ABSTRACTIn the debate about the worth of women in sixteenth and seventeenth century Italy three pro-woman authors of the period, Moderata Fonte, Lucrezia Marinella, and Arcangela Tarabotti, develop...

The aim of this paper is to show that for Aristotle god is, and is not, virtuous. I consider first the arguments of the EN to show that the gods do not have virtue---beginning with an account of the divisions of the faculties of soul, and of the virtues that belong to those divisions. These arguments suggest that nous is a divine virtue, and so in the second section I consider nous, as a faculty of soul and as a virtue, (...) and examine the differences between nous as a human virtue, and nous as a virtue which is also a substance, and with which the first divine principle is identified. In the third and final section I ask what kind of difference Aristotle takes the difference between human and divine nous to be---and in particular whether this is a difference in kind or in degree. (shrink)

Envy and resentment are generally thought to be unpleasant and unethical emotions which ought to be condemned. I argue that both envy and resentment, in some important forms, are moral emotions connected with concern for justice, understood in terms of desert and entitlement. They enable us to recognise injustice, work as a spur to acting against it and connect us to others. Thus, we should accept these emotions as part of the ethical life.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy of Music Education Review 12.1 (2004) 71-75 [Access article in PDF] Response to Kingsley Price's "How Can Music Seem to be Emotional" Marguerite Nering Calgary, Canada Kingsley Price argues that music, since it is not personal, cannot be emotional but can only seem emotional. In an earlier draft of this paper he described it more fully: "Music is not a person, cannot possibly harbor an inward life, (...) and cannot possibly be emotional." He then sets out to discover how music, since for him it is not emotional, can seem to be so. Through a step-by-step process of philosophical inquiry, he first looks within perception and not finding an answer there, searches without, mainly focusing on meaning and Susanne Langer's theory of emotion and music. His search is unrewarded, leaving him to conclude that the answer to his question remains an incomprehensible mystery.His logic at first seems impervious to dispute. Had he not strictly limited his meaning of music and emotion-particularly emotion-it may have simplified responding to his query. For him, "music" refers to instrumental music that is heard or perceived. "Emotion" means conscious feelings we find ourselves in when undergoing emotion.The major question one must ask is whether his basic premise is accurate. Is he correct in stating that music unequivocally is not emotional but only seems so? [End Page 71] Is he correct in stating that music does not harbor an inward life? After all, he is talking about instrumental music that is perceived. While one cannot deny that notated music on paper is not emotional, does this hold for instrumental music being performed and transmitted? The source is a live human, someone who has an inward life, or at least did have at the time of production. The receptor is alive and has an inward life. The human source is sending living music imbued with emotion and energy. The airwaves transport these vibrations. Can we really say that the living or live music reaching the receiver's ears is not carrying real emotion?Returning to Price's analysis, we find he looks first at perception itself, in this case sense perception, and determines that it has two major constituents: awareness and the object of awareness. He argues that awareness cannot seem to exist; it must exist. It is always simple; therefore, there can be no characteristic that makes it seeming and not real. I question whether the latter conclusion necessarily follows, that is, that reality is a consequence of simplicity, but I must agree that awareness by virtue of its existence must be real.Music heard is the object of awareness. He states that the distinction between seeming and reality does apply to some things-for example, to Macbeth seeing a dagger that really is not there-but declares that this cannot apply to music heard, for it actually exists. Does this mean that one cannot hear music that really is not there? The illusion should work for hearing if it works for vision. Back to his argument, because music heard exists, he reasons that one cannot say that the seeming emotionality in music can be traced to the character of the music that bears it. I wonder then how this would apply to a person playing music with real emotion for his or her own enjoyment? In this case the human receptor of music is also the human source of the music. They are one and the same, and this person of course has an inward personal life. Does this music only seem emotional or is it really emotional? It would make sense that it is really emotional.He then looks at whether the seemingness of emotionality can be traced to emotionality itself and deduces that it cannot. Emotions are real. If we feel joy, it is real joy we are feeling and not seeming joy. One cannot debate this. Again, however, I am not convinced of the seemingness of the emotionality of music. Because music comes from a living person, it is an extension... (shrink)

Aristotle's remarks about the differences between the sexes have become infamous for their implications for the social status of women. In his observations on female biology, Aristotle claims that "the female nature is, as it were, a deformity." In describing women's role in the public sphere, he claims that women are naturally subordinate because, while they possess a deliberative faculty, that capacity is "without authority." While both claims express the "inferiority" of female bodies/women relative to male bodies/men, it is not (...) self-evident that the defects Aristotle identifies in female biology have cognitive or moral manifestations that would justify the rule of men over women in political life. Marguerite Deslauriers here aims to construct a coherent picture of Aristotle's views on sexual and gender-based difference from these remarks and to show the extent to which his views on female biology and women's role in politics are causally connected. Without exculpating Aristotle from charges of misogyny, Deslauriers contextualizes his explanations of the role and origin of female animals in his biology and the role of women in his political philosophy; she shows how Aristotle developed these views and the importance they hold for his wider philosophical commitments. She then explores how Aristotle might have seen the link between the physiology of sex and the bearing it has on political life. She ultimately argues that in Aristotle's conception of sexual difference in biology and politics, there is a tension between his view of the inferiority of female bodies and women and his commitment to the idea that females and women are valuable both for generation and for the political life characteristic of human beings. In this tension she finds a difference between Aristotle and his predecessors: while previous accounts associate sexual difference with affliction, Aristotle sees sexual difference as a benefit, both to a species and a political community. This volume will be of interest to philosophers and students interested in ancient philosophy, feminist philosophy, as well as those studying moral and political philosophy. (shrink)

This is a response to the paper “The fruit of knowledge: To bite or not to bite? Isotta Nogarola on Eve’s sin and its scholastic sources,” by Marcela Borelli, Valeria A. Buffon, and Natalia G. Jakubecki. It has two aims. The first is to show the importance of discussions of Eve in the querelle des femmes, and so to emphasize the importance of Borelli, Buffon and Jakubecki’s analysis of Nogarola’s account of Eve. A second aim is to highlight the philosophical (...) rigour of Nogarola’s discussion of the culpability of Eve as demonstrated by Borelli, Buffon and Jakubecki, by contrasting it with attempts to exculpate Eve from responsibility that were made in pro-woman works written between the composition of Nogarola’s work and its publication. (shrink)

The newly private corporation challenges scholars to re-examine corporate social responsibility under a markedly different governance system. We theorize regarding the implications of public corporations going private through use of private equity. The new governance system includes few owners and an expert, involved board of directors; combined with a greatly reduced public presence, public-to-private firms are proposed to place greater emphasis on financial performance and lesser emphasis on social performance. Several variables are proposed to moderate the lesser emphasis on social (...) performance. (shrink)

Czech translation of Marguerite Léna’s Choisir l’ Europe: Constantin Sigov et la dignité humaine.

Iris Marion Young argues we cannot understand others' experiences by imagining ourselves in their place or in terms of symmetrical reciprocity (1997a). For Young, reciprocity expresses moral respect and asymmetry arises from people's greatly varying life histories and social positions. La Caze argues there are problems with Young's articulation of asymmetrical reciprocity in terms of wonder and the gift. By discussing friendship and political representation, she shows how taking self-respect into account complicates asymmetrical reciprocity.

L'édition critique de la première question du traité (Utrum aliquis philosophus per inquisitionem philosophicam in naturali lumine ad veram humanae beatitudinis notitiam valeat pervenire) est basée sur les sept manuscrits connus, dont deux autographes. L'auteur du traité, le maître parisien Pierre d'Ailly, qui deviendra plus tard un homme d'Eglise d'une grande importance politique, y conduit sa recherche en intégrant l'Ethique à Nicomaque d'Aristote et la corrigeant pour ainsi dire par la Consolation de Boèce, choisie comme texte de base (complémentaire) à (...) l'enseignement de l'éthique en faculté des arts. Quelques précieux aspects de l'histoire de la philosophie et de la théologie (denier quart du XIVème siècle) sont mis à jour, grâce à l'édition et l'étude de cette question: Pierre d'Ailly, qui ne cache pas ses sympathies pour Ockham,?uvre en polémiste contre Jean de Ripa et l'attaque en quelques points centraux de sa doctrine sur la vision béatifique. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 126.3 (2005) 458-460 [Access article in PDF] Robert Mayhew. The Female in Aristotle's Biology: Reason or Rationalization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004. xii + 136 pp. Cloth, $28. Aristotle says quite a lot about sexual difference and the characteristics of male and female in his biological works, especially the Generation of Animals. He is interested in the purpose of sexual difference in those animal (...) species that display it, because he knows that many plants and some animals are not sexually differentiated and hence that sexual difference is not necessary for generation. He distinguishes between the principles that are male and female and the animals that have these principles. He defines male and female according to whether they generate in themselves or in another and explains that this ability depends on whether they are able to concoct semen from the ultimate nutriment (), which depends in turn on an ability to heat the blood. He discusses the generative organs of male and female, the contributions each makes to the process of generation, and the factors that determine whether a given animal offspring will be male or female. In all of this, he considers the views of his predecessors and tries both to salvage what he believes to be correct and explain his rejection of many claims. At the same time, Aristotle is working out his views on the relation between matter, form, and final causation, and on natural substances and the transmission of form. There is a lot going on in the discussions of sex and its operations in the biological works, but relatively little attention has been paid to it in the philosophical literature. For these reasons a book on the subject of the female in Aristotle's biology is a welcome contribution.Mayhew treats a range of issues in separate chapters: sexual difference in bees and wasps, the contributions of male and female parents to conception, the analogy drawn between eunuchs and females, Aristotle's scattered comments about anatomical differences (other than in generative organs) between male and female, and differences in character that might be based on biological differences. The discussion of these issues might be interesting, particularly if they could be connected, but Mayhew often fails to bring out what is at stake philosophically in, for example, Aristotle's discussion of the sexes of wasps and bees or in his references to the similarities of eunuchs to women.The argument of the book is directed not so much to the content of what Aristotle says as to the motivation behind his various claims about the female. Mayhew wants to argue that while Aristotle's conception of the female is, in general and in many details, false, it is the product of honest (if mistaken) science and not of misogynist ideological bias (1–2). Each chapter is intended to address two questions. First, what exactly does Aristotle claim? Second, is there any evidence that Aristotle's claim, and the arguments in support of it, are the product of rationalization? (6). Mayhew's answers to the first of these questions are generally accurate and helpful; he cites the important passages, sets them in context, and often says something sensible about how we should interpret them. The second question, about rationalization, is much more problematic.On the one hand, Mayhew sometimes uses it to untangle the complex of [End Page 458] commitments that Aristotle certainly brought to questions of sexual difference: a commitment to observational accuracy, but also to undivided form, to the priority of form over matter, and, doubtless (in my view, although not in Mayhew's), a more or less unreflective commitment to the priority of male over female. In the chapters on entomology and on the contribution of male and female to generation, Mayhew succeeds in distinguishing various scientific and philosophical concerns that lead Aristotle to say what he does, and which are probably sufficient to explain his views without supposing that we have to assume a bias against the female to explain those views.On the other hand, Mayhew construes the question... (shrink)

Aristotle discusses character in four contexts: ethics, poetic theory, the study of rhetoric and zoology. What he means by character is different in each of these cases, but not radically different. He always uses it as a device to explain actions or behavioural patterns: in animals, in people, and in fictional people. The similarities between the character exhibited by different species, moral character, and tragic character have gone unexamined. As a result, the notion of character as explanatory, and the possibilities (...) and limitations of explanation by means of character are still undetermined. (shrink)

The migration of publicly-held companies to private status through use of private equity has been both lauded and lambasted. While agency theorists praise the public-to-private or PTP firm as being an efficient form of corporate governance, others suggest that going private allows owners and managers to extract, rather than add, value.We contribute by developing a categorization of the potential sources of value for the PTP firm. We analyze the effects of each source of value, and find that there are specific (...) negative effects for non-equity stakeholders associated with several sources. Our analysis indicates that the degree to which value is added versus extracted will vary across firms; yet, all will tend to engage in some value extraction. Policy implications are discussed. (shrink)

This work examines Aristotle's discussions of definition in his logical works and the Metaphysics, and argues for the importance of definitions of simple ...

Early feminist or pro-woman works often combine the claim that the rational souls of men and women are the same with an argument for the superiority of women. This article considers two such works, Lucrezia Marinella's The Nobility and Excellence of Women and the Defects and Vices of Men (Venice, 1601 [1999]) and Marguerite Buffet's In Praise of Illustrious Learned Women, both Ancient and Modern (Paris, 1668), in order to show the continuities and distinctive features of feminist arguments for (...) superiority, to emphasize the differences in the conceptions of reason and physiology that distinguish them, and to demonstrate that claims of superiority persisted even as those defending women's worth began to adopt egalitarian positions. (shrink)

Marie de Gournay, in a central argument in the pamphlet Égalité des hommes et des femmes [The Equality of Women and Men], offers an interpretation of an argument for equality that she attributes to ‘the School.’ I argue that Gournay is drawing on Aristotle’s Metaphysics to formulate an argument for the equality of women; that she does not temper that argument with claims for the superiority of women, which makes her unique for some time; and that her alleged misrepresentation of (...) her authorities – Aristotle in particular – is itself an interesting and suggestive phenomenon. Moreover, while some of her contemporaries would have agreed that the soul of a person has no sex, Gournay was unusual in arguing that the social implication of this was intellectual equality for women and men, just so long as education should be provided to women as well as men. (shrink)