Community-supported agriculture (CSA) initiatives are spaces where diverse work relations are performed. From a postcapitalist perspective, these initiatives attempt to create alternative-capitalist and non-capitalist work relations next to capitalist ones. While analyses of work relations in CSA abound, it remains uncertain how such diversification is made possible and how it is shaped by the micro-politics of and power relations in these initiatives. This paper addresses this gap by analysing how power shapes transformations to postcapitalist work relations in CSA. It provides (...) substantial empirical evidence of multiple manifestations of power enabling or constraining postcapitalist work relations through a comparative case study of three CSA initiatives in Portugal. Results show that while CSA creates postcapitalist work relations that are non-alienated, non-monetised and full of care, they insufficiently unmake unbalanced power relations established in capitalist work relations. This paper argues that, when establishing postcapitalist work relations, the selected CSA initiatives could benefit from actively deconstructing internal hierarchies, de-centralising decision-making power from farm owners and addressing oppressive power relations that are ossified in their local and cultural context. (shrink)

(1) This paper is about how to build an account of the normativity of logic around the claim that logic is constitutive of thinking. I take the claim that logic is constitutive of thinking to mean that representational activity must tend to conform to logic to count as thinking. (2) I develop a natural line of thought about how to develop the constitutive position into an account of logical normativity by drawing on constitutivism in metaethics. (3) I argue that, while (...) this line of thought provides some insights, it is importantly incomplete, as it is unable to explain why we should think. I consider two attempts at rescuing the line of thought. The first, unsuccessful response is that it is self-defeating to ask why we ought to think. The second response is that we need to think. But this response secures normativity only if thinking has some connection to human flourishing. (4) I argue that thinking is necessary for human flourishing. Logic is normative because it is constitutive of this good. (5) I show that the resulting account deals nicely with problems that vex other accounts of logical normativity. (shrink)

Many philosophers suppose that sometimes we think we are saying or thinking something meaningful when in fact we’re not saying or thinking anything at all: we are producing nonsense. But what is nonsense? An account of nonsense must, I argue, meet two constraints. The first constraint requires that nonsense can be rationally engaged with, not just mentioned. In particular, we can reason with nonsense and use it within that-clauses. An account which fails to meet this constraint cannot explain why nonsense (...) appears meaningful. The second constraint requires that nonsense does not express thoughts. An account which fails to meet this constraint undercuts the critical force of the concept of nonsense. I offer an account which meets both constraints. The central idea is that to be under the illusion that some nonsense makes sense is to enter a pretence that the nonsense is meaningful. (shrink)

The environment impacts human health in profound ways, yet few theories define the form of the relationship between human physiology and the environment. It is conjectured that such complex systems cannot interact directly, but rather their interaction requires the formation of an intermediary “interface.” This position contrasts with current epidemiological constructs of causation, which implicitly assume that two complex systems transfer information directly while remaining separate entities. Further, it is contended that dynamic, process‐based interfaces incorporate components from all the interacting (...) systems but exhibit operational independence. This property has many consequences, the foremost being that characteristics of the interface cannot be fully resolved by only studying the systems involved in the interaction. The interface itself must be the subject of inquiry. Without refocusing the attention on biodynamic interfaces, how the environment impacts health cannot be discerned. Also see the video abstract here https://youtu.be/XeyjeZeyo4o. (shrink)

Public benefit corporations are National Health Service, that is, state, entities whose function to provide healthcare in discharge of public duties. If we regardvalue as the output of such organisations, it seems logical to connect the values of the organisation to thevalue produced by such organisations. But, on closer examination there are competing underlying logics in play: (1) those based on promoting organisational efficiency and efficacy; and (2) those based on the idea of building service provision around the clinician–patient relationship. (...) Underlying these logics are differing value sets. These clash. Because of the clashing of underlying moral frameworks the connection between values andvalue becomes hard, if not impossible. This paper argues that (1) the clash in these moral frameworks must be addressed by the organisation rather than between individuals or groups of individuals within the organisation; (2) alloying duties within hybrid professionals submerges but does not resolve these conflicts; (3) one approach could be to impose on the organisation itself an ethical imperative to promote, enhance and protect from deterioration the welfare of the patients; (4) a board ethics committee is a possible organisational structure that could transparently and fairly balance clashes within the competing moral frameworks in a way that could reconcile the competing logics and (5) if such conflicts can be better resolved at the organisational level what the organisation must do to achieve its objectives will become clearer because what needs to be valued would naturally emerge connecting values,value and what is valued. (shrink)

This study investigates the impact of firms’ legacy institutional imprints on its engagement in corporate misconduct. We discover that a closed economic regime’s protectionist policies inscribe imprints in the form of opaque organizational routines and cause incumbent firms to develop competitive limitations. Utilizing the theoretical principles of the organizational imprinting theory, this research attests to the endurance of corruptive routines and argues that the degree of closed economy imprints increases firms’ engagement in income-increasing earnings management in the post-liberalization period. Furthermore, (...) we find that the impact of imprints is weakened by firms’ choices on international exposure and internal innovation. By utilizing the historical data on Indian economic policies from 1956 to 1991 and analyzing a sample of 18,432 firm-year observations for 2,396 listed Indian manufacturing firms from 1997 to 2007, we find support for our hypotheses. (shrink)

It is fruitful to think of the representational and the organism-centered approaches as complementary levels of analysis, rather than mutually exclusive alternatives. Claims to the contrary by proponents of the organism-centered approach face what we call the “basketball problem.”.

The purpose of the study is to investigate whether internal and external institutional environmental conditions play a role in the institutionalization of strategic commitment to corporate social responsibility (CSR) among Indian firms in the wake of the mandatory CSR norms or not (where the firms of certain size and profitability are mandated to spend on CSR). The study examines the fixed effects regression on balanced panel data collected from the annual reports and Prowess database of Bombay Stock Exchange-listed firms. Our (...) results show that both internal and external institutional environments play a major role in diffusing a strategic commitment to CSR among firms. Furthermore, we find that firms indulge in frequency, outcome, and trait-based imitations while learning from peer firms to attain legitimacy from their stakeholders. Overall, our findings show that vicarious learning through imitation plays an important role in making firms truly committed to CSR instead of just donating money or greenwashing. To the best of our knowledge, our study is among the pioneering attempts to look at the impact of both internal and external environments on institutionalizing CSR commitment among firms in India. (shrink)

Pylyshyn's target article argues that perception is not inferential, but this is true only under a narrow construal of inference. A more general construal is possible, and has been used to provide formal theories of many visual capacities. This approach also makes clear that the evolution of natural constraints need not converge to the “veridical” state of the world.

Hull et al. propose a set of features that can be used to identify explanatory systems as being selectionist. The commentary questions the necessity of identifying a unit of retention at the level of behavior-environment interactions. It is concluded that an answer to the question “Are units of retention necessary?” can only be given in light of a clear statement of the goals of a science of behavior.

Graphical AbstractWe can, for example, understand intimately how the human endocrine systems works, and likewise the chemical nature of compounds present in our environment; but the result of the interaction cannot be deduced from any simple combination of the two knowledge sets: it's not the interacting entities that we should be studying, but the process that creates the phenomena that we witness as a result of this interaction. This is the “biodynamic interface” to which Manish Arora, Alessandro Giuliani and (...) Paul Curtin refer in their article in this issue, and it is a conceptual structure that comes into being upon interaction of entities: a new way to study interactions in complex systems and better understand emergent phenomena. (shrink)

Rural queer studies, viewed through the lens of relational agriculture, offer critiques of heteropatriarchal norms in farming and highlight strategies used by queer farmers to manoeuvre discrimination and thrive in rural areas. This paper responds to recent calls for further scrutiny of the experiences of gender and sexually underrepresented groups in community-supported agriculture (CSA). It investigates the empowerment of rural queer people in CSA Guadiana, South Portugal, through the experiences of 12 queer members. I collected data through participant observation, semi-structured (...) interviews and a focus group and analysed them through open coding, followed by focused coding. Results indicate that CSA Guadiana, despite not originally designed for this purpose, facilitates various forms of empowerment and active engagement among queer members, particularly influenced by the leadership of queer producers and recurrent gatherings in queer-owned farmland. Three key lessons of queer empowerment in CSA Guadiana emerge from the analysis and contribute to debates on the politics of recognition, queer community action and visibility in the rural context: (i) self-confidence to perform queerness may be restricted to a selective rural community; (ii) partnerships between producers and co-producers may enable reciprocal queer empowerment; and (iii) queer leadership in agri-food community action may quietly represent gender and sexual diversity in the countryside. These findings offer the rural queer literature novel insights into the complexities, contradictions and limitations of empowerment experienced by queer farmers, artisanal food producers and consumers in a rural CSA. (shrink)

Many philosophers suppose that sometimes we think we are saying or thinking something meaningful when we're not saying or thinking anything at all: we are producing nonsense. But what is nonsense? An account of nonsense must, I argue, meet two constraints. The first constraint requires that nonsense can be rationally engaged with, not just mentioned. In particular, we can reason with nonsense and use it within that-clauses. An account which fails to meet this constraint cannot explain why nonsense appears meaningful. (...) The second constraint requires that nonsense does not express thoughts. An account which fails to meet this constraint undercuts the critical force of the concept of nonsense. I offer an account which meets both constraints. The central idea is that to be under the illusion that some nonsense makes sense is to enter a pretence that the nonsense is meaningful. (shrink)

This paper is about when associations, and in particular associations that are part of the state, should be treated as legal persons. I distinguish two forms of association – those that render coherent the agency of their members and those that are group agents – and argue that only the latter should be treated as persons. Following this, I discuss the conditions under which associations that are part of the state can legitimately be group agents.

In recent months, pharmaceutical manufacturers have brought legal challenges to a provision of the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) empowering the federal government to negotiate the prices Medicare pays for certain prescription medications. One key argument made in these filings is that price negotiation is a “taking” of property and violates the Takings Clause of the US Constitution. Through original case law and health policy analysis, we show that government price negotiation and even price regulation of goods and services, including (...) patented goods, are constitutional under the Takings Clause. Finding that the IRA violates the Takings Clause would radically upend settled constitutional law and jeopardize the US’s most important state and federal health care programs. (shrink)

Management of meaning inside organizations has been an enduring issue in organization studies. Issues relating to commitment and control through the meaning-making mechanisms have been studied by organization culture theorists for sometime now. However, rapidly changing dynamics of the business environment lend these issues a critical salience today. Two factors of this dynamic context are particularly noteworthy. Firstly, a redefinition of the long-standing employment relationship—loyalty no longer being traded for lifelong employment—has led management to look for alternative sources of gaining (...) commitment from their employees. Second, several factors—socio-cultural, organizational and individual—have led the employees today to explore issues relating to meaning and purpose in their workplaces. Labelled variously by different scholars, the most widely accepted term for this growing movement is ‘Spirituality at Work’ (SAW). In this article we link the two factors to present a framework wherein the emergence of an issue from the private individual domain to the organizational is seen as having the potential of answering concerns of eliciting commitment from employees in a turbulent environment. However, the SAW movement is accompanied by vigorous debates about the concept itself and on how it is to be studied. In the course of this article we present the central conceptual debates that have characterized the SAW discourse to emerge with three definitional themes to understand and study SAW, and then argue for utilizing the person–organization fit lens to study SAW. We end with a conceptual framework that would enable researchers to make a comprehensive study of the elusive phenomenon of SAW. (shrink)

A legal fiction is a knowingly false assumption that is given effect in a legal proceeding and that participants are not permitted to disprove. I offer a semantic pretence theory that shows how fiction-involving legal reasoning works.

I offer a new reconstruction of Hegel’s criticism of Kant’s idealism. Kant held that we impose categorial form on experience, while sensation provides its matter. Hegel argues that the matter we receive cannot guide our imposition of form on it. Contra recent interpretations, Hegel’s argument does not depend on a conceptualist account of perception or a view of the categories as empirically conditioned. His objection is that given Kant’s dualistic metaphysics, the categories cannot have material conditions for correct application. This (...) leads to subjectivism in the content of experience: the subject is given an implausibly strong role in determining what is the case. Hegel’s own absolute idealism solves this problem. (shrink)

This work underscores the true brilliance and timelessness of colonial metaphors of authorship that extend into the postmodern Age. The emphasis is upon both re-invention and comprehensive scholarship on music and film.

Perception is a very complex cognitive process that yields a unique picture of the world, a picture that may be quite different from reality. A number of factors operate to shape and sometimes distort perception. These factors can reside in the perceiver, in the object or target being perceived, or in the context of the situation in which perception is made. Understanding the complex process of perception is very important in the study of Organizational Behaviour as human behaviour is based (...) on their perception of what reality is and not on reality itself. Recognition of the difference between perceptual world and the real world is not only vital to the understanding of Organizational Behaviour but also essential for any individual to achieve the ultimate goal (that is, Moksha). This article explores the understanding of perception process in the spiritual perspective. The objective of the article is to synchronize the psychological perspective with the scriptures’ perspective of the perceptual process. Incorrect perceptions known as illusions (caused by Maya) and reasons underlying the perception distortions can be better examined, understood and controlled by the underlying philosophies in the Vedic literature, Bhagwad Gita and various Indian scriptures. The concept of Samskara, Sthitaprajna and Anaasakti mentioned in scriptures provide an insight for improving perception. (shrink)

Converging psychophysical evidence suggests that the human visual system parses shapes into component parts for the purposes of object recognition. We examine the Schyns et al. claim of “creation” of features in light of recent work on part-based representations of visual shape, particularly the perceptual rules that human vision uses to parse shapes.

Journal of Human Values, Ahead of Print.

My comments focus on the relation between theoretical reason and agency in Gomes’ account. I argue that, while Gomes is right that agency plays a role in relating us to an objective world, accounting for it does not require us to exclude theoretical reason in advance by requiring that the propositions to which we practically assent be theoretically undecidable. There are both theoretical and practical grounds for taking ourselves to have agency in thinking, and we should prefer an account of (...) reason which allows both kinds of grounds to play a role in rationalizing our commitments. Gomes should, therefore, weaken the dualism of theoretical and practical reason which he takes over from Kant. This dualism is in any event hard to sustain outside the context of transcendental idealism; weakening it allows for what I suggest is a better account of the interaction between theoretical and practical reason. (shrink)

While the concepts of race and ethnicity have been abused historically, they are potentially invaluable in epidemiology and public health. Epidemiology relies upon variables that help differentiate populations by health status, thereby refining public health and health care policy, and offering insights for medical science. Race and ethnicity are powerful tools for doing this. The prerequisite for their responsible use is a society committed to reducing inequalities and inequities in health status. When this condition is met, it is irresponsible not (...) to utilize these concepts. (shrink)

Academic research studies examining the ethical attitudes and behaviors of salespeople have produced several frameworks that explore the ethical decision-making processes to which salespeople adhere when faced with ethical dilemmas. Past literature enriches our understanding; however, a critical review of the relevant literature suggests that an emotional route to salesperson ethical decision-making has yet to be explored. Given the fact that individuals’ emotional capacities play an important role in decision-making when faced with an ethical dilemma, there is a need for (...) empirical research in this area. We address this issue by outlining and testing an emotion-based model to study the ethical attitudes and behaviors of salespeople in a relational selling context. Building on the cognitive-affective model proposed by Gaudine and Thorne (J Bus Ethics 31:175–187, 2001 ), we outline a framework that incorporates higher order prosocial emotions: capacity for concern and capacity for guilt. We include salesperson’s role clarity within the organization as a moderator to examine person–situation interaction. (shrink)

Background‘The Clinical Ethics Advisory Group’ (CEAG) is the clinical ethics support body for Newcastle upon Tyne Hospitals National Health Service Foundation Trust. A significant change in CEAG’s way of working occurred over the past 5 years as a result of Court decisions, increasing public expectations and an increase in CEAG’s paediatric case flow.PurposeReview historical data: (a) as a useful benchmark to look for the early impact of significant service changes and (b) to seek possible reference (‘sentinel’) cases for use with (...) a posited practical (casuistic) case-based reasoning model.MethodsAudit of the minutes of the first 22 years’ meetings was undertaken by the two chairs of CEAG over that period of time.Results223 matters discussed: 86 Trust policy issues; 117 clinical cases (84 adult (32 urgent), 33 child (8 urgent)); 12 CEAG procedural issues and 8 UK Clinical Ethics Network ‘round robin’ cases. The range of topic areas was wide. A broad range of ethical structures were deployed, principlism predominated. Quality was subjectively assessed by each reviewer, but different methods were used. This proved highly concordant between the two reviewers. 47% (105/223) of discussions were ‘excellent’ (*A4C4–A4C4) and 70% (156.5/223) ‘good’ or better (*A4C4–A3C3). By meeting the criteria of ‘excellent’ and ‘prospective’, 92/223 (41%) of matters were deemed potentially suitable as sentinel cases.ConclusionsThe audit provides a rich vein of information. There is demand for CEAG’s services, workload is becoming more complex. Formal funding for such services seems justified. (shrink)

What is the relation of logic to thinking? My dissertation offers a new argument for the claim that logic is constitutive of thinking in the following sense: representational activity counts as thinking only if it manifests sensitivity to logical rules. In short, thinking has to be minimally logical. An account of thinking has to allow for our freedom to question or revise our commitments – even seemingly obvious conceptual connections – without loss of understanding. This freedom, I argue, requires that (...) thinkers have general abilities to respond to support and tension among their thoughts. And these abilities are constituted by following logical rules. So thinkers have to follow logical rules. But there isn’t just one correct logic for thinking. I show that my view is consistent with logical pluralism: there are a range of correct logics, any one of which a thinker might follow. A logic for thinking does, however, have to contain certain minimal principles: Modus Ponens and Non-Contradiction, and perhaps others. We follow logical rules by exercising logical capacities, which display a distinctive first-person/third-person asymmetry: a subject can find the instances of a rule compelling without seeing them as instances of a rule. As a result, there are two limits on illogical thinking. First, thinkers have to tend to find instances of logical rules compelling. Second, thinkers can’t think in obviously illogical ways. So thinking has to be logical – but not perfectly so. When we try to think, but fail, we produce nonsense. But our failures to think are often subjectively indistinguishable from thinking. To explain how this occurs, I offer an account of nonsense. To be under the illusion that some nonsense makes sense is to enter a pretence that the nonsense is meaningful. Our use of nonsense within the pretence relies on the role of logical form in understanding. Finally, while the normativity of logic doesn’t fall directly out of logical constitutivism, it’s possible to build an attractive account of logical normativity which has logical constitutivism as an integral part. I argue that thinking is necessary for human flourishing, and that this is the source of logical normativity. (shrink)

The Schrödinger’s cat paradox has troubled physicists for many years and many ways to solve it has been provided so far. In this paper I will try to provide a different method of solving the Paradox with the help of logical machine and it will look like a hybrid of Wigner’s no-go theorem and the machine of Gödel in his Incompleteness Theorems. And due to the machine the paradox will not require any human intervention to measure the state of the (...) cat, whether it is alive or dead, while the measurement will be made by humans with regard to the statement given out by the machine. (shrink)

This essay traces the parallel, but unrelated, evolution of two sets of reactions to traditional idealist history of science in a world-historical context. While the scholars who fostered the postcolonial approach, in dealing with modern science in the non-West, espoused an idealist vision, they nevertheless stressed its political and ideological underpinnings and engaged with the question of its putative Western roots. The postidealist history of science developed its own vision with respect to the question of the global spread of modern (...) science, paying little heed to postcolonial debates. It then proposes a historiographical approach developed in large part by historians of South Asian politics, economics, and science that, without compromising the preoccupations of each of the two groups, could help construct a mutually comprehensible and connected framework for the understanding of the global workings of the sciences. (shrink)

This article maps the Manvantara section of the Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa to reveal a patronymic pattern at play which is key to understanding the interplay between the mythologies of Goddess and Sun found in the Mārkaṇḍeya. It explains why the Devī Māhātmya occurs, especially in the Manvantara, which has puzzled scholars since colonial times. The article argues that the compositional strategy was implemented to present the Goddess as an analog to Viṣṇu, Manu, Sun, and the Indian king, all paragons of preservation.

Maximize Presupposition! is an economy condition that adjudicates between contextually equivalent competing structures. Building on data discovered by O. Percus, I will argue that the constraint is checked in the local contexts of embedded constituents. I will argue that this architecture leads to a general solution to the problem of antipresupposition projection, and also allows I. Heim’s ‘Novelty/Familiarity Condition’ to be eliminated as a constraint on operations of context change.

इस पर्चे में मैंने विज्ञान के विकास को आधुनिकता की पृष्टभूमि में मानव-मुक्ति के लक्ष्य की दशा व दिशा के सन्दर्भ में आलोचनात्मक विश्लेषण पद्धति से समझने का प्रयास किया है। इस कार्य के लिए मैंने पेपर में चार प्रमुख बिंदुओं को उढाया है। -/- पहला बिंदु विज्ञान की मूल्य निरपेक्षता (Value neutrality) को लेकर है जिसके तहत मैंने पूँजी के साथ विज्ञान के संबंध को समझने का प्रयास किया है। -/- दूसरे बिंदु में विज्ञान शिक्षा और सामाजिक सरोकार के (...) संबंध को वैज्ञानिक तार्किकता (Scientific rationality) और यांत्रिक तार्किकता (Instrumental rationality) के सन्दर्भ में समझने का प्रयास किया है। -/- तीसरे बिंदु में समाज में विज्ञान के अधिपत्य को लेकर उठाया गया है जिसके कारण विज्ञान का अन्य प्रकार की ज्ञान प्रणालियों से संबंध विच्छेद करने की प्रवित्ति को बढ़ावा मिलता है। -/- चौथे एवं अंतिम बिंदु में मैंने विज्ञान, तकनीक व विज्ञान का समाज के प्रति नैतिक उत्तरदायित्व के अंतरसंबंध को समझने का प्रयास किया है। . (shrink)