Contextualism is the view that the extension of perspectival claims (involving e.g. predicates of personal taste or epistemic modals) depends on the context of utterance. Relativism is the view that the extension of perspectival claims depends on the context of assessment. Both views make concrete, empirically testable predictions about how such claims are used by ordinary English language speakers. This chapter surveys some of the recent empirical literature on the topic and presents four new experiments (total N=724). Consistent with contextualism (...) and inconsistent with relativism, the results suggest that the extension of perspectival claims depends on the context of utterance, not the context of assessment. (shrink)

. This paper explores the relationship between gift giving, guanxi and corruption through a study of the relationships between UK manufacturing companies in China and their local component suppliers. The analysis is based on interviews in the China-based operations of 49 UK companies. Interviews were carried out both with senior (often expatriate) staff and with local line managers who were responsible for everyday purchasing decisions and for managing relationships with suppliers. The results suggest that gift giving is perceived to be (...) a significant problem in UK-owned companies in China. However the relationship between these payments and established understanding of gift giving within guanxi-networks appears to be weak. Gift giving appears to be associated with illicit payments, corruption and the pursuit of self-interest. Firms seek to reduce the incidence of illicit transactions by changing staff roles, instituting joint responsibilities, which include the separation of different aspects of sourcing/purchasing, ineasing the involvement of senior staff in the process and through the education of employee and suppliers. (shrink)

How is knowledge of geometry developed and acquired? This central question in the philosophy of mathematics has received very different answers. Spelke and colleagues argue for a “core cognitivist”, nativist, view according to which geometric cognition is in an important way shaped by genetically determined abilities for shape recognition and orientation. Against the nativist position, Ferreirós and García-Pérez have argued for a “culturalist” account that takes geometric cognition to be fundamentally a culturally developed phenomenon. In this paper, I argue that (...) when understood as moderate versions supported by the state-of-the-art research, the nativist and culturalist views are in fact possible to reconcile. While Ferreirós and García-Pérez present the work of Spelke and colleagues as implying that geometric cognition is genetically determined, I argue that they fail to appreciate the role that Spelke and colleagues see for cultural factors. On this basis, I provide theoretical and terminological clarifications and show that moderate versions of the nativist and culturalist view are in fact consistent with each other. I then propose a unifying theoretical framework for future study that can integrate the two accounts in ontogeny by moving beyond the crude nature (nativism) vs. nurture (culturalism) dichotomy. (shrink)

Empirical evidence challenges many of the assumptions that underlie traditional philosophical and commonsense conceptions of human agency. It has been suggested that this evidence threatens also to undermine free will and moral responsibility. In this paper, I will focus on the purported threat to moral responsibility. The evidence challenges assumptions concerning the ability to exercise conscious control and to act for reasons. This raises an apparent challenge to moral responsibility as these abilities appear to be necessary for morally responsible agency. (...) I will argue that this challenge collapses once the underlying conditions on moral responsibility are specified in sufficient detail. I will argue, in other words, that the empirical evidence does not support a challenge to the assumption that we are, in general, morally responsible agents. In the final section, I will suggest that empirical research on human agency is nevertheless relevant to various questions about moral responsibility. (shrink)

Benjamin Libet's empirical challenge to free will has received a great deal of attention and criticism. A standard line of response has emerged that many take to be decisive against Libet's challenge. In the first part of this paper, I will argue that this standard response fails to put the challenge to rest. It fails, in particular, to address a recent follow-up experiment that raises a similar worry about free will (Soon, Brass, Heinze, & Haynes, 2008). In the second part, (...) however, I will argue that we can altogether avoid Libet-style challenges if we adopt a traditional compatibilist account of free will. In the final section, I will briefly explain why there is good and independent reason to think about free will in this way. (shrink)

In this conceptual analysis contribution to the special issue on radical embodied cognition, we discuss how embodied cognition can exist with and without representations. We explore this concept through the lens of judgment and decision making in sports (JDMS). Embodied cognition has featured in many investigations of human behavior, but no single approach has emerged. Indeed, the very definitions of the concepts “embodiment” and “cognition” lack consensus, and consequently the degree of “radicalism” is not universally defined, either. In this paper (...) we address JDMS not from a rigid theoretical perspective, but from two embodied cognition approaches: one that assumes there is mediation between the athlete and the environment through mental representation, and another that assumes direct contact between the athlete and the environment and thus no need for mental representation. Importantly, our aim was not to arrive at a theoretical consensus or set up a competition between approaches, but rather to provide a legitimate scientific discussion about how to explain empirical results in JDMS from contrasting perspectives within embodied cognition. For this, we first outline the definitions and constructs of embodied cognition in JDMS. Second, we detail the theory underlying the mental representation and direct contact approaches. Third, we comment on two published research papers on JDMS, one selected by each of us: (1) Correia et al. (2012) and (2) Pizzera (2012). Fourth, following the interpretation of the empirical findings of these papers, we present a discussion on the commonalities and divergences of these two perspectives and the consequences of using one or the other approach in the study of JDMS. (shrink)

Michel Foucault entwickelt sich gegenwartig zweifellos zu einer der neuen Bezugsgrossen des padagogischen Diskurses: Nach einer langen Phase grosser Widerstande innerhalb der deutschsprachigen Erziehungswissenschaft werden jetzt die ...

In this highly original book, Markus Gabriel presents 'Neo-Existentialism', an anti-naturalist view that holds that human mindedness consists in an open-ended proliferation of mentalistic vocabularies. Challenged by Charles Taylor, Andrea Kern and Jocelyn Benoist, Gabriel deftly refutes naturalism's metaphysical claim to epistemic exclusiveness.

In Western medicine the interpretation prevails that mental illness is a psychological and/or biological disorder. Most important concepts in health psychology, such as sense of coherence, self‐efficacy, hope, or dispositional optimism are all very cognition and individual centered. In this individualized perspective, mental illness is constructed in such a way that it can be treated in a dyadic doctor–patient or therapist–patient relationship with the help of drugs or therapeutic techniques. In this article, I would like to develop a contrasting social (...) construction of mental illness. In Umbanda and Candomblé temples in Brazil, what is interpreted in the Western model as illness is understood as a “spiritual problem.” Here, the individual is constructed in relationship to the community, and individual health and healing is footed in moral‐spiritual orders. In presenting the details of my investigation, I will apply Grawe’s common factors as a foil for developing the link between mental illness and its social context. (shrink)

Cognitive science began as a multidisciplinary endeavor to understand how the mind works. Since the beginning, cognitive scientists have been asking questions about the right methodologies and levels of explanation to pursue this goal, and make cognitive science a coherent science of the mind. Key questions include: Is there a privileged level of explanation in cognitive science? How do different levels of explanation fit together, or relate to one another? How should explanations at one level inform or constrain explanations at (...) some other level? Can the different approaches to the mind, brain, and culture be unified? The aim of this issue of topiCS is to provide a platform for discussing different answers to such questions and to facilitate a better understanding between the different strands of thinking about the right levels of explanation in cognitive science. (shrink)

Hume glaubte, die Kausalverknüpfung sei eine „secret connection“, also eine Verknüpfung, die mindestens unerkennbar, wenn nicht sogar inexis- tent ist. Einige moderne Gegner Humes halten dem entgegen, dass apos- teriorisch entdeckte, metaphysische Notwendigkeit, wie wir sie bei- spielsweise von Kripke und Putnam kennen, diejenige objektiv-reale Verknüpfung in der Welt ist, die auch die Rolle einer kausalen Verknüp- fung in der Welt spielen kann. Ich hinterfrage diese anti-Hume’sche Identifizierung kausaler mit me- taphysischer Notwendigkeit, zeige aber auch einen anderen Weg auf, kausale (...) Kräfte zu postulieren: Wenn unsere willentlichen Handlungen auf Widerstände in der Welt stoßen, haben wir (direkten) Beobachtungszu- gang zu einer Verknüpfung in der Welt, die mindestens einen essentiellen Teil kausaler Kraft ausmacht. (shrink)

According to the standard view in philosophy, intentionality is the mark of genuine action. In psychology, human cognition and agency are now widely explained in terms of the workings of two distinct systems (or types of processes), and intentionality is not a central notion in this dual-system theory. Further, it is often claimed, in psychology, that most human actions are automatic, rather than consciously controlled. This raises pressing questions. Does the dual-system theory preserve the philosophical account of intentional action? How (...) much of our behavior is intentional according to this view? And what is the role of consciousness? I will propose here a revised account of intentional action within the dual-system framework, and we will see that most of our behavior can qualify as intentional, even if most of it is automatic. An important lesson will be that philosophical accounts of intentional action need to pay more attention to the role of consciousness in action. (shrink)

I argue for the possibility of a proprioceptive art in addition to, for example, visual or auditory arts, where aspects of some martial arts will serve as examples of that art form. My argument is inspired by a thought of Ted Shawn’s, one of the pioneers of American modern dance: "Dance is the only art wherein we ourselves are the stuff in which it is made.” In a first step, I point out that in some practices of martial arts (in (...) the paper I will introduce “hyongs” & “katas”), we are, too, the stuff these performances are made of. Second, I show that we, as martial arts practitioners, are not in the first place visual or auditorial observers (as common in painting or music or ballet) but introspective, proprioceptive perceivers of our bodies and their movements. (As a corollary we get that we are, in such a case, necessarily our exclusive audience.) In an third crucial step, I show that the martial arts practices referred to, hyongs & katas, and especially the proprioceptive aspects thereof, can indeed count as art. Thus, proprioceptive art is possible because some practices of some martial arts are actual existing examples of that art form. (shrink)

In this paper, we explore digitally fabricated aesthetic enhancements and modifications of the body as well as digitally fabricated fauna habitats. We will address how we utilize speculative works through our bio inspired digitally fabricated designs via two of our most recent projects: {skin} D.E.E.P. and in silico et in situ. Through these two projects we explore cultural implications of the intersection of technology and biologically inspired art/design. Technology has provided an ever increasing amount of data which has facilitated the (...) way data can be used in aesthetic explorations. Technology can redefine the human experience by enhancing our senses, experiences, and forms of expression. In our work {skin} D.E.E.P., we explore these ideas via augmentation through wearables and biomimetic expressions on the skin through digitally fabricated prosthetics. {skin} D.E.E.P. employs temporary biomimetic skin patterns via wearable 3D printed exoskeletons. The first series of this work mimics the patterns and textures of animal skin via ephemeral impressions onto human skin. Taking inspiration from shedding snakeskin, we shed the outer layer by removing the 3D printed prosthesis. The epidermis retains the negative imprint of the prosthetic mimicking the look of serpent skin. The dermis reestablishes the smooth form of the human skin as it heals itself within the hour, erasing the ephemeral imprint, symbolically representing rebirth and renewal. Investigating the ephemeral aesthetic of textured patterns on human skin will not by any means provide a solution to an engineering problem, yet acts as a larger philosophical basis to conduct a discussion about the possibilities of blending bio inspired designs. The manifestation of data into physical form occurs via digital fabrication in our most recent series in silico et in situ: fauna habitats in the age of voxels, where we aim to create a new ecosystem for animals and to potentially augment their habitat. The habitats include pollinator waterers, spider habitats and turtle basking platforms. This project pushes forward with a new piece—the development of a 20-foot avian sculpture that will solely exist to support the habitat of the Chimney Swift species. The Chimney Swift is a near-threatened bird species in the US. in silico et in situ investigates the interplay of art, nature and technology by contextualizing sculptural works and placing these sculptures into nature. The project serves as a breeding ground for a larger dialogue about nature, culture, human intervention, design art and technology. Providing the artwork in the public sphere, barrier free in nature, fosters this discourse. (shrink)

Context: Cognitive science, as an interdisciplinary research endeavour, poses challenges for teaching and learning insofar as the integration of various participating disciplines requires a reflective approach, considering and making explicit different epistemological attitudes and hidden assumptions and premises. Only few curricula in cognitive science face this integrative challenge. Problem: The lack of integrative activities might result from different challenges for people involved in truly interdisciplinary efforts, such as discussing issues on a conceptual level, negotiating colliding frameworks or sets of premises, (...) asking profound questions challenging one’s own paradigm, and differences in terminologies, as well as from the “personal” challenge of realising one’s own limits of knowledge and, hence, the need to trust in another person’s expertise. This implies that the proposed curriculum structure provides an “epistemic laboratory”: a space for experiencing and negotiating, as well as constructing different viewpoints in a trustful setting. Approach: A newly-designed interdisciplinary cognitive science curriculum is presented that is based on a constructivist epistemology. We suggest that a careful construction of the learning space is a necessary requirement. The MEi:CogSci curriculum is designed and structured in such a way that enables didactical measures that allow for collaborative construction of meaning by discussing concepts, methods and terminologies and also hidden assumptions. Findings: The experience with four cohorts of students has shown that a truly interdisciplinary approach to cognitive science demands a different attitude towards knowledge as well as towards teaching and learning on both sides: the teacher and the student. The research orientation promotes an understanding of knowledge as something that is actively constructed, rendering the role of the teacher that of a co-learner rather than a transmitter of knowledge, thereby also changing the responsibility of students. (shrink)

Ausgehend von historischen und sozialtheoretischen Befunden rekonstruieren wir zunächst in skizzenhafter Form, wie es zu einer Konstruktion von Behinderungen als Verkörperungen einer Mangelhaftigkeit anthropologischen Ausmaßes gekommen ist. In Anschluss hieran vertreten wir die These, dass Behinderung eine kulturelle Norm darstellt, die der Kultur selbst Grenzen setzt. Nicht der Mensch stellt das „eigentliche“ Mängelwesen dar, sondern die gesellschaftliche Kultur vorenthaltener oder eingeschränkter Teilhabe sowie die pädagogische Kultur mangelhafter Bildungsmaßnahmen. In ethischer Hinsicht begründen wir diese These von der Verantwortung gegenüber dem Anderen (...) her, dessen Andersheit wir als irreduzibel bzw. radikal fassen. Wir schließen mit einer kurzen Reflexion über die Frage, wie sich dieser veränderte Zugang zu Menschen mit Behinderungen bildungstheoretisch fassen lässt. (shrink)

In this paper, we will discuss Peter van Inwagen’s contribution to the epistemological debate about revealed peer disagreement. Roughly, this debate focuses on situations in which at least two participants disagree on a certain proposition based on the same evidence. This leads to the problem of how one should react rationally when peer disagreement is revealed. Van Inwagen, as we will show, discusses four possible reactions, all of which he rejects as unsatisfying. Our proposal will be to point to hidden (...) assumptions in van Inwagen’s reasoning and ask whether he is willing to reject at least one of these to get rid of the problem. In short, our thesis amounts to the following: Of the two epistemological claims, which we call “Weak” and “Full-blown Fallibilism”, van Inwagen cannot simultaneously accept the first and reject the latter, while this is what he seems to suggest. Revealing this potential dilemma for van Inwagen’s position will lead to a more detailed discussion of how “rationality”, “truth”, “evidence” and “justification” interrelate and how a closer look at their relation might help solving the puzzle of revealed peer disagreement. (shrink)

Dans ce livre très original, Markus Gabriel avance une théorie du soi humain qui surmonte les blocages inhérents aux positions standards en philosophie de l'esprit contemporaine. Son point de vue, le néo-existentialisme, est intégralement antinaturaliste, en ce sens qu'il rejette toute théorie selon laquelle l'ensemble de nos meilleures connaissances scientifiques naturelles serait pleinement capable de rendre compte de l'esprit humain. L'auteur montre plutôt que l'esprit humain consiste en une prolifération ouverte de vocabulaires mentalistes. Leur rôle dans la forme de (...) vie humaine consiste à rendre compte du fait que l'être humain ne se fond pas simplement dans la nature inanimée et le reste du règne animal. Les humains s'appuient sur un autoportrait qui les situe dans un contexte aussi large que possible au sein de l'univers. Ce qui distingue cet autoportrait de notre connaissance de la réalité naturelle, c'est que nous changeons en vertu de nos croyances, vraies ou fausses, au sujet de nous-mêmes. (shrink)

We propose that rapid eye movement (REM) and slow-wave sleep contribute differently to the formation of episodic memories. REM sleep is important for building up invariant object representations that eventually recur to gamma-band oscillations in the neocortex. In contrast, slow-wave sleep is more directly involved in the consolidation of episodic memories through replay of sequential neural activity in hippocampal place cells.

The author examines whether a theology of creation is compatible with environmental ethics or not. He argues that theological perception of nature as creation of God is neither anthropocentric nor biocentric. It is a theological argument he gives for this position: First of all theology of creation is in itself not made to function as a basis of ethics. Its subject is the creativity of God and not human beings as moral agents. On the other side biblical texts do not (...) perceive living beings as beings with an intrinsic value. The author further on argues for a compassionate God which takes suffering on earth seriously. Therefore theological theories of everything, explaining evil and suffering to be compatible with the will of God have to be refused. The article ends with a discussion of the metaphor of >playing God< and concludes that there are no reasonable theological arguments agairrst improving human beings genetically. (shrink)

In the first part I argue that Buddhism and Hinduism can be unified by a Pure Consciousness thesis, which says that the nature of ultimate reality is an unconditioned and pure consciousness and that the phenomenal world is a mere appearance of pure consciousness. In the second part I argue that the Pure Consciousness thesis can be supported by an argument from quantum physics. According to our best scientific theories, the fundamental nature of reality consists of quantum fields, and it (...) seems that quantum fields have merely particle-like appearances—particles seem to be mere epiphenomena. This interpretation can be generalized. There appear to be individual entities, small and large, and their ontological reality is precisely what it appears to be—they are mere appearances. (shrink)

The threats we face today are unprecedented, from the existential crisis of climate change to the prospect of self-annihilation brought about by the uncontrolled expansion of AI. Add to this the crisis of liberal democracy and we seem to be swirling in a state of moral disarray, unsure whether there are any principles to which we can appeal today that would be anything other than particularistic. In contrast to this view, Markus Gabriel puts forward the bold argument that there (...) are guiding moral principles for human behaviour. These guiding principles extend across cultures, they are universally valid and form the source of universal values in the twenty-first century. In developing what he calls a 'New Moral Realism', Gabriel breathes new life into the idea that humanity's task on our planet is to enable moral progress through co-operation. It is only by achieving moral progress in a way that incorporates universal values - and thus embraces all of humanity - that we can avoid the abyss into which we will otherwise slide. Written with verve, wit and imagination, Gabriel's call for a new enlightenment is a welcome antidote to the value relativism and nihilism of our times and it lays out a moral framework within which we can work together, as surely we must, to deal with the great challenges we now face. (shrink)

Among the many “post”-isms, through which the thought of the present attempts both to create an orientation in regard to its historical place and possibilities, and simultaneously to express its frustration and anxiety about the lack of such an orientation, there is one—certainly predating all the others—which seems to enjoy, perhaps alone among them, a rather strong consensual acceptance. We live in post-metaphysical times, at the times of, or even after, the end of metaphysics. The relatively broad unanimity with respect (...) to this global description may, of course, be due to the fact that it seems to relate to some internal affair of philosophy—an activity which hardly commands a particularly great interest or respect today. Nevertheless such a consensus of philosophers over the state of philosophy seems to be a remarkable occurrence even in itself, given the ineliminable strife of its sects which characterizes its whole history. (shrink)

Dass wir durch Wahrnehmung einen Zugang zur materiellen Welt haben, scheint selbstverständlich zu sein. Und dass die visuelle Wahrnehmung dabei einen prominenten Platz einnimmt, scheint ebenfalls selbstverständlich zu sein. Doch was genau sehen wir: die Gegenstände selbst oder bloß ihre wahrnehmbaren Eigenschaften? Wie gelingt es uns überhaupt, etwas zu sehen? Können wir allein aufgrund von optischen und physiologischen Vorgängen etwas sehen, oder setzt das Sehen bereits Begriffe voraus, mithilfe derer wir etwas als etwas sehen können? -/- Diese Fragen, die in (...) der gegenwärtigen Wahrnehmungs- und Erkenntnistheorie ausgiebig erörtert werden, waren bereits in der Frühen Neuzeit Gegenstand intensiver Debatten. In vielfacher Hinsicht legten die Diskussionen im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert sogar die Grundlage für heutige Theorien, da sie zum einen die Probleme in aller Schärfe benannten, zum anderen aber auch Lösungsstrategien vorlegten, die auch heute noch von Bedeutung sind. -/- Der Band soll diese Debatten (von Descartes bis Reid) neu erschließen und einem breiten philosophisch interessierten Publikum zugänglich machen. Es soll gezeigt werden, dass die Frühe Neuzeit kein ehrwürdiges Museum der Philosophiegeschichte ist, sondern eine äußerst produktive und anregende philosophische Epoche, die zu einem Dialog einlädt. (shrink)

We propose that the fundamental mechanism underlying resilience is the integration of novel or negative experiences into internal schemata. This process requires a switch from reactive to predictive control modes, from the brain's salience network to the default mode network. Reappraisal, among other mechanisms, is suggested to facilitate this process.

While the principal ideas of a systems theory for the molecular sciences have been introduced in part I (Reiher, 2003), illustrative examples for the ingredients of this systems chemistry are discussed in greater detail in this work. The potential wealth of systems chemistry is then demonstrated for a recently developed approach for the calculation of hydrogen bond energies in non-decomposable systems.