Prolonged trunk flexion is known to affect passive and active stabilization of the trunk. Previous studies have evaluated changes in spinal range of motion, muscle activity and reflex behavior induced by prolonged trunk flexion, whereas the effect on sitting postural control is vastly underexplored. In this study, we compared the effects of supported and unsupported intermittent trunk flexion on center of pressure motion during sitting on an unstable seat. Participants were exposed to 1-h intermittent trunk flexion and CoP root mean (...) square distance, velocity and frequency before and after the exposure were assessed. Contrary to our hypothesis, there were no main effects of exposure, no main effects of condition, and no interaction between exposure and condition. Our results indicate that prolonged intermittent flexion does not induce any changes in CoP motion during a seated balance task, regardless of the presence of a trunk support during prolonged intermittent flexion. This suggests a successful compensation of decreased passive stiffness by increased reflex activity. (shrink)

In this book, Matej Kohar demonstrates how the new mechanistic account of explanation can be used to support a non-representationalist view of explanations in cognitive neuroscience, and therefore can bring new conceptual tools to the non-representationalist arsenal. Kohar focuses on the explanatory relevance of representational content in constitutive mechanistic explanations typical in cognitive neuroscience. The work significantly contributes to two areas of literature: 1) the debate between representationalism and non-representationalism, and 2) the literature on mechanistic explanation. Kohar begins with (...) an introduction to the mechanistic theory of explanation, focusing on the analysis of mechanistic constitution as the basis of explanatory relevance in constitutive mechanistic explanation. He argues that any viable analysis of representational contents implies that content is not constitutively relevant to cognitive phenomena. The author also addresses objections against his argument and concludes with an examination of the consequences of his account for both traditional cognitive neuroscience and non-representationalist alternatives. This book is of interest to readers in philosophy of mind, cognitive science and neuroscience. (shrink)

This paper is guided by two research hypotheses: (1) In contemporary public discourse, many of the most urgent political problems are predominantly framed and understood in moral terms; (2) this shift in framing has far-reaching consequences, impeding our understanding of the underlying problems and their eventual solution. The two hypotheses are demonstrated using multiple examples, with the fight against climate change serving as the main case study. The moral framing (thinking in terms of individual actions, duties and obligations, blame and (...) personal responsibility) is shown to crowd out political considerations (focused on institutions and policy), even when such moral considerations are either out of place or immaterial. Consequently, individual actions and responsibility are shown to be overemphasized in contemporary public discourse to such an extent that the viable political solutions are often discounted or overlooked. The context of the argument offered here is provided by the realism-moralism debate on the distinction between morality and politics. The ambition of the paper is to show that, regardless of their possible deeper distinction (the “distinctively political normativity”), there is a strong pragmatic case for carefully distinguishing between ethical and political theorizing. Morality and politics provide different frames, distinct interpretive frameworks that consequently give rise to contrasting solutions. Therefore, they need to be kept apart. (shrink)

The popularity of conspiracy theories poses a clear challenge for contemporary liberal democracies. Conspiracy theories undermine rational debate, spread dangerous falsehoods and threaten social cohesion. However, any possible public policy response, which would try to contain their spread, needs to respect the liberal commitment to protect pluralism and free speech. A successful justification of such a policy must therefore: 1) clearly identify the problematic class of conspiracy theories; and 2) clarify the grounds on which the state is justified in acting (...) against them. This article argues that the prevailing epistemic approaches to conspiracy theorizing cannot fulfil these criteria. Defining conspiracy theories by their flaws in reasoning, questionable coherence or factual mistakes can neither sharply distinguish problematic conspiracy theories from other, non-problematic worldviews nor justify state action. Thus, we propose to understand conspiracy theories through their ethical unreasonableness. We hold that containment of conspiracy theories is justifiable insofar as they undermine the liberal-democratic ideals of mutual respect, freedom and equality. We then show that such ‘ethical’ criteria for conspiracy theories can be sufficiently robust and clear-cut so that they can serve as a useful guide for public policy. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to establish a specific view of linguistic understanding based on the framework of normative inferentialism. Normative inferentialism is presented as an overspecification (rich) account of meaning—the meaning of a sentence is understood as a cluster of context‐dependent contents. The standard psychological mechanism responsible for reaching understanding of an utterance depends on the ability to eliminate contextually irrelevant aspects/parts of meaning. The advantages of the view are that the mechanism can (a) explain a wide range (...) of linguistic phenomena including polysemy, homonymy, and conversational implicatures, and (b) explain partial understanding of an utterance. (shrink)

This article examines the relationship between the concept of sovereignty and the process of European integration. It is argued that the nature of this relationship has been both mutually informative and transformative. As a particular understanding of sovereignty has influenced and determined the perception of European integration, i.e., its conceptualization, so the process of European integration has reflected back on sovereignty and entailed its rethinking. This poses a particular challenge for legal theorists: how to pin down the meaning of sovereignty (...) and European integration so as to put both in the best conceptual and normative light. The article begins by looking at the traditional perspective on sovereignty and how this has been challenged by European integration. The focus then shifts from sovereignty to European integration in order to examine how different perspectives on sovereignty, when used as an epistemic lens for understanding the process of European integration, have produced uneven conceptions of this integration. Finally, the article concludes by making a choice between the various conceptions of sovereignty and European integration. It is argued that the best conception of European integration is offered by the constitutional form of a union founded on pluralist sovereignty. (shrink)

In spite of the iron curtain looming large between western academics and their (often politically persecuted and institutionally detached) colleagues in the eastern bloc, some intellectual developments bear striking similarities. This paper analyses one of them: the conception of human rights by Ladislav Hejdánek as opposed to Kantian constructivism, which was developed in the “west” by John Rawls and others. Both Rawls and Hejdánek, who was one of the philosophical heavyweights of Czech dissent, are moved by very similar concerns: the (...) need to ground objective values without falling into utilitarianism or some (other) form of naïve ethical objectivism. They view political values as constructed and yet objective, not given but still sound. Given the immense difference in their professional position and philosophical style, this indicates a truly interesting case of a unity of concern bridging the east and the west, even under very unfavorable political conditions. (shrink)

Recent work on compositional distributional models shows that bialgebras over finite dimensional vector spaces can be applied to treat generalised quantifiersGeneralised quantifiers for natural language. That technique requires one to construct the vector space over powersets, and therefore is computationally costly. In this paper, we overcome this problem by considering fuzzy versions of quantifiers along the lines of ZadehZadeh, L. A., within the category of many valued relationsMany valued relations. We show that this category is a concrete instantiation of the (...) compositional distributional model. We show that the semantics obtained in this model is equivalent to the semantics of the fuzzy quantifiers of ZadehZadeh, L. A.. As a result, we are now able to treat fuzzy quantification without requiring a powerset construction. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss Quine’s views on language sharing and linguistic communities. It is sometimes explicitly and often implicitly taken for granted that Quine believes that speakers can form communities in which they share a language. The aim of the paper is to show that this is a misinterpretation and, on the contrary, Quine is closer to linguistic individualism – the view according to which there is no guarantee that speakers within a community share a language and the notion (...) of idiolect is more fundamental than the notion of shared language. (shrink)

Ispitujuci ulogu porodice u procesu intergeneracijskog/transgeneracijskog prenosenja traume i secanja, rad pokusava da odgovori na pitanje na koji nacin suocavanje sa neprozivljenom prosloscu utice na zivote potomaka neposrednih pocinilaca i zrtava holokausta, odnosno, na formiranje identiteta tzv. postgeneracije? Sto je vremenska distanca u odnosu na Drugi svetski rat veca, i sto je broj onih sa neposrednim iskustvom i secanjem manji, termini kao sto su pamcenje i sec?anje poceli su da gube svoje ustaljeno znacenje. Kako je istrazivanje pokazalo, i pored odsustva (...) licnog secanja, pripadnici potomaka onih koji su preziveli masivne traumatske dogadjaje subjektivno su duboko povezani sa secanjem prethodne generacije. U skladu sa cinjenicom da samu traumu i secanje nije moguce fizicki preneti na potomke, rad analizira i poredi termine koje je strucna literatura do sada usvojila, kao sto su sekundarna traumatizacija, tercijarna traumatizacija, zatim, eho traume, ali i postpamcenje. Osnovna teza ovog rada jeste da eho secanja, eho traume, suocavanje s prosloscu, ali i istovremena nemogucnost izmirenja s njom, dovode do tzv. krize identiteta postgeneracije holokausta. (shrink)

A relativistic, i.e., Lorentz co-variant theory without constraints is formulated. This is possible if we allow the dynamical variables to depend on an invariant parameter τ. Thus we obtain a dynamical theory in spacetime, called relativistic dynamics. First the case of a point particle, and then of extended objects such as membranes of arbitrary dimensions are considered.

A theory is presented in which a field depends not only on spacetime coordinates xμ, but also on a Lorentz-invariant parameter τ. Such a theory is conceptually and technically simple and manifestly covariant at every step. The generator of evolution and the generator of spacetime translations and Lorentz transformations are obtained in a straightforward way. In the quantized theory the Heisenberg equation of motion is written in a covariant form and is equivalent to the field equation. The equal τ commutator (...) between the field and its canonically conjugate momentum is just proportional to the spacetime δ function. Finally comparison with the conventional field theory is done, and it is found that the expectation value of the momentum operator in the on shell states is the same. (shrink)

The theory of unconstrained membranes of arbitrary dimension is presented. Their relativistic dynamics is described by an action which is a generalization of the Stueckelberg point-particle action. In the quantum version of the theory, the evolution of a membrane's state is governed by the relativistic Schrödinger equation. Particular stationary solutions correspond to the conventional, constrained membranes. Contrary to the usual practice, our spacetime is identified, not with the embedding space (which brings the problem of compactification), but with a membrane of (...) dimension 4 or higher. A 4-membrane is thus assumed to represent spacetime. The Einstein-Hilbert action emerges as an effective action after functionally integrating out the membrane's embedding functions. (shrink)

The arguments by Pandres that the double valued spherical harmonics provide a basis for the irreducible spinor representation of the three dimensional rotation group are further developed and justified. The usual arguments against the inadmissibility of such functions, concerning hermiticity, orthogonality, behaviour under rotations, etc., are all shown to be related to the unsuitable choice of functions representing the states with opposite projections of angular momentum. By a correct choice of functions and definition of inner product those difficulties do not (...) occur. And yet the orbital angular momentum in the ordinary configuration space can have integer eigenvalues only, for the reason which have roots in the nature of quantum mechanics in such space. The situation is different in the velocity space of the rigid particle, whose action contains a term with the extrinsic curvature. (shrink)

Predmet ovog rada je vjerojatno najutjecajnija verzija moralnog realizma, poznata kao “moralni realizam naturalizam”. Nakon što predložim formulaciju za koju smatram da najpotpunije opisuje poziciju moralnog realizma, raspravljam o tome je li moguće provesti aposteriornu identifikaciju moralnih i prirodnih svojstava. U drugom dijelu nastojim pokazati da moralni realisti naturalisti ne uspijevaju izbjeći poznatom Mackievu “argumentu iz čudnosti” . Na kraju raspravljam o tome mogu li realisti naturalisti moralnim svojstvima pripisati eksplanatornu moć.The subject of this paper is probably the most influential (...) version ofmoral realism, known as “moral realism naturalism”. After I propose what seems to be the most appropriate formulation of moral realism, I discuss whether it is possible to show that moral properties and natural properties can be identified a posteriori. In the second part I try to show that moral realists naturalists cannot refute wellknownMackie’s “argument from querness” . In the end I discuss whether moral realists naturalists can ascribe the explanatory power to moral properties. (shrink)

Strong motivational internalists claim that the relation between moral judgment and motivation is necessary. It is widely accepted that strong motivational internalism is false because it cannot accommodate various phenomena from common experience. In order to make room for these phenomena, motivational internalists usually propose the weak formulation of their thesis. In the first part of the paper I differentiate between several versions of both strong and weak motivational internalism. In the second part I argue that the reasons for endorsing (...) weak motivational internalism of any form are not compelling. (shrink)

According to the objection raised by Fodor and Lepore, inferentialism is untenable because it cannot provide a distinction between meaning-constitutive and ‘utterly contingent’ inferences. As they argue, without the distinction, the meanings of expressions cannot be shared and, without the shared meanings, the successfulness of communication cannot be explained. In other words, without the distinction, inferentialism becomes committed to holism. The aim of this paper is to show that if we understand communication in terms of the coordination of actions, then (...) partial sharing of meanings, i.e. sharing of contextually relevant aspects of meanings, is a sufficient requirement for communication to be successful. As I argue, if we accept such a view of communication, then inferentialism can explain the successfulness of communication without relying on the notion of shared meanings and so it can navigate the muddy waters of holism. (shrink)

Tattoos are widely regarded as morally neutral, and the decision to have them as carrying no ethical implications. The aim of this paper is to question this assumption. I argue that decisions to have tattoos involve risks that are not merely prudential—they are normative. The argument starts with a thesis that the power we presently have over our lives is constrained by the need to respect our future selves. If we make a discretionary choice that disregards our future interests and (...) preferences, then, under certain circumstances, we can be morally to blame. I argue that certain decisions to get tattoos fit this description. Therefore, getting some tattoos makes us blameworthy. (shrink)

Medieval interpretations of hylomorphism, in which substances are conceived as metaphysical composites of prime matter and substantial form, are receiving attention in contemporary philosophy. It has even been suggested that a recovery of Aquinas's conception of prime matter as a ‘pure potentiality’, lacking any actuality apart from substantial form, may be expedient in hylomorphic interpretations of quantum mechanics. In this paper, we consider a recent hylomorphic interpretation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, the theory of Cosmic Hylomorphism, which does not explicitly invoke (...) any notion of prime matter in its original formulation. We argue that prime matter does in fact play a role in constituting and individuating particles in this theory. However, we demonstrate that the notion of prime matter which features in the extended version of Cosmic Hylomorphism that we propose here is distinct from Aquinas's conception of prime matter, inasmuch as it has discrete metaphysical parts. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been increasing interest in Rich Meaning Approaches (RMA) that understand the meanings of words as rich conceptual structures, such as Pustejovsky’s generative lexicon. The reason for this is based on compositionality, as rich meanings have been shown to be indispensable for explaining conflict resolution in compositional processes. However, while the benefits of postulating rich meanings to explain conflict resolution are undeniable, the overall contribution of rich meanings to sentence comprehension has not yet been discussed. This (...) paper aims to show that inferentialism counts as a version of RMA and that, once this is recognised, it can provide a robust rationale for the role of rich meanings in sentence comprehension. The rationale is based on the idea that rich meanings are indispensable for pragmatic purposes as they play a role in facilitating communication. As I argue, rich meanings not only assist in composing the semantic (truth-conditional) content of complete sentences, but also provide crucial information for determining the discursive commitments and entitlements established by utterances. Consequently, examining the implications of inferentialism for compositional processes a) offers new insights into their function and outputs and b) presents an alternative to the representationalist perspective on sentence comprehension. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss a specific approach to measuring and comparing the simplicity of theories that is based on Lewis’s notion of fundamental properties. In particular, I discuss the criterion of simplicity as stated by Williams. According to Williams, the best candidate for a theory is the one which has the shortest definition in terms of fundamental properties. The aim of this paper is to show that the criterion thus specified has two constraints. First, the criterion is not applicable (...) to cases in which candidates for theories that specify fundamental properties are compared. Secondly, the applicability of the criterion in social sciences seems to be unwarranted. (shrink)

Engineers fine-tune the design of robot bodies for control purposes, however, a methodology or set of tools is largely absent, and optimization of morphology (shape, material properties of robot bodies, etc.) is lagging behind the development of controllers. This has become even more prominent with the advent of compliant, deformable or ”soft” bodies. These carry substantial potential regarding their exploitation for control—sometimes referred to as ”morphological computation”. In this article, we briefly review different notions of computation by physical systems and (...) propose the dynamical systems framework as the most useful in the context of describing and eventually designing the interactions of controllers and bodies. Then, we look at the pros and cons of simple vs. complex bodies, critically reviewing the attractive notion of ”soft” bodies automatically taking over control tasks. We address another key dimension of the design space—whether model-based control should be used and to what extent it is feasible to develop faithful models for different morphologies. (shrink)

This paper is guided by two research hypotheses: (1) In contemporary public discourse, many of the most urgent political problems are predominantly framed and understood in moral terms; (2) this shift in framing has far-reaching consequences, impeding our understanding of the underlying problems and their eventual solution. The two hypotheses are demonstrated using multiple examples, with the fight against climate change serving as the main case study. The moral framing (thinking in terms of individual actions, duties and obligations, blame and (...) personal responsibility) is shown to crowd out political considerations (focused on institutions and policy), even when such moral considerations are either out of place or immaterial. Consequently, individual actions and responsibility are shown to be overemphasized in contemporary public discourse to such an extent that the viable political solutions are often discounted or overlooked. The context of the argument offered here is provided by the realism-moralism debate on the distinction between morality and politics. The ambition of the paper is to show that, regardless of their possible deeper distinction (the “distinctively political normativity”), there is a strong pragmatic case for carefully distinguishing between ethical and political theorizing. Morality and politics provide different frames, distinct interpretive frameworks that consequently give rise to contrasting solutions. Therefore, they need to be kept apart. (shrink)

Opponents of the new mechanistic account of scientific explanation argue that the new mechanists are committed to a ‘More Details Are Better’ claim: adding details about the mechanism always improves an explanation. Due to this commitment, the mechanistic account cannot be descriptively adequate as actual scientific explanations usually leave out details about the mechanism. In reply to this objection, defenders of the new mechanistic account have highlighted that only adding relevant mechanistic details improves an explanation and that relevance is to (...) be determined relative to the phenomenon-to-be-explained. Craver and Kaplan (B J Philos Sci 71:287–319, 2020) provide a thorough reply along these lines specifying that the phenomena at issue are contrasts. In this paper, we will discuss Craver and Kaplan’s reply. We will argue that it needs to be modified in order to avoid three problems, i.e., what we will call the Odd Ontology Problem, the Multiplication of Mechanisms Problem, and the Ontic Completeness Problem. However, even this modification is confronted with two challenges: First, it remains unclear how explanatory relevance is to be determined for contrastive explananda within the mechanistic framework. Second, it remains to be shown as to how the new mechanistic account can avoid what we will call the ‘Vertical More Details are Better’ objection. We will provide answers to both challenges. (shrink)

In this paper, I show how normative inferentialism could be used to explain several phenomena related to natural languages. First, I show how the distinction between the inferential potential and the inferential significance fits the standard distinction between the meaning of a sentence and the content of an utterance. Second, I show how the distinction could be used to explain ambiguity and free pragmatic enrichment from the perspective of normative inferentialism. The aim of this paper is to establish theoretical foundations (...) that enable normative inferentialism to enter the discussions within the literalism-contextualism debate. As I argue, the biggest advantage of inferentialism is that it provides one general framework for the representation of meaning/content that naturally incorporates contextual information and so it can be used to represent meanings of various types of context-dependent sentences. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: A traditional objection to inferentialism states that not all inferences can be meaning-constitutive and therefore inferentialism has to comprise an analytic-synthetic distinction. As a response, Peregrin argues that meaning is a matter of inferential rules and only the subset of all the valid inferences for which there is a widely shared corrective behaviour corresponds to rules and so determines meaning. Unfortunately, Peregrin does not discuss what counts as “widely shared”. In the paper, I argue for an empirical plausibility of (...) Peregrin’s proposal. The aim of the paper is to show that we can find examples of meaning-constitutive linguistic action, which sustain Peregrin’s response. The idea is supported by examples of meaning modulation. If Peregrin is right, then we should be able to find specific meaning modulations in which a new meaning is publicly available and modulated in such a way that it has a potential to be widely shared. I believe that binding modulations – a specific type of meaning modulations – satisfy this condition. (shrink)

The criterion of naturalness represents David Lewis’s attempt to answer some of the sceptical arguments in (meta-) semantics by comparing the naturalness of meaning candidates. Recently, the criterion has been challenged by a new sceptical argument. Williams argues that the criterion cannot rule out the candidates which are not permuted versions of an intended interpretation. He presents such a candidate – the arithmetical interpretation (a specific instantiation of The criterion of naturalness represents David Lewis’s attempt to answer some of the (...) sceptical arguments in (meta-) semantics by comparing the naturalness of meaning candidates. Recently, the criterion has been challenged by a new sceptical argument. Williams argues that the criterion cannot rule out the candidates which are not permuted versions of an intended interpretation. He presents such a candidate – the arithmetical interpretation (a specific instantiation of Henkin’s model), and he argues that it opens up the possibility of Pythagorean worlds, i.e. the worlds similar to ours in which the arithmetical interpretation is the best candidate for a semantic theory. The aim of this paper is a) to reconsider the general conditions for the applicability of Lewis’s criterion of naturalness and b) to show that Williams’s new sceptical challenge is based on a problematic assumption that the arithmetical interpretation is independent of fundamental properties and relations. As I show, if the criterion of naturalness is applied properly, it can respond even to the new sceptical challenge. (shrink)

Josip Pipenbacher se je po maturi leta 1891 vpisal na študij klasične filologije na Dunaju; tu je leta 1895 doktoriral (v disertaciji se je ukvarjal s Ksenofontovim spisom Ustava Lakedajmoncev) in opravil profesorski izpit. Najprej je kot suplent poučeval na Državni c. kr. nižji gimnaziji v Ljubljani (zdaj gimnazija Poljane), nato kot profesor na Višji c. k. gimnaziji v Novem mestu in končno znova na Drugi c. kr. državni gimnaziji v Ljubljani; to je med letoma 1921 in 1928 vodil kot (...) direktor. Po ustanovitvi Univerze v Ljubljani je med letoma 1920 in 1939 kot honorarni predavatelj vodil latinske proseminarje in tečaje latinščine. Napisal je vrsto učnih pripomočkov, najbolj znani so latinska slovnica in štiri latinske vadnice, vse v več izdajah, sodeloval pa je tudi pri nastajanju Wiesthalerjevega Latinsko-slovenskega slovarja, za katerega je obdelal črko R. Bil je strog ocenjevalec, posebej odmevna je bila njegova ocena Latinske slovnice Josipa Tominška), napisal pa je tudi nekaj prispevkov s področja metodike pouka latinskega jezika. Kot šolnik se je vključeval v delo različnih društev in organizacij, vseskozi je finančno podpiral različna študentska, prosvetna in druga društva, nekaj časa pa je deloval tudi v lokalni politiki kot član ljubljanskega mestnega sveta. Zadnja leta svojega življenja je preživel na svojem posestvu v Sveti Marjeti na Dravskem polju. Umrl je 11. aprila 1949 v Mariboru. (shrink)

Continuously from the 1940s, Michael Polanyi comments on topics that have resonated later since the 1960s in the works of his fellow theorists of science, philosophers of natural sciences, and epistemologists. First part of this article provides a brief reconstruction of Polanyi’s concept of „personal knowledge“ which focuses mainly on the interconnection of the individual level of scientific research with its social dimension. My aim is to evaluate the potential of this concept for the interpretation of research fields where sciences (...) are in close contact with other disciplines. I am convinced that Polanyi’s original approach to the problem of reality should be read as an advocacy of diversity of thought. In my interpretation, Polanyi carries out some form of philosophical therapy of science and its self-concept, which, like the whole of Western society, has undergone dramatic changes over the last century. (shrink)

Business ethics’ theories have come under a lot of criticism lately. The problem has been the lack of a philosophical base or the inadequate implementation of it. We are trying to solve this problem by examining the roots of ethics and then applying it to the business environment. The root that has been undeservedly overlooked has been the concept of free will, the oldest philosophical problem on which every ethics theory lies. We have chosen two theories that we think would (...) be the best base for business ethics. We will shortly present the others. Since free will presents the core of business ethics, business ethicists must first agree on which theory to implement. Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ theory of free will best amplify the core of economic theory, because it gives reason a central and most important role in the theory. The concept of free will is mainly philosophical as is business ethics so the article follows this tradition, but we tried to give business examples where possible. We do not give a final conclusion because it should be reached by debate and mutual agreement between business ethicists. (shrink)

Though historically important, the notion of tacit consent plays little role in contemporary discussions of political legitimacy. The idea, in fact, is often dismissed as obviously implausible. The ambition of this paper is to challenge this assumption and show that tacit consent can become a key ingredient in a theory of legitimacy. Instead of defining tacit consent through residence (where, according to John Locke or Plato's Socrates, staying in the country amounts to tacitly consenting to its system of rule), the (...) paper explores a different strategy, delimiting tacit consent as an absence of active dissent. The basic idea starts from the fact that widespread anti-government protests and demonstrations always carry a potent delegitimating force. Political legitimacy is therefore never permanent and unchangeable, regardless of the nature of the regime, and can be undermined at all times by active dissent from the population. Having established the relationship between dissent and delegitimation of political power, even the inverted, stronger claim is defended: the absence of active dissent (i.e., tacit consent) can, under certain circumstances, serve to legitimize political power. The paper sets up and defends several conditions that need to be met for the right normative mandate to be created by the population tacitly accepting the existing power arrangements. If those are fulfilled (especially when full freedom of expression and information is granted), tacit consent can become a vital element of political legitimacy. (shrink)

Tailoring the design of robot bodies for control purposes is implicitly performed by engineers, however, a methodology or set of tools is largely absent and optimization of morphology (shape, material properties of robot bodies, etc.) is lag- ging behind the development of controllers. This has become even more prominent with the advent of compliant, deformable or "soft" bodies. These carry substantial potential regarding their exploitation for control – sometimes referred to as "mor- phological computation" in the sense of offloading computation (...) needed for control to the body. Here, we will argue in favor of a dynamical systems rather than com- putational perspective on the problem. Then, we will look at the pros and cons of simple vs. complex bodies, critically reviewing the attractive notion of “soft” bodies automatically taking over control tasks. We will address another key dimension of the design space – whether model-based control should be used and to what extent it is feasible to develop faithful models for different morphologies. ----- This paper was also published in the 2014 AISB proceedings http://aisb50.org/representation-of-reality-humans-animals-and-machines/ - http://doc.gold.ac.uk/aisb50/. (shrink)

Internalisti razloga smatraju da je prisutnost motiva preduvjet za postojanje razloga. Prema humeovskoj interpretaciji ovog stajališta, razlozi za djelovanje uvijek su relativni budući da njihovo postojanje ovisi o arbitrarnim elementima koji čine nečiji subjektivni motivacijski skup. Jedan od najvećih izazova humeovskom internalizmu predstavlja kantovska interpretacija internalističkog stajališta. Glavna intencija kantovskog pristupa jest dokazati mogućnost racionalne motivacije te tako osporiti humeovski relativizam. U članku kritički prikazujem ovu raspravu te nastojim obraniti humeovski internalizam od jednog suvremenog kantovskog prijedloga.Internalists about reasons argue that (...) the presence of a motive is a precondition for the existence of a reason. According to the Humean interpretation of this view, reasons for action are always relative since their existence depends on the arbitrary elements which form one’s subjective motivational set. One of the greatest challenges to Humean internalism is the Kantian interpretation of the internalist position. The main intention of Kantian approach is to prove the possibility of rational motivation and thus deny Humean internalism. In this article I critically examine this discussion and attempt to defend Humean internalism against one contemporary Kantian proposal. (shrink)

Lidová psychologie coby základ naší schopnosti vysvětlovat a předvídat jednání je významné téma filozofie mysli. Debaty, které ji obklopují, se nicméně v minulosti zaměřovaly primárně na otázky jejího statusu v rámci vědeckého zkoumání mysli a formy ji zakládajících mechanismů (teorie, simulace aj.). Relativně menší pozornost byla věnována otázce obsahu lidové psychologie – tedy tomu, které koncepty či schopnosti pod označení „lidová psychologie“ řadit. V článku se zabývám právě otázkou obsahu a možné odpovědi na otázku obsahu předloženou pluralistickým pojetím lidové psychologie. (...) Nejdříve uvádím některé argumenty zpochybňující standardní pojetí lidové psychologie a následně představuji pojetí pluralismu rozšiřující lidovou psychologii o řadu sociálně kognitivních schopností. V závěru se krátce věnuji tomu, jaké dopady by takto šířeji pojímaná lidová psychologie mohla mít pro otázky jejího statusu a formy. (shrink)

The article provides an analysis of Paul and Patricia Churchland’s eliminative materialism. I will distinguish two lines of argument in their eliminativism: one seeking to eliminate folk psychology and the second criticising Jerry Fodor’s language of thought hypothesis. Then I will closely examine the second line of argument, and show that it represents the main motive of Churchland’s work since the end of 1980s and demonstrate why the success of the argument against the language of thought hypothesis does not constitute (...) a reason for the elimination of folk psychology. Finally, I will examine the consequences of this approach for the role of folk psychology in the study of mind and show that the weakened eliminativist position still fulfils the original aim of Churchland’s program. (shrink)

The decline of empirical research on ethical decision-making based on ethical theories might imply a tacit consensus has been reached. However, the exclusion of virtue ethics, one of the three main normative ethical theories, from this stream of literature calls this potential consensus into question. This article investigates the role of all three normative ethical theories—deontology, utilitarianism and virtue ethics—in ethical decision-making of corporate executives. It uses virtue ethics as a dependent variable thus studying the interconnectivity of all three normative (...) ethical theories in specific circumstances. We find that managers use different ethical theories in different circumstances (business vs. private life, formal vs informal ethical leadership, etc.). A predictive model of ethical decision-making, however, cannot be established. We also find that only a limited number of variables influence the choice of ethical theory, which leans business ethics towards postmodern management paradigm. We suggest that moral pragmatism could provide the answer to ethical decision-making. (shrink)

Contemporary defenses of the doctrine of double effect are mainly focused on avoiding the absurdity charge raised by Judith Thomson (). There are two strategies proposed in the literature for refuting Thomson's argument. In this paper I argue that answering Thomson's challenge comes at a heavy price: while both versions of the DDE that are developed within these two strategies successfully avoid the absurdity charge, they also remain incomplete. Thomson's argument reveals that the proponents of the DDE can at best (...) provide a partial defense of the claim that intentions can be relevant to permissibility. (shrink)