The use of psychosocial interventions for people with dementia is common and recommended because they focus on the underlying problem and well-being of the person. The promotion of well-being is a relevant dimension in person-centred care, where the aim is to confirm the person’s ‘personhood’. Most literature about ethics in dementia care instructs us on how and when to include people with dementia in our research. Little is written about the ethical aspects regarding the use of psychosocial interventions in daily (...) care. In clinical practise, several challenges arise about the use of psychosocial interventions. Those include questions about the person’s ability to participate in decision-making and how we know what is best for them. Furthermore, we must consider what kinds of psychosocial interventions are best for everybody, or if intervention causes discomfort for the person. This article emphasizes the necessity to consider the ethical aspects of the implementation of psychosocial interventions while taking into consideration the persons individual needs. A particular ethical challenge arises when a person with dementia is unable to express themselves verbally. Therefore, it is essential that the staff know the history and preferences of each person with dementia. The ethical aspects of psychosocial interventions for people with dementia will be discussed using Beauchamp and Childress four ethical principles: respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice. The person-centred approach proposed by Kitwood’s and Brooker. (shrink)

In June 2021, new waves of the current COVID-19 pandemic are still messing up our lives and magnetizing the compass of our life. No other epidemics or pandemics have been politicized at such a level since ancient times. The full political spectrum from right to left has tried to ride this pandemic and upset the public health response efforts. Statistics and politics have changed our daily approach to this brutal infection, but even crueler has been the palpable miscommunication. Massive and (...) uncontrolled lockdowns and not climate change are destroying the economy of our planet. Intolerance against vaccine opponents and hesitant families has been vocalized with martial tones in both social media and news channels. In this book, the author analyzes the pandemic in a historical context, emphasizes the importance of facemasks, but also highlights our human approach to anti-mask psychology. It would be appalling to call mistakes in public health decisions "learned lessons" because it reduces the gravity of the consequences of inadequate communication. Our youth is our future. The mental issues arising from a lack of social interaction and in-person education are dreadful. Vaccines are powerful and represent the most outstanding progress in medicine. There is light at the end of the tunnel, but vaccine acceptance or herd immunity is not the answer, or probably, not the only one. There is true hope that we are going back to our world, but the COVID-19 pandemic may be an occasion to reconsider the traditional family in the center of our lives and daily politics. A tolerance towards any race needs to be contagious, militant, and blazing to vehemently rebuild and revitalize the American Dream. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:One Body: An Essay in Christian Sexual Ethics by Alexander R. PrussBenedict M. Guevin O.S.B.One Body: An Essay in Christian Sexual Ethics. By Alexander R. Pruss. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2013. Pp. ix + 465. $45.00 (paper). ISBN: 978-0-268-03897-7.As a professor of moral theology in general and of sexual ethics in particular, I found Alexander Pruss’s largely philosophical account of sexual ethics to be (...) refreshing. As much as I try to dissuade my students from using religious legalism to justify the rightness or wrongness of certain sexual practices, I find it almost impossible to break them of the bad habit of using such phrases as “Because the Church teaches...” or “Because the Bible says...”. Even when I counter by saying, “The Church teaches that something is good because it is good and not because the Church says it is good, and such goodness is grounded in the natural law and a sound anthropology,” such legalism still persists. And so, to read Pruss’s extensive analysis of sexual ethics using both personalist and Thomistic principles as well as what we have received from divine revelation is a much-needed tonic not only for students of theology and philosophy but for all those interested in discovering the role of human reason and biology in crafting a sexual ethic.After an introduction, the proper beginning of Pruss’s analysis is found in chapter 2. Here, the author discusses love and its forms with a particular focus on the meaning of agapē in the New Testament. Pruss argues that, philosophically speaking, we should love everyone. But love should not be understood as monolithic. There are various kinds of love: agapē, philia, and erōs. The New Testament understanding of agapē contains the other two, for it is love itself. This kind of love is a love that loves the other as the other is, for the other’s sake, and in a way that is appropriate to that person in the light of objective facts. Moreover, this kind of love is not simply a feeling or an emotion but is concentrated in an action that is an expression of one’s will.In chapter 3, Pruss takes up the issue of desire. He evaluates desire in two ways: (1) desire and libido, and (2) sexual desire, need, and pleasure. He [End Page 485] concludes that sexual desire is not a need in the same way that we desire food, drink, communication, love, and to be loved. Without these latter, human life would be seriously lacking or, in the case of food and drink, quickly cut short. Second, he observes that circumstances may not be appropriate for fulfilling one’s sexual desire. Finally, while human life would be seriously compromised by the lack of food, drink, communication, love, and the need to be loved, abstaining from the fulfillment of sexual desire even over a long period of time would not be detrimental to human well-being in the same way.Pruss does not imply by the preceding that sexuality does not matter. Chapter 4, in fact, deals with the meaningfulness of sexuality. There are two sets of rules regarding sexuality and its expression. Some rules are moral in nature, like the prohibition against rape. Other rules are customs, for example, the exchanging of rings after the exchange of marital vows. With respect to the moral rules regarding sexuality, Pruss highlights casual sex, sexual assault, gay rights, and romantic love. Apart from sexual assault and rape—both of which lack consent—casual sex, homosexual sex, and romantic love have the following in common, namely, that sex is indeed innately important to human beings and that sex aspires to be romantic in nature. While, as in the case of casual sex, romantic love does not necessarily give rise to true love, romantic love is often the prelude to a deep and unique form of love. Why this is so has to do with the meaning of sexual union.Sexual union is the topic of chapter 5, presented under the title “One Flesh, One Body.” Scripture, Pruss affirms, describes the person as... (shrink)

This article aims to explore representation of the content knowledge of historical Malay manuscripts by extracting the event features using an event ontology framework. The manuscript used during the testing is Sulalatus Salatin (Sejarah Melayu ) by Abdul Ahmad Samad and it was published at University of Malaya Digital Library database. In aligning to a domain-specific ontology, the Simple Event Model (SEM) model is adopted and an event-based ontology for historical Malay manuscripts is designed. Information extraction approach is done manually (...) to extract events from the manuscript and mapped into Protégé editor. Competency questions were constructed and submitted to the Protégé editor using SPARQL to check the ontology capability of providing answers as well as to examine its correctness. Event-based ontology model assists in discovering and representing the content knowledge of historical Malay manuscripts and supports organisation of knowledge. All the main concepts are extracted from selected Malay manuscript and 17 concepts used to develop the event-based ontology model. The knowledge was verified by three domain experts in Malay manuscript. In the findings, the interrater reliability for Event and Actor instances is 84%, which means 16% of instances and its type are incorrect and need amendment. For Place, interrater reliability is 95% and 99% for Role. Meanwhile, the experts achieved 100% agreement for Time. In addition, the experts agreed that the concepts, properties and instances for Malay Manuscript Ontology and complied with the criteria of consistency, completeness, conciseness, expandability and ease of use. The development of the event-based model of an ontology-based system with a high level of semantic granularity reflects the various cultural riches and intellectual aspect stored in Malay manuscripts. This will enable systematic research of the knowledge embedded in the manuscripts and make it widely and easily accessible by everyone. (shrink)

In Chinese scholarship, Xunzi is often regarded as an eclectic Confucian master who accepted some form of utilitarian thoughts (e.g. Fung Yu-lan, Mou Zongsan and Xu Fuguan). This characteristic was also observed by some western scholars such as Benjamin I. Schwartz. In a recent study, I argued that the basic character of Xunzi’s philosophy is utilitarianism in a broad sense based on an examination on his intellectual criticism and political criticism. Xunzi asserts that humans are innately driven by self-interested desires, (...) and he evaluates all intellectual works and political behaviours by their utility. However, he does not limit utility to only basic animal desires such as food and sex. In Xunzi’s view, humans also have innate emotions; hence, these emotions should also be accounted for in their utility. This is similar to John Stuart Mill’s redefinition of Bentham’s concept of utility. Are Xunzi’s and Mill’s concepts of utility exactly the same? This question has yet to be examined. This article is a comparative study between utilitarianism and Xunzi’s philosophy which especially explores the compatibility of these two philosophies. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Opining the articuli fidei:Thomas Aquinas on the Heretic’s Assent to the Articles of FaithM. V. DoughertyTHOMAS AQUINAS’S ACCOUNT of the infused virtue (habitus) of faith presupposes that some intrinsically intelligible truths are beyond the range of the natural cognitive abilities of human beings. The possession of the virtue of faith allows the believer to transcend certain natural epistemic limitations so that he can assent to truths that are necessary (...) for salvation. Consonant with the Catholic theological tradition, Aquinas refers to such truths as the articles of faith (articuli fidei), and stock examples include propositions concerning the Trinity and the Incarnation.1In light of the many and well-known texts from the Corpus Thomisticum that highlight the disproportion or incommensurability between the articles of faith and the natural cognitive abilities of human beings, it would not be unreasonable for one to assume that faith is required to assent to such articles of faith [End Page 1] in this life. Such an interpretive assumption could be expressed as:A1: A human being can assent to the articles of faith in this life if and only if the human being is fortified with the infused virtue of faith.One might be led to ascribe A1 to Aquinas when one considers that he criticizes the Pelagians precisely for maintaining that the assent to matters of faith is caused by nothing other than free will.2 Still further, one might think that strong evidence for A1 is Aquinas’s claim that “free will does not suffice for believing, since those things that are of faith are above reason.”3I argue, however, that A1’s identification of the virtue of faith as a necessary condition for the assent to the articles of faith does not adequately reflect Aquinas’s position, despite the many texts that may suggest such a view.4 That Aquinas does not endorse A1 can be made evident by examining his largely overlooked account of the epistemic state of the heretic (haereticus). To be sure, most commentators who explore the Thomistic treatment of heresy focus on the psychology of error underlying the heretic’s denial of one or more of the articles of faith.5 In the present paper I take an alternate path, however, focusing on those epistemic acts whereby the heretic gets its [End Page 2] right, so to speak, by correctly assenting to some of the articles of faith. Aquinas maintains that the heretic does not possess the infused virtue of faith yet still assents to all the articles of faith except for the one or more articles that he denies. Bereft of faith, the heretic “holds those things that are of faith by another mode than through faith.”6 This seemingly anomalous epistemic condition deserves consideration.7I. Intellects without FaithThe heretic appears to be cognitively privileged, since without faith he assents to the things that are of faith, seemingly overcoming without divine assistance the aforementioned disproportion between the limited range of reason and the articles of faith. Aquinas is aware of the apparent difficulty; in the Summa theologiae he defuses the rather unusual objection that heretics appear to have greater cognitive capacities than the faithful, since heretics routinely and unassistedly assent to those higher truths without possessing the virtue of faith.8 Aquinas concludes that the heretic holds the articles of faith by opinion (opinio), not faith.What makes one a heretic? Frequently Aquinas identifies obstinacy (pertinacia, instantia) as a necessary condition for heresy.9 The cause of heresy is at times identified with pride [End Page 3] (superbia).10 On Aquinas’s account, heresy is a species of unbelief (infidelitas) and every heretic is a schismatic.11 But the heretic does get many things right. If one were to deny all of the articles of faith, one would not qualify as a heretic, but would simply be a nonbeliever or an apostate. So, apart from the denial of an article (or a few articles) that specifies heretics as the distinct kind of heretic they happen to be, heretics for the most part succeed in assenting to most—but not all—of the articles of faith.Although the... (shrink)

The article devoted to the analysis of theoretical and conceptual developments of the Russian Social Democrats in the emigrant period. The authors note that the concept of democratic socialism, which began to be formed in 1917, was considerably amended and deepened when the Mensheviks created a new party program developed in 1922-1924. The significance of this program of the RSDLP is practically not evaluated in the science literature. In the analysis of Soviet historiography, the authors of the article outlined the (...) lack of attention to the projects of the Mensheviks in emigration, as the researchers insisted on the collapse of the RSDLP in post-October period. Some of modern researchers are highly skeptical about the intellectual developments of the Russian Social Democrats after the events of October 1917. However, the authors identified a number of innovative elements in the projects of the Mensheviks in this time. The new party program is an original stage in the formation of the concept of post-revolutionary development of Russia. In the course of the inner-party discussion, the differences in assessing the degree of Russia’s readiness for socialist transformation, as well as the Bolshevik experiment with various internal political trends, were sharply denoted. The article analyzes the positions of representatives of the official Mensheviks and the right wing of the party. The authors acknowledge the significant transformation of the political attitudes of the Mensheviks, pointing to some delusional and utopian nature of a number of program theses. (shrink)