This first full English translation of the Heguanzi outlines the historical relevance of this ancient Chinese text which connects pre Qin philosophy with later religious and millenarian movements often associated with Daoism.

For human interaction, it is important to understand what emotional state others are in. Especially the observation of faces aids us in putting behaviours into context and gives insight into emotions and mental states of others. Detecting whether someone is nervous, a form of state anxiety, is such an example as it reveals a person’s familiarity and contentment with the circumstances. With recent developments in computer vision we developed behavioural nervousness models to show which time-varying facial cues reveal whether someone (...) is nervous in an interview setting. The facial changes, reflecting a state of anxiety, led to more visual exposure and less chemosensory (taste and olfaction) exposure. However, experienced observers had difficulty picking up these changes and failed to detect nervousness levels accurately therewith. This study highlights humans’ limited capacity in determining complex emotional states but at the same time provides an automated model that can assist us in achieving fair assessments of so far unexplored emotional states. (shrink)

I distinguish three ways in which early modern rationalists seek to apply the principle of sufficient reason to empirical science, and critically assess some of their attempts to do so. I focus especially on how these thinkers assume substantive theories of explanation and intelligibility--which are indebted to the mechanist and experimentalist traditions--in many of their deployments of this rationalist principle. A recurring problem is that these philosophers deploy their standards of intelligibility inconsistently: some of their own favored explanations do not (...) always live up to their standards. I argue that the problem is especially acute for Leibniz and Euler, given their enthusiasm for final-causal explanations. (shrink)

Jesus Christ may be regarded as the chief spirit of agitation and innovation. He himself declared, “I come not to bring peace, but a sword.” One cannot delve seriously into the centuries of activism and scholarship against racism, Jim Crowism, and the terrorism of lynching without encountering the legacies of Timothy Thomas Fortune and Ida B. Wells-Barnett. Black scholars from the 19th century to the present have been inspired by the sociological and economic works of Fortune and Wells. (...) Scholars of American philosophy, however, continue to ignore their writings, their theoretical contributions and their ethical aspirations, preferring instead the insipid declarations of white turn of the century.. (shrink)

Wells identifies influential mistakes about language embedded in the empiricist philosophical tradition of Locke, Russell and Ayer. He shows how these errors stimulated a religious backlash, in which faith became coupled with commonsense realism. He also covers behaviourism and magical thinking.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Objective Reality of Ideas in Descartes, Caterus, and Su irez NORMAN j. WELLS IT HAS LONG BEEN ACKNOWLEDGEDthat Francisco Sufirez's distinction between a formal and an objective concept exercised some influence upon Descartes's teaching on 'idea'.' It would appear, however, that not enough attention has been given to that distinction of Sufirez (and especially to another to be mentioned shordy) to aid in dispelling what I take to (...) be a widespread confusion and misunderstanding with regard to 'idea' in Descartes, especially with respect to 'idea' taken 'objectively'. Much, if not all, of the confusion in question has to do with Descartes's admittedly equivocal use of the term 'idea'. For he had allowed that 'idea' could be taken 'materially' (materialiter), on the one hand, for the knowing activity of the intellect. On the other hand, it could be taken 'objectively' (objective) for the thing (res) represented by that knowing activity.' At this point, the contemporary reader can only be brought up short, See E. Gilson, Index scolastico-cart~sien (New York: Burt Franklin Reprint, 1912), 48-49; Discours de la m~thode: Texte et commentazre (Paris: J. Vrin, 1947), 321; G. Rodis-Lewisin her edition of Meditationes de Prima PhRosoph.m (Paris: J. Vrin, 1953), 41 n. 1; L'oeuure de Descartes (Paris: J. Vrin, 1971), 53~ n. 8; J. Collins, Modern European Philosophy (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1954), 165;T.J. Cronin, S.J., Objecttve Being m Descartes and SuArez (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1966); "Objective Reality of Ideas in Human Thought: Descartes and Su~rez," Wisdom in Depth: Essays in Honor of Henri Renard, SJ., eds. V. F. Daues, S.J., M. R. Holloway, S.J., L. Sweeney, S.J. (Milwaukee : Bruce, 1966), 68-79; L. Gilen, S.J., "Uber die Beziehungen Descartes zur zeitgenossischen Scholastik," Scholastik 32 (1957): 41-66; R. Dalbiez, "Les sources scolastiques de la th~orie cart6sienne de l'&re objectif," Revue d'histoire de la philosophic 3 (1929): 464-72;J. Owens, C.S.S.R., in The Cambridge HtstoU of Later Medu,val Philosophy, eds. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, J. Pinborg (Cambridge University Press, 1982), 459; G. Nuchelmans,Judgment and Propositwnfrom Descartesto Kant (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co., 1983), 36-54. " Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. C. Adam et P. Tannery, 11 vols. (Paris: J. Vrin, 1897-19o9; hereafter cited according to volume, page and line), Praefatio ad Lectorem, 7: 8. 19-251 "Sed respondeo hic subesse aequivocationem in voce ideae: sumi enim potest vel materialiter, pro operatione intellectus, quo sensu me perfectior dici nequit, vel objective, pro re per istam operationem repraesentata, quae res, etsi non supponatur extra intellectum existere, potest tamen me esse perfectior ratione suae essentiae." It is clear that two realities are to be causally accounted for. The [33] 34 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 28"1 JANUARY 1990 conditioned as we are by an appreciation of 'objectivity' altogether extramental! It makes for a considerable wrench of perspective to do justice to Descartes's acknowledged doctrine of intramental objectivity and an intramental 'thing represented' (resrepraesentata). 'Idea', then, in traditional Cartesian fashion, designates the act of representing as well as the 'thing represented '. S Yet, for all this, and despite repeated expressions of the same doctrine, there is a persistent tendency in the history of Cartesianism and its scholarship to interpret 'idea' taken 'objectively' as in some way representative. Contrary to what I take to be Descartes's constant position, such a rendering unwittingly transfers that function which is proper to the cognitive activity, mind is the efficient cause of its cognitive activity. With respect to ideas taken 'objectively', such as the ideas of God and the triangle on the levels of metaphysical and mathematical intelligibility, an efficient cause, extrinsic to the mind, is certainly at issue. For here we are in the presence of what is independent of the mind, however intramental it may be. On the triangle, see Medit. 5; 7: 64. ]4s7 : "...est tamen profecto determinata quaedam ejus natura, sire essentia, sive forma, immutabUis et aeterna, quae a me non efficta est, nec a mente mea dependet." For the idea of God, see Medit. 5; 7: 68. l o-12: "Nam sane multis modis inteUigo illam [ideam... (shrink)

This book covers the author's conception of God aside from any religion. He does not come from a religious view in order to transmit the truest conception of God that he is capable of because any religion, whatever it might be, always claims God for itself in an exclusionary fashion. In other words, you must be a follower of the chosen faith before God will accept you into his kingdom. Wells rejects this view. Any man or woman who accepts (...) God's love as one person connecting to their own creator, is fine. An intermediary, despite what they might crow from whatever pulpits they use, is not necessary. We are all God's children. We are all seeking the same God, so to be dogmatic within a certain exclusionary faith is small-minded and petty. If you want to grow up, spiritually, then this book is for you. (shrink)

The Biological Foundations of Belief is a groundbreaking study of the relationship between biology and religion. Wesley Raymond Wells argues that human belief systems are deeply rooted in our biological makeup, and that understanding this connection can shed new light on the origins and evolution of religion. This book is a fascinating exploration of the intersection between science and spirituality. This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization (...) as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Do extreme, unethical governmental policies often produce results opposite to those intended? This book considers the ironic outcomes of recent global events and concludes that there is a 'rule of reverse results' at work. While not a hard and fast law, the rule points out the increased probability that a policy will backfire if it is immoral while ethical policies, even if extreme, are unlikely to produce reverse results. The issue here is that of increased likelihood but not of certainty. (...) Governments can never be sure as to the effects of their actions: to some extent they are always working in the dark. But if the motivation is right, moral and humane the policies will not often produce adverse results the opposite of those intended. Based on events in global history in the Twentieth and Twenty-First centuries the chapters can each be read individually, as well as being part of the argument. (shrink)

In Losing Our Virtue: Why the Church Must Recover Its Moral Vision, theologian David Wells argues that the Church is in danger of losing its moral authority to speak to a culture whose moral fabric is torn. Although much of the Church has enjoyed success and growth over the past years, Wells laments a "hollowing out of evangelical conviction, a loss of the biblical word in its authoritative function, and an erosion of character to the point that today, (...) no discernible ethical differences are evident in behavior when those claiming to have been reborn and secularists are compared." The assurance of the Good News of the gospel has been traded for mere good feelings, truth has given way to perception, and morality has slid into personal preference. Losing Our Virtue is about the disintegrating moral culture that is contemporary society and what this disturbing loss means for the church. Wells covers the following in this bold critique: how the theologically emptied spirituality of the church is causing it to lose its moral bearings; an exploration of the wider dynamic at work in contemporary society between license and law; an exposition of the secular notion of salvation as heralded by our most trusted gurus -- advertisers and psychotherapists; a discussion of the contemporary view of the self; how guilt and sin have been replaced by empty psychological shame; an examination of the contradiction between the way we view ourselves in the midst of our own culture and the biblical view of persons as created, moral beings. Can the church still speak effectively to a culture that has become morally unraveled? Wells believes it can. In fact, says Wells, no time in this century has been more opportune for the Christian faith -- if the church can muster the courage to regain its moral weight and become a missionary of truth once more to a foundering world. - Publisher. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

This paper records both dissatisfaction and evidence of poor current standards of literacy, notably in the area of the written word, among higher education students. It also suggests what may be done to remedy the situation.

In several works, Jason Brennan and Peter Martin Jaworski defend the following thesis: If it is permissible to have, use, or exchange something for free, then it is permissible to have, use, or exchange that thing for money. In this paper, I argue that No Limits is false. Moreover, the reasons why it is false reflect many of the complaints made against markets. The paper will proceed as follows: In §1, I summarize Brennan and Jaworski’s position to clarify exactly what (...) a challenge to No Limits requires. In §2, I raise just such a challenge, one which also captures the concern behind some “semiotic objections.” In §3, I offer a modification to No Limits that avoids my objection but, as a result, re-opens the question of whether markets in some of the goods Brennan and Jaworski discuss are permissible. I conclude in §4 by considering a possible response and some thoughts on the dialectic as it stands. (shrink)

Such a thesis is counter to prevailing trends among contemporary philosophers. All that is about to be maintained is that facts may be regarded as entities, i.e. that it is legitimate and tenable so to regard them; this is much less than saying that they must be so regarded, and that anyone who declined to make use of the category of facts would be mistaken. Yet even so weak a thesis will be viewed askance by many; those who concede its (...) meaningfulness and logical possibility will still, a large proportion of them, dismiss it on other grounds-particularly on the ground of superfluity. And precisely one of the reasons why we have selected this particular thesis for defense, is as an occasion to examine the weight and force of Ockham's Razor. (shrink)

Rachel Wells turns to the examination of three recent artistic practices, which integrate facts in their work not as an antagonistic other but as a constitutive element to their efficacy and ethics. She argues, that in introducing news, factual actions, or objects with traces of factual events, Alfredo Jaar, Jeremy Deller and Martin Creed use facts in order to retract from the position of art as an expression of artistic freedom and subjectivity and thus as the opposite of fact. (...) Instead, she states that by introducing the factual the artists underline each in their own way the instability of given eptistemological and ethical frameworks. Far from being a mere relativist pose, Wells understands this denial of a stable subjectivist position as a reconfigured sense of “decision”—perhaps in the sense of Nancy’s articulation of a “decision of existence—that lets the factual take precedence over the control in and of the artwork as a heightened form of responsiveness and responsibility. Whereas Jaar uses the factual to engage overt political action, Deller presents facts that avoid taking an overtly critical perspective forcing the viewer to think about political events. Creed in contrast seeks for the interpretation of the past altogether, would avoid to take over the responsibility of taking a position. Whereas David Hume stated famously, that reasoning concerning matter of fact is founded in causality and Immanuel Kant concludes, that responsibility and freedom begins where causality ends, Wells understands the positions of Jaar, Deller and Creed as an attempt to reconcile the realm of the factual and the realm of the moral. Responsibility would then arise exactly out of the insight in the impossibility to ground moral stances in rationality and causality and in an attempt to use causality to demonstrate this impossibility. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ontological and Other AssumptionsLloyd A. Wells (bio) and Sandra J. Rackley (bio)Fahrenberg and Cheetham have conducted an immensely thought-provoking study of the assumptions about human nature made by 800 students and pose a question about the future impact of these assumptions on individuals’ practice in professions including medicine and psychotherapy.This work represents a branch of “philosophical anthropology,” which considers assumptions people make about human nature. The authors used (...) a questionnaire, much of which was newly designed, to assess the assumptions made by university students studying psychology, philosophy, sciences, and other disciplines. Most of the respondents were studying at Freiburg, but some were sampled at several other universities in both the former East and West Germanies. Questions involved consciousness and the brain, evolution, free will, belief in God, the meaning of life, and theodicy.Given the importance of these beliefs and assumptions in so many peoples’ lives, it is quite surprising that there are so few modern data available, and this study ventures an important first step in assessing these assumptions. However, there are many problems inherent in this study (and any like it).The first, for us, is the validity of the questionnaire itself, an issue that was not specifically addressed in the paper. Face validity is a problem even in the few questions quoted directly in the paper. For example, some statements contain two clauses, and one could well agree with one without agreeing with another: “I do not know whether a God exists and I do not believe it is possible to know.” This is the most relevant answer for a true agnostic, but the assumption that “I do not know whether a God exists” does not necessarily link at all with “I do not believe it is possible to know.” Similarly, a theist might have trouble with the two clauses, “I know God really exists” and “I do not doubt this.” (Technically, knowledge does imply a lack of doubt, but belief certainly does not.) Particularly in the trilemmas, where various patterns of response were analyzed, these multiple-clause statements may have led students to respond in a manner inconsistent with their true beliefs and assumptions. Furthermore, many of the questions contain terms that may have been unfamiliar to first-year university students. The authors explain their rationale in not defining terms, but the lack of clarity about definitions may have led some of the students to not fully understand the questions asked and to perhaps influence the answers they chose.Misunderstanding of the questions may account for some of the disparities reported in the results. Other apparent inconsistencies, however, do not seem to be a result of unclear questions. For example, sixty percent of the students agreed with the statement that “I believe in … existence after death,” whereas forty-seven percent agreed with the statement that “when my brain is dead my consciousness and my person cease to be.” These [End Page 203] findings do not add up, and this study has several similar sets of data. People contradict themselves in long and complex questionnaires, and this may be a simple explanation for these findings, but is this the only explanation? How seriously did the students take the questionnaire, often given as part of their class? How honest were their responses?How generalizable are the findings of this study? It is very difficult even to speculate about this. The statistics are incomprehensible in light of the data given, and one must essentially take them on faith, wherever one falls on the God/theodicy questions. The design has many flaws, but we do learn how a subsample of German university students rate important factors about the meaning of life. Statements are made in the paper that the students’ results correlate with similar results for the general population, but this assertion seems to be based on a very few questions. One would like much more delineation of this apparent correlation, because we wonder about the juxtaposition of developmental factors with the answers the students gave to this questionnaire. First-year university students are at a critical developmental point, and it would be fascinating to follow this large cohort of students over time to see whether... (shrink)

This is the first of three instalments which attempt to present a summary and critique of the life-work of William Burroughs Steele. Steele was an American business man who, subsequent to retiring after the First World War, spent his life working on a comprehensive study of mankind and its aspirations and follies, producing a gargantuan treatise called The Anatomy of Frustration-a treatise previously not published in its entirety. Here, Mr. Wells explains that he himself has decided to publish an (...) account of Steele's little-known treatise "in general terms and for the general public." Contents include: "Part I. What All Men Seek," "Part II. Toward the Next Beginning," and "Part III. Why We Are Frustrated." Herbert George Wells (1866 - 1946) was a prolific English writer who wrote in a variety of genres, including the novel, politics, history, and social commentary. Today, he is perhaps best remembered for his contributions to the science fiction genre thanks to such novels as "The Time Machine" (1895), "The Invisible Man" (1897), and "The War of the Worlds" (1898). Many vintage books such as this are becoming increasingly scarce and expensive. We are republishing this book now in an affordable, modern, high-quality edition complete with a specially commissioned new biography of the author. First published in "Harper's Magazine," April-June 1936. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Lyngzeidetson [1990] has claimed that a type of parallel computer called the ‘Connection Machine’ instantiates architectural principles which will ‘revolutionize which "functions" of the human mind can and cannot be modelled by (non-human) computational automata.’ In particular, he claims that the Connection Machine architecture shows the anti-mechanist argument from Gödel's theorem to be false for at least one kind of parallel computer. In the first part of this paper, I argue that Lyngzeidetson's claims are not supported (...) by his arguments; in the second part I consider some other aspects of parallel computation which may be of theoretical significance in cognitive science. (shrink)

Written by two well-known theologians, the book encompasses Christian ethics in its entirety, but also offers a new way of viewing this subject.

The past decade has been Hellenistic rather than Hellenic, a Silver rather than a Golden Age. But if it has not been a midday, it has been no twilight either.