A major source of latter-day skepticism about necessity is the work of David Hume. Hume is widely taken to have endorsed the Humean claim: there are no necessary connections between distinct existences. The Humean claim is defended on the grounds that necessary connections between wholly distinct things would be mysterious and inexplicable. Philosophers deploy this claim in the service of a wide variety of philosophical projects. But Saul Kripke has argued that it is false. According to Kripke, there are necessary (...) connections between distinct existences; in particular, there are necessary connections between material objects and their material origins. In this paper I argue that the primary motivation for the Humean claim, Hume's datum, also motivates the key premise in an argument for the necessity of origins. The very considerations that the Humean takes to show that necessary connections between wholly distinct things would be mysterious and inexplicable indicate that there must be some such necessary connections. Thus, in the absence of alternative support, there is no reason to believe the Humean claim. (shrink)

Medicalization in contemporary psychopharmacology is increasingly dominated by commercial interests that threaten the scientific and ethical integrity of psychiatry. At the same time, the proliferation of new social media has altered the manner in which the social groups and institutions that have stakes in medicalization interact. Consumers are at once more powerful than ever before, but also more vulnerable. The upshot of all these developments is that medicalization is no longer simply the professed enemy of anti-psychiatry and its supporters. It (...) is now also an enemy of psychiatry. Once a welcome ally of psychiatry, medicalization appears to have turned into a fearsome enemy. (shrink)

Montesquieu: politics and history.--Rousseau: the social contract.--Marx's relation to Hegel.

Ce recueil d'articles, publié pour la première fois en 1965 aux Editions François Maspero, a connu un succès exceptionnel pour un ouvrage théorique : quinze tirages (soit 45 000 exemplaires) et de très nombreuses traductions. Comme le notait Elisabeth Badinter dans Combat du 25 avril 1974 : "Les étudiants et les intellectuels marxistes découvrirent Althusser et à travers lui, sinon un nouveau Marx, du moins une nouvelle façon de le lire. Depuis la Critique de la raison dialectique de Sartre, Althusser (...) est le seul philosophe à proposer une interprétation vraiment originale des œuvres de Marx. " Depuis les années 1960, les études marxistes n'ont pu ignorer cette approche qui établissait une "coupure épistémologique" dans l'œuvre marxienne, séparant les textes idéologiques du jeune Marx de ceux plus scientifiques du Marx de la maturité. Elle offrait aussi une autre évaluation de l'apport de Hegel à Marx et n'hésitait pas à s'inspirer des réflexions philosophiques de Mao Zedong pour nourrir sa propre philosophie. Rares sont les livres ayant suscité autant de passions théoriques et provoqué autant de débats. "Comment expliquer une telle influence? D'abord, évidemment, par la nouveauté qui caractérise, dans les années 1960-1965, sa lecture de Marx. Lecture "symptomale ", au sens freudien du terme, c'est-à-dire attentive au non-dit tout autant qu'au discours explicite... Il s'agit d'en finir avec la version humaniste, bavarde et idéologique du marxisme vulgaire et de donner le jour à une véritable pratique révolutionnaire, fondée sur un savoir rigoureux. " Le Monde. (shrink)

Industrial animal agriculture is a significant driver of climate change, habitat loss, and the ongoing extinction crisis, all of which will continue to accelerate as global demand for animal products grows. Plant-based alternatives to animal products, which have existed for over a thousand years, offer a potential solution to this problem, as the intersection of recent technological innovation and shifting capital investment trends have ushered in a new era of alternative proteins that are redefining food categories like meat, eggs, and (...) milk. To better understand these evolving food forms, their attendant technologies, and the opportunities they afford for ameliorating the impacts of industrial animal farming, this article provides a genealogy of plant-based alternative proteins, with a particular focus on the current era and the role that design principles like biomimicry and skeuomorphism play in reproducing the organoleptic properties (the sensorial, experiential aspects) of animal products. Comparing the alternative protein market to other markets in which more sustainable foods and energy have failed to displace their environmentally destructive counterparts, it concludes by considering if whether creating novel new protein forms, rather than imitating conventional animal products, may afford a more promising path toward transformation of the food system. (shrink)

The theory of biological autonomy provides a naturalized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purposively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist (...) conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. (shrink)

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

In this paper I review some leading developments in the empirical theory of affect. I argue that (1) affect is a distinct perceptual representation governed system, and (2) that there are significant modular factors in affect. The paper concludes with the observation thatfeeler (affective perceptual system) may be a natural kind within cognitive science. The main purpose of the paper is to explore some hitherto unappreciated connections between the theory of affect and the computational theory of mind.

When evolutionary explanation is transferred from its normal habitat of biology to the realm of human social, cultural, and moral concerns, a problem is often neglected. After examining arguments for and against Social Darwinism, this paper identifies this problem and proceeds by exploring the possibility of a middle-ground position according to which Social Darwinism would be enough for explaining some aspects of moral and social behaviour but not enough for explaining all aspects. The investigation indicates that this middle-ground position is (...) not viable because intentional content burdens evolutionary ethics with fundamental problems, problems that need to be resolved before any further progress is attainable. (shrink)

A raft of new philosophical problems concerning truth have recently been discovered by several theorists. These problems concern the question of how ascriptions of truth are to be grounded. Most previous commentators have taken the problems to shed light on the theory of ground. In this paper, I argue that they also shed light on the theory of truth. In particular, I argue that the notion of ground can be deployed to clearly articulate one strand of deflationary thinking about truth, (...) according to which truth is “metaphysically lightweight.” I offer a ground-theoretic explication of the lightness of truth and show how it yields a novel solution to the problems concerning how truth is grounded. So, the theory of truth and the theory of ground interact fruitfully: we can apply the notion of ground to offer a clear explication of the deflationist claim that truth is “metaphysically lightweight” that both captures the motivations for that claim and solves the problems. (shrink)

One of the nation's leading military ethicists, Louis P. Pojman argues that globalism and cosmopolitanism motivate the need for greater international cooperation based on enforceable international law. The best way to realize the promises of globalism and cogent moral arguments for cosmopolitanism, Pojman contends, is through the establishment of a World Government.

This is a chapter on the history of ideas related to recovery. Moral treatment was a novel approach to caring for mentally ill patients that arose towards the end of the eighteenth century in Europe, and then spread to North America. It is most famously associated with the names of William Tuke in York, and Philippe Pinel in Paris. These two very different men—Tuke was a wealthy English Quaker businessman and philanthropist, and Pinel was a famous French medical author and (...) doctor—formulated two quite different approaches to the care of the mentally ill. Yet there are also important similarities in their approaches. The concept of “recovery” plays a fundamental role in both Tuke's and Pinel's conceptions of the care and treatment of mental illness. It is interesting, and important, to consider the underlying premises of their respective clinical approaches as we consider the nature and origins of the concept of “recovery” today. (shrink)

The book covers all of the major discussions of the concept, from Longinus, Johnson, Dennis, Burke, and Kant, up to Mallarme. Kant's structural model of the sublime moment is translated into terms suitable for literary analysis.

Dans les notes préparatoires à sa thèse le jeune Marx fait le lien entre la création philosophique et la Création originelle. Son travail de lecture d’Epicure l’amène à poser puis à évacuer la question de l’Origine. Dans cette évacuation c’est la question du sens qui disparaît elle aussi. Ou plus précisément, l’évacuation de la transcendance au profit de l’immanence ne trouve sa pertinence euristique que dans une redéfinition du sens non plus comme logique qui produit l’homme, mais comme logique inaugurée (...) par l’homme. (shrink)

La position de Schopenhauer vis-à-vis de Spinoza relève à la fois de l’attirance pour celui qui a « intuitionné » la force de la volonté, et du rejet pour celui qui inspire la philosophie de son époque. Sa lecture de Spinoza consistera à le reléguer dans son époque et à ôter tout fondement aux tentatives néo-spinozistes.

In this text the ancient philosophical question of determinism (“Does every event have a cause ?”) will be re-examined. In the philosophy of science and physics communities the orthodox position states that the physical world is indeterministic: quantum events would have no causes but happen by irreducible chance. Arguably the clearest theorem that leads to this conclusion is Bell’s theorem. The commonly accepted ‘solution’ to the theorem is ‘indeterminism’, in agreement with the Copenhagen interpretation. Here it is recalled that indeterminism (...) is not really a physical but rather a philosophical hypothesis, and that it has counterintuitive and far-reaching implications. At the same time another solution to Bell’s theorem exists, often termed ‘superdeterminism’ or ‘total determinism’. Superdeterminism appears to be a philosophical position that is centuries and probably millennia old: it is for instance Spinoza’s determinism. If Bell’s theorem has both indeterministic and deterministic solutions, choosing between determinism and indeterminism is a philosophical question, not a matter of physical experimentation, as is widely believed. If it is impossible to use physics for deciding between both positions, it is legitimate to ask which philosophical theories are of help. Here it is argued that probability theory – more precisely the interpretation of probability – is instrumental for advancing the debate. It appears that the hypothesis of determinism allows to answer a series of precise questions from probability theory, while indeterminism remains silent for these questions. From this point of view determinism appears to be the more reasonable assumption, after all. (shrink)

Axiomatizations of measurement systems usually require an axiom--called an Archimedean axiom--that allows quantities to be compared. This type of axiom has a different form from the other measurement axioms, and cannot--except in the most trivial cases--be empirically verified. In this paper, representation theorems for extensive measurement structures without Archimedean axioms are given. Such structures are represented in measurement spaces that are generalizations of the real number system. Furthermore, a precise description of "Archimedean axioms" is given and it is shown that (...) in all interesting cases "Archimedean axioms" are independent of other measurement axioms. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume's Moral Sentiments and the Structure of the Treatise LOUIS E. LOEB ACCORDING TO NORMAN KEMP SMITH and Thomas Hearn, Hume classified moral sentiments as direct passions.' According to Pb.II A,rdal, Hume classified the basic moral sentiments of approval and disapproval of persons as indirect passions. if either of these interpretations is correct, there is an intimate connection between Books II and 111 of Hume's Treatise. This is (...) because the direct and indirect passions (together with the will) are the subject of Book 11 and moral sentiments are discussed in Book 111. So if moral sentiments are special cases of either direct or indirect passions, the treatment of passions in Book Ii is central to the understanding of Book 111. 1 contend, on the contrary, that Hume's moral sentiments are neither direct nor indirect passions. Consequently, the connection between Books 11 and 111 of the Treatise is much less intimate than A,rdal and Hearn have recently suggested.' i. Hume's Classification of the Impressions of Reflection In the four paragraphs of II, i, I Hume provides an exhaustive "Division of the Subject"--the "subject" being "all the perceptions of the mind. ''4 Nowhere else in the Treatise is a complete "division" to be found. As A,rdal points out, such introductory chapters "are likely to be written after the bulk of the book has been completed, or at least to be carefully revised in the light of the main arguments in the book. ''~ For these reasons, there is a strong presumption that the "division" in!I, i, 1should be taken as canonical. Hume's "division" is straightforward. In the first paragraph, perceptions are divided into ideas and impressions; in the first and second paragraphs, impressions are divided into those of sensation and those of reflection; in the third paragraph, impressions of reflection are divided into the calm and the violent; in the fourth (as I am indebted to Wdham Frankena, Ronald Glossop, and Peter Jones for their most helpful comments. ' Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume (New York: St. Martm'~ Press, 1966), pp. 167-168; and Thomas K. Hearn, Jr., "Ardal on the Moral Sentiments in Hume's rreattse," Phtlosophy 48 (1973):290. z Passton and Value m Hume's "Treatise" (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1966), pp. I 1, 109-133. For a discussion heavily influenced by Ardal, see Stewart R. Sutherland, "Hume on Morality and the Emotions," Phllosophwal Quarterly 26 (1976) : 14-19 especially. ' See Ardal, pp. I-5, 109-133; and Hearn, pp. 288, 292. 9 A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), p. 275; hereafter cited as T followed by page number. 9 Ardal, p. 94. 13951 396 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY indicated by the last sentence of the third), the violent impressions of reflection are divided into the direct and the indirect. The structure is of a genus-species sort, and none of the distinctions cut across each other: J calm i sense of beauty and deformity (T, 276), moral sentiments impressions of reflection = emotions (secondary impressions) violent = passions direct indirect desire, aversion, grief, joy, pride, humility, love, hope, fear (T, 277, 439) hatred (T, 276-277) This classification is based upon the only natural reading of paragraph three and the first sentence of paragraph four of II, i, I. I quote this material, adding my own emphasis and deleting Hume's: The reflective impressions may be divided into two kinds, viz. the calm and the violent. Of the first kind is the sense of beauty and deformity in action, composition, and external objects. Of the second are the passions of love and hatred, grief and joy, pride and humility. This division is far from being exact. The raptures of poetry and music frequently rise to the greatest height; while those other impressions, properly called passions, may decay into so soft an emotion, as to become, in a manner, imperceptible. But as in general the passions are more violent than the emotions arising from beauty and deformity, these impressions have been commonly distinguish'd from each other. The subject of the human mind being so copious and various, I shall here take... (shrink)

How should philosophy approach religious experience? Can philosophy do more than describe religious experience without discussing its object? Can religion make genuine truth claims? These are some of the questions raised in these essays.

• " Qu'on ne se méprenne pourtant pas : ce n'est pas la curiosité de son objet, mais son intelligence, qui est tout Montesquieu. Il ne voulait que comprendre. Nous avons de lui quelques images qui trahissent cet effort et sa fierté. Il ne pénétrait dans la masse infinie des documents et des textes, dans l'immense héritage des histoires, chroniques, recueils et compilations, que pour en saisir la logique, en dégager la raison. Il voulait tenir le "fil" de cet écheveau (...) que des siècles avaient emmêlé, tenir le fil et le tirer à lui, pour que tout vint. Tout venait. " • Cet essai décisif de philosophie politique marqua plusieurs générations de philosophes. Il ouvre des perspectives saisissantes dans une oeuvre réputée difficile, et conclut tout à trac " Un tel parcours pour revenir chez soi. ". (shrink)

V.1. livres I-IV V.2. livres V-VII. V.3 livres VIII-X.

- La bibliographie de l'auteur - Les protagonistes du dialogue de Diderot, A et B, discutent du Voyage autour du monde du navigateur français Louis Antoine de Bougainville récemment paru (en 1771). B propose de parcourir un prétendu Supplément qui en remet en question certaines soi-disant évidences énoncées par Bougainville. Deux passages de ce supplément sont enchâssés dans la discussion: Les adieux du vieillard, et le long Entretien de l'aumônier et d'Orou.

Hamilton games-theoretic conflict model, which applies Maynard Smith's concept of evolutionarily stable strategy to the Prisoner's Dilemma, gives rise to an inconsistency between theoretical prescription and empirical results. Proposed resolutions of thisproblem are incongruent with the tenets of the models involved. The independent consistency of each model is restored, and the anomaly thereby circumvented, by a proof that no evolutionarily stable strategy exists in the Prisoner's Dilemma.

This essay argues for the necessity of a phenomenological perspective on mind and mental disorder while also emphasizing the inherent difficulty of adopting such an orientation. Here I adopt a via negativa approach—by considering three forms of error that the phenomenologists Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty recognize as needing to be guarded against, lest they subvert the project of attaining an adequate understanding of consciousness or subjectivity: namely (1) prejudices deriving from theory and common sense, (2) distorting effects (...) of reflection, and (3) what Heidegger termed the forgetting of the ontological difference. Phenomenology insists on the importance of studying subjective life while also acknowledging the epistemological paradoxes inherent to this domain—a domain whose very self-evidence is inseparable from mystery, whose visibility conceals a deeper invisibility. I consider these issues in light of phenomenology’s relevance for certain issues in psychopathology and literary representation. (shrink)

Les principes fondamentaux régissant les rapports entre l’espace, le temps, l’objet et la causalité sont présentés et examinés. Il est découvert, par des expériences de pensée successives, que l’abandon de l’un ou l’autre de ces principes permettrait peut-être de résoudre de façon neuve des difficultés classiques de la philosophie comme la flèche de Zénon, Achille et la tortue ou le bateau de Thésée. Sont révélés à cette occasion plusieurs asymétries importantes existant entre l’espace et le temps, dans leurs rôles respectifs (...) vis-à-vis des objets matériels et de la relation causale. Le rapport entre le temps et la causalité est, enfin, plus particulièrement étudié. (shrink)

Althusser delivered these lectures on Rousseau's Discourse on the Origins of Inequality at the École normale supérieure in Paris in 1972. They are fascinating for two reasons. First, they gave rise to a new generation of Rousseau scholars, attentive not just to Rousseau's ideas, but also to those of his concepts that were buried beneath metaphors or fictional situations and characters. Second, we are now discovering that the "late Althusser's" theses about aleatory materialism and the need to break with the (...) strict determinism of theories of history in order to devise a new philosophy "for Marx" were being worked out well before 1985 in this reading of Rousseau dating from twelve years earlier, which introduces into Rousseau's text the ideas of the void, the accident, the take, and the necessity of contingency. (shrink)

This text derives from a recording, and transcripts, of the introduction which Althusser gave on 6 December 1963, to a seminar for students in the École Normale Supérieure, Paris, offered at his invitation by Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron. Althusser takes the opportunity to raise questions about the status of social science and suggests that Bourdieu and Passeron represent slightly different strands of contemporary research practice, partly as a result of their different formation and practice since themselves leaving the École. (...) Althusser first considers the relation between the human sciences and the traditionally instituted Faculty of Letters or Humanities. What is the origin of the compulsion to constitute a science of human relations? Given that the social sciences have established themselves, Althusser then tries to define their nature. He suggests that they have three forms: as abstract and general theory, as ethnology, and as empirical sociology. He discusses the pros and cons of each in some detail. Althusser then asks what are the features which constitute sciences and concludes that they must always possess discrete theoretical perspectives corresponding with discrete components of reality but must also possess an element of self-referentiality or, as he puts it, must be objects to themselves. Althusser suggests that his contemporary social sciences are not philosophically adequate by the criteria which he advances. He proceeds to introduce Bourdieu and Passeron in such a way as to invite consideration of whether their practices meet his criteria. (shrink)

t. 1. Sections I à X -- t. 2. Sections XI à XXVII -- t. 3. Sections XXVIII à XXXVIII et index.