In this paper, we propose two agent-based simulation models for the evolution of language in the framework of evolutionary language games. The theory of evolutionary language games arose from the union of evolutionary game theory, introduced by the English biologist John Maynard Smith, and language games, developed by the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. The first model proposed is based on Martin Nowak’s work and is designed to reproduce and verify the results Nowak obtained in his simplest mathematical (...) model. For the second model, we extend the previous one with the introduction of a world where the languages live and evolve, and which influences interactions among individuals. The main goal of this research is to present a model which shows how the presence of a topological structure influences the communication among individuals and contributes to the emergence of clusters of different languages. (shrink)

Modern technology offers an increasing number of tools for teaching mathematics, but technology adoption in schools encounters many barriers. The Technology Acceptance Model explains that technology usage is dependent on intentions, which rest on perceived ease of use and perceived usefulness. Less is known about the relationship between intentions and actual behaviour. In the current study we show that the level of cognitive investment on the part of the teachers, captured by the construct of Need for Cognition (NC), is crucial (...) in the use of technology in mathematical instruction, while controlling for a variety of background factors. Furthermore NC moderates the relationship between intentions and technology use, such that high NC weakens the relationship between the perceived usefulness of technology in pedagogy and its actual use. (shrink)

Excerpt from Vorlesungen Über das Wesen der Religion: Nebst Zusätzen und Anmerkungen Sch reihe fie meinen fammtliehen qberfen 016 ben achten sbanb an, weil ber 6chlu6 mit bem i'befen be6 @heiftenthume ein finniofer, bem b[an' bee 3bee, biz meiner (R)efammtaugahe 511 @mnbe liegt, burchauo miberfpmhenbee Ware. S>iefer gnfolge habe ich ba qbefen be6 (shtiftenthumo an meiner erften, b. H. Fruhften thrift gemacht, unb bahn abfiehttich bte @efammtauagabe mit ben (erlauterungen unb @rgangungen gum qbefen be6 @hriftenthumo begonnen. Sda nun aber bafl'elbe (...) buch auch in hie (c)efammtauogabe mit aufgenommen merben mute, fo eefcheint e6 feet bem (R)ruef nach 16 mein Iehte6 bert, mein Ieter qbifle unb (c)ebanfe. S)tefer trugerifche 6chein mu bahn auf; gehoben, ba6 (shetflenthum auf ben *blah guruefgebrangt werben, ber ihm in %ahrhcit gebuhrt. $dte6 gefehieht aber bureh btefeoflefungen. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to put forward an alternative to what I shall call "the received view on phenomenal concepts". According to this view, our concepts of phenomenal states directly refer to these states. I claim, on the contrary, that phenomenal concepts are _descriptive, indirect_ _and_ _relational_. More precisely, I endorse a descriptivist analysis according to which phenomenal concepts are descriptive concepts having perceptual demonstratives as constituents. I introduce and discuss two distinctions: the distinction between the perceptible properties (...) of objects and the qualitative characters of experiences on the one hand, and the corresponding distinction between perceptual demonstratives of perceptible properties and phenomenal concepts on the other. I then proceed as follows. Firstly, I state the main motivations behind the received view. Then, I try to show that every argument that can be advanced in favor of the received view is either powerless against my descriptivist position, or can be re-interpreted as an argument supporting it. In particular, I argue to the effect that some of the main motivations which are usually taken for granted when accepting the received view rest upon a fallacy, which I call the. (shrink)

1. Erlangen 1829-1832 -- 2. Erlangen 1830-1832.