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Tarih ilmi bir bütünlük ve süreklilik arz eder. Bir olay hakkında başlangıç ve bitiş tarihlendirmeleri izâfidir. Dolayısıyla olayın başlangıcı kabul edilen tarih öncesi bir doğuş ve gelişme sürecinin olduğu, aynı şekilde olayın bittiği zannedilen dönemde de etkilerinin bazen yıllarca devam ettiği görülmektedir. Ancak gerek araştırmacı gerekse okuyucu dikkate alınarak, araştırmanın kolaylaştırılması, derinliği/vukûfiyeti arttırma, anlama, anlamlandırmayı kolaylaştırma gibi sebep ve amaçlar göz önüne alınarak tarih, kısımlara ayrılmıştır. Tarihin kısımlara ayrılmasında savaşlar, bir devletin doğuşu veya yıkılışı gibi dönemin siyasî, sosyal veya dinî (...) hayatın akışını değiştiren, onlara yol veren olaylar veya coğrafya dikkat alınmaktadır. Bu bölümlere ayırma ameliyesinin sonraki araştırmacılar tarafından yapıldığını, geçmişe dönük bir tasarım, yaklaşım olduğunu da söylememiz gerekmektedir. (shrink)

Juan B. Justo en la historia y el pensamiento argentinos, por A. Solari.--Teoría y práctica de la historia, por M. H. Alberti.--La base biológica de la historia, por F. Escardó.--La técnica, por A. Justo.--La economía, por R. Bogliolo.--La guerra, por A. G. Rodríguez.--La política, por A. Ghioldi.--La lucha de ciases, por R. Mondolfo.--El salariado, por M. Palacín.--Las formas típicas del privilegio, por J. L. Pena.--El gremialismo proletario, por E. Frugoni.--La cooperación libre, por N. Repetto.--La democracia obrera, por L. Pan.--La religión, (...) la cilencia, el arte, por R. Rivière. (shrink)

This book examines all verses of the Quran involving knowledge related concepts. It begins with the argument that an analysis of the Quranic concept of ignorance points to epistemic virtues that can pave our way towards gaining knowledge and/or understanding. It deals with the Quranic concepts of perceptual, rational, and revelatory knowledge as well as understanding and wisdom in the light of recent discussions in Western analytic epistemology. It also argues that the relevant Quranic verses seem to involve concept of (...) an epistemic conscience whose proper exercise can yield knowledge or understanding. While not overlooking the Quranic emphasis on revelation as a source of knowledge, the book draws our attention to a remarkable overlap between some strains of contemporary virtue epistemology and Quranic approach to knowledge. It shows that the Quranic verses suggest a progressive sequence from propositional knowledge to understanding to wisdom. (shrink)

Peckham claims that my "behavior" in dealing with the quotations in Natural Supernaturalism is the same, in methodology and validity, as the interpretative behavior of Booth's waiter. But the great bulk of the utterances in my quotations—and no less, of the utterances constituting Peckham's own essay—do not consist of orders, requests, or commands. Instead, they consist of assertions, descriptions, judgments, exclamations, approbations, condemnations, and many other kinds of speech-acts, the meanings of which are not related to my interpretative behavior, even (...) in the indirect way in which the meaning of Booth's order is related to the future behavior of his waiter. M. H. Abrams, author of Natural Supernaturalism and The Mirror and the Lamp and Class of 1916 Professor of English at Cornell University, responds in this essay to Morse Peckham's "The Infinitude of Pluralism" . Morse Peckham, in his Critical Response, was commenting on issues raised by the forum on "The Limits of Pluralism" , to which M. H. Abrams contributed. Previous contributions to Critical Inquiry are "Rationality and Imagination in Cultural History: A Reply to Wayne Booth" and "The Deconstructive Angel". (shrink)

In retrospect, I think I was right to compose Natural Supernaturalism by relying on taste, tact, and intuition rather than on a controlling method. A book of this kind, which deals with the history of human intellection, feeling, and imagination, employs special vocabularies, procedures, and modes of demonstration which, over many centuries of development, have shown their profitability when applied to matters of this sort. I agree with Booth that these procedures, when valid, are in a broad sense rational, and (...) subject to analysis and some degree of definition. But the rules underlying such a discourse are complex, elusive, unsystematic, and subject to innovative modification; they manifest themselves in the intuitive expertise of the historian; and the specification of these rules should not precede, but follow practice. . . . After the fact, nevertheless, a book like Natural Supernaturalism is subject to close critical inquiry about its methods and rationale. I am grateful to Booth for opening up such an inquiry, and for doing so in a way that is not only disarming, but seems to me to be the most promising of useful results. That is, instead of adopting a prosecutorial stance, demanding: "Justify the rationality and probative force of what you have done; it looks dammed suspicious to me," he has adopted the friendly tactic of saying: "Your book, in my experience of it, has yielded discoveries that I want to call knowledge, by methods, however deviant from standard rubrics of valid reasoning, that it seems irrational to call non-rational. Let's set out to clarify what these methods are, and to see what grounds we can find for the claim that they provide warranted knowledge." M.H. Abrams' contributions to Critical Inquiry are "The Deconstructive Angel" and "Behaviorism and Deconstruction: A Comment on Morse Peckham's 'The Infinitude of Pluralism'". (shrink)

M. F. Burnyeat taught for 14 years in the Philosophy Department of University College London, then for 18 years in the Classics Faculty at Cambridge, 12 of them as the Laurence Professor of Ancient Philosophy, before migrating to Oxford in 1996 to become a Senior Research Fellow in Philosophy at All Souls College. The studies, articles and reviews collected in these two volumes of Explorations in Ancient and Modern Philosophy were all written, and all but two published, before that decisive (...) change. Whether designed for a scholarly audience or for a wider public, they range from the Presocratics to Augustine, from Descartes and Bishop Berkeley to Wittgenstein and G. E. Moore. Their subject-matter falls under four main headings: 'Logic and Dialectic' and 'Scepticism Ancient and Modern', which make up the first volume, with 'Knowledge' and 'Philosophy and the Good Life' contained in this, the second volume. The title 'Explorations' well expresses Burnyeat's ability to discover new aspects of familiar texts, new ways of solving old problems. In his hands the history of philosophy becomes itself a philosophical activity. (shrink)

The European Legacy, Volume 17, Issue 3, Page 414-415, June 2012.

The restoration of "forgotten" names to the bosom of our culture is a natural and necessary accompaniment of the political freedom beginning to make its way in our country. Free and continuous creativity is being reunited with the reader, the listener, and the participant, who had been tragically alienated from it. Our half-knowledge, intellectual arbitrariness, and opportunism are becoming clearer, more acute, and more shameful. All this is an inevitable accompaniment of one of the most prestigious and, it would seem, (...) least labor consuming trends in contemporary publishing and journal policy. The publication of texts of Russian philosophers has marked journals as different in character and mission as Novyi mir, Voprosy filosofii, Literaturnaia ucheba, Druzhba narodov, Volga, and many others. In most cases they are more or less well known works reprinted from the YMCA Press, equipped with prefaces—some better, some worse—and devoid of any sort of real intellectual commentary. (shrink)

The article analyzes the dignity of a person in secular and Orthodox aspects. The authors argue that every phenomenon of the material and spiritual world is objectively inherent in internal contradictions, so it is not an exception and an idea of human dignity in secular and religious contexts. The research methods are comprehensive and based on the philosophical, anthropological and philosophical and cultural analysis of human dignity in secular and Orthodox dimensions. Discussion. The concepts of «secular» (universal) and «Christian» morality (...) are characterized and distinguished. The authors argue that the latter comes from a supernatural source, from a moral law, the basis of which is the belief in the immortality of the human spirit. Christian morality provides such norms of behavior of people in which the biblical moral commandments are observed.The roots of the universal morality are in a culture that has produced a humanistic outlook, within which a person is recognized as self -sufficient value, capable of asserting his dignity, transforming himself and the world without the intervention of a transcendental super -sensory nature (God). The universal morality is the principles and norms that regulate the behavior of people, the activities of their communities, associations in terms of universally recognized ideas about good and evil, honesty and disobedience, honesty and dishonesty. Finally, the article suggests that, despite the differences, and sometimes contradictions in the understanding of the essential manifestations of human dignity between secular and Christian contexts, quite obvious to both aspects is the understanding that the leading place should be occupied by the personality that manifests itself manifestation and individual aspiration, in the depths of its own consciousness and in its desire for free self -determination and creativity, as a prerequisite for the affirmation of one’s dignity. (shrink)

Human opacity is the intrinsic quality of unknowabil- ity of human beings with respect to machines. The descriptive rela- tionship between humans and machines, which captures how much information one can gather about the other, can be explicated using an opacity-transparency relationship. This relationship allows us to describe and normatively evaluate a spectrum of opacity where humans and machines may be either opaque or transparent. In this paper, we argue that the advent of Affective Computing (AC) has begun to shift (...) the ideal position of humans on this spectrum towards greater transparency, while much of this technology is shifting towards opacity. We explore the implications of this shift with regard to the affective information of humans and how the threat to human opacity by AC systems has various adverse repercussions, such as infringement of one’s autonomy, deception, manipulation, and increased anxiety. There are also distributive consequences that expose vulnerable groups to unjustified burdens and reduce them to mere profiles. We further provide an assessment of current AC technology, which follows the descriptive relationship between humans and machines from the lens of opacity and transparency. Finally, we foresee and address three possible objections to our claims. These are the beneficence of AC systems, their relation to privacy, and their restrictive capacity to capture human affects. Through these arguments, the paper aims to bring attention to the ontological relationship between humans and machines from the perspective of opacity and transparency while emphasizing on the gravity of the ethical concerns raised by their threat to human opacity. (shrink)

Of articles which are submitted for publication in Philosophy, a surprisingly large proportion are about the views of Richard Rorty. Some, indeed, we have published. They, along with pretty well all the articles we receive on Professor Rorty, are highly critical. On the perverse assumption that there must be something to be said for anyone who attracts widespread hostility, it is only right to see what can be said in favour of Rorty's latest collection of papers, entitled, Truth and Progress,.

Lloyd Weinreb, Oedipus at Fenway Park: What Rights There Are and Why There Are Any Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994, viii, 221 pp.

(1972). Properties and causes: An approach to the problem of hypothesis in the scientific methodology of Sir Isaac Newton. Annals of Science: Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 217-233.

The author reconstructs the theory of F. Varela with relevance to the hard problem of consciousness. This problem was touched by Varela in relatively late period of his work. However, the implications for dissolution of this problem can be found in his earlier works with H. Maturana. Theory of autopoietic systems ties life and cognition together, resulting in natural historical comprehension of consciousness and its functioning. Autopoiesis, understood as network of processes of production of components used as resources for maintaining (...) these processes, sets organizational invariances, distinguishing living system from its milieu. The main criterion of living system is an ability to maintain autopoietic organization while undergoing structural transformations with environment. Structural plasticity leads to multiple realizability of autopoietic organizations, which, in turn, leads to radical conclusion on nature of knowledge. One can distinguish the knower and the known only contingently, as the structure of knowledge reflects cognitive structure of the knower. This intertwinement permits Varela to introduce the enactivist program, which presupposes not simply reform in the scientific research of consciousness but also rethinking the implications of scientific knowledge itself. Cognition is a sensorimotor constitution of the world. Therefore, consciousness is not an object of material nature among other objects but provides our cognitive access to nature. Varela intended to abandon the theoretical approach to the problem of consciousness. His aim was not to provide a new argument. This is a consequence of the enactivist position which, according to theory of autopoiesis, must be applicable to the knower himself. (shrink)

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant explains the purpose of the transcendental deduction of the categories by referring to the practice of legal deduction (KrV, A 84/B 116). However, he does not elaborate the details of the analogy and the reader is left to fill in the blanks concerning legal deductions and their supposed similarities with transcendental deductions. In this paper, I suggest we use judicial imputation to clarify Kant’s analogy between transcendental and legal deductions. My claim is that (...) the core of the analogy is not the similarities between the acquisition of property and that of concepts but rather similarities in the application of a law to a deed. (shrink)