Obra epistologràfica / introducció de J. Estellés -- Obra filològica / introducció de J. Pérez Durà -- Obra filosòfica / introducció de C. Mínguez -- Obra jurídica / introducció d'I. Roca -- Obra religiosa / introducció d'I. Roca -- Sobre ciència i medicina / introducció de J. Ll. Barona i V. Navarro -- Sobre la dona / introducció de N. Campillo -- Obra pedagògica / introducció d'A. Mayordomo -- Obra psicològica / introducció de F. Tortosa.

The favourable reception of the analytic philosophy of language plays a central role in the composition of Ricœur’s literary hermeneutics. Following a brief description of the historical and methodological context of this reception, we show how Ricœur intends to link up phenomenology and analytic philosophy of language. Then we examine the role allocated to the analytic philosophy of language in establishing the idea of metaphor as a “more fundamental mode of reference” in The Rule of Metaphor . But once again (...) Ricœur situates this semantic interpretation of metaphor within the context of an ontology. The result is methodological difficulties that mark the limits of Ricœur’s reception of the analytic philosophy of language. Keywords: Semantics, Metaphor, Ontology, Structuralism, Poetics. Résumé La réception de la philosophie analytique du langage joue un rôle central dans la constitution de l’herméneutique littéraire de Ricœur. Après avoir tracé le cadre historique et systématique dans lequel s’inscrit cette réception, on montre comment Ricœur se propose d’articuler phénoménologie et philosophie analytique du langage. On étudie ensuite le rôle assigné à la philosophie analytique du langage pour la mise en place de la conception de la métaphore comme “mode plus fondamental de la référence” dans La métaphore vive . Mais Ricœur situe encore une fois cette interprétation sémantique de la métaphore dans un cadre ontologique. Il en résulte des difficultés systématiques qui marquent les limites de la réception de la philosophie analytique du langage par Ricœur. Mots-clés: Sémantique, Métaphore, Ontologie, Structuralisme, Poétique. (shrink)

En 1587, le jeune Galilée est invité à donner Due lezioni all’Accademia Fiorentina circa la figura, sito e grandezza dell’Inferno di Dante [Galilei 1587] afin d’éclairer une vive controverse sur l’interprétation de la géographie de l’Enfer dantesque. Ce travail d’exégèse littéraire permet à Galilée de faire reconnaître ses talents mathématiques comme ses qualités pédagogiques. Mais la portée de ces leçons va bien au-delà, car on peut y voir apparaître plusieurs thèmes majeurs de l’œuvre ultérieure de Galilée : au plan mathématique, (...) l’importance de la géométrie d’inspiration archimédienne, au plan physique, l’étude des questions de similitude que pose la résistance des matériaux – sans oublier l’intérêt constant du scientifique pour la langue et pour la culture littéraire. (shrink)

Dans sa Philosophie de la nouvelle musique, Theodor W. Adorno constatait déjà que la musique "en un mouvement critique, a dissous l'idée d'oeuvre achevée et rompu avec le public". Et il ajoutait : "ni la crise sociale, ni celle de la culture - et dans le concept de crise on implique déjà la reconstruction administrante - aucune de ces crises n'a pu paralyser la vie musicale officielle". L'idée que la musique dite "contemporaine" se vive sous la forme d'une crise, et (...) que cette crise implique toutes les parties prenantes de l'acte esthétique, du compositeur au public, semble donc être installée depuis longtemps dans la pensée musicale. Plus qu'un travail historiographique, il s'agissait de mettre en évidence la nature de cette crise à travers un ensemble d'études et d'analyses impliquant des acteurs majeurs de la musique de création du vingtième siècle. En réunissant ici une série d'articles écrits depuis bientôt trente ans, l'auteur nous convie à une réflexion personnelle et sans compromis sur le bouleversement du rapport esthétique qui a traversé le champ musical et sur la manière dont il affecte notre faculté d'écouter."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Na questão do livre-arbítrio, Raimundo Lúlio parte, sem dúvida, de colocações agostinianas referentes às três potências da alma. Mas o pensador mallorquino vive num mundo onde a noção de individuo adquiriu espaços antes desconhecidos. Entretanto, comparando o pensamento de Lúlio, com o de Abelardo e de Duns Scotus, parece que ele se encontra bem mais próximo de Agostinho que do *individualismo' dos pensadores medievais.

En 1587, le jeune Galilée est invité à donner Due lezioni all’Accademia Fiorentina circa la figura, sito e grandezza dell’Inferno di Dante (ci-après Leçons sur l’Enfer) [Galilei 1587] afin d’éclairer une vive controverse sur l’interprétation de la géographie de l’Enfer dantesque. Ce travail d’exégèse littéraire permet à Galilée de faire reconnaître ses talents mathématiques comme ses qualités pédagogiques. Mais la portée de ces leçons va bien au-delà, car on peut y voir apparaître plusieurs thèmes majeurs de l’œuvre ultérieure de Galilée (...) : au plan mathématique, l’importance de la géométrie d’inspiration archimédienne, au plan physique, l’étude des questions de similitude que pose la résistance des matériaux – sans oublier l’intérêt constant du scientifique pour la langue et pour la culture littéraire. (shrink)

Les primeres edicions dels escrits de Joan Lluís Vives encara susciten problemes als estudiosos del gran humanista. En aquesta obra, catàleg d’una àmplia exposició bibliogràfica, s’inclouen tant les edicions prínceps pròpiament dites com les reimpressions que recullen modificacions introduïdes per l’autor, així com el seu epistolari.

On retrace ici le parcours intellectuel de Marc Faessler, théologien réformé que son engagement de pasteur ouvert aux défis du monde reconduit sans fin aux sources vives des Écritures bibliques. En dialogue constant avec la pensée juive, il découvre dans l’œuvre philosophique d’Emmanuel Levinas une radicalité anthropologique qui lui permet de ressaisir autrement et plus généreusement les orientations fondamentales de sa propre tradition.

Max Skjönsberg's The Persistence of Party: Ideas of Harmonious Discord in Eighteenth-Century Britain is a rich, detailed, and nuanced study of eighteenth-century ideas about party politics and the British political contexts that both inspired and were affected by their development. The study is ambitious in scope and extensively researched. With David Hume and Edmund Burke as its principal protagonists, the book is organised chronologically and centered on analyses of writings by Paul de Rapin-Thoyras, Henry St John, 1st Viscount Bolingbroke, Hume, (...) John Brown, and Burke to illustrate the centrality of party, as a concept, to political debate in the eighteenth... (shrink)

Millikan's account of substance concepts fails to do away with features. Her approach simply moves the suite of relevant features into an encapsulated module. The crux of the problem for scientists studying human infants and nonhuman animals is to determine how individuals reidentify objects and events in the world.

According to a promising proposal, cognitive abilities and processes in the context of social institutions should be characterized as socially extended cognition. However, this idea invokes resistance because it seems to invoke metaphysical problems such as a serious variant of the problem of cognitive bloat. In this paper, I argue that defenders of socially extended cognition are not overly worried by such problems because their position is akin to a position known as ‘distributed cognition,’ which avoids these problems. Nevertheless, I (...) will argue that the explanatory aims of socially extended cognition do not correspond to the distributed cognition perspective. The ensuing predicament can be avoided, however, by recognizing that the idea of socially extended cognition hinges on the conflation of two dimensions of the interconnection of the elements in a cognitive system, which I will label ‘functional integration’ and ‘task-dependency.’ Separating these dimensions allows us to identify an overlooked alternative for extended and distributed cognition – symbiotic cognition – that fits cognition in social institutions better than both and avoids the predicament. (shrink)

This paper re-examines the welfare economics of risk. It singles out a class of criteria, the “expected equally-distributed equivalent”, as the unique class which avoids serious drawbacks of existing approaches. Such criteria behave like ex-post criteria when the final statistical distribution of wellbeing is known ex ante, and like ex-ante criteria when risk generates no inequality. The paper also provides a new result on the tension between inequality aversion and respect of individual ex ante preferences, in the vein of Harsanyi’s (...) aggregation theorem. (shrink)

Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi have recently argued against a simulationist interpretation of neural resonance. Recognizing intentions and emotions in the facial expressions and gestures of others may be subserved by e.g. mirror neuron activity, but this does not mean that we first experience an intention or emotion and then project it onto the other. Mirror neurons subserve social cognition, according to Gallagher and Zahavi, by being integral parts of processes of enactive social perception. I argue that the notion of (...) enactive social perception does not yet explain why social perception is subserved by mirroring. I also argue that this problem cannot be avoided by means of an appeal to multiple realization. Instead, I propose a holistic model of neural resonance-based social cognition that does give an explanatory role to mirroring by allowing for a partial experiential overlap between experiencing and recognizing emotions and intentions. This account avoids the simulationist step-wise conception of social cognition and recognizes the qualitative difference between first- and third-person emotion and intention attribution. It does capture too much of the simulationist intuitions, however, to warrant the label ‘social perception’. (shrink)

As a collective action problem, climate change is best tackled by coordination. Most moral philosophers therefore agree on our individual responsibility as political citizens to help establish such coordination. There is disagreement, however, on our individual responsibilities as consumers to reduce emissions before such coordination is established. In this article I argue that from a Kantian deontological perspective we have a perfect duty to refrain from activities that we would not perform if appropriate coordination were established. Moral autonomy means that (...) we do not need to wait for an external lawmaker to tell us what we ought to do. In practice, this means basing our decisions on a shadow price for carbon: if we would not go out for a drive on a sunny Sunday afternoon in a gas-guzzling sport utility vehicle if gas prices were twice as high, we should not do it now. Moreover, we have imperfect duties to reduce emissions by more than our perfect duties require. (shrink)

The goal of this essay is to assess the Selected-Effects Etiological Theory of biological function, according to which a trait has a function F if and only if it has been selected for F. First, I argue that this approach should be understood as describing the paradigm case of functions, rather than as establishing necessary and sufficient conditions for function possession. I contend that, interpreted in this way, the selected-effects approach can explain two central properties of functions and can satisfactorily (...) address some recent counterexamples. This reading, however, shows that there is only a partial overlap between biological functions and selected effects, so the former cannot be reduced to the latter. Finally, I maintain that this result is still compatible with a naturalistic theory of function that appeals to some evolutionary process. (shrink)

Due to their financial incentive, clinicians who earn income from a firm that markets medical devices, pharmaceuticals, tests, etc. might inappropriately prescribe their products or services. The Cleveland Clinic’s conflict of interest (CI) policy creates rules governing clinicians who accept compensation from outside firms that market products they prescribe or use in their practice (hereafter, covered financial relationships). The CI policy is implemented by the Innovation Management and Conflict of Interest Program (IM&COI) (hereafter the Committee).

This article defends the principle of giving a fresh start to individuals who come to consider that they have mismanaged their share of resources at an earlier stage of their life. The first part challenges the ethical intuition that it would be unfair to tax the steadfast frugal in order to help the regretful spendthrift and argues that the possibility of changing one’s mind is an important freedom. The second part examines the disincentives induced by fresh-start policies. It shows that (...) even when individuals can strategically misrepresent their preferences, there remains a significant difference between unforgiving and forgiving policies. It shows that the optimal policy does not only redistribute funds, but also puts protective constraints on early individual decisions (for example, compulsory saving through social security taxes). Key Words: fairness • freedom • fresh start • incentives • preference changes • regret. (shrink)

The goal of this essay is to put forward an original theory of artifact function, which takes on board the results of the debate on the notion of biological function and also accommodates the distinctive aspects of artifacts. More precisely, the paper develops and defends the Dual-Aspect Theory, which is a monist account according to which an artifact’s function depends on intentional and reproductive aspects. It is argued that this approach meets a set of theoretical and meta-theoretical desiderata and is (...) superior to alternative views. (shrink)

In the transdisciplinary field of ‘mindfulness,’ originally a Buddhist concept (Pāli sati; Sanskrit smṛti; Chinese nian 念; Tibetan dran pa), the two tendencies represented by Buddhist traditional a...

The prevailing scientific paradigm is that matter is primary and everything, including consciousness can be derived from the laws governing matter. Although the scientific explanation of consciousness on these lines has not been realized, in this view it is only a matter of time before consciousness will be explained through neurobiological activity in the brain, and nothing else. There is an alternative view that holds that it is fundamentally impossible to explain how subjectivity can arise solely out of material processes—“the (...) hard problem of consciousness”—and instead consciousness should be regarded in itself as a primary force in nature. This view attempts to derive, for example, the laws of physics from models of consciousness, instead of the other way around. While as scientists we can understand and have an intuition for the first paradigm, it is very difficult to understand what “consciousness is primary” might mean since it has no intuitive scientific grounding. Here we show that worlds experienced through virtual reality are such that consciousness is a first order phenomenon. We discuss the Interface Theory of Perception which claims that in physical reality perceptions are not veridical and that we do not see the “truth” but that perception is based on evolutionary payoffs. We show that this theory may provide an accurate description of perception and consciousness within VR, and we put forward an experimental study that could throw light on this. We conclude that VR does offer an experimental frame that provides intuition with respect to the idea that “consciousness is first” and what this might mean regarding the perceived world. However, we do not draw any conclusions about the veracity of this notion with respect to physical reality or question the emergence of consciousness from brain function. (shrink)

This paper sheds new light on the subtle relation between probability and logic by (i) providing a logical development of Bruno de Finetti's conception of events and (ii) suggesting that the subjective nature of de Finetti's interpretation of probability emerges in a clearer form against such a logical background. By making explicit the epistemic structure which underlies what we call Choice-based probability we show that whilst all rational degrees of belief must be probabilities, the converse doesn't hold: some probability values (...) don't represent decision-relevant quantifications of uncertainty. (shrink)