eigentliche Fundament unserer Kultur. Für ihn mündet der moderne Fortschritt nicht zwangsläufig in einen herrschaftlichen Subjektivismus, denn für die Fehlentwicklungen im 20. Jahrhundert sind nicht die überkommenen Modelle von Mensch und Wirklichkeit zur Verantwortung zu ziehen, sondern die Missachtung moderner Grundsätze wie Individualität, Freiheit und Rationalität.Temeljem različitih pozivanja Ernsta Cassirera i Martina Heideggera na Descartesa treba ukazati s jedne strane na razlike između idejno-povijesnog i fenomenološkog pristupa a s druge na divergentno razumijevanje povijesti, znanosti i subjektiviteta. Cassirer i Heidegger suglasni su da je kartezijansko mišljenje temeljno za naše današnje samorazumijevanje, u kojemu čovjek fungira kao autonomni subjekt, jednako kao i sadašnje shvaćanje stvarnosti, u kojem se biće analizira pomoću modernih prirodnih znanosti. Ipak, razlike se manifestiraju u izlaganjima te nove slike čovjeka i svijeta, koja odstupaju jedna od drugih. Dok Heidegger u uspostavljanju čovjeka kao subjekta pokušava ustvrditi korijen postojećih odnosa moći i implicitni znanstveni diskurs, koji naposljetku iz tog područja isključuje sve što se ne može matematički verificirati, Cassirer polaže akcent na izobrazbu individualnosti i autonomije ljudskoga uma. U sukcesivnom samooslobođenju čovjeka uočava on temeljni princip antropološkog ideala. Od Descartesa, a poglavito od prosvjetiteljstva, čovjeka se smatra samosvrhom; on može zrelo određivati svoje djelovanje, no mora na sebe preuzeti i odgovornost za njega. Ta epistemološka i etička načela tvore za Cassirera pravi fundament naše kulture. Za njega se moderni napredak ne ulijeva neizbježno u vladajući subjektivizam, budući da za pogrešan razvoj u 20. st. nisu odgovorni naslijeđeni modeli čovjeka i stvarnosti, nego prezir modernih načela poput individualnosti, slobode i racionalnosti. (shrink)

Pretendo usar o exemplo dos nomes de percursos de valores como prova de que, contrariamente ao que Michael Resnik e Michael Dummett sustentam, Frege nunca abandonou o seu princípio do contexto: “Apenas no contexto de uma sentenya tem uma palavra significado”. Em particular, pretendo mostrar que a prova da completude com relação ao significado, que Frege tentou introduzir na linguagem formal das Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, baseia-se em uma aplicação do principio do contexto, e que, em consequencia, tambem nomes de percursos (...) de valores tem significado apenas nocontexto de uma sentença. A teoria Fregeana do sentido e do significado somente pode ser entendida adequadamente sob o pano de fundo do princfpio do contexto.Taking course-of-values names as an example, I want to show that, contrary to what Michael Resnik and Michael Dummett claim, Frege never abandoned his context principle “Only in the context of a sentence do words have meaning”. In particular, I want to show that Frege’s attempted proof of referentiality for the formal language of Grundgesetze der Arithmetik rests on the context principle and that, consequently, course-of-values names have a reference only in the context of a sentence. It is only in the light of the context principle that Frege’s theory of sense and reference can be understood appropriately. (shrink)

No artigo que se segue, iremos relacionar o tema „intuição“ e „pensamento“ao problema, virulento no idealismo alemão, da sistemática filosófica. Depois que aconcepção kantiana de sistema assente na “Arquitetônica da razão” foi criticada comoformalista e que, ao mesmo tempo, se propagou no século XVIII a crítica aos sistemasracionalistas, exercida antes pelo empirismo, irrompeu no final desse século uma crisena filosofia, expressa talvez de modo mais marcante em um “fragmento” de FriedrichSchlegel: "É igualmente mortal ao espírito ter um sistema e não (...) ter nenhum". Fichte eSchopenhauer tratam da questão do sistema reportando-a à relação entre intuição epensamento. (shrink)

Existem intertextualidades surpreendentes entre as tradições vétero e neotestamentárias. Os autores do Novo Testamento, pois, fizeram questão de ou citar literalmente algo das Sagradas Escrituras de Israel ou, de forma mais livre, fazer alusões a tais tradições. Nesse sentido, a personagem de Moisés e pormenores ligados à sua trajetória e/ou biografia, presentes nas narrativas de Êxodo a Deuteronômio, ganha maior destaque na segunda parte da Bíblia cristã. Justamente isso vale também para um discurso que, segundo a narrativa em Ex 3,1–4,17, (...) o Senhor, Deus de Israel, dirigiu a Moisés, visando à necessidade de o líder profético precisar convencer outros através de suas palavras: «Eu, pois, estarei com tua boca e te instruirei sobre o que deverás falar». Conforme os Evangelhos segundo Marcos, Mateus, Lucas e João, Jesus acolheu tal tradição e esperança religiosa ao instruir seus discípulos. A investigação dos pormenores da intertextualidade aqui indicada constitui a tarefa da pesquisa apresentada neste artigo. (shrink)

Schopenhauer é considerado o precursor ou o primeiro representante da filosofia da vida, desenvolvida posteriormente por Dilthey, Nietzsche, Bergson e outros. Em contraste com a filosofia clássica da vida e com as concepções éticas a ela relacionadas, a vida em Schopenhauer não é vista como um fim, mas como um meio para um outro fim, ou seja, para a ética, que culmina na negação da vontade de vida. Já nas primeiras anotações manuscritas, Schopenhauer usa diversas metáforas para caracterizar a vida (...) como um meio para o conhecimento ético. Com bastante frequencia aparece a imagem da vida como espelho, no qual o homem vê sua própria natureza e assim a essência do mundo. Na obra madura, essa imagem é substituída pelo conceito de objetivação da vontade. Na medida em que a mais elevada e mais clara objetivação da vontade representa a história da vida de um indivíduo, o conceito de vida de Schopenhauer é estreitamente ligado à sua teoria do caráter. Neste ensaio eu considero a complicada relação entre vida, conhecimento e ética em Schopenahauer no pano de fundo de sua hermenêutica protometafísica, seguindo o desenvolvimento de seu uso da metáfora do espelho.Schopenhauer is said to be precursor or first exponent of the philosophy of life as it has been developed later on by Dilthey, Nietzsche, Bergson and others. However, in contrast to classical philosophy of life and to the ethical conceptions going back to it, in Schopenhauer life is not viewed as an end but as a means to another end, namely to the ethics which culminates in the denial of the will-to-live. Already in the earliest hand-written manuscripts Schopenhauer uses different metaphors in order to characterize life as a medium of ethical knowledge. In particular the image of life as a mirror in which a human being sees his own nature and thus realizes the essence of the world often occurs. In the mature work this image is replaced by the concept of objectivation of will. As far as the highest and clearest objectivation of will is the life story of a human individual Schopenhauer’s concept of life is bound up with his theory of character. In my essay I consider the complicated relationship between life, knowledge and ethics in Schopenhauer on the background of his proto-hermeneutic metaphysics by following the development of his use of the mirror-metaphor. (shrink)

The essay deals with the enormous success of the Russian television series The Boy’s Word. Blood on the Asphalt (Slovo patsana. Krov’ na asfalte, 2023), directed by Zhora Kryzhovnikov, on both sides of the trenches during the Russo-Ukrainian war. It discusses the role of social media and the public reception in Ukraine and Russia. In particular, the way the series depicts the so-called ‘Kazan phenomenon’, when the Tatar capital was shocked by criminal youth gangs in the late Soviet Union, makes (...) it attractive and topical in the current situation. By analyzing this, the essay also attempts to gain a better understanding of how popular cultural products take up and process social problems and conflicts in a complex way. (shrink)

As tradições bíblicas se interessam, de forma decidida, pela inversão de situações políticas, nas quais regimes repressivos, de modo violento, impõem sua vontade. Prevê-se o insucesso dos opressores, pelo fato de os oprimidos se tornarem resistentes. Por excelência, porém, Deus é descrito como quem insiste na prevalência da justiça. Contudo, as dimensões teológico-éticas dos textos bíblicos precisam ser descritas de forma exata e pormenorizada. Tal processo é exigente, por incluir pesquisas literário-históricas e por poder avançar apenas versículo por versículo. No (...) caso, o estudo científico do texto bíblico exige que este seja analisado na língua em que, originalmente, foi composto. A pesquisa do contexto histórico, por sua vez, ganha, muitas vezes, maior qualidade quando enriquecida por estudos arqueológicos ou por uma maior atenção às tradições literárias extrabíblicas. Neste sentido, o artigo aqui apresentado oferece um estudo exegético do segundo episódio do livro do Êxodo (Êxodo 1,8-14), visando à contribuição bíblica ao debate sobre religião, política e violência. Palavras-Chave: Religião. Teologia Bíblica. Êxodo. Política. Violência.Biblical traditions, in decisive form, are interested in the reversal of political situations in which repressive regimes impose their will through violence. The failure of oppressors is foreseen because the oppressed become rebels. For good reason, then, God is described as the One who insists that justice prevail. All in all, the theological-ethical dimensions of biblical texts must be described in a detailed and exact manner. Such a process is demanding: it includes literary-historical research and can advance only line-by-line. Besides, scientific study of the biblical traditions demands that the text will be read in the language in which it was originally composed. Beyond that, the investigation of the historical context will mostly obtain more quality including archaeological studies and paying attention to the extra-biblical literary traditions. In this sense, the article presented here offers an exegetical study of the second episode of Exodus (Exodus 1:8-14), forming a biblical contribution to the debate surrounding religion, politics, and violence. Keywords: Religion. Biblical Theology. Exodus. Politics. Violence. (shrink)

This chapter presents the perceptual reality monitoring theory of consciousness (PRM). PRM is a higher-order theory of consciousness. It holds that consciousness involves monitoring the reliability of one’s own sensory signals. I explain how a perceptual reality monitoring mechanism computes the higher order representations that are crucial for consciousness. While PRM accounts for the difference between conscious and unconscious states, it does not explain, on its own, why experiences feel the way they do—the phenomenal character of experience. PRM is compatible (...) with multiple theories of phenomenal character. Here, I show how to combine it with ‘Mental Quality Space’ theory. I finish by presenting empirical evidence for PRM, as well as some of its predictions. (shrink)

American philosophical realism developed in two forms: “new” and “critical” realism. While the new realists sought to ‘emancipate’ ontology from epistemology and defended a direct theory of perception, the critical realists promoted a representationalist account of perception and thus argued for an epistemological dualism. Bertrand Russell’s early philosophical writings figured prominently in both of these American realist camps. However, while the new realists quite enthusiastically embraced the Russellian analytic style of reasoning (and Russell himself appreciated the American new realists as (...) anti-idealist allies), the critical realists were significantly more reserved toward Russell’s point of view. In the present paper, I identify the reasons for this difference in reception. In particular, I will show that the critical realists’ reservations pertained primarily to a more traditionalist—‘continental’—account of philosophy, whereas the neo-realists proved instrumental in setting the stage for later full-blown analytic philosophy in the United States. (shrink)

There are two bodies of literature, one offering theories of the legitimacy of domestic institutions like states, another offering theories of the legitimacy of international institutions like the IMF. Accounts of domestic legitimacy stress the importance of democratic procedure, while few to no theorists make democracy a necessary condition for the legitimacy of international institutions. In this paper, I ask whether this asymmetry can be defended. Is there a unified higher-order theory which can explain why legitimacy requires democracy in the (...) domestic context, but not in the international context? I argue that no proceduralist higher-order theory succeeds, and that we need to look for other solutions. (shrink)

In this article, I try to shed new light on Frege’s envisaged definitional introduction of real and complex numbers in _Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik_ (1884) and the status of cross-sortal identity claims with side glances at _Grundgesetze der Arithmetik_ (vol. I 1893, vol. II 1903). As far as I can see, this topic has not yet been discussed in the context of _Grundlagen_. I show why Frege’s strategy in the case of the projected definitions of real and complex numbers in (...) _Grundlagen_ is modelled on his definitional introduction of cardinal numbers in two steps, tentatively via a contextual definition and finally and definitively via an explicit definition. I argue that the strategy leaves a few important questions open, in particular one relating to the status of the envisioned abstraction principles for the real and complex numbers and another concerning the proper handling of cross-sortal identity claims. (shrink)

Views exchanged between Narahara Śesharāva Pohanekara, b. 1907, and Vāmana Malhāra Jośī, 1882-1943, Marathi litterateurs, on the latter's article, Jñāna he visha kā amr̥ta? on the philosophical concept of knowledge.

No detailed description available for "Importance and Legacy".

Fully updated with new topics covering the latest developments and debates, the second edition of this highly influential text retains its unique combination of accessibility and originality. Second edition of a highly influential text that has already become a standard in the field, for students and professional researchers alike, due to its impressive line-up of contributors, and its unique combination of accessibility and originality Twenty-six essays in total, covering 13 essential topics Features five new topics that bring readers up to (...) speed on some of the latest developments in the field, and give them a glimpse of where it's headed: Should knowledge come first? Do practical matters affect whether you know? Is virtuous motivation essential to knowing? Can knowledge be lucky? Can evidence be permissive? Substantially updates two other debates: Is there immediate justification? Can belief be justified through coherence alone? (shrink)

Introspection is the capacity by which we know our own conscious mental states. Several theories aim to explain it. According to acquaintance theory, we know our experiences by being acquainted with them. Acquaintance is non-causal, non-inferential, and non-observational. I present a dilemma for the acquaintance theory of introspection. Either subjects are always acquainted with all their experiences; or some attentional mechanism selects the relevant experiences (or aspects of experiences) for introspection. The first option is implausible: it implies that subjects are (...) omniscient about their own experiences. The second option is also implausible: if acquaintance is a non-causal relation, introspection cannot target specific (aspects of) experiences without violating the principle of causal closure of the physical. (shrink)

In der Reihe werden herausragende monographische Untersuchungen und Sammelbände zu allen Aspekten der Philosophie Kants veröffentlicht, ebenso zum systematischen Verhältnis seiner Philosophie zu anderen philosophischen Ansätzen in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Veröffentlicht werden Studien, die einen innovativen Charakter haben und ausdrückliche Desiderate der Forschung erfüllen. Die Publikationen repräsentieren damit den aktuellsten Stand der Forschung.

Does particle physics really describe the basic constituents of the material world or is it just a useful tool for deriving empirical predictions? This book proposes a novel answer to that question, emphasizing the importance of causal reasoning for the justification of scientific claims. It thereby responds to general worries about scientific realism as well as to more specific challenges stemming from the interpretation of quantum physics.

Was macht das Besondere der menschlichen Lebensform aus? Wie können wir es verstehen, dass unsere Art wie alle anderen natürlich evolviert ist und dennoch als einzige Art die Fähigkeit entwickelt hat, unter dem Anspruch der Freiheit und in reflexiver Distanz zu handeln, damit aber die Umwelt auf eine Welt hin zu transzendieren? Jung argumentiert, dass sich diese Fragen nur beantworten lassen, wenn man philosophische, evolutionstheoretische und kognitionswissenschaftliche Ansätze aufeinander bezieht. Der Schlüssel hierfür ist der Begriff der Bedeutung. Alle Lebewesen erfassen (...) ihre Umwelt im praktischen Umgang mit ihr als bedeutsam. Auch der Geist des Menschen ist essentiell verkörpert und basiert auf erlebten Bedeutsamkeiten. Die Fähigkeit zur symbolischen Artikulation und kulturellen Weiterentwicklung solcher Lebensbedeutungen erlaubt es ihm aber auch, die lokale Umwelt zu transzendieren und dabei Werte, Normen und objektive Geltungsansprüche zu entwickeln. Eine zeitgemäße Anthropologie muss in der Lage sein, diese qualitativen Besonderheiten des menschlichen Geistes als Resultate von Naturprozessen verständlich zu machen. Sie verbindet methodischen Naturalismus mit Offenheit für die Transzendenz des Geistes über die Umwelt. Damit leistet der Autor einen wichtigen Beitrag zu einem nichtreduktionistischen Verständnis des Menschen, das Leib und Geist nicht dualistisch trennt, sondern ihre spannungsvolle Einheit sichtbar macht. (shrink)

In the leadership literature of the past 100 years or so, rhetoric has been a topic for a long time and ethics was introduced some 30 years ago. However, the three topics, leadership, rhetoric, and ethics, have not been connected. This is astonishing because when ethical leadership made its comeback, scholars acknowledged the debt that ethical leadership owes to Aristotelian ideas. For Aristotle, leadership, ethics, and rhetoric were inseparable: without ethics, there could neither be good leadership nor rhetoric, and rhetoric (...) was the bridge from leader to follower and back. Aristotle is known as the practical philosopher and we argue that closing this major lacuna in leadership theory, would be beneficial for practice too and would help prevent Theranos-like scandals. The lacuna lies in what some call a Machiavellian view of leadership and rhetoric: both are regarded as amoral tools to achieve given ends. Aristotle would bristle at that idea. Both, leadership and rhetoric, to be good, must aim at the noble. The noble is not dictated by a heroic despot nor by a selfless saint but is understood by a leader because s/he is a socially embedded individual. We argue that leadership should be understood as personal development, that organisational rules must not inhibit virtue, that leadership is more about listening than talking, that synthesising that which is heard is central, and finally, that the common, not the collective, good is the goal of leadership. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to refute the aphorism “There is no arguing about taste”. On the one hand, judgements of taste arise from individual feelings, on the other hand, they claim to be universally valid. The question of whether there can be sensible dispute about taste arises from this conflict between subjectivity and universality. The article shows how sensible dispute is possible without denying the subjective character of the judgement. Dispute leads to an explication of the standard that (...) determined the individual judgement of taste. Based on this, three stages of sensible dispute open up: adjustment of the standard, improvement of the standard, and idealisation of the standard. Thus, the article demonstrates not only that it is possible to argue about taste in a sensible way, but also on which levels such a dispute can take place. (shrink)

Delayed-choice experiments in quantum mechanics are often taken to undermine a realistic interpretation of the quantum state. More specifically, Healey has recently argued that the phenomenon of delayed-choice entanglement swapping is incompatible with the view that entanglement is a physical relation between quantum systems. This paper argues against these claims. It first reviews two paradigmatic delayed-choice experiments and analyzes their metaphysical implications. It then applies the results of this analysis to the case of entanglement swapping, showing that such experiments pose (...) no threat to realism about entanglement. (shrink)

While scientific realism generally assumes that successful scientific explanations yield information about reality, realists also have to admit that not all information acquired in this way is equally well warranted. Some versions of scientific realism do this by saying that explanatory posits with which we have established some kind of causal contact are better warranted than those that merely appear in theoretical hypotheses. I first explicate this distinction by considering some general criteria that permit us to distinguish causal warrant from (...) theoretical warrant. I then apply these criteria to a specific case from particle physics, claiming that scientific realism has to incorporate the distinction between causal and theoretical warrant if it is to be an adequate stance in the philosophy of particle physics. (shrink)

1. Logik und Philosophie der Mathematik.--2. Logik und Sprachphilosophie.--3. Logik und Semantik.

The paper argues that a causal explanation of the correlated outcomes of EPR-type experiments is desirable and possible. It shows how Bohmian mechanics and the GRW mass density theory offer such an explanation in terms of a non-local common cause.

Der Zwang, der auf Menschen mit abweichendem Verhalten seit Jahrhunderten und auch heute noch ausgeübt wird, wurde z. T. sehr grundsätzlich kritisiert, doch stehen Menschen in der psychiatrischen Praxis oft vor der Entscheidung, jemandem durch die Gewährung der Bewegungsfreiheit die Möglichkeit zur Selbstschädigung zu eröffnen, oder die Person mit Zwang vor sich selbst zu schützen oder auch Schaden von anderen abzuwenden. Während der Schutz anderer Personen wesentlicher Teil des Strafrechts ist, wird der Schutz vor sich selbst meist mit fehlender Entscheidungskompetenz, (...) individuell fehlender Autonomie begründet. Bei der Frage, ob es überhaupt Willensfreiheit gibt, die der konkreten Person dann abgeht, kann man sich neben einigen allgemeinen Überlegungen auf die Praxis von Strafrecht und medizinischer Ethik beziehen. Für den Willensbegriff ist der Rückgriff auf zwei mittelalterliche Klassiker erhellend, die Wille und Verstand in unterschiedlicher Weise in Beziehung setzen. Dies eröffnet die Möglichkeit einer systematischen Differenzierung von Graden der Willensfreiheit, die bei problematischem Verhalten zu unterschiedlichen rechtlichen und medizinischen Behandlungen führen. Eine besondere Rolle nimmt seit einigen Jahren der – wohl aus dem Mittelalter entlehnte – Begriff des natürlichen Willens ein. Dabei bleibt die Einsicht wichtig, dass es in diesem komplexen Problemfeld immer wieder unklare Grenzfälle gibt, so dass als praktische Norm die möglichst große Bewahrung der Autonomie und damit der Würde der Patient*innen zu gelten hat. (shrink)

"Die Grenzen des Revisionismus" befasst sich mit den erkenntnis- und wissenschafttheoretischen Positionen des frühen Moritz Schlick und des frühen Ernst Cassirer.

Eino Kaila's thought occupies a curious position within the logical empiricist movement. Along with Hans Reichenbach, Herbert Feigl, and the early Moritz Schlick, Kaila advocates a realist approach towards science and the project of a “scientific world conception”. This realist approach was chiefly directed at both Kantianism and Poincaréan conventionalism. The case in point was the theory of measurement. According to Kaila, the foundations of physical reality are characterized by the existence of invariant systems of relations, which he called structures. (...) In a certain sense, these invariant structures, he maintained, are constituted in the act of measuring. By “constitution”, however, Kaila meant neither the dependency of the objects of measurement on a priori concepts (or Kantian categories) nor their being effected by conventional stipulations in a Poincaréan sense. He held that invariant structures are, quite literally, real: they exist prior to and independently of our theoretical capacity. By executing measurements, invariant structures are detected and objectively determinable by laws of nature. (shrink)

This article considers the evolution of Feigl's attempt at establishing a stable form of scientific realism. I will argue that Feigl's work in that area should be appreciated for two reasons: it represents a telling case against the view of there being an unbridgeable ‘analytic-continental divide’ in the context of twentieth-century philosophy; it contradicts the idea that scientific realism is at odds with logical empiricism. It will be shown that Feigl developed his scientific realist position from within the logical empiricists’ (...) Vienna Circle. This, in turn, necessitates a fresh approach toward the contemporary scientific realism debate. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that the French philosopher and historian of science Abel Rey played a more influential role in the formative phase of the Vienna Circle than hitherto supposed. On the whole, it will be argued that Rey's contribution had political impact. His interpretation of "modern physics" in 1907 in the face of the alleged "bankruptcy of science" should be appreciated as a masterpiece of applied enlightenment thought. As such, it was especially paradigmatic for Philipp (...) Frank's "positivist" defense of the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics against the irrationalist tendencies of the 1920s and 1930s. (shrink)

Science of consciousness in Yoga and Indian philosophy; contributed research papers.

Helmholtz's theory of space had significant impact on Schlick's early ?critical realist? point of view. However, it will be argued in this paper that Schlick's appropriation of Helmholtz's ideas eventually lead to a rather radical transformation of the original Helmholtzian position.

Analytic philosophy in the United States emerged parallel to the demise of idealism. During the second half of the nineteenth century, Josiah Royce had contributed importantly to the predominance of idealist systems and corresponding academic groups. With the rise of pragmatism and new realism, the situation changed dramatically: the idealist movement lost momentum and realism began to dominate the discourse. The present paper argues that the critiques of idealism put forward by the realists during the first two decades of the (...) twentieth century were instrumental to the emergence of analytic philosophy in the United States. As I will explain, Ralph Barton Perry (1876–1957) was the key figure in the underinvestigated genesis of this movement. (shrink)

The biggest research programme within business ethics is arguably Corporate Social Responsibility and all its related streams (Corporate Citizenship, Social Justice, etc.) While there seems to be widespread agreement that business ethics is situated between the amoral or even immoral view of Milton Friedman as explicated in his 1970 New York Times paper, and the moral view expounded by R. Edward Freeman, this essay challenges that view. Friedman, maybe owed to his flamboyant writing style and crude and purely rhetorical oversimplifications (...) has been misinterpreted to advocate for managers to be completely amoral maximisers of profitability. This misinterpretation has become common wisdom, despite him clearly stating that the law and the moral standards of surrounding society must limit profit-seeking behaviour. Freeman's stakeholder theory, on the other hand, is seen as being on the other end of the continuum, arguing for selflessness—another misinterpretation, as I argue with Ed Freeman's help. Instead, I suggest that both Friedman and Freeman represent the virtuous mean of the business ethics continuum and not its extremes because they both base their theories on the idea of the free and socially embedded individual. The two vicious ends of the continuum are inhabited by the unreal, atomised, completely a-social and selfish individual on the one end, and by the equally unreal collectivised self-less individual on the other. The mainstream in business ethics has declared the collective and selfless end to be the ideal that must guide practice and research. The selfish and the selfless strawmen have prevented a proper debate in business ethics for too long. (shrink)

This paper examines Ralph Barton Perry's analysis of the ‘ego-centric predicament’. It will be shown that Perry convincingly argued against prevailing contemporary versions of idealism and that it makes perfectly good sense to consider him a precursor of subsequent trends in American analytic philosophy. Perry's appraisal and promotion of the contemporary logic of relations in the framework of early twentieth-century American neorealism provides further evidence of his being a proto-analytic philosopher. His personal acquaintance with Bertrand Russell proved instructive in this (...) regard. On the whole, Perry's distinctive approach to philosophy was instrumental in establishing the analytic style of reasoning in the United States. This paper is devoted to substantiating this claim. It is thus hoped that a clearer picture of early twentieth-century American philosophy will begin to emerge. (shrink)

It is common in the literature to claim that legitimacy is the right to rule and that, accordingly, Hohfeldian rights analysis can be used to understand the concept. However, we argue that authors in the legitimacy literature have not generally realised the full potential of Hohfeldian analysis. We discuss extant approaches in the literature that conceptually identify legitimacy with one particular Hohfeldian incident, or, more rarely, a determinate set of incidents. Against these views, and building on parallel debates in property (...) theory, we suggest that Hohfeldian analysis pushes one towards the claim that legitimacy possesses no determinate essence. We provide a rationale for this novel view and disarm a series of objections. (shrink)

Roy Wood Sellars (1880–1973) is often reduced to his role as father of Wilfrid Sellars. This is unfair because during the 1920s, ‘30s, and ‘40s, Roy Wood was one of the leading figures of the then prevailing American realist movement. In the present paper, I will focus on one particular facet of R. W. Sellars’ philosophical approach: his continual examination of Albert Einstein’s special theory of relativity. I shall primarily reconstruct his discussion of Einstein’s theory, as it can be found (...) in his seminal The Philosophy of Physical Realism (1932). In contrast to authors such as Bertrand Russell or Émile Meyerson, Sellars refused to interpret special relativity in a realist vein. In his view, it should be seen as an “ars mensurandi” and thus being interpreted purely operationally. As with Einstein himself, the concept of simultaneity was his paradigm case in point. However, Sellars opined that besides the physical (mensurational) concepts of time and simultaneity there also exists an ontological understanding of these notions. “Real” time and “absolute” simultaneity are, according to Sellars, the indispensable non-relativistic counterparts to Einstein’s respective relativistic conceptions. They are to be interpreted realistically since they prove, Sellars maintains, to be explanatory regarding events in Einstein-Minkowski’s world. In the course of the paper, I shall compare this view with the one defended by Henri Bergson. Furthermore, Sellars’ later approach from the 1940s and ‘50s will be briefly considered and critically discussed by confronting it with more recent attempts at ontologically ‘grounding’ special relativistic kinematics. (shrink)

Was ist der Mensch? Und welche Bedeutung hat diese Frage fur die Philosophie? Fur die erste Halfte des 20. Jahrhunderts gilt die zwischen Ernst Cassirer und Martin Heidegger gefuhrte Davoser Disputation als der paradigmatische Streit um den Menschen und das richtige Verstandnis von Philosophie. Ausgeblendet wird dabei, dass die Protagonisten des Streits ihre Positionen selbst in einer Dreierkonstellation mit der von Max Scheler und Helmuth Plessner begrundeten modernen philosophischen Anthropologie sahen. Bezieht man diese dritte, naturphilosophische Alternative mit ein, so eroffnen (...) sich neue Wege der Auseinandersetzung mit Heideggers Daseinsontologie und Cassirers Kulturphilosophie. Zugleich wird eine originelle Position kenntlich, die auch fur eine Reihe von Themenkreisen des gegenwartigen Fragens nach dem Menschen von methodisch-sachlicher Aufschlusskraft ist: den Naturalismus, das Tier-Mensch-Verhaltnis, den Personbegriff und das Verhaltnis von menschlicher Lebensform und objektivem Geist. (shrink)

Critical realism is a frequently mentioned, but not very well-known, late nineteenth-/early twentieth-century philosophical tradition. Having its roots in Kantian epistemology, critical realism is best characterized as a revisionist approach toward the original Kantian doctrine. Its most outstanding thesis is the idea that Kantian things-in-themselves are knowable. This idea was—at least implicitly—suggested by thinkers such as Alois Riehl, Wilhelm Wundt, and Oswald Külpe. Interestingly enough, the philosophical position of the early Moritz Schlick stands in the critical realist tradition as well. (...) As will be outlined in the course of this paper, both Schlick’s magnum opus General Theory of Knowledge (1918) and his seminal Space and Time in Contemporary Physics (1917) are based on the assumption that the objects of science are relations and that relations have the status of Kantian things-in-themselves. By way of conclusion, I shall point out that this— more or less directly—leads to the current debate over ‘structural’ realism. (shrink)

Religionspsychologie wird in Deutschland zumeist im Bereich der Praktischen Theologie und Religionspädagogik betrieben und stellt kein eigenständiges psychologisches Teilfach dar. Theorien der religiösen Entwicklung sind daher häufig von ihrem theologischen Kontext beeinflusst. Gängige Modelle religiöser Entwicklung nimmt Allolio-Näcke in diesem Band aus psychologischer Perspektive in den Blick und entwirft erstmals seit 30 Jahren eine eigene kulturpsychologische Theorie religiöser Entwicklung. Ein historischer Rahmen, der die Entstehung der Religionspsychologie nachzeichnet und sie im wissenschaftlichen Kanon verortet, rundet den Band ab.

Laudisa (Found. Phys. 38:1110–1132, 2008) claims that experimental research on the class of non-local hidden-variable theories introduced by Leggett is misguided, because these theories are irrelevant for the foundations of quantum mechanics. I show that Laudisa’s arguments fail to establish the pessimistic conclusion he draws from them. In particular, it is not the case that Leggett-inspired research is based on a mistaken understanding of Bell’s theorem, nor that previous no-hidden-variable theorems already exclude Leggett’s models. Finally, I argue that the framework (...) of Bohmian mechanics brings out the importance of Leggett tests, rather than proving their irrelevance, as Laudisa supposes. (shrink)