In [6] Messmer and Wood proved quantifier elimination for separably closed fields of finite Ershov invariant e equipped with a (certain) Hasse derivation. We propose a variant of their theory, using a sequence of e commuting Hasse derivations. In contrast to [6] our Hasse derivations are iterative.

This is a slightly edited transcript of a lecture given by Per Martin‐Löf on 26 October 2022 at the Rolf Schock Symposium in Stockholm. In 2020, the Rolf Schock Prize in Logic and Philosophy was awarded to Dag Prawitz and Per Martin‐Löf, and the symposium was organised in their honour. The transcript was prepared by Ansten Klev and edited by the author.

Publisher's description: The Phenomenology of Religious Life presents the text of Heidegger's important 1920621 lectures on religion. First published in 1995 as volume 60 of the Gesamtausgabe, the work reveals a young Heidegger searching for the striking language that eventually formed the mature expression of his thought. The volume consists of the famous lecture course "Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion," a course on "Augustine and Neoplatonism," and notes for a course on "The Philosophical Foundations of Medieval Mysticism" that was (...) never delivered. Heidegger's engagements with Aristotle, St. Paul, Augustine, and Luther give readers a sense of what phenomenology would come to mean in his later works. Here, Heidegger reveals an impressive display of theological knowledge, protecting Christian life experience from Greek philosophy and defending Paul against Nietzsche. The appearance of this first English translation marks a significant event in Heidegger scholarship and affords a unique look into his phenomenology. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to consider what it means to teach and learn philosophy in accordance with logotectonic thinking. The contemporary obsession with critical thinking, incessant questioning, and addressing “current problems” gains its genuine philosophical meaning only in the light of logotectonic building, which is able to differentiate philo-sophical thinking- as thanks-giving and learning·from the sofia and what has been thought – from the modern-”meditation” (Besinnung) and the submodern “anarchic” reflection.

Recognize the “philo- sophia ” as such, this side of Postmodernism, means, starting from the surprising studies of Heribert Boeder, see it as a thought epochally built on a Wisdom, that is, on a initial Knowledge about the Destiny of Man. For the philo-sophical thought of the so-called “German Idealism”, that Wisdom is neither that of the Muses, as in the First epoch, neither the “Christian sapientia”, as in the Middle epoch, but the “Civil Consciousness” about Duty and Freedom.

Tanto la explicación de sentido de la modernidad como el lenguaje de la posmodernidad han rechazado la noción de presente intemporal conocida otrora por la filosofía. Aquí se quiere mostrar en qué sentido y por qué razón el novísimo pensamiento logotectónico permite recuperar aquella noción merced a una nueva distinción del presente.

"Fried and Polt's translation of Martin Heidegger's Being and Truth is a well-crafted and careful rendering of an important and demanding volume of the Complete Works."-Andrew Mitchell, Emory University In these lectures, delivered in 1933-1934 while he was Rector of the University of Freiburg and an active supporter of the National Socialist regime, Martin Heidegger addresses the history of metaphysics and the notion of truth from Heraclitus to Hegel. First published in German in 2001, these two lecture courses (...) offer a sustained encounter with Heidegger's thinking during a period when he attempted to give expression to his highest ambitions for a philosophy engaged with politics and the world. While the lectures are strongly nationalistic and celebrate the revolutionary spirit of the time, they also attack theories of racial supremacy in an attempt to stake out a distinctively Heideggerian understanding of what it means to be a people. This careful translation offers valuable insight into Heidegger's views on language, truth, animality, and life, as well as his political thought and activity. Gregory Fried is Professor and Chair of the Philosophy Department at Suffolk University. He is author of Heidegger's Polemos: From Being to Politics and editor of A Companion to Hedegger's Introduction to Metaphysics. Richard Polt is Professor and Chair of the Philosophy Department at Xavier University. He is author of The Emergency of Being: On Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy and Heidegger: An Introduction. (shrink)

"Is higher education a right, or a privilege? This author argues that all citizens in a free and open society should have an unconditional right to higher education. Such an education should be costless for the individual and open to everyone regardless of talent. A readiness and willingness to learn should be the only qualification. It should offer opportunities that benefit citizens with different interests and goals in life. And it should aim, as its foundational moral purpose, to help citizens (...) from all walks of life live better, freer lives. Using concepts and ideas from liberal political philosophy the author argues that access to educational goods and services is something to which all citizens have a right over a full life. Such goods, it is argued, play a key role in helping citizens realize self-determined goals. Higher education should therefore be understood a basic social institution responsible for ensuring that all citizens can access such 'autonomy-supporting' goods. The book examines the implication of this justification of the right to higher education for questions of educational justice, political authority, distributive justice, civic education, and personal autonomy"--. (shrink)

. This is thinking that is alive, always green.Ó ÑReview of Metaphysics ÒThis translation . . . enlarges our historical view of the probing advances in Heidegger's thought.Ó ÑInternational Studies in Philosophy This clear translation ...

Some random processes, like a series of coin flips, can produce outcomes that seem particularly remarkable or striking. This paper explores an epistemic puzzle that arises when thinking about these outcomes and asking what, if anything, we can justifiably believe about them. The puzzle has no obvious solution, and any theory of epistemic justification will need to contend with it sooner or later. The puzzle proves especially useful for bringing out the differences between three prominent theories; the probabilist theory, the (...) normic theory and a theory recently defended by Goodman and Salow. (shrink)

Modal phenomena in general, and modal claims in particular, present a problem for contemporary philosophers. The truth conditions of modal claims differ from those of nonemodal claims. I discuss a widely accepted strategy that posits possible and impossible worlds in order to analyze modal claims and thus systematize our intuitions about modal reality.

I discuss the problem that Kant’s ethics seems to be incapable of capturing our strong intuition that emergencies create a context for actions that is very different from other cases of helping and from other opportunities to further obligatory ends. I argue that if we pay attention to how Kant grounds beneficence we see that distress and emergency function as constitutive concerns. They are vital to establishing the duty of beneficence in the first place, and they also guide the application (...) of duties to specific cases. Kant’s conception of imperfect duties to others, when understood correctly, offers a way to understand why emergencies are morally important, but also why other factors have a place in our moral reasoning. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Björn Lundgren and H. Orri Stefánsson (forthcoming) present three objections to normic de minimis expected utility theory (NDEUT) – a decision theoretic framework defended in Smith (2024). In this paper, I respond to these objections and outline some possible ways in which NDEUT might be modified or further developed. Like any de minimis framework, NDEUT employs a risk threshold to sort possibilities into those that must be considered when making a decision, and those that can be (...) legitimately ignored – the so-called ‘de minimis risks’. While this threshold would usually take the form of a probability value, in NDEUT the de minimis risks are identified instead on the basis of their abnormality. In the first section I will set up some of the formalism used in NDEUT and consider Lundgren and Stefánsson’s first objection – which is essentially formal in nature. In the second section I will delve further into the interpretation of NDEUT and consider the second and third objections, which turn on particular examples. (shrink)

In his 1956 book Das Gemüt, Stephan Strasser presents an original phenomenological investigation into human happiness and pleasure. We will examine Strasser’s theory of happiness in more detail and reveal how he incorporates important phenomenological insights from Thomas Aquinas’ theory of the passions of the soul. Both Strasser and Aquinas view happiness as the fulfilment of intentional striving and differentiate between various feelings associated with the pursuit and attainment of a goal, such as joy and pleasure. However, while Aquinas believes (...) that only an imperfect form of happiness can be attained in this life, Strasser aims to determine the essence of the highest form of happiness possible for human beings as the felt anticipation of perfect happiness in the future. Strasser, therefore, interprets Aquinas’ theory through the lens of an existential-phenomenological approach. (shrink)

What might a contemporary philosophical practice after and following Foucault look like? After briefly analyzing Foucault’s rather ambiguous stance towards academic philosophy in his posthumously published Le discours philosophique, we argue for continuing his historico-philosophical practice of diagnosing the present. This means taking up his analytic heuristic (with its three dimensions of power, knowledge and subjectivity) rather than his more concrete diagnostic concepts and the specific historical results they yield. We argue that the common methodological operation on each of the (...) three axis is to shift the perspective from the given legitimacies, norms, identities and selves to their historical, conflict-ridden emergence. Practicing philosophy in this way allows developing Foucauldian contributions in two contemporary philosophical debates: critical ontology and political epistemology. While ontology and epistemology might seem surprising fields to work in for philosophers inspired by and critically loyal to Foucault, we attempt to dispel these reservations and illustrate the stakes in both debates, pointing to the urgent issues of ecological questions and of the problematization of untruths in politics respectively. (shrink)

Graham Harman writes that the “basic dualism in the world lies…between things in their intimate reality and things as confronted by other things.” However, dualism implies irreconcilable difference; what Harman points to is better expressed as a dyad, where the two components imply one another and interact. This article shows that systems theory has long asserted the fundamental character of Harman’s dyad, expressing it as the union of internal structure and external function, which correspond exactly to what Levi Bryant, characterizing (...) Harman’s views, refers to as the intra-ontic and the inter-ontic, respectively. After interpreting Harman’s dyad in terms of the ontology of systems theory, the article illustrates his dyad with a variety of examples, including conceptions about truth, ethics, value, and intelligence. The structure–function dyad is a spatial conception of a system as an object. It is usefully augmented with a temporal dimension, expressed in a third component or with an additional orthogonal dyad. Adding a temporal dyad to the structure–function dyad joins the idea of an event and/or process to the idea of an object. (shrink)

In this article, we discuss the ethics of research suspensions in animal research facilities and the consequent (mis)treatment of laboratory animals during emergencies. Through a case study from Switzerland during the COVID-19 pandemic, we articulate ethical principles and moral considerations that ought to guide the treatment and care of laboratory animals within animal research facilities during emergencies. They include a principle of preparedness, the importance of recognizing animal laboratory personnel as essential workers and conducting a Harm-Benefit Analysis in the case (...) of an emergency, assigning responsibilities in a clear way, and providing psychological support in the aftermath of an emergency. More generally, we suggest that the pandemic should be taken as a learning opportunity for critically re-evaluating and improving emergency planning within animal research institutions worldwide, in view of mitigating risks to both human and animal well-being in future emergencies. (shrink)

I discuss two puzzling and neglected passages in the Critique of Practical Reason, namely, V:92 and V:163. In these passages Kant claims that practical philosophers should follow the paradigm of the chemist and conduct experiments on common human reason. I explain Kant’s conception of the chemical experiment, provide a detailed interpretation of the two passages in question, and conclude by applying the structure of the chemical experiment to the Analytic of the Critique of Practical Reason. Chemical experiments as a model (...) of ethics should be understood as a method of confirming that a philosophical theory systematizes and defends ideas that ordinary rational agents are already committed to. (shrink)

The history of Beyng (1938-40) -- Koinon, out of the history of Beyng (1939-40).

This article seeks to contribute to the discussion on the nature of choice in virtue theory. If several different actions are available to the virtuous agent, they are also likely to vary in their degree of virtue, at least in some situations. Yet, it is widely agreed that once an action is recognised as virtuous there is no higher level of virtue. In this paper we discuss how the virtue theorist could accommodate both these seemingly conflicting ideas. We discuss this (...) issue from a modern Aristotelian perspective, as opposed to a purely exegetic one. We propose a way of resolving what seems to be a major clash between two central features of virtue ethics. Our proposal is based on the notion of parity, a concept which recently has received considerable attention in the literature on axiology. Briefly put, two alternatives are on a par (or are ‘roughly equal’) if they are comparable, although it is not the case that one is better than the other, nor that they are equally good. The advantages of applying the concept of parity to our problem are twofold. Firstly, it sheds new light on the account of choice in virtue theory. Secondly, some of the criticisms that have been mounted against the possibility of parity can be countered by considering the notion of choice from a virtue theory perspective. (shrink)

In his treatment of a Kantian concept of moral freedom, Schiller argues for two kinds of freedom: freedom in the spirit of autonomous practical reason and freedom in which man is considered a mixed (sensual and rational) being. It is apparent that Schiller is on a Reinholdian path. He follows Reinhold’s theory of free will in conceiving of moral freedom primarily as the capacity to decide between the material drive as a sensible, self-interested drive and the formal drive as a (...) rational, unselfish drive. But it is also obvious that Schiller modifies Reinhold’s results in order to obtain a concept of aesthetic freedom. This project is important in view of a deeper understanding of the concept of aesthetic consciousness but is of little use in achieving a better understanding of the concept of moral freedom. (shrink)

Whether or not we adopt some form of physicalism in our thinking about the psychology of humans and other organisms we all believe that a mind is something that comes into being, changes, develops and decays. The correlation of the development and then later the decay of our mental powers with changes in the brain post-dates our belief that the mental realm is as much an area where things ebb and flow, come to be and pass away, as is the (...) physical. Even ancient authors who hold to the indestructibility of the soul allow that it changes in a host of ways. It is very odd, then, to discover that Aristotle appears to deny all this and feels impelled to treat the soul as unchanging and motionless. I propose to explore here exactly what Aristotle meant by saying the soul does not move and why he said it. In the end our investigation leads to some difficulties for Aristotle's psychological ontology which I am not able to resolve. (shrink)

Bertrand Russell abandoned the notion of acquaintance in July 1918. What changes does this force in his account of the mind? This paper focuses on one puzzle of interpretation about this. In 1913, Russell offered an account of ‘egocentric particulars’, his term for indexicals and demonstratives. He argued that the fundamental objection to neutral monism was that it could not provide an adequate theory of these terms. In 1918, Russell now embraces a form of neutral monism, but he does not (...) return to the problem of indexicals until 1940 in his William James lectures. Is the account given in 1940 significantly different from the one given in 1913? What was the argument against neutral monism in 1913? Does Russell offer a new solution in 1940 or reject his earlier view as mistaken? The answers offered here are used to draw more general morals about the current debate concerning relational theories of sense perception. (shrink)

El presente capítulo tiene dos propósitos. El primero es mostrar los fundamentos fisicalistas de las posturas filosóficas que defienden el determinismo naturalista, en la tradición de la filosofía analítica. El segundo es analizar una posible compatibilidad entre el determinismo teológico y el naturalista de acuerdo con los principios causales de estos determinismos. Concluyo que tal compatibilidad no es posible porque ambos determinismos están fundados en los principios del fisicalismo que es intrínsecamente contradictorio. Además, ninguno de tales determinismos es defendible si (...) se atiende a la distinción epistemológica entre hechos y proposiciones, que permite introducir una asimetría entre las propiedades de lo físico y lo mental. (shrink)

Frege hat in seinen Schriften zu den philosophischen Grundlagen der Logik eine eigenwillige Konzeption der Wahrheit skizziert, der zufolge das Wahre und das Falsche keine Eigenschaften von Sätzen oder Gedanken sind, sondern Gegenstände, die von Sätzen bezeichnet werden. In dem vorliegenden Sammelband werden zentrale Komponenten dieser Konzeption näher beleuchtet: die Thesen der Undefinierbarkeit der Wahrheit und der Redundanz des Wortes „wahr“, die Auffassung der Wahrheitswerte als Gegenstände, das so genannte slingshot-Argument, die Konzeption der Tatsachen als wahre Gedanken und die Bestimmung (...) der logischen Gesetze als Gesetze des Wahrseins. Mit Beiträgen von Joachim Bromand, Gottfried Gabriel, Martin Grajner, Dirk Greimann, Andreas Kemmerling, Ulrike Kleemeier, Michael Kober, Verena Mayer, Uwe Meixner, Marco Ruffino, Richard Schantz, Hans Sluga und Christian Thiel. (shrink)

Berulang kali saya ditanya oleh sesama umat Katolik apakah buku bacaan Misa Katolik juga dipakai oleh gereja Protestan, sebab mereka mengalami bahwa dalam ibadat hari minggu gereja Kristen lain dipakai bacaan Alkitab yang sama. Memang belum banyak diketahui perkem-bangan luar biasa yang selama setengah abad terakhir terjadi berkaitan dengan lectionarium atau leksionari ibadat hari Minggu dalam seluruh umat Kristen. Karena itu publikasi thesis Pendeta Y.B. Mulyono (S2 di STT Proklamasi) tentang Revised Common Lectionary (RCL) sangat di-butuhkan, dan membantu juga diri (...) saya.... Thesis M. yang diterbitkan dengan rapi oleh Grafika KreasIndo (Sinode GKI) menjadi bacaan penting bagi setiap pengkhotbah, entah pendeta atau imam, dan hendaknya mendapat tempat dalam pendidikan hermeneutika dan homiletika para calon imam dan pendeta. (Martin Harun, Guru Besar Ilmu Teologi Emeritus, Sekolah Tinggi Filsafat Driyarkara, Jakarta). (shrink)

This paper is referring to Fichte’s ambivalent notion of nature. For Fichte, nature is something that needs to be formed. This formability is an evidence of the imperfection, even depravity of an unformed and therefore unfree nature. Fichte seems to allude indirectly on Martin Luther and the Reformation tradition. Accordingly, nature – which is in itself evil or will become evil – is a state from which men had to step out. The affinity to Rousseau’s picture of nature is (...) obvious. Finally, the article asks for the position of Fichte’s notion of nature in the philosophy of German Idealism. At a turning point Schelling tries to explain that nature is something that can be understood as a self-integrating concept. In dem Beitrag wird der Versuch unternommen, den vieldeutigen Naturbegriff Fichtes zu bestimmen. Es soll gezeigt werden, dass Fichte Natur vorrangig als etwas versteht, das »gebildet« werden muss. Diese Bildbarkeit zeugt, so die These, dabei von der Vorstellung einer depravierten, d. h. ungebildeten und damit auch unfreien Natur, wobei Fichte hier mutatis mutandis auf Luther und die reformatorische Tradition zurückzugreifen scheint. Dieser Traditionslinie folgend ist Natur etwas, das als an sich böse oder als böse geworden eingeschätzt wird, d. h. sie wird als ein Zustand bewertet, aus dem man zur Einlösung des Freiheitanspruches notwendigerweise heraustreten müsse. Hierbei wird u. a. auch die Nähe Fichtes zu Rousseaus Naturverständnis deutlich. Schließlich fragt der Beitrag nach dem generellen Ort von Fichtes Naturbegriff innerhalb der philosophischen Entwicklung des Deutschen Idealismus, die mit Schelling eine Kehrtwende erlebt, infolgedessen die Einkehr in eine eigentlich mit Hegel endgültig hinter sich gelassene Natur wieder möglich wird. (shrink)

Daniel Taylor and Dawn Goodwin present a case study of the Morecambe Bay Inquiry (MBI), which examined the high rate of maternal and neonatal deaths over a period of 9 years (2004–2013), within the small maternity unit of Furness General Hospital (FGH), one of the three hospitals comprising Morecambe Bay Hospitals Trust.1 They examine this through a conceptual lens, and provide a solution involving changes in medical education. This commentary explores both these elements. First, they use the lens of ‘Normalisation (...) of Deviance’ (NoD) to explain organisational failure. However, other available lenses such as ‘Sociology of Disasters’, ‘Organisational Silence’ and ‘Comfort-seeking Behaviour’ may point to different problems and solutions. More justification for their choice of the lens of NoD would have been useful. Similarly, more justification for their focus on a cluster of five ‘serious untoward incidents’ (SUIs) occurring in 2008 would also have been useful. They suggest that before 2008, the perinatal mortality rate was low, patient satisfaction was high and recent level 2 accreditation of maternity services by the Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts all suggested standards of care within the obstetric department were adequate. This stream of positive signals is likely to have contributed towards a genuine belief of safe operation within the maternity unit by staff and board members. However, as they acknowledge, the first problem can be seen in 2004. According to the MBI,2 there were SUIs in the years before and after 2008, but this …. (shrink)

Social attitudes toward usury (here defined using the archaic meaning as the taking of interest on loans) have changed dramatically over the centuries. From antiquity until the Protestant Reformation, usury was regarded as an inherently evil activity. Today, with few exceptions, usury is met with moral indifference. Modern objections to usury are limited to protest against "excessive" interest rates rather than interest per se. With this change in focus, the very meaning of the term "usury" has also changed. Many early (...) pronouncements against the taking of interest emphasized the plight of the poor, but ironically, the poor actually pay the highest rates of interest in the modern American economy. Despite the universality of usury, some socio-economic subcultures still manage to avoid the taking or giving of interest. Orthodox branches of both Judaism and Islam have maintained bans on usury throughout the centuries and up to the present time. This is especially interesting in the case of Judaism, given the popular cultural image of the Jew as usurer. Jewish free loan systems may actually offer a model for modern loan programs that can be designed to aid poor borrowers, who are frequently shut out of mainstream financial services. (shrink)