The gloriously simple practice of choosing one thing to do, when to do it, and getting it done. Every day, a billion knowledge workers wake up, gravitate towards a pixelated screen and process information for eight hours or more, facing an endless and bewildering array of work and life choices. We're confronted with countless always-on options; untimely, unsolicited notifications; and a constant competition for our attention. This depletes our faculty for choosing the right things to do, leading millions to become (...) perplexed, frazzled, anxious, or depressed. Timeboxing by Marc Zao-Sanders is a comprehensive guide to carefully and intentionally selecting what to do, specifying start and finish times, focusing solely on that single activity, and getting it done to an acceptable standard within that timeframe. This is the fundamental, transcendent time-management practice; countless luminaries, from Carl Jung and Albert Einstein to Bill Gates and Steve Jobs, have employed some form of it in their daily lives. Zao-Sanders provides an informative and accessible look at every aspect of this revolutionary method- how to do it consistently, and how to do it well. Timeboxing offers guidance on what you can, should, and will do at any given moment. This pragmatic and life-changing practice of intentional daily activity has been proven to yield what almost every human being wants most: a chosen, cherished life. (shrink)

Il y eut la fabuleuse croissance économique et industrielle des décennies d'après-guerre. Il y eut l'utopie communiste puis celle, libertaire, des années soixante-dix. Comme tout ce qui pouvait susciter une espérance, tout cela est mort. Il n'est plus question que de pollution gigantesque, de dérèglement climatique, d'invasion par les pauvres, de postures belliqueuses. Tout ce qui peut paraître désespérant est présenté comme inéluctable ; tout ce qui pourrait nourrir une espérance serait illusoire. En conséquence, la politique, cet art du possible, (...) ne suscite plus que scepticisme, dégoût ou indifférence. À défaut d'espoir, les électeurs se tournent en masse vers des populistes. D'autres se réfugient dans un ultracisme religieux. Bref, le temps est aux discours apocalyptiques. Pourtant, il n'est pas impossible de retrouver l'espérance. D'abord, le pire n'est pas inéluctable. À ceux qui proclament que le 'réalisme' impose ceci ou cela, il faut montrer que d'autres voies sont possibles, pourvu que l'on y croie, qu'on veuille réaliser ce que l'on souhaite, qu'on s'en donne les moyens. Et puis, la perte de l'espérance est la voie la plus sûre vers la catastrophe que l'on dit redouter. Croire celle-ci inéluctable, c'est en préparer la venue. Voilà pourquoi l'espérance est un devoir."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

This article is an examination of killing in war in its moral and normative dimension – with attention given to how killing affects the acting agent. The author argues against the commonplace belief – often tacitly held if not consciously asserted – among academics, the general public, and even – if surprisingly – military professionals, that killing, including in a justified war, is always morally wrong – even when legally sanctioned and necessary to avert a greater moral wrong. This critique (...) of the “killing is wrong but in war it is necessary” trope is motivated in part by the large numbers of psychiatric battle casualties (specifically moral injury) suffered during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and which have attended military activity throughout history. The article approaches the issue through the field of Christian ethical reflection on just war. In building a moral framework for killing in combat, the article explores a typology of homicide, intention, double effect, love, and whether the attitudinal expectations of just warriors in the Christian tradition is realistic in combat. With this moral framework for killing in hand, this article concludes by drawing a critical distinction between moral injury and moral bruising. (shrink)

This essay critiques Professor Martha Nussbaum's book, Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America's Tradition of Religious Equality . Nussbaum's thesis is that the entire tradition of religious liberty in America can be both best understood and justified by recourse to the overarching principle of equal respect —that “[a]ll citizens have equal rights and deserve equal respect from the government under which they live.” Nussbaum insists that equal respect pervades the tradition and that all other values of religious liberty are (...) subordinate to it. She examines various free-exercise and establishment issues in light of this principle, concluding that the tradition of religious equality is under threat and calling for renewed vigilance in its defense. This essay criticizes Nussbaum's elevation of the principle of equal respect to supreme normative status. It claims that Nussbaum's single-minded focus on equal respect distorts and misunderstands the conflicts actually at issue in many religious liberty disputes. The essay focuses specifically on the inadequacies of her assessment of two prominent religious liberty cases, one in the free exercise and the other in the established context. This essay concludes that there are reasons for deep skepticism about Nussbaum's approach as a comprehensive theory of the religion clauses. (shrink)

The diversity of contemporary "capitalisms" underscores the need to supplant the amorphous concept of structure with more precise concepts, particularly institutions and networks. All institutions entail both embodied and relational aspects. Institutions are relational insofar as they map obligatory patterns of "getting by and getting along"—institutional orders—that steer stable social fields over time. Institutions are simultaneously embodied as institutional paradigms, part of a larger bodily agency Pierre Bourdieu called habitus. Institutions are in turn tightly coupled to networks between various people (...) based on, but not reducible to, strategic interests. Yet social interaction sometimes exceeds institutional boundaries, giving rise to disjunctive fields and underscoring the prominence of institutional failures in the unfolding of antagonistic relations such as warfare. Such disjunctive fields can be tracked in relation to some transnational networks at the global level without assuming developmental convergence. This last point underscores the meaning of neoclassical sociology, which eschews assumptions of developmental convergence at the global level. (shrink)

Dans Les Nuées, Aristophane adresse des critiques à Socrate auxquelles Platon répond philosophiquement dans l’Apologie. Or le Socrate des Nuées porte des traits de Protagoras, et certains reproches attribués à l’un valent pour l’autre. Comme pour Socrate, Platon a composé pour Protagoras une apologie, dans le Théétète. Si nous comparons les accusations de la pièce à ce que Platon prête à Protagoras, nous constatons qu’il se fait son défenseur. Mais pour quelle raison et à quel point de vue? Par une (...) analyse des concepts de geloion et de mimèsis comique, on montre comment Platon déploie une stratégie de réappropriation de la pensée de Protagoras – pour lui donner un tour philosophique qui constitue en même temps une réflexion critique sur le statut de l’objet comique.In the Apology, Plato gives a philosophical answer to critics contained in Aristophanes’ Clouds. However, through Socrates, The Clouds target Protagoras too. As a matter of fact, Plato composed an apology for him, as well in the Theaetetus, that answers the charges in the comedy against Protagoras, becoming in a certain way his « lawyer ». But why and what for? Analysing the concepts of geloion and comic mimesis, we show how Plato undertakes to give a philosophical reading of Protagoras’ thought, which, in the same time, constitutes a critical thinking about the object of comedy. (shrink)

Dans le Timée, Platon considère le vivant intelligible comme modèle du vivant parfait qu’est le monde. La notion pose cependant plusieurs difficultés, qui tournent autour de la possibilité d’une vie au niveau intelligible. Dans un premier temps, j’examine donc ce qu’il faut entendre par intelligible (noèton) chez Platon, à savoir moins un objet qu’une relation cognitive d’un type particulier, principielle, de l’âme à cet objet. Dans un second temps, j’explore le type de vie propre à ce vivant intelligible, comme le (...) principe d’organisation qui associe les Formes de tous les vivants. (shrink)

This article shows how Plato’sParmenidesexplores the relationship between place and the geometric forms that are inscribed in it, independently of sensation, becoming and causality. The analysis concurs with essential points of what is said in theTimaeusaboutkhôra, this receptacle deprived of any intrinsic qualities, on which every sensitive reality is drawn.