The aim of this article is to elucidate the notions of explanation and mechanism, in particular of the social kind. A mechanism is defined as what makes a concrete system tick, and it is argued that to propose an explanation proper is to exhibit a lawful mechanism. The so-called covering law model is shown to exhibit only the logical aspect of explanation: it just subsumes particulars under universals. A full or mechanismic explanation involves mechanismic law statements, not purely descriptive ones (...) such as functional relations and rate equations. Many examples from the natural, biosocial, and social sciences are examined. In particular, macro-micro-micro-macro social relations are shown to explain other wise puzzling macro-macro links. The last part of the article relates the author's progress, over half a century, toward understanding mechanism and explanation. (shrink)

A powerful critique of nudge theory and the paternalist policies of behavioral economics, and an argument for a more inclusive form of rationality.

This article addresses the following problems: What is a mechanism, how can it be discovered, and what is the role of the knowledge of mechanisms in scientific explanation and technological control? The proposed answers are these. A mechanism is one of the processes in a concrete system that makes it what it is — for example, metabolism in cells, interneuronal connections in brains, work in factories and offices, research in laboratories, and litigation in courts of law. Because mechanisms are largely (...) or totally imperceptible, they must be conjectured. Once hypothesized they help explain, because a deep scientific explanation is an answer to a question of the form, "How does it work, that is, what makes it tick—what are its mechanisms?" Thus, by contrast with the subsumption of particulars under a generalization, an explanation proper consists in unveiling some lawful mechanism, as when political stability is explained by either coercion, public opinion manipulation, or democratic participation. Finding mechanisms satisfies not only the yearning for understanding, but also the need for control. Key Words: explanation • function • mechanism • process • system • systemism. (shrink)

According to ontological reductionism, molecular chemistry refers, at last, to the quantum ontology; therefore, the ontological commitments of chemistry turn out to be finally grounded on quantum mechanics. The main problem of this position is that nobody really knows what quantum ontology is. The purpose of this work is to argue that the confidence in the existence of the physical entities described by quantum mechanics does not take into account the interpretative problems of the theory: in the discussions about the (...) relationship between chemistry and physics, difficulties are seen only on the side of chemistry, whereas matters highly controversial on the side of physics are taken for granted. For instance, it is usually supposed that the infinite mass limit in the Born-Oppenheimer approximation leads by itself to the concept of molecular framework used in molecular chemistry. We will argue that this assumption is implicitly based on an interpretative postulate for quantum mechanics, which, in turn, runs into difficulties when applied to the explanation of the simplest model of the hydrogen atom. (shrink)

This collection of essays deals with three clusters of problems in the philo sophy of science: scientific method, conceptual models, and ontological underpinnings. The disjointedness of topics is more apparent than real, since the whole book is concerned with the scientific knowledge of fact. Now, the aim of factual knowledge is the conceptual grasping of being, and this understanding is provided by theories of whatever there may be. If the theories are testable and specific, such as a theory of a (...) particular chemical reaction, then they are often called 'theoretical models' and clas sed as scientific. If the theories are extremely general, like a theory of syn thesis and dissociation without any reference to a particular kind of stuff, then they may be called 'metaphysical' - as well as 'scientific' if they are consonant with science. Between these two extremes there is a whole gamut of kinds of factual theories. Thus the entire spectrum should be dominated by the scientific method, quite irrespective of the subject matter. This is the leitmotiv of the present book. The introductory chapter, on method in the philosophy of science, tackles the question 'Why don't scientists listen to their philosophers?'. (shrink)

Entries cover the major branches and doctrines of modern philosophy.

This essay addresses the relationships between prescription and description in legal rules. The analysis will focus on the culture-laden connotations of factual categories implied in all legal sentences and/or provisions. This investigation is spurred by the need to assess the impact of cultural difference in people’s understanding of legal imperatives and, symmetrically, how that impact is to be considered in the application of law. Differences in ways of categorizing the world could position the cultural pre-understanding required by law, and the (...) pluralism recognized and protected by constitutional principles and human/fundamental rights discourse, at a crossroads. Hence, even when we find an illegitimacy or an ignorance about what legal rules do not explicitly state but instead implicitly presuppose, this does not exclude that behind that ignorance there may be something worthy of legal protection. A question emerges: is it legitimate and reasonable to consider the ignorantia facti resulting from differing ways of categorizing the factual world as automatically and uncritically subject to the principle ignoratia legis non excusat? The essay continues with an assessment of the possible consequences of ignorantia facti in the administration of justice in multicultural societies and migration contexts. For this purpose, the opportunity for an intercultural use of law—including within national law—will be considered as a means of avoiding the discriminatory application of ignorantia facti. This topic will be addressed by leveraging both semiotic and cultural-anthropological analytical tools, including the well-known greimasien “contrat de véridiction”. (shrink)

PHILOSOPHY: BEACON OR TRAP* There was a time when everyone expected almost everything from philosophy. It was the time when philosophers drew confidently ...

This essay, between serious and facetious, addresses an apparently secondary implication of the planetary tragedy produced by Covid-19. It coincides with the ‘problem of the veil,’ a bone of contention in Islam/West relationships. More specifically, it will address the question of why the pandemic has changed the proxemics of public spaces and the grammar of ‘living together.’ For some time—and it is not possible to foresee how much—in many countries people cannot go out, or enter any public places, without wearing (...) a sanitary mask. In short, almost all of us, by obligation or by urgent advice from the public authorities of the various countries, will not live the public sphere with our faces uncovered. The alteration of the social context affecting many Western countries will inevitably involve also the ‘local’ perception of the Islamic veil and—as a matter of equality—the consistency of the prohibition of wearing it. What will thus become of the ban on wearing it in public places established by some countries such as France and asseverated by the ECHR? If everyone can and will have to go around with their faces covered, why should only Islamic women be discriminated against? Will not the change in boundary conditions produced by Covid-19 also induce Western people to re-categorize the meaning of the veil? And will this re-categorization not directly affect the ‘fact’ of wearing the veil, that is, its empirical perception? And still, will this psycho-semantic change not show how empirical perceptions are cultural constructs rather than ‘objective facts,’ as such allegedly independent from the observer’s point of view? Consequentially, will the plurality of perceptions and cultural meanings related to the gesture of covering one’s own face not gain renewed relevance in determining the legitimacy of wearing the veil? The socio-semantic earthquake produced by Covid-19 compels us to rethink this and other issues orbiting around the translation of ‘facts’ into legal language; furthermore, it highlights the instrumentality of many ideological/partisan and ethnocentric assumptions passed off as objectivity regarding those alleged ‘facts.’ The essay will attempt to provide an answer to the above questions by proposing a semiotic-legal approach to intercultural conflicts and, indirectly, the pluralism in law. (shrink)

Individualism comes in at least ten modes: ontological, logical, semantic, epistemological, methodological, axiological, praxiological, ethical, historical, and political. These modes are bound together. For example, ontological individualism motivates the thesis that relations are n-tuples of individuals, as well as radical reductionism and libertarianism. The flaws and merits of all ten sides of the individualist decagon are noted. So are those of its holist counterpart. It is argued that systemism has all the virtues and none of the defects of individualism and (...) holism. One such virtue is the ability to recognize that individualism is a system rather than an unstructured bag of opinions--which raises the question whether thorough and consistent individualism is at all possible. Key Words: holism • individualism • system • systemism. (shrink)

Here we prove the existence of sheaf cohomology theory in arbitrary o-minimal structures.

The Bible recounts that in Eden, Adam gives names to all the animals. But those names are not only representations of the animals’ nature, rather they shape and constitute it. The naming by Adam contains in itself the divide between the human and non-human. Then, there is the Fall: Adam falls and forgets Being. Though he may still remember the names he gave to the animals in Eden, he is no longer sure about their meaning. Adam will have to try (...) to remember his own intentions. Through this effort he can also become aware of how he thinks, who he is, and what was the natural order he knew before the Fall. Medieval bestiaries tell us this story. Bestiaries are works of word play populated by animal figures. They depend on back-and-forth anthropomorphization, or circular metaphor. Animal figures are portrayed as both a mirror of human nature and a window on it. Bestiaries served as means for the moral education of human beings and, at the same time, a way to criticize the current state of humanity, including political and ethical habits. Within the moral irony of medieval bestiaries we can find the origin of the invented nature that modernity will try, subsequently, to insert into natural rights discourse through the teleological oxymoron of their naturalized and naturalizing counter-factuality. I will propose a historical-semiotic journey through the ironic representations of the human-beasts from the ancient world to contemporaneity. The proposal resulting from this cultural excursion is that the words included in the many national and international Rights declarations operate much like the names Adam gave to the animals and still more as they were re-read in medieval bestiaries, both textual and musical. So, can the words of Rights still serve as musical scores, open to an infinite play of re-signification? If we were able to overcome the modern culture/nature and human being/animal dualisms, we could cast, today as in the past, a zoological gaze on human rights by means of contemporary bestiaries and, in this way, perhaps find the gist of rights’ names and our ever regained and ever lost again humanity. (shrink)

El vínculo postmodernidad tecnológica/comunicación humana tiene en los mass-media, la TV, el cine, el internet y sus derivados; en las publicaciones sin censura y en la publicidad, herramientas de distorsión educativa y de salud comunitarias. La postmodernidad impacta en la organización social y en la cultura con su dicotomía de racionalismo vs. irracionalismo. La visión kantiana de la ciencia, la moral y el arte en pro de una sociedad más justa, libre y feliz, se desmorona en el intento de «superar (...) la modernidad».La sociedad cibernética burocratiza e impide la libertad del hombre. Los mass media y la sociedad de la comunicación no han generado una sociedad más «transparente» o consciente de sí misma, sino más compleja y caótica. Las dicotomías sujeto-objeto y público-privado hacen al individuo ajeno a su vida, un elemento de ciencia ficción, inmerso en un proceso virtual que lo desplaza a mundos electrónicos. En el éxtasis de la comunicación el medio predomina con su dispersión sobre el mensaje; el saber científico se orienta al desarrollo tecnológico y al poder, destacando su aspecto lingüístico, que no impide que cada vez más se hable y se escriba peor. El impacto de los mass media impulsa conductas antisociales y una «búsqueda de sensaciones intensas», para aplacar estados emocionales derivados del vacío existencial, de la frustración e insatisfacción vital de ciertas poblaciones.La persistencia de la divulgación enajenante, alienadora de la autoconciencia y falseadora de la realidad, no fomenta el desarrollo de una función personal, vincular y social saludables. (shrink)

Defines the concepts, problems, principles, and theories that are used in modern philosophy.

This fascinating exploration of the great discoveries of history's most important mathematicians seeks an answer to the eternal question: Does mathematics hold the key to understanding the mysteries of the physical world?

The author submits that Popper's social philosophy rests on seven pillars: rationality (both conceptual and practical), individualism (ontological and methodological), libertarianism, the nonexistence of historical laws, negative utilitarianism ("Do no harm"), piecemeal social engineering, and a view on social order. The first six pillars are judged to be weak, and the seventh broken. In short, it is argued that Popper did not build a comprehensive, profound, or even consistent system of social philosophy on a par with his work in epistemology. (...) Still, he did make some important contributions to the field, such as unveiling the philosophical roots of totalitarianism and defending social engineering against both revolutionists and conservatives. (shrink)

El intento de estas páginas es el de seleccionar dentro de la semántica del miedo que contribuye a organizar la imagen moderna del orden político y jurídico el elemento específico del pánico, en la hipótesis de que este último constituya una diferencia que es asimismo un recurso epistémico. Dicho de un modo directo: si el miedo se presenta como una referencia constitutiva del orden, de su constitución como de su mantenimiento, el pánico parece, en cambio, cargado de un signo contrario; (...) nos habla de la disolución de un agregado dado por supuesto y es inclusivo en el perimetrar los límites y las condiciones de posibilidad. El objetivo es aquel de repasar algunos momentos de la historia del pánico buscando argumentar que el pánico es una pasión política, en el sentido de que se refiere a aquello de lo que la político está hecha, y al mismo tiempo es expresión de un límite "pasional" de la política, en tanto que define políticamente un límite interno. Respecto a tal objetivo, esta aportación no reivindica más que los caracteres de un hilvanado necesitante de un desarrollo ulterior por lo que se refiere no solo a aquello que no se incluye (y es obviamente mucho), sino también a los nudos que de forma conscientemente provisional se indican. Además, se limita a una periodizacion histórica que es de alguna manera preliminar, deteniéndose en el umbral de la fase en la cual el pánico es una palabra de un discurso disciplinar, es parte del objeto de un saber codificado (psicología, sociología, ciencia política), incluso si no desempeña necesariamente un rol apaciguador. (shrink)

This paper assesses the novelty of NSMs - or better, of any social and political movement in contemporary Western societies - in the light of their capacity to develop systems of relationships which cut across established social and political cleavages. It illustrates first the relational bases of Rokkan's concept of cleavage, and its contribution to the understanding of social movements; it then shows how Simmel's concept of the intersection of social circles and his distinction between concentric and crosscutting circles may (...) be fruitfully applied to the analysis of political cleavages and their changing forms. In the conclusions, the elements of an approach to the study of the newness of social movements, based on the integration of Rokkan's and Simmel's principles, are introduced. (shrink)

The goal of this article is to answer some of the criticisms of my views on social science formulated by contributors to the symposium on my philosophy of social science. Key Words: emergence • mechanism • method • process • understanding.

Dans l’histoire et le débat autour de l’anthropologie philosophique allemande du XXe siècle, l’œuvre et le destin du médecin juif-allemand Paul Alsberg (1883-1965) constituent un véritable cas qui permit d’interroger la genèse et la validité de l’anthropologie philosophique même. En suivant Joachim Fischer, on entend ici par « Philosophische Anthropologie » une orientation de la pensée du XXe siècle, dont le fil rouge offre une réponse originale à la « destruction de l’idéalisme pendant le XI...

The present paper provides a comparative analysis of imperial and canonical legislation concerning the abduction of lay or consecrated women in the 4th century, when both legislations delineated the distinctive features of the abovementioned crimen. The imperial law showed both an extreme severity towards abductors and a leniency towards lay and consecrated women, who were considered innocent; however, women were not allowed to live together with their abductors. The canonical legislation also severely punished abductors and considered lay women innocent; however, (...) contrary to the provisions in the civil laws, the ecclesiastical legislation condemned consecrated women who consented to abduction. The paper aims to reconstruct the basic outline of both legislative systems and to identify a set of key features that might describe female submission to both the will of male members of the family and to the provisions in the canonical laws: indeed, the consent to abduction often represented an extreme attempt on the part of women to determine their own lives. (shrink)

In this essay both the facts/values and facticity/normativity divides are considered from the perspective of global semiotics and with specific regard to the relationships between legal meaning and spatial scope of law’s experience. Through an examination of the inner and genetic projective significance of categorization, I will analyze the semantic dynamics of the descriptive parts comprising legal sentences in order to show the intermingling of factual and axiological/teleological categorizations in the unfolding of legal experience. Subsequently, I will emphasize the translational (...) and enactive cognitive disposition underlying the construction of the second premise of the so-called judiciary syllogism and thereby the untenability of the idea that ‘law makes its facts.’ Hence, I will try to bring to the fore the cultural pre-assumptions encapsulated in the positivistic and therefore also formalistic or analytical approaches to legal experience and the loss of their inner consistency when legal experience confronts the phases and major changes of global semiotics. Finally, I will strive to relativize the opposition between the positivist and non-positivistic theories of law in view of an understanding of legal experience focused not only, or at least not primarily, on what ‘law is’ but also on ‘how’ it unwinds through, and _in spite of_, environmental and semantic transformations. (shrink)

The framework for this contribution is the transformation of the textual community, namely, modern society, into a digital community, in other words, a network society. This paper analyzes two theses. The first holds that the text, due to its genetic and historic nature, is always IMMUTABLE, STABLE, and never mobile. For this reason, the text represents the foundational element of a specific society, modern society. The second thesis is based on the assertion that within information and hypertext technologies two diverse (...) views confront and contrast each other. I locate these tendencies in the following key words: “dream” (Nelson) and “intellect” (Engelbart). Hypertext technology and culture represent the most transformative location and agency, they are the actors of the paradigm shift in which we are implicated. The hypertext revolution is based on the criticism of and attack against the material supports of writing and reading, as well as typographic technologies. Hypertext fights and wins this battle. However, hypertext technology is not able to reach the deep structure of alphabetic culture that is made not only of material support but also mental and bodily experience, consolidated and evolving, and of social relationships that are implied in the materiality of the support. La cornice di riferimento di questo contributo è la trasformazione della società testuale, cioè della società moderna, in società digitale, ovvero nella società dei network. Nell’intervento vengono analizzate due tesi: la prima afferma che il testo, per sua natura genetica e storica, è sempre IMMUTABILE, STABILE e non è mai mobile e per questo è fondativo di una società specifica, quella che noi chiamiamo la società moderna. La seconda tesi si basa sull’assunto che all’interno della cultura informatica e tecnologica che genera gli ipertesti si confrontano e si scontrano due idee diverse. Identifico queste due tendenze nelle parole chiave: dream (Nelson) e intellect (Engelbart). La tecnologia e la cultura ipertestuale sono il luogo e l’agente più fortemente trasformativi, gli attori del cambio di paradigma che ci coinvolge. La rivoluzione ipertestuale ha le sue basi nell’attacco e nella critica dei supporti materiali della scrittura e della lettura e sulle tecnologie tipografiche. L’ipertesto combatte e vince questa battaglia. La tecnologia ipertestuale non riesce però a raggiungere la struttura profonda della cultura alfabetica che è composta non solo da supporti ma da esperienze sia della mente sia del corpo, da relazioni sociali consolidate e mutanti che sono sottese e operanti con la materialità del supporto. (shrink)

1. Chiarificazione e valutazione. H.L.A. Hart è stato uno dei più influenti filosofi del diritto del ventesimo secolo. In particolare nei paesi di lingua inglese, i suoi scritti sono stati a lungo il punto di riferimento per gli studiosi della disciplina. Tale opinione è largamente diffusa, anche tra coloro – e non sono pochi – che ne hanno criticato, talvolta in modo severo, i lavori. Di recente questo primato è stato messo in discussione per via della crescente attenzione suscitata dal (...) pens... (shrink)

The article has three parts. The first is devoted to the analysis of some features of Italian philosophy that might be used to explain why analytic philosophy of politics, and analytic philosophy in general, has few practitioners. The second part gives an explanation of the relatively small audience Rawls has among liberals in Italy. Some features of the Italian liberal tradition might be helpful in explaining this fact; hence a short presentation of these features (as exemplified by Croce) is outlined. (...) The third part deals with the reception of Rawls's ideas among the small group of analytic political philosophers in Italy. (shrink)

Nous proposons dans cet article un développement de l’idée proposée par F.A. Hayek selon laquelle l’ordre du droit coutumier est un ordre d’action, une coordination des plans individuels dans un système d’échange régi par ce droit. Cette conception s’oppose à l’idée suivant laquelle l’ordre légal doit être avant tout fondé sur la cohérence logique des concepts et doctrines de ce droit. Un exemple important de cette approche est celui de la structure de maximisation des richesses de William Landes et Richard (...) Posner. L’article montre que la cohérence logique n’est ni nécessaire ni suffisante pour un ordre de plans ou pour une “cohérence praxéologique”. Nous défendons la position du droit coutumier classique suivant laquelle le droit se développe en accord avec les anticipations marginales des parties en présence. Dans la mesure où le droit se développe dans ce sens, il est possible d’approcher des objectifs jumelés du droit coutumier : la certitude relative et l’adaptation aux circonstances particulières.This article is a development of the idea, proposed by F.A. Hayek, that the order of common law is an order of actions, that is, a coordination of the plans of individuals in a system of exchanges governed by that law. This is in contrast to the idea that legal order is primarily to be found in the logical coherence of the law’s doctrines and concepts. The article shows that logical coherence is neither necessary nor sufficient for an order of plans, or “praxeological coherence”. It argues for the classic common law position that the law develops in accordance with the marginal expectations of the relevant parties. To the extent that the law develops in this way, it is possible for the twin goals of the common law to be approximated: relative certainty and adaptation to novel circumstances. (shrink)