Globally, parents and children in same-sex parent families are impacted by many laws related to the parental sexual orientation. These laws vary considerably from one country to another, ranging from full legal recognition to criminalization. The psychological consequences of living in an ambiguous or hostile legal climate likely interfere with parental health, family functioning, and child development. However, a systematic evidence synthesis of the pertinent literature and its placement within a broader psychological model are currently lacking. The aims of this (...) review were thus (1) to systematically review qualitative and quantitative evidence on the impact of sexual orientation laws on same-sex parent families in key domains and (2) to place these findings within a broader model informed by minority stress and family theories. Our review was preregistered and conducted in line with PRISMA guidelines. We searched for qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods studies on the impact of sexual orientation laws on target outcomes (parental health, family functioning, child outcomes) via systematic database search (PubMed, Scopus, Web of Science) and forward-backward searches. Fifty-five studies published between 1999 and 2020 were eligible for inclusion and were synthesized using a data-based convergent synthesis design. Thirteen descriptive and three overarching analytical themes were identified through thematic synthesis. Linking our findings with minority stress and family theories, we propose a novel legal vulnerability model for same-sex parent families. The model posits that legal vulnerability constitutes an increased risk for parental and child health as well as family functioning through individual and shared pathways between family members. Additionally, the model introduces counteractions that families engage in on the personal, familial, and systemic level to mitigate the impact of legal vulnerability, as well as moderators on the contextual, familial, couple, and individual level that modulate this impact. Implications for research and clinical practice are discussed. (shrink)

In his recent work in social epistemology, Alvin Goldman argues that truth is the fundamental epistemic end of education, and that critical thinking is of merely instrumental value with respect to that fundamental end. He also argues that there is a central place for testimony and trust in the classroom, and an educational danger in over‐emphasizing the fostering of students’ critical thinking. In this paper I take issue with these claims, and argue that (1) critical thinking is a fundamental end (...) of education, independently of its instrumental tie to truth, and (2) it is critical thinking, rather than testimony and trust, that is educationally basic. (shrink)

This paper considers two philosophical problems and their relation to science education. The first involves the rationality of science; it is argued here that the traditional view, according to which science is rational because of its adherence to (a non-standard conception of) scientific method, successfully answers one central question concerning science''s rationality. The second involves the aims of education; here it is argued that a fundamental educational aim is the fostering of rationality, or its educational cognate, critical thinking. The ramifications (...) of these two philosophical theses for science education are then considered, and a science education which takes reasons in science as its fundamental feature is sketched. (shrink)

Critique of instrumental accounts of epistemic rationality.

The main thesis is that the study of science must itself be a science. the only viable philosophy of science is a naturalized philosophy of science.

Recent work in epistemology has focused increasingly on the social dimensions of knowledge and inquiry. Education is one important social arena in which knowledge plays a leading role, and in which knowledge-claims are presented, analyzed, evaluated, and transmitted. Philosophers of education have long attended to the epistemological issues raised by the theory and practice of education . While historically philosophical issues concerning education were treated alongside other philosophical issues, in recent times the former set of issues have been largely neglected (...) by philosophers working in the core areas of the discipline. Interestingly, the rise of social epistemology has been accompanied by a renewed interest by mainstream philosophers in philosophical questions concerning education. Whether or not this accompaniment is accidental, or is legitimately explainable in terms of broad intellectual, philosophical, or social/political currents and movements, I will not endeavor to address here. The increasing respectability of and philosophical interest in both social epistemology and philosophy of education are in any case salutary developments, each signaling both a broadening of the set of interests and issues deemed legitimate by practitioners of the parent discipline, and an increased willingness to take seriously the philosophical problems raised by the ubiquitous social/communal effort to transmit/transform culture by way of education. (shrink)

Measuring outcomes using quantitative analytic methods is the hallmark of scientific research in healthcare. For clinical ethics support services (CESS), tangible outcome metrics are lacking and literature examining CESS quality is limited to evaluation of single cases or the influence on individual healthcare professional’s perceptions or behaviour. This represents an enormous barrier to implementing and evaluating ethics initiatives to improve quality. In this context, Kok _et al_ propose a theoretical framework for how moral case deliberation (MCD) can drive quality at (...) an organisational-level, termed _morisprudence_ 1. By offering mechanistic insights into how MCD can lead to organisational learning and quality improvement (QI), they provide a roadmap for actionable items to measure quality. As conceptualised, _morisprudence_ follows accumulation of organisational practical wisdom from a repertoire of ‘paradigmatic’ MCDs, aiding identification of patterns of morally important features. Here, there are parallels between healthcare professionals’ clinical judgement, where past experience... (shrink)

Courts reviewing gun laws that burden Second Amendment rights ask how effectively the laws serve public safety — yet typically discuss public safety narrowly, without considering the many dimensions of that interest gun laws serve. “Public safety” is a social good: it includes the public's interest in physical safety as a good in itself, and as a foundation for community and for the exercise of constitutional liberties. Gun laws protect bodies from bullets — and Americans' freedom and confidence to participate (...) in every domain of our shared life, whether to attend school, to shop, to listen to a concert, to gather for prayer, or to assemble in peaceable debate. Courts must enforce the Second Amendment in ways that respect the public health and constitutional reasons a democracy seeks to protect public safety. Lawyers and citizen advocates can help, by creating a richer record of their reasons in seeking to enact laws regulating guns.This inquiry is urgent at a time when the Supreme Court's new conservative majority may expand restrictions on gun laws beyond the right to keep arms for self-defense in the home first recognized inDistrict of Columbia v. Hellerin 2008. (shrink)

Advocates of naturalized epistemology who wish to secure epistemology’s normativity want that normativity to be restricted to instrumental concerns, because these can be understood naturalistically. But epistemic normativity cannot be so limited; a ‘categorical’ sort of normativity must be acknowledged. Naturalism can neither account for nor do away with this sort of normativity. Hence naturalism is at best a seriously incomplete and therefore inadequate meta-epistemological position.

Op-ed about the role of anti-hypocrisy in political criticism.

Emma Williams’ ‘In Excess of Epistemology’ admirably endeavours to open the way to an account of critical thinking that goes beyond the one I have defended ad nauseum in recent decades by developing, via the work of Charles Taylor and Martin Heidegger, ‘a radically different conception of thinking and the human being who thinks’, one that ‘does more justice to receptive and responsible conditions of human thought.’ In this response I hope to show that much of Williams’ alternative approach is (...) compatible with my own; that, where incompatible, the alternative is problematic; and, finally, that there is a risk of talking past one another, talking at cross-purposes, that all sides must work to overcome. (shrink)

Millions of Americans are dependent on what is often called the “safety net.” These loosely-organized networks of health and social service providers serve the many Americans who are uninsured, dependent on public coverage, or for a variety of reasons unable to access other private systems of care. The Institute of Medicine report, America’s Health Care Safety Net: Intact but Endangered, called attention to both the fragility and the resilience of this health care safety net. The IOM report underscored the critical (...) importance of the safety net to the health and well-being of millions of individuals and called for efforts to strengthen it and improve the nation’s ability to monitor its viability. Given this central role, any health care reform efforts need to be fully informed by an understanding of what the safety net includes, how it is financed, and how it is responding to a series of challenges it now faces. (shrink)

New Work on Critical Thinking: Comments on Frímannsson, Holma and Ritola.

El Pensamiento crítico como un ideal educacional.

Several concepts of conscious experience are distinguished in this chapter. Phenomenal states are introduced and their relationship to states of seeing is discussed. The kinds of experiences that will be central in the rest of the book are identified.

No indictment of existing education is more serious than the charge that it fosters uncritical rather than critical dispositions. It is difficult to see how the addition of anything but epistemology - and even more importantly of philosophy in general - can remedy that deficiency. The sentiment expressed here by Professor Matthew Lipman is a profound one. I agree completely that education has, as one of its fundamental tasks, the fostering of critical dispositions. I agree, moreover, that epistemology is basic (...) to an education that takes seriously the enhancement of critical thinking. Philosophy for Children has forcefully delivered the message, to both the educational and the philosophical communities, that philosophy can and should be viewed as a central component of an adequate education. (shrink)

I spent last year teaching in Paris and when I came home for visits, Emil and I would play the analogy game between Western European and American political tendencies. Besides the obvious matches between Reagan, Thatcher and Chirac, we talked of the similarities between George Will and Ian Gilmore, the intellectual spokesman for the Tory Wets, both of whom drew on the same stock of quotes from Bolingbroke, Hume and Burke. But what of the American neo-liberals? Who were their counterparts? (...) Despite some obvious similarities between the British Social Democrats and some of the French high-tech socialists, it was difficult to compare the neo-liberals to any other European formation. (shrink)

Until the mid 1970s, pragmatism reigned as the “almost… official philosophy of America.” European critics charged that James’ and Dewey's pragmatism was less a philosophy than a “method of doing without one.” But pragmatism's loose and democratic emphasis on problem-solving suited the unbounded American personality with its optimistic faith in persistent progress. Dewey's pragmatism was at once so democratic and informal in its emphasis on shared methods of rational inquiry that Bertrand Russell once accused him of “being unable to distinguish (...) between the work of a scientist and that of a bricklayer.” Pragmatism was so central to America's sense of itself, noted a widely-read 1950 Amherst College pamphlet on “Pragmatism and American Culture,” that to question its merits was to place “American civilization itself on trial.”. (shrink)

Research on civic development in schools has identified a number of promising practices for increasing civic knowledge and interest among youth. This study examines the relationship between the most promising practices and increased political engagement as a young adult, using the likelihood of voting as a proxy. By assessing nationally representative survey data using a linear probability model, I explore whether youth who take civics in high school are more likely to vote as young adults. Results show a significant positive (...) association between taking a civics course and extracurricular participation in high school, and likelihood of voting as a young adult, even after adjusting for other determinants of civics education and voter turnout. This paper explains the significance of these findings and makes the case for the importance of high school civic education and for further exploration of the factors involved in the process. (shrink)

It has often been thought that the existence of an infinite amount of time implies the realization of all possibilities. However, it can be proved that it is not true that for any T, if T is an infinite period of time, then every possibility is actualized in T. The proof works for any sense of 'possibility' in which there are possibilities that cannot be actualized simultaneously.It still might be argued that if there is an infinite amount of time, then (...) each possibility is actualized sometime (during some infinite period of time, though not all). In particular it might be claimed that if there is an infinite amount of time, then there is an uninterrupted infinite period of time; and (P*) for any T, if T is an uninterrupted infinite period of time, then every possibility is actualized in T. However, it can also be shown that (P*) is not necessarily true.For it to be actually true, some very strong Principle of Universal Random Change must be true. (shrink)