They reject the correspondence theory, insist truth is anemic, and advance an "anti-theory" of truth that is essentially a collection of platitudes: "Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white; "Grass is green" is true if and only if grass is green. According to disquotationalists, the only profound insight about truth is that it lacks profundity. David contrasts the correspondence theory with disquotationalism and then develops the latter position in rich detail - more than has been (...) available in previous literature - to show its faults. (shrink)

It is sometimes argued that contextualism cannot explain (dis)agreements concerning matters of personal taste because it treats sentences involving predicates of taste as indexical. I aim to weaken this charge. Given the idea that people sometimes use indexical sentences to express (dis)agreements about taste, two kinds of (dis)agreement are distinguished, namely doxastic and non-doxastic. Taste (dis)agreements are better explained in terms of the later kind, in which case they become amenable to contextualist treatment. It is argued that if something instantiates (...) a taste property (like being tasty for A), it has to instantiate a corresponding attitudinal property (like being liked by A). Based on this, utterances of taste sentences express propositions that concern tastiness of something (e.g., that X is tasty for A) and these propositions entail other propositions that concern non-doxastic attitudes the speakers bear toward something (e.g., that X is liked by A). One speaker is claimed to (dis)agree with another speaker provided their respective entailed propositions feature (in)compatible non-doxastic attitudes. Although this explanation is similar to hybrid accounts that are currently growing in popularity, it departs from them in some notable respects. (shrink)

This book disassembles the moral assessment of business practices into its constituent parts to identify and clarify the four key concepts that form the basis of important moral disagreements in business: ‘personhood,’ ‘ownership,’ ‘harm,’ and ‘consent.’ ‘Moral bottom lines’ are those fundamental concepts in business ethics that ultimately account for our most resilient moral claims and unsurpassable convictions, and exploring them provides essential insights into the grounds on which we disagree in business ethics. This analysis is useful for students in (...) business school looking to understand fundamental moral disagreements in business and for practitioners interested in connecting practice with their own moral intuitions. The book also challenges scholars of business ethics by arguing that we can reduce business ethics disagreements to these four issues. "This is the most refreshing book on business ethics to appear in a long time. By focusing on 'personhood,' 'ownership,' 'harm,' and 'consent,' Eabrasu brings a new level of clarity and insight into disagreements on business ethic issues. Rather than reaching for an artificial utopian resolution, he embraces the challenge of explaining why we disagree. This is a must-read for serious business ethic scholars."Nicolas CapaldiLoyola University New OrleansLegendre-Soulé Distinguished Chair in Business Ethics. (shrink)

Viewing missionary Protestantism and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as carriers of transnational institutional innovation, this article compares their successes and failures at creating self-sustaining institutions in distant societies. Missionary Protestantism and NGOs are similar in that they attempt to establish formal organizations outside kinship, lineage, and ethnic forms of solidarity. Focusing on institutions as ways to create collective capacities that organize social life, we trace the route whereby Protestant missionaries established congregational religion in Africa and identify social practices that made this (...) enterprise successful but are comparatively absent in current NGO attempts to transform organizational life. Largely ignored by sociologists interested in institutional transformation, the history of congregational religion offers valuable sociological lessons about the conditions for radical institutional innovation. Its success was rooted first, in colonial missionaries’ ability to enforce new ways of life on small exemplary communities; second, in local adaptations (African prophetic movements, Pentecostalism) that deepened and widened the social reach of congregational principles; and third in the incentives Protestantism created for propagating the congregational form. (shrink)

In this paper we give additional arguments in favor of the point of view that the violation of Bell, CHSH and CH inequalities is not due to a mysterious non locality of nature. We concentrate on an intimate relation between a protocol of a random experiment and a probabilistic model which is used to describe it. We discuss in a simple way differences between attributive joint probability distributions and generalized joint probability distributions of outcomes from distant experiments which depend on (...) how the pairing of these outcomes is defined. We analyze in detail experimental protocols implied by local realistic and stochastic hidden variable models and show that they are incompatible with the protocols used in spin polarization correlation experiments. We discuss also the meaning of “free will”, differences between quantum and classical filters, contextuality of Kolmogorov models, contextuality of quantum theory and show how this contextuality has to be taken into account in probabilistic models trying to explain in an intuitive way the predictions of QT. The long range imperfect correlations between the clicks of distant detectors can be explained by partially preserved correlations between the signals created by a source. These correlations can only be preserved if the clicks are produced in a local and deterministic way depending on intrinsic parameters describing signals and measuring devices in the moment of the measurement. If an act of a measurement was irreducibly random they would be destroyed. It seems to indicate that QT may be in fact emerging from some underlying more detailed theory of physical phenomena. If this was a case then there is a chance to find in time series of experimental data some fine structures not predicted by QT. This would be a major discovery because it would not only prove that QT does not provide a complete description of individual physical systems but it would prove that it is not predictably complete. (shrink)

The adoption of personalisation as the principle on which policy and practices for social care in England should be developed has been hailed as marking a fundamental transformation in the nature of social care and the experiences of service users. This article examines both the discourse of personalisation and the practices that are being adopted to implement this from an ethic of care perspective. It adopts an approach based on Sevenhuijsen's ‘Trace’ analysis to trace the normative frameworks in key policy (...) documents (in particular Putting People First), noting that critics of care have largely succeeded in relegating care to a marginal position within policy discourse and that a relational sensibility is largely absent within this. The article considers the practices associated with personalisation in relation to the moral principles of an ethic of care and conceptions of the ‘individual’ within these. It addresses the implications of this approach for broader political and policy issues: the universality of provision, collective responsibility for welfare and well-being, and broader issues of social justice in conditions of vulnerability. (shrink)

David Wallace has recently argued that the eigenstate–eigenvalue (E–E) link has no place in serious discussions of quantum mechanics on the grounds that, as he claims, the E–E link is an invention of philosophers rather than the community of practicing physicists. This raises an historical question regarding the origin of the link. This paper aims to answer this question by tracing the historical development of the link through six key textbooks of quantum mechanics. In light of the historical evidence from (...) these textbooks, it is argued that Wallace provides insufficient grounds for dismissing the E–E link from discussions of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Our paper offers a contribution to the growing literature on the sociology of innovation rather than the still dominant economic theory of innovation. We suggest that innovation first and foremost represents a process of cognitive displacement whereby existing metaphorical frameworks are reconstituted to account for new phenomena in a process that changes both the metaphor’s and the new phenomenon’s compositions. We suggest that integral to this process is knowledgeability, or a bundle of social and cognitive competencies that emerge as one (...) of the main prerequisites for innovative thinking. We conclude by examining the most important social and cognitive competencies that structure the possibilities for invention and innovation in the contemporary knowledge economy. (shrink)

To study animal welfare empirically we need an objective basis for deciding when an animal is suffering. Suffering includes a wide range ofunpleasant emotional states such as fear, boredom, pain, and hunger. Suffering has evolved as a mechanism for avoiding sources ofdanger and threats to fitness. Captive animals often suffer in situations in which they are prevented from doing something that they are highly motivated to do. The an animal is prepared to pay to attain or to escape a situation (...) is an index ofhow the animal about that situation. Withholding conditions or commodities for which an animal shows (i.e., for which it continues to work despite increasing costs) is very likely to cause suffering. In designing environments for animals in zoos, farms, and laboratories, priority should be given to features for which animals show inelastic demand. The care ofanimals can thereby be based on an objective, animal-centered assessment of their needs. (shrink)

In some recent articles, Jaegwon Kim has argued that non-reductive physicalism is a myth: when it comes to the mind-body problem, the only serious options are reductionism, eliminativism, and dualism.[1] And when it comes to reductionism, Kim is inclined to regard a functionalist theory of the mind as the best available option—mostly because it offers the best explanation of mind-body supervenience. In this paper, I will discuss Kim’s views about functionalism. They may be contended on two general grounds. First, some (...) functionalists will object to being classified as reductionists. Second, Kim argues for a version (or a reading) of functionalism, conceptualized functionalism, that makes it rather similar to the “old” mind-body identity theory it was designed to replace. Moreover, Kim’s conceptualized functionalism turns out to be a somewhat surprising brand of reductionism—a reductionism with some eliminativist cut-outs and, possibly, some dualist leftovers. At the end of the paper I propose a construal of the more standard version of functionalism that obviates Kim’s argument for switching-over to his conceptualized version. (shrink)

This book presents a critical evaluation of the doctrine of the Trinity, tracing its development and investigating the intellectual, philosophical and theological background that shaped this influential doctrine of Christianity. Despite the centrality of Trinitarian thought to Christianity and its importance as one of the fundamental tenets that differentiates Christianity from Judaism and Islam, the doctrine is not fully formulated in the canon of Christian scriptural texts. Instead, it evolved through the conflation of selective pieces of scripture with the philosophical (...) and religious ideas of ancient Hellenistic milieu. Marian Hillar analyzes the development of Trinitarian thought during the formative years of Christianity from its roots in ancient Greek philosophical concepts and religious thinking in the Mediterranean region. He identifies several important sources of Trinitarian thought heretofore largely ignored by scholars, including the Greek middle-Platonic philosophical writings of Numenius and Egyptian metaphysical writings and monuments representing divinity as a triune entity. (shrink)

This article examines problems that arise when women enter nontraditional blue-collar occupations. Despite job security, women's arrival in one such workplace generated strains by threatening assumptions of male supremacy. Previous research has examined women's modes of accommodation to male-dominated workplaces. In this case, men as well as women developed accommodative patterns that allowed them to accept women as co-workers without giving up their beliefs about male superiority.

Narrowly speaking, the correspondence theory of truth is the view that truth is correspondence to a fact -- a view that was advocated by Russell and Moore early in the 20 th century. But the label is usually applied much more broadly to any view explicitly embracing the idea that truth consists in a relation to reality, i.e., that truth is a relational property involving a characteristic relation (to be specified) to some portion of reality (to be specified). During the (...) last 2300 years this basic idea has been expressed in many ways, resulting in a rather extended family of views, theories, and theory sketches. The members of the family employ various concepts for the relevant relation (correspondence, conformity, congruence, agreement, accordance, copying, picturing, signification, representation, reference, satisfaction) and/or various concepts for the relevant portion of reality (facts, states of affairs, situations, events, objects, sequences of objects, sets, properties, tropes). The resulting multiplicity of versions and reformulations of the theory is due to a blend of substantive and terminological differences. (shrink)

Truthmakers have come to play a central role in David Armstrong's metaphysics. They are the things that stand in the relation of truthmaking to truthbearers. This chapter focuses on the relation. More specifically, it discusses a thesis Armstrong holds about truthmaking that is of special importance to him; namely, the thesis that truthmaking is an internal relation. It explores what work this thesis is supposed to do for Armstrong, especially for this doctrine of the ontological free lunch, raising questions and (...) pointing out difficulties along the way. At the end of the chapter, it is shown that Armstrong's preferred truthbearers generate a serious difficulty for his thesis that the truthmaking relation is internal. (shrink)

In this article I wish to show how care ethics puts forward a fundamental critique on the ideal of independency in human life without thereby discounting autonomy as a moral value altogether. In care ethics, a relational account of autonomy is developed instead. Because care ethics is sometimes criticized in the literature as hopelessly vague and ambiguous, I shall begin by elaborating on how care ethics and its place in ethical theory can be understood. I shall stipulate a definition of (...) care ethics as a moral perspective or orientation from which ethical theorizing can take place. This will mean that care ethics is more a stance from which we can theorize ethically, than ready-made theory in itself. In conceiving care ethics in this way, it becomes possible to make clear that, for instance, a moral concept of autonomy is not abandoned, but instead is given a particular place and interpretation. In the final part of this article I will show how ‘relational autonomy’ can be applied fruitfully in the practice of psychiatric care. (shrink)

In this volume, G. Marian Kinget's classic work, On Being Human, can be read for the first time in light of a second, previously unpublished work, Pleasure And Pain. Taken together, these two works offer a new generation of readers a comprehensive picture of the insights, principles, and goals of humanistic psychology. On Being Human, Kinget's pioneering work, which arose from the original humanistic revolution in psychology, systematically describes the characteristics that make human beings different from all other forms (...) of life. In this work, Kinget explores man in his full nature not solely as a biological organism modified by experience and culture. She presents a person as a symbolic entity capable of pondering his existence, and lending it meaning and direction. Man is the only animal who knowingly exists in space and time, manifesting transcendental and metaphysical concern throughout history and culture. On Being Human presents the fundamentals of any valid approach to psychology as well as to other fields concerned with the individuality of the human being. It describes the specific human capacities for reflective thought and declarative language, and it discusses the unique ability of humans to devise culture and question origins. Pleasure and Pain considers the interdependence of human pleasure and pain. This idea, which leads to unnecessary fears and unwarranted expectations, goes unrecognized in a contemporary western society focused on the accumulation of pleasure without any awareness of the duality of the pleasure-pain experience. Kinget refutes the widespread fallacy that fun lies in the means, when it actually lies in the subject, and she discusses the human potential for autonomous "management" of the pleasure-pain dimension of human existence. (shrink)

This paper enquires into the possibility of establishing a causal link between social performance (SP) and financial performance (FP) in corporate social responsibility (CSR). It shows that this endeavour is limited by several biasing factors (such as time horizons, sample choices and the tools chosen to measure SP and FP) and faces the logical fallacy post hoc ergo propter hoc (after this, therefore because of this), which indicates that a sequence of events does not necessarily establish a causal link. The (...) paper contributes to the methodological literature in CSR currently focused on empirical tests aiming to discern the linkages between SP and FP, both by emphasising the interest in interpreting and justifying SP and by suggesting a redirection of empirical efforts towards the understanding of entrepreneurial preference for a specific type of SP. (shrink)

O presente artigo visa defender a tese de que há dois tipos diferentes de métodos nas éticas de Aristóteles. Costumeiramente, as prescrições metodológicas de EN VII 1 e EE I 6 são vistas como complementares, fazendo parte de um mesmo método que fora descrito por Barnes como o “método dos endoxa”. Esse método, claramente presente na prescrição da EN, consiste em estabelecer os phainomena, percorrer as aporias e provar o que for possível das opiniões reputadas. Contudo, o método que é (...) prescrito em EE I 6 parte da noção de “passar do mais vago ao mais preciso” utilizando os phainomena como indícios e modelos. Defenderemos aqui que a noção de phainomena, embora apareça nas duas prescrições, tem papéis e escopos diferentes em cada um dos métodos, de onde surge sua diferença. Para isso, analisaremos a prescrição de EN VII 1 juntamente ao assim chamado “método dos endoxa”, em seguida partiremos para a análise da prescrição de EE I 6 e, por fim, analisaremos detalhadamente a diferença entre essas duas prescrições. (shrink)

Review of În căutarea fericirii. Viaţa familială în spaţiul românesc în sec. XVIII-XX (Looking for happiness. Family life in the Romanian space of the 18th-20th centuries) Coordinators: Ioan Bolovan, Diana Covaci, Daniel Deteşan, Marius Eppel, Elena Crinela Holom (Cluj: Presa Universitară Clujeană, 2010).

Czy można obronić teizm probabilistyczny? Krytyczne uwagi do książki Dariusza Łukasiewicza Opatrzność Boża, wolność, przypadek Artykuł zawiera krytyczną analizę fragmentu książki Dariusza Łukasiewicza pt. Opatrzność Boża, wolność, przypadek.

In the Netherlands there is a growing debate over the possibility of introducting ‘compassionate interference’ as a form of good psychiatric care. Instead of respecting the autonomy of the patient by adopting an attitude of non‐interference, professional carers should take a more active and commited role. There was a great deal of hostile reaction to this suggestion, the most commonly voiced criticism being that it smacked of ‘modern paternalism’. Still, the current conception of care leaves us with a paradox. On (...) the one hand patients are regarded as individuals who have a strong interest in ( and a right to) freedom and non‐interference; on the other hand many of them have a desperate need for flourishing, viable relationships. In fact, part of their problem is that they cannot relate very well with other people. This creates a dichotomy, because respecting patients' autonomy often means that they cannot be given the help they so desperately need. In this respect current care practices do not answer the caring needs of these patients.The criticism on care practices is to be considerd as important. It invites us to reexamine and reevaluate the current conception of caring relationships and its main values. In line with this reexamination an alternative perspective on care is introduced in this paper, a perspective in which `compassionate interference' is not so much a threat to autonomy, but a means of attaining autonomy. For this we need a different definition of autonomy than that commonly used in current care practice. (shrink)

There are no moral cookbooks—no algorithms for whipping up moral confections to suit every occasion. But more modest and flexible tools might still be useful for practical ethics. One team describes how professionals can be taught to use a framework for understanding moral problems.

This paper is concerned with a popular view about the nature of propositions, commonly known as the Russellian view of propositions. Alvin Plantinga has dubbed it, or more precisely, a crucial consequence of it, Existentialism, and in his paper “On Existentialism” (1983) he has presented a forceful argument intended as a reductio of this view. In what follows, I describe the main relevant ingredients of the Russellian view of propositions and states of affairs. I present a relatively simple response Russellians (...) might want to make to Plantinga’s anti-existentialist argument. I then explore one aspect of this response—one that leads to some rather curious consequences for the Russellian view of propositions and states of affairs. (shrink)

This article draws on two studies that have used an ethic of care analysis to explore lay, nursing and social work care for people with dementia. It discusses the political as well as the practice application of ethic of care principles and highlights the necessity to understand both what people do and the meanings with which such practices are imbued in order to identify `good care' and the relationship between this and social justice. Examples of care for people with dementia (...) are discussed by reference to core principles of an ethic of care: attentiveness, responsibility, competence, responsiveness and trust. These illustrate the potential for the development of a shared language within which different disciplines, lay carers and people with dementia can communicate about how needs could best be met in complex and difficult circumstances. (shrink)

The article discusses peirce's attack on descartes' concept of intuition and gives an analysis of his conclusions that: there are no objective criteria enabling us to discern between intuition and indirect knowledge; there is no satisfactory logical or experimental explanation of intuitive knowledge; there can be no cognition without signs. peirce's arguments against intuition possess elements which later proponents of intuitive knowledge (husserl, bergson, scheler, heidegger) would find difficult to deal with. if logical positivists in the 1930's had been acquainted (...) with peirce's views, the discussion on "protocol sentences" and the verification principle would have developed differently or ended sooner. (shrink)