_The International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE) is a working group of editors of selected medical journals that meets annually. Founded in Vancouver, Canada, in 1978, it currently consists of 11 member journals and a representative of the US National Library of Medicine. The major purpose of the Committee is to address and provide guidance for the conduct and publishing of biomedical research and the ethical tenets underpinning these activities. This advice is detailed in the Committee's _ Uniform Requirements (...) for Manuscripts Submitted to Biomedical Journals: Writing and Editing for Biomedical Publication (URM)._ Recently, the ICMJE has adopted an interventionist role to ensure transparency of conflict of interest revelations in the conduct and publication of industry supported research. It also pursues a policy for the lodgement with trial registries of specified details of Phase III clinical trials. Failure to comply would jeopardise publication of trial outcomes in ICMJE member journals. This policy has resulted in the coming on stream of trial registries, international agreement on trial minimal datasets and compliance with trial registration requirements._. (shrink)

Sometimes metaphysicians appeal to simplicity as a reason to prefer one metaphysical theory to another, especially when a philosophical dispute has otherwise reached a state of equilibrium. In this paper, I show that given a Quinean conception of metaphysics, several initially plausible justifications for simplicity as a metaphysical criterion do not succeed. If philosophers wish to preserve simplicity as a metaphysical criterion, therefore, they must radically reconceive the project of metaphysics.

This chapter contains sections titled: The Prima Facie Duty to Obey: A Brief History Implications of Catechistic Metaethics for the Duty of Obedience Implications of Commonalist Metaethics for the Duty of Obedience Conclusion References.

Ch. 1. Antropogenez -- ch. 2. Problema t︠s︡elesoobraznosti -- ch. 3. Dialektika kak geneticheskai︠a︡ logika.

Der siegreiche Zug der technische Zivilisation zerstörte die Harmonie des Menschen und der Umwelt, änderte traditionelle Wertvorstellungen. Der "technische Intellekt" ist nicht befähigt, Konkrete Probleme der menschlichen Geschichte zu lösen. Unter dem Vorwand des Kampfes mit diesem "technischem Intellekt" verstärken sich in der modernen Welt irrationalistlische Tendenzen, welche die Vernunft und die menschliche Rationalität im allgemeinen angreifen. In dieser Situation wächst die Rolle der sozialen Erkenntnis, di dialektisch-materialistische Rationalität verkörpert.

(1979). A Comparison of Item‐ Total Point Biserial Correlation, Rasch and Alpha‐Beater Item Analysis Procedures. Educational Studies: Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 265-273.

‘A is a better X than B’ is to mean the same as ‘If one is choosing an X, then, if one chooses B, one ought to choose A’ (R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals, p. 184).

Lloyd Weinreb, Oedipus at Fenway Park: What Rights There Are and Why There Are Any Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994, viii, 221 pp.

In this paper we define the concept of a system function language which is a language generated by a system function. We identify system function languages with recursively enumerable sets which are non-simple and co-infinite. We then define restricted system function languages and identify them with recursive sets which are co-infinite. Finally we state and prove some independence and dependence relationships between system function languages and some of the more well-known decision problems. MSC: 03D05, 03D20, 03D25.

On Avicenna, 980-1037, a Muslim philosopher.

Is arguing over ontology a mistake? A recent proposal by Karen Bennett suggests that some metaphysical disputes, such as those over constitution and composition, can be dismissed on epistemic grounds. Given that both sides in a dispute try to minimize the differences between them, there are no good metaphysical grounds for choosing between them. In this paper, I expand on her epistemic dismissivism, arguing that given the Quinean conception of the task and method of metaphysics, we are warranted in believing (...) that all ontological disputes will end in a draw, even if they have not yet done so. By a draw, I mean that while both sides in a dispute are genuinely disagreeing about what there is and there are still moves open to them, there are no moves remaining that will advance the discourse further. (shrink)

A free logical analysis of singular terms couched in terms of the semantic theory of Keenan and Faltz is shown to avoid problems with both Frege's and Russell's treatments. At its heart is the proposal of Keenan and Faltz to reverse the usual mode-theoretic conception of individuals and properties, taking the latter as primitive and the former as derived therefrom. A simple extension of the notion 'property' is then shown to enable a parallel treatment of definite generics.

Will understanding our brains help us to know our minds? Or is there an unbridgeable distance between the work of neuroscience and the workings of human consciousness? In a remarkable exchange between neuroscientist Jean-Pierre Changeux and philosopher Paul Ricoeur, this book explores the vexed territory between these divergent approaches--and comes to a deeper, more complex perspective on human nature.Ranging across diverse traditions, from phrenology to PET scans and from Spinoza to Charles Taylor, What Makes Us Think? revolves around a central (...) issue: the relation between the facts of science and the prescriptions of ethics. Changeux and Ricoeur ask: Will neuroscientific knowledge influence our moral conduct? Is a naturally based ethics possible? Pursuing these questions, they attack key topics at the intersection of philosophy and neuroscience: What are the relations between brain states and psychological experience? Between language and truth? Memory and culture? Behavior and action? What is a mental representation? How does a sign relate to what it signifies? How might subjective experience be constructed rather than discovered? And can biological or cultural evolution be considered progressive? Throughout, Changeux and Ricoeur provide unprecedented insight into what neuroscience can--and cannot--tell us about the nature of human experience.Changeux and Ricoeur bring an unusual depth of engagement and breadth of knowledge to each other's subject. In doing so, they make two often hostile disciplines speak to one another in surprising and instructive ways--and speak with all the subtlety and passion of conversation at its very best. (shrink)