In times of ongoing resource shortages, appropriate evaluation criteria are crucial for the ethical prioritization of medical care. While the use of scoring models as tools for prioritization is widespread, they are barely discussed in the medical-ethical discourse in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. During this time, the challenge of providing care for patients in need has promoted consequentialist reasoning. In this light, we advocate for the integration of time- and context-sensitive scoring (TCsS) models in prioritization policies that foster (...) treatment opportunities for patients with subacute and chronic conditions. We argue, first, that TCsSs enable a more efficient use of resources, reducing avoidable harm to patients by preventing arbitrary postponement of necessary but nonurgent interventions. Second, we contend that on an interrelational level, TCsSs render decision-making pathways more transparent, which promotes the information requirement of patient autonomy and raises confidence in the resulting prioritization decision. Third, we claim that TCsS contributes to distributive justice by reallocating available resources to the benefit of elective patients. We conclude that TCsSs promote anticipatory measures that extend the timeframe for responsible action into the future. This strengthens patients' ability to exercise their right to healthcare—primarily during times of crisis, but ultimately in the longer term too. (shrink)

El presente trabajo parte del paralelo antitético establecido en torno al par amigo-enemigo que aparece en el “Concepto de lo político” de C. Schmitt para, a continuación, analizar las interesantes propuestas que llevan a cabo distintos autores, entre otros, H. Blumenberg, a las que añadiremos como contrapunto los representantes de la Escuela de J. Ritter, W. Böckenförde y H. Lübbe. En especial señalamos el tránsito que se produce de la neutralidad a la neutralización, a partir de la nueva consideración (...) de la temporalidad que se produjo a comienzos del Siglo XVI. Sin embargo, de esta paradójica constitución surgirán una serie de mitos correlativos a la neutralización que la refuerzan, por lo que nos referimos, finalmente, al status quo y al regreso, que constituyen los ecos metáforicos del moderno binomio progreso-regreso. (shrink)

In the light of several ongoing antitrust investigations in the E.U. and the U.S., the following research paper analyzes whether ‘big tech’ – same as the big banks – need special regulatory (and economic -political) attention and if so, how an updated form of regulatory policy for the digital era could look like. It does so by utilizing – and reviving – the normative and business -ethical ideals of German ‘neoliberalism’, also known as (classical) ordoliberalism. Especially, Walter Eucken’s work has (...) the potential to inform and enrich the current debate concerning the regulation of big tech. The main goal of the paper is to outline a potentially new regulatory framework – one that combines (and revises) Eucken’s ordoliberalism with the competition policy of the European Union. (shrink)

The E.U. is shortly before implementing the Digital Markets Act (DMA), which aims to regulate digital markets and (ideally) rein in the power of big tech gatekeepers. Several researchers claim that this proposal – and especially its goal to ensure the contestability and fairness of digital markets – is ordoliberal in nature, yet what is missing in the academic literature is a closer look at the parallels (and differences) between the E.U.’s competition policy (and the DMA) and ordoliberalism. This paper (...) tries to close the gap and help answer the question of whether the DMA is indeed standing in an ordoliberal tradition. Furthermore, it evaluates the Act’s institutional strengths and weaknesses – as seen from an ordoliberal perspective – and points out potential ways to strengthen E.U. competition policy (and the DMA) and bring it closer to the ordoliberal ideal. (shrink)

Bioethics, Volume 36, Issue 5, Page 519-524, June 2022.

Revisionism in the theory of moral responsibility is the idea that some aspect of responsibility practices, attitudes, or concept is in need of revision. While the increased frequency of revisionist language in the literature on free will and moral responsibility is striking, what discussion there has been of revisionism about responsibility and free will tends to be critical. In this paper, I argue that at least one species of revisionism, moderate revisionism, is considerably more sophisticated and defensible than critics have (...) realized. I go on to argue for the advantages of moderate revisionist theories over standard compatibilist and incompatibilist theories. (shrink)

Recent years have seen recurring episodes of tension between proponents of freedom of speech and advocates of the disenfranchised. Recent survey research attests to the ideological division in attitudes toward free speech, whereby conservatives report greater support for free speech than progressives do. Intrigued by the question of whether “canceling” is indeed a uniquely progressive tendency, we conducted a vignette-based experiment examining judgments of offensiveness among progressives and conservatives. Contrary to the dominant portrayal of progressives and conservatives, our study documented (...) ideological symmetry in their evaluations of offensive speech. When faced with utterances whose content matters to them, both conservatives and progressives viewed outgroup speakers as more offensive than ingroup speakers. A second contribution of this chapter is to provide a deeper understanding of the cognitive mechanism implicated in evaluating outgroup speech as more offensive than ingroup speech. Our results suggest that perception of offensiveness is mediated by ascriptions of intent: we tend to attribute negative intent to the speaker whenever we deem their utterances to be offensive, even against the explicitly stated speaker’s background attitudes. (shrink)

Focusing on the recent work of Michael Bratman as emblematic of several important developments in the philosophy of action, I raise four questions that engage with a set of interlocking concerns about systemic functionalism in the philosophy of action. These questions are: (i) Are individual and institutional intentions the same kind of thing? (ii) Can the risk of proliferation of systemic functional explanations be managed? (iii) Is there an appealing basis for the apparent methodological individualism in our theories of action (...) and agency? and (iv) Why not, instead, pursue a methodologically anti-individualist and ecological approach to action and agency? The latter alternative, I suggest, offers a promising way to retain many of the core insights of the Bratmanian project while avoiding the difficulties inherent to some of the methodological presumptions of some strands of contemporary philosophy of action. (shrink)

In recent years, reflection on the relationship between individual moral responsibility and determinism has undergone a remarkable renaissance. Incompatibilists, those who believe moral responsibility is incompatible with determinism, have offered powerful new arguments in support of their views. Compatibilists, those who think moral responsibility is compatible with determinism, have responded with ingenious counterexamples and alternative accounts of responsibility. Despite the admirable elevation of complexity and subtlety within both camps, the trajectory of the literature is somewhat discouraging. Every dialectical stalemate between (...) incompatibilists and compatibilists seems to be superseded by a similar though often more subtle stalemate.1 The stalemates have two sources. On the one hand, incompatibilists again and again find powerful intuitive support from our folk concept. On the other hand, compatibilists seem right to insist that even if determinism were true, this would not mitigate our need for a concept of responsibility. (shrink)

In this article I propose a resolution to the history issue for responsible agency, given a moderate revisionist approach to responsibility. Roughly, moderate revisionism is the view that a plausible and normatively adequate theory of responsibility will require principled departures from commonsense thinking. The history issue is whether morally responsible agency – that is, whether an agent is an apt target of our responsibility-characteristic practices and attitudes – is an essentially historical notion. Some have maintained that responsible agents must have (...) particular sorts of histories, others have argued that no such history is required. Resolution of this contentious issue is connected to a wide range of concerns, including the significance and culpability of different forms of manipulation, the plausibility of important incompatibilist criticisms of compatibilism, and of course, a satisfactory account of moral responsibility. As it turns out, history matters sometimes, but less frequently than we might think. (shrink)

Theoretical tools aimed at making explicit the injustices suffered by certain socially disadvantaged groups might end up serving purposes which were not foreseen when the tools were first introduced. Nothing is inherently wrong with a shift in the scope of a theoretical tool: the popularization of a concept opens up the possibility of its use for several strategic purposes. The thesis that we defend in this paper is that some public figures cultivate a public persona for whom the conditions of (...) the notion of testimonial injustice might be taken to apply, and this situation is exploited to their advantage, as a means to advance their political agendas. More specifically, they take advantage of this to generate situations of crossed disagreements, which in turn foster polarization. (shrink)

A cien años del final de la Primera Guerra Mundial, el viejo continente vuelve actualmente a encontrarse en un estado de conmoción como aquel que antecedió a este cruel conflicto. El texto busca pensar cómo esta confrontación llegó a adquirir dimensiones apocalípticas, para, de esta forma, advertir a qué nos podemos ver avocados de continuar por este camino. La tesis propuesta aquí es que al menos cuatro aspectos confluyeron allí, a saber: 1. La propensión nihilista de occidente; 2. La perversión (...) “natural” propia a todos los hombres, largamente reprimida por la sociedad moralista del siglo XIX y que, con el estallido de la Gran Guerra, mostró su lado más siniestro; 3. En el conflicto de 1914 el espíritu de la guerra se compenetró con el alma del progreso; 4. En esta contienda bélica, por primera vez, desempeña un papel determinante el atmoterrorismo. Estas consideraciones tienen como punto de partida las reflexiones que hicieron, a propósito de cada uno de estos aspectos, Martin Heidegger, Sigmund Freud, Ernst Jünger, y Peter Sloterdijk. (shrink)

I discuss experimental work by Nichols, and Nichols and Knobe, with respect to the philosophical problems of free will and moral responsibility. I mention some methodological concerns about the work, but focus principally on the philosophical implications of the work. The experimental results seem to show that in particular, concrete cases we are more willing to attribute responsibility than in cases described abstractly or in general terms. I argue that their results suggest a deep problem for traditional accounts of compatibilism, (...) and that they may cast some light on the literature surrounding Frankfurt cases. I also suggest a way in which mature philosophical convictions about free will may reflect a contingent process of refining and defending either of two competing strands of intuitions, and suggest that this may partly explain the persistence of philosophical debates about free will. (shrink)

Cet article a pour objet l’analyse de trois types de théorisations de la signification basées sur un modèle binaire du signe. Celles de Frege, Husserl et Saussure. Relevant d’un même paradigme, les deux premières sont confrontées en tant que s’y développent deux conceptions opposées de la signification – extensionnelle chez Frege, intensionnelle chez Husserl – contribuant à la mise en place, selon des perspectives opposées, de la dualisation de la syntaxe et de la sémantique. Relativement à cette conséquence, leur paradigme (...) est ensuite opposé à celui de la sémiologie structurale de Saussure dans laquelle l’interaction de la syntaxe et de la sémantique est internalisée au niveau du système qu’intègrent les signes comme éléments. De sorte que ce que l’on vise au terme de cet article, c’est à mettre au jour une explication possible de la raison de la divergence entre deux types de conceptions de la sémantique qui organiseront le développement de courants concurrents tout au long de l’histoire de la linguistique du 20e siècle, l’une formelle et mathématisée, l’autre structurale. (shrink)

In this paper I criticize libertarianism and skepticism about free will. The criticism of libertarianism takes some steps towards filling in an argument that is often mentioned but seldom developed in any detail, the argument that libertarianism is a scientifically implausible view. I say "take some steps" because I think the considerations I muster (at most) favor a less ambitious relative of that argument. The less ambitious claim I hope to motivate is that there is little reason to believe that (...) extant libertarian accounts satisfy a standard of naturalistic plausibility, even if they do satisfy a standard of naturalistic compatibility. The argument against skepticism about free will tries to show (1) perhaps the most prominent form of skeptical argument against the existence of free will does not work, and (2) there is a good general argument against skepticism about free will. (shrink)

According to the partisan cheerleading view, numerous political disagreements that appear to be genuine are not authentic disputes, because partisans _deliberately_ misreport their beliefs to show support for their parties. Recently, three arguments have been put forth to support this view. First, contemporary democracies are characterized by affective rather than ideological polarization. Second, financial incentives indicate that partisans often deliberately misreport their beliefs to express their attitudes. Third, partisans have inconsistent and unstable political beliefs, so we should not take these (...) attitudes seriously. In this paper, I examine these arguments and present an alternative view, which I call the partisan conviction view. According to it, partisans are not necessarily insincere in their political judgments, and they are in genuine disagreement. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungEine wichtige Aufgabe empirischer Sozialforschung in der Medizinethik besteht darin, bisher unbekannte ethische Probleme zu identifizieren und zu beschreiben. Die Frage, welche Sachverhalte in den Gegenstandsbereich der Medizinethik fallen, ist jedoch sowohl aus wissenschaftlicher Sicht voraussetzungsreich als auch in der Praxis umstritten. Im Beitrag werden theoretische, methodologische und forschungspraktische Aspekte der Identifikation und Auswahl ethischer Probleme diskutiert und das Vorgehen am Beispiel einer konkreten empirisch-ethischen Studie illustriert. Der Schwerpunkt des Artikels liegt hierbei auf den Vorbedingungen sowie dem konkreten Vorgehen bei (...) der Integration von Laien- und Expertenperspektive. Im ersten Teil wird zunächst vorbereitend die Frage nach der Abgrenzung zwischen ethischen Problemen und anderen praktischen Herausforderungen adressiert. Dies geschieht unter Rückgriff auf die philosophisch-ethische Systematik sowie unter Berücksichtigung des stark praxisorientierten Charakters von Medizinethik. Anschließend wird ein Vorschlag zur Unterscheidung zweier Typen ethischer Probleme gemacht und die Frage nach der Definitionsmacht zur Auszeichnung ethischer Probleme auf den spezifischen Kontext empirisch-ethischer Forschung übertragen. Aufbauend auf diesen theoretischen Überlegungen wird im dritten Abschnitt des Beitrags schließlich ein Vorgehen zur Identifikation ethischer Probleme am Beispiel des ETHICO-Projektes als einer empirisch-ethischen Interventionsstudie im Bereich der Onkologie vorgestellt. Zusammenfassend vertritt der Beitrag die These, dass die Identifikation ethischer Probleme in der Medizin ein theoretisch komplexes und methodisch anspruchsvolles Unterfangen ist, bei dem nicht allein die Perspektive philosophischer Theorie eingenommen werden sollte, sondern vielmehr Formen der Integration von Laien- und Expertenperspektive entwickelt werden müssen. (shrink)

I examine the extent to which Dennett’s account in Freedom Evolves might be construed as revisionist about free will or should instead be understood as a more traditional kind of compatibilism. I also consider Dennett’s views about philosophical work on free agency and its relationship to scientific inquiry, and I argue that extant philosophical work is more relevant to scientific inquiry than Dennett’s remarks may suggest.

This paper tackles the following puzzle. On the one hand, a growing body of literature suggests that most of our current political disagreements are pernicious and difficult to resolve because they are instances of deep disagreement. On the other hand, there does not seem to be anything inherent to a deep disagreement that necessarily makes it pernicious nor irresolvable. To address this issue, I distinguish two senses in which a disagreement can be deemed “deep”, and show that they are conflated (...) in the literature. In order to separate them, I refer to these two senses as deep disagreement and deep conflict. Contrary to recent literature, I argue that most of our current pernicious political disagreements are so not because they are instances of deep disagreement, but of deep conflict. This way, the problem disappears. (shrink)

A population can be ideologically or affectively polarized. Ideological polarization relates to people’s political beliefs, while affective polarization deals with people’s feelings toward the ingroup and the outgroup. Both types of mental states, beliefs and feelings, are typically measured through direct self-report surveys. One philosophical assumption underlying this way of measuring polarization is a concrete version of the first-person authority thesis: the speaker’s sincerity guarantees the truth of their mental self-ascriptions. Based on various empirical studies, the first part of this (...) paper argues that we are particularly bad at spotting our own mental states regard­ing political issues. This, in turn, raises doubts about the accuracy of direct self-report surveys in measuring polarization. In the second part, I introduce Michael Lynch’s notion of political meaning to argue that traditional surveys can still provide valuable information for detecting polarization. However, I suggest that this information pertains not to participants’ beliefs and feelings, but rather to their level of commitment to the core beliefs of the political groups they identify with, which is a relevant aspect of pernicious polarization. (shrink)

Estudio Bibliográfico de / A Bibliographical Study of: José M. Sevilla, Ragione narrativa e ragione storica. Una prospettiva vichiana su Ortega y Gasset. Introducción de Giuseppe Cacciatore. Guerra Edizioni, Perugia, 2002, pp. 269. I.S.B.N. 88-7715-615-5.

Los docentes de los distintos conservatorios realizan las programaciones didácticas en base a la formación recibida. En este trabajo se realiza un análisis sobre la coherencia entre la legislación y las programaciones didácticas. También se estudia lo que dice la normativa vigente al respecto y qué cambios solicita la Unión Europea y la Unesco.La planificación es esencial para poder atender a la diversidad del alumnado y a que estos puedan conseguir todos los objetivos planteados de manera individual y a ritmos (...) distintos. (shrink)

Although the Fichte’s philosophy is usually considered an example of abstract system far from the reality, its basic ideas were already present in a series of theories and facts previous to their writings. That the I need a No–I that determines it, that the I is essentially activity and their po..

En contra de una interpretación separatista, este artículo aboga por la existencia de una unidad entre la filosofía teórica y la filosofía práctica del bien en Aristóteles; al mismo tiempo, sugiere que su investigación se realice teniendo en cuenta la manera como se corresponden dos principios del pensamiento aristotélico: por un lado, el bien y la justicia no son cualidades necesarias , que es la tesis de los escritos teóricos; y, por otro, no hay manera de adquirir el bien para (...) el hombre, sino a través de la virtud, que es un hábito selectivo de lo bueno conforme a la razón –que es la tesis de los escritos prácticos. En el análisis de estos principios y su relación se descubre un tema más de fondo en la filosofía aristotélica: el concepto formal de bien es insuficiente para hacer bueno a un hombre, aunque no pueda ser suprimido en la explicación de su carácter moral. Against a separatist interpretation, this paper argues for the existence of a unity between Aristotle's theoretical and practical philosophy of goodness. At the same time, it suggests that this unity should be discovered in the correspondence of two principles: the goodness and justice are predicated according to more and less, which is the principle of his theoretical or logical writings and the principle saying that the only way to get a good end is through virtue, which is a selective habit of good things according to reason –which is the thesis of his practical treatises. The analysis of these two principles and their relations discovers a deeper issue in Aristotelian philosophy: the formal concept of goodness is insufficient to make good a man, although it cannot be suppressed in the explanation of the moral character of man. (shrink)