In the leadership literature of the past 100 years or so, rhetoric has been a topic for a long time and ethics was introduced some 30 years ago. However, the three topics, leadership, rhetoric, and ethics, have not been connected. This is astonishing because when ethical leadership made its comeback, scholars acknowledged the debt that ethical leadership owes to Aristotelian ideas. For Aristotle, leadership, ethics, and rhetoric were inseparable: without ethics, there could neither be good leadership nor rhetoric, and (...) rhetoric was the bridge from leader to follower and back. Aristotle is known as the practical philosopher and we argue that closing this major lacuna in leadership theory, would be beneficial for practice too and would help prevent Theranos-like scandals. The lacuna lies in what some call a Machiavellian view of leadership and rhetoric: both are regarded as amoral tools to achieve given ends. Aristotle would bristle at that idea. Both, leadership and rhetoric, to be good, must aim at the noble. The noble is not dictated by a heroic despot nor by a selfless saint but is understood by a leader because s/he is a socially embedded individual. We argue that leadership should be understood as personal development, that organisational rules must not inhibit virtue, that leadership is more about listening than talking, that synthesising that which is heard is central, and finally, that the common, not the collective, good is the goal of leadership. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie Jahrgang: 101 Heft: 3 Seiten: 445-468.

Rationality and reason are often used as synonyms, although they are very different concepts. In this article we argue that rationality is the concept of reason that has been stripped of its human elements. Ancient and medieval philosophers such as Aristotle and Aquinas stressed that the concept of reason is composed of sensitive, discursive, and moral elements. Post-Enlightenment thinkers instead, building on the works of René Descartes and Isaac Newton, took these out and claimed that rationality must be based (...) on an external logic devoid of value-concepts such as perfection, harmony, meaning and aim (Koyré in From the closed world to the infinite universe, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1957). The purpose of this essay is to highlight this shift in Western thought and its consequences for management theories. While explaining the ancient concept of reason in contrast with modern rationalism (Klein in: Williamson RB, Zuckerman E (eds) Jacob Klein—lectures and essays, St. John’s College Press, Annapolis, 1985), we aim at raising awareness of the differences between building a research programme (especially in business sciences like economics and management) on rationality or on reason. (shrink)

Resumen: Comparada con la economía de hoy, la de la Grecia antigua -por lo menos en una de sus concepciones- era una economía limitada. Exteriormente, porque en Hesíodo sirve para el sustento de la casa, y en Aristóteles para el sustento de la ciudad; interiormente y de manera sistemática, en el pri..

The great Pontano -- The storms of life -- The haven of philosophy -- Rewriting moral philosophy -- Learned authority -- Latin philosophy -- Virtue, inside out -- The rule of reason -- Beyond the veil -- Chronology of Pontano's works -- Chronology of Pontano's life -- Moral virtues in Aristotle and Pontano.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Plato on Virtue:Definitions of ΣωΦpoσynh in Plato's Charmides and in Plotinus Enneads 1.2 (19)Matthias VorwerkWhen interpreting Plato's dialogues we are confronted with a number of difficulties that we rarely meet when looking at the works of any other philosopher in antiquity. The most important reason for these difficulties can be found in the literary form that Plato has chosen for all his extant works, the dialogue. Instead of (...) developing his theories in systematic treatises, as at least some of the pre-Socratic philosophers and most of the philosophical later writers we know of did, Plato prefers to display philosophical conversations, usually with Socrates as the main interlocutor. The advantage of this literary form is that it conveys a sense of immediacy and vividness as does a drama on stage;1 it involves readers in the discussion and lets them experience the process of dialectic going on in the conversation.2 Nevertheless, Plato's dialogues raise a number of questions for those who do not read them only as pieces of literature but who want to analyze their philosophical content, especially where the so-called early dialogues3 are concerned: How are we to interpret the figure of Socrates? Is he supposed to represent the historical Socrates or is he only Plato's mouthpiece, or both? Are the aporiai of the early dialogues really insoluble or are there hints at possible solutions? Are we allowed to refer to later Platonic dialogues, in which metaphysical theories such [End Page 29] as the immortality of the soul, the theory of ideas, and cosmology are explicitly developed, in order to interpret the dialogues of the early period? Is it possible to detect something like a Platonic system that stands behind the dialogues but is not presented in all its details? What is the relation between such a system and Aristotle's reports about the unwritten doctrines () that Plato taught in his school, the Academy? In what regard are Plato's oral teachings at the Academy and his written dialogues connected to each other? And finally: What was Plato's object in composing the dialogues? These are some of the vexed questions that have been occupying scholars since Friedrich Schleiermacher for the past two centuries4 and that form the complex of problems every interpreter of Plato has to face.The present study does not intend to give a solution to all the problems mentioned above. It is concerned with one of the central aporetic early dialogues, the Charmides, which deals with the definition of the meaning of (hereafter, sophrosune), one of the Platonic cardinal virtues. First I am going to describe which definitions of sophrosune are proposed in the Charmides and how Socrates seemingly proves them wrong. Then I will show that these definitions are accepted in Plato's later dialogues or that they can at least be justified with the help of these. Finally I will present Plotinus' theory of the stages or grades of virtue with respect to sophrosune, and with the help of this theory I shall try to find a solution for the aporiai in the Charmides.1. The Definitions of Sophrosune in Plato's CharmidesThe Charmides,5 named after one of the interlocutors of Socrates, is set in the Athens of the year 432, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian [End Page 30] war.6 After a longer absence, which he spent in the military expedition at Potidaia, Socrates returns to Athens and on the next day immediately goes to the usual public meeting places (, 153a2-3). In the Palaistra or wrestling-school of Taureas he meets some friends, among them Chairephon and Critias, the latter being a cousin of Plato's mother and later one of the thirty tyrants.7 When Socrates inquires after the state of philosophy and asks for information about young men excelling in the fields of knowledge and beauty (, 153d4-5), he is referred to Charmides, who has just arrived and who enchants not only the young but also the older men with his beauty. He is Critias' cousin and Plato's uncle, the brother of his mother. Thus the two most important interlocutors in this... (shrink)

Although metaphysics as a discipline can hardly be separated from Aristotle and his works, the questions it raises were certainly known to authors even before the reception of Aristotle in the thirteenth century. Even without the explicit use of this term the twelfth century manifested a strong interest in metaphysical questions under the guise of «natural philosophy» or «divine science», leading M.-D. Chenu to coin the expression of a twelfth century «éveil métaphysique». In their commentaries on Boethius and (...) under the influence of Neoplatonism, twelfth century authors not only anticipate essential elements of thirteenth century metaphysics, they also make an original contribution to the history of metaphysics by attempting to integrate the theory of first principles, philosophical theology and ontology. This volume presents and examines the contributions of the twelfth century to metaphysics made by selected Jewish, Christian and Muslim authors of the Iberian Peninsula and Francia. -/- Contributors include Matthias Lutz-Bachmann (Frankfurt am Main), Andreas Speer (Würzburg), Charles Burnett (London), Alexander Fidora (Frankfurt am Main), Thomas Ricklin (Neuchâtel), Yossef Schwartz (Jerusalem), Josep Udina (Barcelona), Jack C. Marler (St. Louis/USA), Gillian R. Evans (Cambridge), Andreas Niederberger (Frankfurt am Main) and Françoise Hudry (Paris). (shrink)

Theories of epistemology make reference—via the perspective of an observer—to the structure of information transfer, which generates reality, of which the observer himself forms a part. It can be shown that any epistemological approach which implies the participation of tautological structural elements in the information transfer necessarily leads to an antinomy. Nevertheless, since the time of Aristotle the paradigm of mathematics—and thus tautological structure—has always been a hidden ingredient in the various concepts of knowledge acquisition or general theories of (...) information transfer. We hold that Darwin’s Evolutionary Theory is the first scientific theory which consistently presupposes a non-tautological structure for the information transfer and, at the same time, keeps it strictly distinct from the tautological metric of scientific observation. The consequences of this technique—namely the dissociation of information from intentionality—have not yet been fully drawn. (shrink)

The three ancient commentaries on Aristotle's On the Soul (De anima) are interesting because the commentators, as neo-Platonists, understand the soul completely differently than Aristotle. For them, the soul is the inseperable life principle of the body, a spiritual entity. In response to this challenge, the commentator Priscian (ca. 530 AD) develops the most detailed antique theory of human self-consciousness, which is reconstructed here for the first time.

Aristotle earns the distinction of having put forward the first comprehensive philosophical theory of justice. After the end of the antique world, St. Thomas Aquinas was the first philosopher and theologian to return to Aristotle’s theory of the just. Not only did he do so with the requisite systematic precision; he also developed a new philosophical interpretation of justice. In the present article I shall outline, with the brevity expected of me here, the fundamentals of Aristotle’s theory (...) of justice. This will be followed by a summary of the core aspects of Aquinas’s notion of justice, whose grounding in normative reason will be identified in Aquinas’s treatise on law and political theory, and explicated accordingly. (shrink)

Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics is the text which had the single greatest influence on Aquinas's ethical writings, and the historical and philosophical value of Aquinas's appropriation of this text provokes lively debate. In this volume of new essays, thirteen distinguished scholars explore how Aquinas receives, expands on and transforms Aristotle's insights about the attainability of happiness, the scope of moral virtue, the foundation of morality and the nature of pleasure. They examine Aquinas's commentary on the Ethics and his theological (...) writings, above all the Summa theologiae. Their essays show Aquinas to be a highly perceptive interpreter, but one who also brings certain presuppositions to the Ethics and alters key Aristotelian notions for his own purposes. The result is a rich and nuanced picture of Aquinas's relation to Aristotle that will be of interest to readers in moral philosophy, Aquinas studies, the history of theology and the history of philosophy. (shrink)

This volume contains fourteen papers on Aristotelian and non-Aristotelian medieval accounts of weakness of will, many of which have not yet been the object of scholarly writing. The papers give insight into a variety of accounts of practical rationality that were directly or indirectly influential on modern thinkers. The temporal framework of the volume exceeds the Middle Ages on both ends by including Aristotle and authors from the Renaissance and the Reformation.

Summary The author of the paper studies the ethical views of Matthias Bel expressed in his Preface to Johann Arndt's treatise and in Davidian-Solomonian Ethics, which contain a critique of false Christianity and ancient (especially Aristotle's) ethics. Bel refuses any philosophical ethics based on human nature, since man, in his very essence, is sinful and vicious. This leads to the general moral downfall of the young and mankind. He only recognises ethics whose source and the highest good is (...) God. He accepts ancient ethics as long as it is useful for achieving Christian moral values. Bel was a vociferous critic of the morality of the time; he adopted a highly negative stance towards the Jews and Gypsies living in the then Historical Hungary. The author considers Matthias Bel a confident, or enthusiastic, Pietist in the early period of his life and work; later, he rates him as a moderate Pietist. (shrink)

Die Fragen "woher kommen wir? Wohin gehen wir?" gehören zu den Fragen, die sich Menschen immer schon gestellt haben. Die Idee des Fortschritts und die feste Überzeugung der Möglichkeit einer besseren Zukunft gehören allen historischen Katastrophen zum Trotz zu den Grundpfeilern eines Denkens, das sich stets auch über seine Herkunft definiert hat: der Geschichtsphilosophie. Das neue Studienbuch erschließt das Thema mit innovativem Blick: Aus der Geschichte lernen? Und wenn ja - was?; die Geschichte des Nachdenkens über Geschichte von der Antike (...) bis zur Gegenwart: Augustinus, Joachim, Machiavelli, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche; das Problem der Säkularisierung, die Herkunft und Wandlung von Ideen und Werten verstehen und beurteilen;affirmative oder kritische Genealogie, zyklische und teleologische Modelle der Geschichte; erkenntnistheoretische Grundlegung der Geschichtsschreibung, über die Unmöglichkeit, ohne philosophische Implikationen Geschichte zu denken und zu schreiben. (shrink)

Zoos attract millions of visitors every year, many of whom are schoolchildren. For this reason, zoos are important institutions for the environmental education of future generations. Empirical studies on the educational impact of environmental education programs in zoos are still rare. To address this issue, we conducted two studies: In study 1, we investigated students’ interests in different biological topics, including zoos ( n = 1,587). Data analysis of individual topics revealed large differences of interest, with advanced students showing less (...) interest in zoos. In study 2, we invited school classes of this age group to visit different guided tours at the zoo and tested connection to nature before and after each educational intervention ( n = 608). The results showed that the guided tours are an effective tool to raise students’ connection to nature. Add-on components have the potential to further promote connection to nature. The education programs are most effective with students with a low initial nature connection. (shrink)

When I take a sip from the coffee in my cup, I can taste that it is sweet. When I hold the cup with my hands, I can feel that it is hot. Why does the experience of feeling that the cup is hot give me justification for believing that the cup is hot?And why does the experience of tasting that the coffee is sweet give me justification for believing that the coffee is sweet?In general terms: Why is it that (...) a sense experience that P is a source of justification—a reason—for believing that P? Call this the Question. I will discuss various answers to the Question, and defend the one I myself favor. (shrink)

After briefly discussing the relevance of the notions computation and implementation for cognitive science, I summarize some of the problems that have been found in their most common interpretations. In particular, I argue that standard notions of computation together with a state-to-state correspondence view of implementation cannot overcome difficulties posed by Putnam's Realization Theorem and that, therefore, a different approach to implementation is required. The notion realization of a function, developed out of physical theories, is then introduced as a replacement (...) for the notional pair computation-implementation. After gradual refinement, taking practical constraints into account, this notion gives rise to the notion digital system which singles out physical systems that could be actually used, and possibly even built. (shrink)

In our contemporary world, the rights of nature have become an important legal device for environmental protection. Some of the most influential rights of nature frameworks can be found in non-Western contexts and have been strongly influenced by ecocentric accounts of nature. This article addresses the question of whether rights of nature can be implemented in Western contexts as well, focusing in particular on Europe. It first examines ecocentric justifications of the rights of nature and discusses two possible non-ecocentric alternatives. (...) Second, two models for implementing rights of nature—the nature’s rights model and the legal personhood model—are compared to demonstrate how different combinations of elements from both models can fit different socio-cultural contexts, including Western ones. (shrink)

A uniform construction for sequent calculi for finite-valued first-order logics with distribution quantifiers is exhibited. Completeness, cut-elimination and midsequent theorems are established. As an application, an analog of Herbrand’s theorem for the four-valued knowledge-representation logic of Belnap and Ginsberg is presented. It is indicated how this theorem can be used for reasoning about knowledge bases with incomplete and inconsistent information.

Adam Smith’s is often falsely portrayed as having argued that radical selfishness is a force for the good and that this “invisible hand’ is his market mechanism. This paper argues that Smith’s real market mechanism, the sympathy manoeuvre, is a viable alternative to Schumpeterian and mainstream models of innovation in economics and also could help build a firmer theoretical basis for other approaches such as Responsible Innovation. To Smith all human activity was social and must be understood and explained in (...) terms of the sentiments involved. Discovery, for instance, is driven by three sentiments (wonder, surprise, admiration), economic activities by sympathetic imagination, the need for exchange, the need to better one’s position in life, and the need for gratitude. Through sympathetic imagination, his famous model of the impartial spectator, Smith elegantly connects the individual and society. Smith’s innovation process is thus an exercise in social construction and not a destructive process based on radical selfishness. The paper argues that this social innovation process is a viable alternative to the extant approaches that are essentially asocial and amoral (economism) or ideologically normative (Responsible Innovation). (shrink)

We examine the moderating role of the situational and organizational contexts in determining unethical managerial behavior, applying the case-survey methodology. On the basis of a holistic, multiple-antecedent perspective, we hypothesize that two key constructs, moral intensity and situational strength, help explain contextual moderating effects on relationships between managers’ individual characteristics and unethical behavior. Based on a quantitative analysis of 52 case studies describing occurrences of real-life unethical conduct, we find empirical support for the hypothesized contextual moderating effects of moral intensity (...) and situational strength. By examining these complex contextual moderators, we aim to contribute to organizational ethics research as we shed light on the critical role that context may play in influencing unethical managerial behavior. (shrink)

The core feature that distinguishes moods from emotions is that moods, in contrast to emotions, are diffuse and global. This article outlines a dispositional theory of moods (DTM) that accounts for this and other features of mood experience. DTM holds that moods are temporary dispositions to have or to generate particular kinds of emotion-relevant appraisals. Furthermore, DTM assumes that the cognitions and appraisals one is disposed to have in a given mood partly constitute the experience of mood. This article outlines (...) a number of implications of DTM (e.g., regarding the noncognitive causation and rationality of moods) and summarizes empirical results supporting the theory. (shrink)

Argues for a closer connection between memories of injustice and promises of justice as a means to overcome violence.

Psychiatric research is in crisis because of repeated failures to discover new drugs for mental disorders. Lack of measurement validity could partly account for these failures. If researchers do not actually measure the effects of drugs on the disorders they aim to investigate, one should expect suboptimal treatment outcomes. I argue that this is the case, focusing on depression, and fear & anxiety disorders. In doing so, I show how psychiatric research illustrates a more general phenomenon that I call “validity (...) drift.” A validity drift occurs when, in the course of developing new measurement procedures, researchers end up studying something different from what they originally aimed to study. I analyze the different ways in which scientists attempt to validate procedures for measuring mental disorders for the purpose of testing drugs in animal models. I show how those validation efforts might fail, thereby leading to validity drifts. Overall, this analysis highlights the complex interplay between the development of new measurement procedures, their calibration, and scientific theories of the target phenomena. (shrink)

One of the most common arguments in favour of the state's authority is that without the coordinating hand of political institutions, we could not achieve important moral benefits. I argue that if we understand authority correctly, then coordination cannot even in principle establish that coordinators have political authority.

Defeaters can prevent a perceptual belief from being justified. For example, when you know that red light is shining at the table before you, you would typically not be justified in believing that the table is red. However, can defeaters also destroy a perceptual experience as a source of justification? If the answer is ‘no’, the red light defeater blocks doxastic justification without destroying propositional justification. You have some-things-considered, but not all-things-considered, justification for believing that the table is red. If (...) the answer is ‘yes’, the red light defeater blocks doxastic justification by destroying propositional justification. You have neither all-things-considered nor some-things-considered justification for believing that the table is red. According to dogmatism, the justificational force of perceptual experiences is indestructible. According to conservatism about sense experience, a perceptual experience ceases to have justificational force if there is evidence against its reliability. Finally, according to meta-evidentialism, a perceptual experience is blocked from being a source of justification is there is no evidence of its reliability. I argue that, of these three theories, meta-evidentialism is the most plausible. (shrink)

As human–machine teams are being considered for a variety of mixed-initiative tasks, detecting and being responsive to human cognitive states, in particular systematic cognitive states, is among the most critical capabilities for artificial systems to ensure smooth interactions with humans and high overall team performance. Various human physiological parameters, such as heart rate, respiration rate, blood pressure, and skin conductance, as well as brain activity inferred from functional near-infrared spectroscopy or electroencephalogram, have been linked to different systemic cognitive states, such (...) as workload, distraction, or mind–wandering among others. Whether these multimodal signals are indeed sufficient to isolate such cognitive states across individuals performing tasks or whether additional contextual information (e.g., about the task state or the task environment) is required for making appropriate inferences remains an important open problem.In this paper, we introduce an experimental and machine learning framework for investigating these questions and focus specifically on using physiological and neurophysiological measurements to learn classifiers associated with systemic cognitive states like cognitive load, distraction, sense of urgency, mind wandering, and interference. Specifically, we describe a multitasking interactive experimental setting used to obtain a comprehensive multimodal data set which provided the foundation for a first evaluation of various standard state-of-the-art machine learning techniques with respect to their effectiveness in inferring systemic cognitive states. While the classification success of these standard methods based on just the physiological and neurophysiological signals across subjects was modest, which is to be expected given the complexity of the classification problem and the possibility that higher accuracy rates might not in general be achievable, the results nevertheless can serve as a baseline for evaluating future efforts to improve classification, especially methods that take contextual aspects such as task and environmental states into account. (shrink)

For several decades, intercultural philosophers have produced an extensive body of scholarly work aimed at mutual intercultural understanding. They have focused on the ideal of intercultural dialogue that is supported by dialogue principles and virtuous attitudes. However, this ideal is challenged by decolonial scholarship as one which neglects power inequalities. Decolonial scholars have emphasized the differences between cultures and worldviews, shifting the focus to colonial history and radical alterity. In return, intercultural philosophers have worried about the very possibility of dialogue (...) and mutual understanding in frameworks that use coloniality as their singular pole of analysis. In this paper, we explore the complex relations between decolonial and intercultural philosophies. While we diagnose tensions between both intellectual discourses, we argue that these tensions turn out to be productive: for intercultural philosophers, decolonial challenges provide an opportunity to critically rethink ideals of equitable dialogue in light of colonial inequity and its deep entrenchment in global philosophical encounters. For decolonial scholars, intercultural philosophies provide an opportunity to sharpen positive proposals of equitable encounters beyond the critique of current forms of colonial domination. Rather than developing a general compromise, we propose a contextualist strategy, highlighting that different situations require different responses that can be strongly confrontational or dialogical in character. Decolonial and intercultural motifs serve different functions in the articulation of a critical global philosophy and can sharpen each other without integrating into a middle ground that is “a little bit intercultural” and “a little bit decolonial”. (shrink)

A major part of philosophical work is engagement with argumentative texts. Engaging with an argumentative text involves correctly identifying the arguments presented in this text. In the context of teaching philosophy in school, the difficulty of correctly identifying arguments in philosophical texts is often underestimated. In this paper, I focus on one specific problem with argument identification that has been neglected in philosophy didactics thus far: the problem that there are many non-argumentative phenomena in an argumentative text that are easily (...) misidentified as expressing (part of) an argument. It is easy to fall for such phenomena if one is not aware of this problem, thereby misinterpreting the author’s intentions. This paper aims to present and discuss such phenomena, as well as to provide guidelines on how to help students recognize them. (shrink)

Takeuti and Titani have introduced and investigated a logic they called intuitionistic fuzzy logic. This logic is characterized as the first-order Gödel logic based on the truth value set [0,1]. The logic is known to be axiomatizable, but no deduction system amenable to proof-theoretic, and hence, computational treatment, has been known. Such a system is presented here, based on previous work on hypersequent calculi for propositional Gödel logics by Avron. It is shown that the system is sound and complete, and (...) allows cut-elimination. A question by Takano regarding the eliminability of the Takeuti-Titani density rule is answered affirmatively. (shrink)

In this article, I first analyze and assess the epistemological and semantic status of canonical value-range equations in the formal language of Frege’s Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. I subsequently scrutinize the relation between (a) his informal, metalinguistic stipulation in Grundgesetze I, Section 3, and (b) its formal counterpart, which is Basic Law V. One point I argue for is that the stipulation in Section 3 was designed not only to fix the references of value-range names, but that it was probably also (...) intended to play a regulative role with an eye to Basic Law V. I further intend to shed new light on the status of Frege’s identification of the truth-values with their unit classes in Grundgesetze I, Section 10 and determine its place and importance in his overall logicist project. In a subsequent section, I first discuss the hypothetical extendability of the logical system of Grundgesetze. In what follows, I analyze the incompleteness of that system—were it not inconsistent and hence trivially complete—by focusing on the role of the definite description operator and the axiom governing it (= Basic Law VI) as well as on the role of the application operator. The latter is defined by means of the former. I further comment on the redundancy of an axiom that could be designed to supplement Basic Law VI by incorporating the second clause of Frege’s two-part elucidation of the description operator. I argue that although it seems likely that Basic Law VI could have been shown to be dispensable in Grundgesetze, Frege would probably have been reluctant to dispense with it, despite his commitment to axiomatic parsimony. In my view, the reason is that he considers it essential that every primitive function-name of his formal language be governed and grounded by a basic law that is tailored to the nature and the role of the primitive name occurring at a key point in the law. Toward the end of the article, I propose solutions to two problems with Frege’s use of “=” in the concept-script sentences that result from his definitions involving the replacement of the double stroke of definition with the judgment-stroke. I conclude the article with a summary of the main results that I have achieved. (shrink)

In this book review, I summarize the main argument of Tilo Wesche's book "Die Rechte der Natur: Vom nachhaltigen Eigentum" (The rights of Nature: On sustainable ownership) and conclude with a critical appraisal.

In this article, I try to shed new light on Frege’s envisaged definitional introduction of real and complex numbers in _Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik_ (1884) and the status of cross-sortal identity claims with side glances at _Grundgesetze der Arithmetik_ (vol. I 1893, vol. II 1903). As far as I can see, this topic has not yet been discussed in the context of _Grundlagen_. I show why Frege’s strategy in the case of the projected definitions of real and complex numbers in (...) _Grundlagen_ is modelled on his definitional introduction of cardinal numbers in two steps, tentatively via a contextual definition and finally and definitively via an explicit definition. I argue that the strategy leaves a few important questions open, in particular one relating to the status of the envisioned abstraction principles for the real and complex numbers and another concerning the proper handling of cross-sortal identity claims. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung In dem Beitrag wird auf der Grundlage ethnographischer Beobachtungen die systematische Pro­duktion eines volleyballspezifischen ‚Vollzugskörpers‘ nachgezeichnet. Damit ist ein Körper gemeint, dessen Bewegungsrepertoire im Trainieren und Üben in eine den Praktiken des Volleyballspiels ad­äquate Form gebracht wird. Training wird in einer praxeologischen Perspektive als ein Dispositiv aus Praktiken, Techniken und sozio-materiellen Arrangements in den Blick ge­bracht, in dem verkörperte Dispositionen auf spezifische Weise ausgeformt und organisiert werden. Im analysierten Fall geht es konkret um die Herstellung eines intelligiblen, Anschlusshandlungen ermöglichenden (...) und somit mitspielfähigen ‚Zuspielerinnen-Körpers‘. Abschließend wird der Vor­schlag zur Diskussion gestellt, das Konzept des ‚Vollzugskörpers‘ durch das Konzept eines ‚Vollzugs­leibes‘ zu ergänzen. Dieses Konzept richtet die Aufmerksamkeit darauf, dass Körper nicht nur von raktiken ‚rekrutiert‘ werden, wie es in praxistheoretischen Ansätzen gern heißt, sondern sich immer auch selbst in einem reflexiven Vollzugsmodus - durch Spüren, Wahrnehmen und Beurteilen - in die Form des sie engagierenden Spiels bringen und darin halten müssen, um als „agile Momente“ des Spielgeschehens wirken zu können. (shrink)

There is no shortage of analyses, even of mutually exclusive ones, concerning the identities of the East Germans. Social scientists as well as journalists find enticing the phenomenon of a society that is in the midst of a transformation; a society that experiences the (national) unification between a part of society that is revolutionary with another part that is geographically separate and non-revolutionary while undergoing a process of social blending. This examination is accompanied by constant exhortations from the politicians - (...) who, as if appealing to themselves, have the task of representing German unity in nationally conceived institutions - to surmount the mental trenches that have arisen. This article tries to discuss some aspects of the processes of identification that are either unfolding in East Germany or are failing to materialize. In this connection we are concerned with interpretations of social and political transformations on the part of the individual, but also with the “impositions of the Western paradigm,” both of which generate norms of behavior and language through which the East Germans must find their own language when describing their situation. (shrink)

The concept of quantity (Größe) plays a key role in Frege's theory of real numbers. Typically enough, he refers to this theory as ?theory of quantity? (?Größenlehre?) in the second volume of his opus magnum Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (Frege 1903). In this essay, I deal, in a critical way, with Frege's treatment of the concept of quantity and his approach to analysis from the beginning of his academic career until Frege 1903. I begin with a few introductory remarks. In Section (...) 2, I first analyze Frege's use of the term ?source of knowledge? (?Erkenntnisquelle?) with particular emphasis on the logical source of knowledge. The analysis includes a brief comparison between Frege and Kant's conceptions of logic and the logical source of knowledge. In a second step, I examine Frege's theory of quantity in Rechnungsmethoden, die sich auf eine Erweiterung des Größenbegriffes gründen (Frege 1874). Section 3 contains a couple of critical observations on Frege's comments on Hankel's theory of real numbers in Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Frege 1884). In Section 4, I consider Frege's discussion of the concept of quantity in Frege 1903. Section 5 is devoted to Cantor's theory of irrational numbers and the critique deployed by Frege. In Section 6, I return to Frege's own constructive treatment of analysis in Frege 1903 and succinctly describe what I take to be the quintessence of his account. (shrink)

According to infinitism, all justification comes from an infinite series of reasons. Peter Klein defends infinitism as the correct solution to the regress problem by rejecting two alternative solutions: foundationalism and coherentism. I focus on Klein's argument against foundationalism, which relies on the premise that there is no justification without meta-justification. This premise is incompatible with dogmatic foundationalism as defended by Michael Huemer and Time Pryor. It does not, however, conflict with non-dogmatic foundationalism. Whereas dogmatic foundationalism rejects the need for (...) any form of meta-justification, non-dogmatic foundationalism merely rejects Laurence BonJour's claim that meta-justification must come from beliefs. Unlike its dogmatic counterpart, non-dogmatic foundationalism can allow for basic beliefs to receive meta-justification from non-doxastic sources such as experiences and memories. Construed thus, non-dogmatic foundationalism is compatible with Klein's principle that there is no justification without meta-justification. I conclude that Klein's rejection of foundationalism. fails. Nevertheless, I agree with Klein that when in response to a skeptical challenge we engage in the activity of defending our beliefs, the number of reasons we can give is at least in principle infinite. I argue that this type of infinity is benign because, when we continue to give reasons, we will eventually merely repeat previously stated reasons. Consequently, I reject Klein's claim that the more reasons we give the more we increase the justification of our beliefs. (shrink)