How should we define ‘health’ and ‘disease’? There are three main positions in the literature. Naturalists desire value-free definitions based on scientific theories. Normativists believe that our uses of ‘health’ and ‘disease’ reflect value judgments. Hybrid theorists offer definitions containing both normativist and naturalist elements. This paper discusses the problems with these views and offers an alternative approach to the debate over ‘health’ and ‘disease’. Instead of trying to find the correct definitions of ‘health’ and ‘disease’ we should explicitly talk (...) about the considerations that are central in medical discussions, namely state descriptions and normative claims . This distinction avoids the problems facing the major approaches to defining ‘health’ and ‘disease’, and it more clearly captures what matters in medical discussions. (shrink)

Hempel and Giere contend that the existence of provisos poses grave difficulties for any regularity account of physical law. However, Hempel and Giere rely upon a mistaken conception of the way in which statements acquire their content. By correcting this mistake, I remove the problem Hempel and Giere identify but reveal a different problem that provisos pose for a regularity account — indeed, for any account of physical law according to which the state of affairs described by a law-statement presupposes (...) a Humean regularity. These considerations suggest a normative analysis of law-statements. On this view, law-statements are not distinguished from accidental generalizations by the kind of Humean regularities they describe because a law-statement need not describe any Humean regularity. Rather, a law-statement says that in certain contexts, one ought to regard the assertion of a given type of claim, if made with justification, as a proper way to justify a claim of a certain other kind. (shrink)

Biologists and philosophers that debate the existence of the species category fall into two camps. Some believe that the species category does not exist and the term 'species' should be eliminated from biology. Others believe that with new biological insights or the application of philosophical ideas, we can be confident that the species category exists. This paper offers a different approach to the species problem. We should be skeptical of the species category, but not skeptical of the existence of those (...) taxa biologists call 'species.' And despite skepticism over the species category, there are pragmatic reasons for keeping the word 'species.' This approach to the species problem is not new. Darwin employed a similar strategy to the species problem 150 years ago. (shrink)

Biology and Philosophy, forthcoming 2007.

I offer an argument regarding chances that appears to yield a dilemma: either the chances at time t must be determined by the natural laws and the history through t of instantiations of categorical properties, or the function ch(•) assigning chances need not satisfy the axioms of probability. The dilemma's first horn might seem like a remnant of determinism. On the other hand, this horn might be inspired by our best scientific theories. In addition, it is entailed by the familiar (...) view that facts about chances at t are ontologically reducible to facts about the laws and the categorical history through t. However, that laws are ontologically prior to chances stands in some tension with the view that chances are governed by laws just as categorical-property instantiations are. The dilemma's second horn entails that if chances are in fact probabilities, then this is a matter of natural law rather than logical or conceptual necessity. I conclude with a suggestion for going between the horns of the dilemma. This suggestion involves a generalization of the notion that chances evolve by conditionalization. Introduction "Chances evolve by conditionalization" How might the lawful magnitude principle be defended? A historical interlude What if chances failed to be determined by the laws and categorical facts? (shrink)

Structured around Charles S. Peirce's three-fold categorical scheme, this article proposes a comparative study of Ayn Rand and Peirce's realist views in general metaphysics. Rand's stance is seen as diverging with Peirce's argument from asymptotic representation but converging with arguments from brute relation and neutral category. It is argued that, by dismissing traditional subject-object dualisms, Rand and Peirce both propose iconoclastic construals of what it means to be real, dismissals made all the more noteworthy by the fact each chose to (...) ground them in indissoluble triads of self-evident first principles. (shrink)

This article considers two sociological postures in relation to Paul Ricoeur’s anthropology of capable man. The first sociological approach scrutinizes the concept of human capacity from the perspective of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics. The second approach elaborated here aims to study the fundamental phenomena of the practical sphere exposed in Philosophie de la volonté. The question of capacities is raised to the upper level, where primitive sensitive experiences are carried out and human beings are still considered to be dependent on vital functions. (...) A reflection will be carried out on the inner certainty of being able to be capable and consubstantial foundation of a practical space integrated by familiarity with the body schema. This study will allow for a critical illumination of social policies currently focused on the activation of individual capacities. (shrink)

The present essay on the being of the sensible investigates the individuation of intensity differentials. This is Deleuze's theme in the fifth chapter of Difference and Repetition, where he places individuation in the context of his ‘transcendental empiricism’. The mechanisms of subjectivation are conceived as spatially-temporally determined actualisations (of the virtual) whose implicit intensity relations are neither accessible empirically nor are they governed by transcendental conditions (in the conventional sense). Central to the discussion is the distinction, stemming from Kant, between (...) intensive and extensive magnitudes. (shrink)

"Representation" is one of those Janus-faced terms that seems blatantly obvious when used in a casual or pre-theoretic manner, but which reveals itself far more slippery when attentively studied. Any allusion to "metarepresentation", it would then seem, only compounds these difficulties. Taking the metarepresentationalist framework in its roughest outline as our point of departure, we thus articulate four key "structural" features that appear binding for any such theory.

This paper explores the biographical and cultural sources that inspired the decision of Janusz Korczak to make his life’s vocation the education of young children from dysfunctional families. This decision emerged out of the radical version of humanism he embraced. His identification of children as the population his humanist ethos must serve, distinguishes it from other versions of humanism. The paper explores the role his sense of self and his identification with Poles, Jews, and humanity play in the composition of (...) this humanism. It identifies the hybridity of his cultural identifications as its heart. It proposes that the tensions between these identifications in general, and his non-Jewish Jewish identification that situated him as being ‘a part of’ and ‘apart from’ Polish society in particular, induced Korczak to create a universal religion of children in which religious, ethnic, or physical distinctions do not generate prejudice, intolerance, and violence. (shrink)

In the first part of this paper I argue that epiphenomenalism does not pose a threat to nonreductive physicalism, if type-epiphenomenalism does not imply the redundancy of mental (or in general higher-level) typing of events and/or states. Furthermore, if justifiable induction over folk-psychological regularities is possible independently of the ways in which these regularities are realized, type-epiphenomenalism does not imply the redundancy ofmental typing. Inthe second part of this paper I explain how justifiable 'cross-realization induction' can be possible. This explanation (...) does what none of the currently available ones can: combine the generally accepted ideas that (i) folk-psychology is a successful means of predicting, explaining, and understanding human behaviour and (ii) that mental states are multiply realized. Given these two steps, it is relatively safe to say that there is no epiphe-nomenalism-threat to nonreductive physicalism. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ Le principal objectif de ce texte est d'apporter certaines clarifications par rapport à des problèmes et difficultés entourant l'usage actuel des notions de culture, d'appartenance et de dialogue. L'auteur montre que l'idée selon laquelle on pourrait être prisonnier de sa propre culture découle d'une transformation récente de la signification du concept de culture. Cette idée est critiquée comme étant un mythe, le mythe de la monade culturelle, reposant sur une mécompréhension des rapports entre culture, appartenance et dialogue. L'auteur s'efforce (...) de proposer une meilleure compréhension de ces trois concepts, de façon à éviter toute forme de relativisme radical. ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is to shed light on some difficulties and problems related to the current use of the concepts of culture, belonging and dialogue. The author shows that the idea that we could be prisoners of our own culture stems from a recent transformation of the meaning of the concept of culture. This idea is criticized as a myth, the myth of the cultural monad, based on a misunderstanding of the relationship among culture, belonging and dialogue. The author tries to offer a better understanding of these three concepts, in order to avoid any form of radical relativism. (shrink)

We are currently observing a shift in the relevance of ethical concerns regarding security screening systems. Due to technological progress, so my hypothesis goes, more direct consequences that such systems may have on the screening subjects' health and bodily privacy become increasingly unimportant compared to more indirect ones resulting from unrestrained information processing and excessive proliferation. However, a specific technical design of a screening system may help to prevent ethically unacceptable applications.

Environmental philosophers spend considerable time drawing the divide between humans and the rest of nature. Some argue that humans and our actions are unnatural. Others allow that humans are natural, but maintain that humans are nevertheless distinct. The motivation for distinguishing humans from the rest of nature is the desire to determine what aspects of the environment should be preserved. The standard view is that we should preserve those aspects of the environment outside of humans and our influence. This paper (...) examines the standard view by asking two questions. First, are the suggested grounds for distinguishing humans from the rest of the environment viable? Second, is such a distinction even needed for determining what to preserve? The paper concludes that debates over whether humans are natural and whether humans are unique are unhelpful when deciding what to preserve. (shrink)

En el presente artículo analizamos la relación que mantienen la memoria y el conocimiento en el marco de la obra Filosofía de la expresión de Giorgio Colli. Una correlación que nos permitirá abordar una gnoseología en la que la razón, recuperando el viejo sentido griego, terminará concibiéndose como un discurso destinado a «reevocar» otra cosa y, al mismo tiempo, como la señal que subrayará la degradación respecto a ese límite metafísico que manifestará. Este falseamiento que exhibirá el conocimiento entendido en (...) cuanto expresión y en estrecha concomitancia con la memoria defendemos que será el que finalmente articulará una original crítica a la teoría de la representación moderna, cuyo valor pensamos que tendría que otorgar a Colli un papel significativo entre los pensadores contemporáneos. (shrink)

Nevin & Grace's approach is an interesting and useful attempt to find ways to measure “core” effects of a history of exposure to reinforcement. The momentum analogy makes intuitive sense, and the evidence for its utility is increasing. Several questions remain, however, about how the analogy will fare in the case of concurrent rather than sequential activities, about the use of extinction as a method to test resistance to change, and about the generality of some of the effects.

George Berkeley's New Theory of Vision is frequently read as a simple precursor or “half-way house” to his later metaphysics. As a result, some allege the value of the New Theory has been overlooked as critics judge it by its association with immaterialism. In this piece I examine the ongoing debate over the nature of the connection between Berkeley's early work on perception and his later immaterialist tracts. I identify four principal positions on the nature of the connection that have (...) been advanced in the scholarly literature, critically engage the evidence for and against them, and finally weigh in by arguing that an excellent case can be made for thinking that the New Theory is a half-way house to immaterialism after all. (shrink)

If the end of exoticism is one of the characteristics of our time, and if classical anthropology based its study of alterity on this exotic distance from the other, is anthropology still possible, and if so, to what end? The author uses these questions as a point of departure for a probing interrogation of ethnological practice, starting with Le;vi-Strauss. The author advocates an anthropology of 'proximity' in place of the usual anthropology of distance. He has studied such emblematic places of (...) Western modernity as the Parisian Metro, or such emblematic 'non-places' as airports, treating as valid anthropological objects phenomena that others might judge less 'pure' or 'significant' than systems of filiation or matrimonial alliance. He outlines an approach to anthropology that focuses on negotiating the social meanings we and others use in making sense of the world, and on the processes of identification that create the difference between same and other. (shrink)

Continues Augé's critical exploration of contemporary modernity with an examination of the role of dreams, myth and fiction in the age of satellite TV and the Internet.

Depuis quelques années, les réseaux sociaux et les usages qu'ils nourrissent ont pris une place significative au sein de la galaxie Internet. Parmi ces réseaux, ceux qui pratiquent la gratuité pour les utilisateurs finals n'ont pas encore stabilisé leur modèle économique et ce, malgré les audiences dont ils bénéficient (Facebook, par exemple). Pour ces réseaux, le défi est désormais de convertir leur succès d'estime en espèces sonnantes et trébuchantes ; en d'autres termes, de mettre leurs capacités de ciblage et de (...) filtrage des internautes, et des communautés que ces derniers forment, au service d'annonceurs solvables. Comme le montre l'exemple de aka'aki, réseau social géolocalisé sur l'Internet mobile, la voie est étroite et le succès non encore garanti. La défiance croissante des internautes à l'endroit de la ' marchandisation ' des données privées constitue la limite principale du ' business model ' en gestation. (shrink)