I offer an appreciation and critique of Ernst Fehr’s altruism research in experimental economics that challenges the "selfishness axiom" as an account of human behavior. I describe examples of Fehr’s experiments and their results and consider his conceptual terminology, particularly his "biological" definition of altruism and its counterintuitive implications. I also look at Fehr’s experiments from a methodological perspective and examine his explanations of subjects’ behavior. In closing, I look at Fehr’s neuroscientific work in experimental economics and question his adherence (...) to a subjective expected utility interpretation of subjects’ behavior. Key Words: altruism • Ernst Fehr • strong reciprocity • neuroeconomics • experimental economics. (shrink)

In this paper we examine Fehr’s notions of “altruism”, “strong reciprocity” and “altruistic punishment” and query his ascription of altruism. We suggest that, pace Fehr, altruism cannot be defined behaviourally because the definition of altruism must refer to the motives of actors. We also advert to certain inconsistencies in Fehr’s usage of his terms and we question his explanation of altruism in terms of ‘social preferences’.

Despite its proliferation in technology studies, the concept of “path dependence” has scarcely been applied to epistemology. In this essay, I investigate path dependence in the production of scientific knowledge, first, by considering Kuhn's scattered remarks that lend support to a path-dependence thesis (Section I) and second by developing and criticising Kuhn's embryonic account (Sections II and III). I examine a case from high-energy physics that brings the path-dependent nature of scientific knowledge to the fore and I pay attention to (...) two sources of path dependence—“theoretical” and “instrumental”. The latter source is particularly important in “big science”. I ask in Section IV whether path dependence in scientific knowledge can lead to circumstances like those in the technological field, in which a theory can come to dominate a scientific speciality even though it is inferior to alternatives. In Section V, I ask what implications my thesis has for science policy. (shrink)

To be monetised, a society requires a unit which measures the values of a wide range of goods. Being thus measurable, the values of goods are mutually commensurable, a point which Aristotle theorised in the _Nicomachean Ethics_ (Book V). But whereas Aristotle gives rise to the impression that the stipulation of a currency unit suffices to make goods commensurable, societies themselves must undergo a process of commensurabilisation whereby people become habituated to valuing goods in terms of a unit of value. (...) This essay examines the development of practices of valuation and commensurability in ancient Greece, paying particular attention to the rule of Solon and his division of the citizenry into census classes according to their yearly income. The assessment of citizens’ income presupposes a unit for measuring income. The stipulation of this unit, it is argued, had a decisive influence in developing practices of valuation and commensurability. (shrink)

In this article, I examine Michele Moody-Adams’ critique of the ‘inability thesis’, according to which some cultures make the resources for criticizing injustice ‘unavailable’ to their members. I investigate Moody-Adams’ alternative ‘affected ignorance’ thesis. Using the example of slavery in ancient Greece, I consider two potential candidates for affected ignorance which involve, respectively, ‘unawareness’ and ‘mistaken moral weighing’; in neither, I hold, may one ascribe culpability to those involved.

In this paper, we examine different forms of altruism. We commence by analysing the definition and, after clarifying its conditions for altruism, we argue that it is not in with everyday linguistic usage of the term. We therefore consider a definition, which we likewise refine, and argue that it better reflects ordinary language use. Both behavioural and psychological approaches define altruism descriptively and thus fail to capture an important aspect of altruism, namely its normative component. Altruism, we argue, is a, (...) i.e. one which embodies both positive and normative components. We discuss and compare various formulations of this normative component. (shrink)

Are human beings motivated exclusively by self-interest? The orthodox theory of rational choice in economics thinks that they are. Amartya Sen disagrees, and his concept commitment is central to his vision of an alternative to mainstream rational choice theory. This book examines commitment as it has evolved in Sen's critique of orthodox rational choice theory. The in-depth focus on commitment reveals subtleties in the concept itself as well as in its relationships with other concepts which Sen develops in his critique (...) of rational choice theory, for example preference, sympathy, weakness of will, agency, personhood, social norms, rights, self-welfare goal and self-goal choice. The book provides a comprehensive understanding of commitment and offers novel interpretations of the term as a way of strengthening its plausibility. Broadly in support of Sen's conceptualization of rational choice, the book nevertheless reveals ambiguities and weaknesses in Sen's conceptual framework, and it reformulates Sen's concepts when doing so strengthens the claims he makes. The book also engages with critics of Sen and argues for the importance of commitment as a component in the theory of rational choice. (shrink)

In a recent contribution to this Journal, Matthew Caulfield urges business owners to curtail the influence of their moral conscience on market decisions: in deciding with whom to transact, vendors should adopt an attitude of impersonalism; they should not deny service on account of moral objections to customers' personal characteristics. The history of service denial in the United States is dominated by business owners denying service to Black customers. Civil rights legislation since the Reconstruction era has been designed to eradicate (...) discrimination in contractual relationships, though its successes have been partial. In the foregoing decade, cases of denying service to LGBTQ + people have rekindled debate about discrimination by businesses. This essay places Caulfield's moral argument for impersonalism into its contemporary legal and legislative context, for it is legislatures and courts which ultimately regulate business conduct. Many matters raised by Caulfield surface in legal debates, though in some decisive recent decisions, courts have not sided with impersonalism. In explaining why, I offer a critique of contemporary legal reasoning in cases of service denial and argue that proponents of impersonalism have reason to be concerned at the granting to businesses the privilege of denying service. (shrink)

This paper examines the role played by consumers in producing what Iris Marion Young calls structural injustice. Through their consumption of a commodity, consumers can contribute to injustice, often as a result of their ignorance toward the ethical footprint of the commodity in question. After establishing that consumers are routinely implicated in structural injustice (Section I), I defend Young’s scepticism towards attributing blame to those who contribute to injustice through acts of consumption, whether their contribution to injustice result from a (...) state of moral or factual ignorance (Sections II-IV). I then examine the action-guiding implications of Young’s work and introduce the concept of conspicuousness to narrow the vast range of possibilities for action (Section V). I also suggest a revision to Young’s derivation of the responsibility she ascribes to people for ameliorating injustice. (shrink)

In this essay, I examine two claims Hobbes makes about obligation in Leviathan:1) that obligation and ‘prudence’ are conceptually separate;2) that fulfilling one's obligations is to one's advantage.My thesis is that Hobbes seeks to reconcile these apparently conflicting claims by arguing that obligation and advantage are empirically identical. He does so, I hold, without ‘reducing’ obligation to advantage. That is, he does not hold that people should only keep covenants if doing so is in their self-interest.In section I, I analyse (...) the temporal structure of covenants and distinguish the decision to enter a covenant from the decision to break or keep a covenant one has already entered. In section II, I examine Hobbes’ fool. Hobbes tries to refute the fool by putting him right about that which conduces to his ‘conservation, and contentment.’. (shrink)

In 1986, a debate - der Historikerstreit (the historians’ dispute) - erupted in the German public sphere. It involved a number of historians who attempted to ‘revise’ approaches to the study of the Holocaust. Their endeavours met with fierce opposition, most notably from Jürgen Habermas, who accused them of trying to endow Germany with a presentable political image by relativizing the Holocaust. This article examines the conduct of the debate, in particular the manner in which each side alleged of the (...) other that it was driven by political motives rather than wissenschaftliche interests. I consider the way in which Ernst Nolte tries to ‘understand’ the Holocaust, and discuss the difficulties of investigating the Holocaust in a wissenschaftlichen manner.1. (shrink)

Michael Sandel's critique of commodification is based on two pillars: corruption and fairness. After outlining these concepts, this paper scrutinizes Sandel's analysis of paid line-standing, focusing, in particular, on queues for congressional hearings in the United States. Sandel's corruption objection to commodifying places in queues for these hearings is unsatisfactory, and I develop an alternative account. According to that alternative, the corruption can be overcome by remedying the background conditions of inequality in society. This conclusion contradicts something that Sandel repeatedly (...) claims, namely, that his corruption and fairness critiques of commodification are independent of each other. The corruption critique of paid line-standing for congressional hearings, I argue, has little normative force beyond that of his fairness critique. (shrink)

Whilst natural scientists have forged close links with industry, economists—in their capacity as consultants—with private enterprise, and psychologists with the burgeoning market for counselling services, philosophers have shown little eagerness to “ply their trade” in any commercial form whatsoever. Indeed, the very juxtaposition of concepts like “philosophy,” “money,” and “the marketplace” may already have raised eyebrows or induced mocking smirks. The image of this unworldly species assuming a commercial role comparable in scope or nature to that of practitioners of other (...) disciplines is scarcely imaginable. Thus, the peculiar nature of philosophy—its “subject matter,” “method,” or “corpus of knowledge”—provides one reason for prima facie scepticism. The advent of philosophical counselling in both Europe and America during the last decade may well shake such scepticism. It is primarily with this development that the authors in this volume of Philosophy in the Contemporary World deal. (shrink)

This article explores the normative nature of institutions. The starting point of my investigation is Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler's notion of the reference transaction from which I derive a recursive relationship between normative judgements and social practices (i. e. regular, routinised actions in a social group), an implication of which I call the "self-justification of practices". Drawing on John Dewey, I demonstrate how prevailing practices influence normative standards and thus how institutions become normative entities. I then show how, despite the (...) conservative bias of normative standards, institutional change comes about. Finally, I enquire into the possibility of normative critique of prevailing practices and institutions. (shrink)