In this paper, I argue against certain dogmas about ambivalence and alienation. Authors such as Harry Frankfurt and Christine Korsgaard demand a unity of persons that excludes ambivalence. Other philosophers such as David Velleman have criticized this demand as overblown, yet these critics, too, demand a personal unity that excludes an extreme form of ambivalence (“radical ambivalence”). I defend radical ambivalence by arguing that, to be true to oneself, one sometimes needs to be radically ambivalent. Certain dogmas about alienation are (...) even more entrenched. Allen Wood’s entry on “alienation” in the Oxford Companion to Philosophy begins as follows: “A psychological or social evil, characterized by one or another type of harmful separation, disruption or fragmentation, which sunders things that belong together.” I think that it is not true that self-alienation is necessarily “harmful.” I argue that radical ambivalence is a form of self-alienation. Thus, because faithfulness to oneself sometimes requires radical ambivalence, to be true to oneself, one sometimes needs to be alienated from oneself. (shrink)

As witnessed by recent films such as _Fight Club_ and _Identity_, our culture is obsessed with multiple personality—a phenomenon raising intriguing questions about personal identity. This study offers both a full-fledged philosophical theory of personal identity and a systematic account of multiple personality. Gunnarsson combines the methods of analytic philosophy with close hermeneutic and phenomenological readings of cases from different fields, focusing on psychiatric and psychological treatises, self-help books, biographies, and fiction. He develops an original account of personal identity (...) and offers a provocative interpretation of multiple personality: in brief, "multiples" are right about the metaphysics but wrong about the facts. (shrink)

The literature of bioethics suffers from two serious problems. (1) Most authors are unable to take seriously both the rights of the great apes and of severely disabled human infants. Rationalism—moral status rests on rational capacities—wrongly assigns a higher moral status to the great apes than to all severely disabled human infants with less rational capacities than the great apes. Anthropocentrism—moral status depends on membership in the human species—falsely grants all humans a higher moral status than the great apes. Animalism—moral (...) status is dependent on the ability to suffer—mistakenly equates the moral status of humans and most animals. (2) The concept person is widely used for justificatory purposes, but it seems that it cannot play such a role. It seems that it is either redundant or unable to play any justificatory role. I argue that we can solve the second problem by understanding person as a thick evaluative concept. This then enables us to justify assigning a higher moral status to the great apes than to simple animals: the great apes are persons. To solve the first problem, I argue that certain severely disabled infants have a higher moral status than the great apes because they are dependent upon human relationships for their well-being. Only very limited abilities are required for such relationships, and the question who is capable of them must be based on thick evaluative concepts. Thus, it turns out that to make progress in bioethics we must assign thick evaluative concepts a central role. (shrink)

One way to understand philosophy as a form of therapy is this: it involves a philosopher who is trying to cure himself. He has been drawn into a certain philosophical frame of mind—the ‘disease’—and has thus infected himself with this illness. Now he is sick and trying to employ philosophy to cure himself. So philosophy is both: the ailment and the cure. And the philosopher is all three: pathogenic agent, patient, and therapist.

Against influential strands of feminist theory, I argue that there is nothing essentialist or homogenising about the category ‘women’. I show that both intersectional claims that it is impossible to separate out the ‘woman part’ of women, and deconstructionist contentions that the category ‘women’ is a fiction, rest on untenable meta-theoretical assumptions. I posit that a more fruitful way of approaching this disputed category is to treat it as an abstraction. Drawing on the philosophical framework of critical realism I elucidate (...) the nature of the vital and inevitable process of abstraction, as a means of finding a way out of the theoretical and methodological impasse that the ‘ban’ on the category ‘women’ has caused. Contrary to many contemporary feminist theorists, I contend that, although the category ‘women’ does not reflect the whole reality of concrete and particular women, it nevertheless refers to something real, namely the structural position as woman. (shrink)

The affective turn -- Violence against women: perspectives and strategies -- Notes -- References -- PART III: Togetherness and its forms -- 7. Feminist visions and socio-political meanings of non-monogamous love -- Contemporary bonding, plurality of love -- Consensual plurality and sustainability of bonding -- Notes -- References -- 8. The invisible ties We share: A relational analysis of the contemporary loving couple -- The semantics of love and the We -- Love in situation: the WeLR in motion -- Enminded (...) bodies in the WeLR -- Final remarks: the bonds the WeLR creates -- Notes -- References -- 9. Silent love: On Irigaray's suggestion of cultivating sexual difference -- A culture of two subjects -- Listening -- The meaning of the word 'silence' -- Silence as a condition of love -- Cultivating silence -- Silent love -- Notes -- References -- 10. Love, feminism and dialectics: Repairing splits in theory and practice -- Dialectical critical realism -- Benjamin: from existential tension to oppressive contradiction -- Dialectics, necessity and redemptive critique -- The reparative turn and the issue of transformation -- In the pulse of now -- Closing words -- Notes -- References -- Index. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to defend the project of transforming philosophy carried out in my book Vernunft und Temperament. Eine Philosophie der Philosophie. In section 1, I distinguish between five philosophical genres in which transformation plays a role: 1. academic texts in which transformation is simply a topic; 2. texts meant to adequately articulate through their form the transformative experiences of their authors; 3. texts aiming to enable the reader to transform herself; 4. texts on other texts; 5. (...) manifestos defending the project of transforming philosophy. Section 2 is such a manifesto. Its main thesis is: “What makes somebody – anybody – a good philosopher is that she is a real human being.” Many of the remaining 16 theses of the manifesto are elaborations on this main thesis. One example is the thesis that the philosophical activity is essentially a becoming – the development of an individual human being. (shrink)

Is it rational to be moral? Can moral disputes be settled rationally? Which criteria determine what we have a good reason to do? In this innovative book, Logi Gunnarsson takes issue with the assumption made by many philosophers faced with the problem of reconciling moral norms with a scientific world view, namely that morality must be offered a non-moral justification based on a formal concept of rationality. He argues that the criteria for the rationality of an action are irreducibly (...) substantive, rather than purely formal, and that assuming that morality must be given a non-moral justification amounts to a distortion of both rationality and morality. His discussion includes substantial critical engagement with major thinkers from two very different philosophical traditions, and is notable for its clear and succinct account of Habermas' discourse ethics. It will appeal to anyone interested in practical reason and the rational credentials of morality. (shrink)

The thesis offers a theoretical account of how and why, in contemporary western societies characterized by formal-legal equality and women’s relative economic independence, women continue to be subordinated to men through sexuality and love. By means of an innovative application of Roy Bhaskar’s critical realism, dialectical critical realism and philosophy of metaReality, it investigates and elaborates Anna G. Jónasdóttir’s claim that men tend to exploit women of their ‘love power’. Also, the thesis advances a critique of the state of affairs (...) of contemporary feminist theory, demonstrating that the meta-theoretical framework of critical realism offers tools that can counter the poststructuralist hegemony in feminist theory. Part I engages in a comprehensive evaluation of Catharine MacKinnon’s, Judith Butler’s and Jónasdóttir’s theorizations of sexuality and gendered power. Insofar as the works of these theorists represent different philosophical paradigms, this critique opens up a discussion of more general meta-theoretical issues, which are elaborated in Part II, where poststructuralist feminist positions are challenged. Following Jónasdóttir’s broadening of the concept of sexuality so as to essentially include practices of love, in Part III the focus of the thesis is shifted from sexuality to love. Here a dialectical deepening and partial recasting of Jónasdóttir’s work is offered, by means of an application of dialectical critical realism and the philosophy of metaReality. The thesis outlines a feminist dialectical-realist depth ontology of love, sexuality and power, which constitutes an alternative to dominant discursive approaches to sexuality and attributes to love its proper place in our existence as sexual human creatures. Although the thesis makes a case for the tenacity of female subordination in and through sexuality and love, it ends on a more optimistic note, by offering a model of how women can break the shackles of love. (shrink)

The literature on theoretical reason has been dominated by epistemological concerns, treatments of practical reason by ethical concerns. This book overcomes the limitations of dealing with each separately. It sets out a comprehensive theory of rationality applicable to both practical and theoretical reason. In both domains, Audi explains how experience grounds rationality, delineates the structure of central elements, and attacks the egocentric conception of rationality. He establishes the rationality of altruism and thereby supports major moral principles. The concluding part describes (...) the pluralism and relativity his conception of rationality accommodates and, taking the unified account of theoretical and practical rationality in that light, constructs a theory of global rationality--the overall rationality of persons. Rich in narrative examples, intriguing analogies, and intuitively appealing arguments, this beautifully crafted book will spur advances in ethics and epistemology as well in philosophy of mind and action and the theory of rationality itself. (shrink)

After a time dominated by nature-phobia, a naturalistic turn is emerging within feminist theory. Welcoming this new theoretical embrace of nature and sympathising with its insistence that nature is not feminism’s enemy, this article nevertheless points to some problematic features of this turn. Focusing on Elizabeth Grosz’s postmodernist readings of Charles Darwin, I suggest that their emphasis of nature’s dynamic, indeterminate and enabling qualities both implies a politically unmotivated glorification of the dynamic and unruly, and as such obscures the important (...) fact that nature also works as a constraining factor on societies. I demonstrate, from the point of view of a Marxist-realist perspective, why an acknowledgement of nature’s limiting force is crucial for the coherence of any theoretical account of the workings of social systems. The article also addresses the feminist imperative to transcend the dualism between nature and culture, and shows how the concept of emergence offers a solution to dilemmas that tend to appear in connection to such efforts of transcendence. (shrink)

In this article I attempt to reconcile two seemingly conflicting theorisations of love, the one elaborated by Roy Bhaskar as part of his philosophy of meta-Reality and Anna G. Jónasdóttir’s historical materialist-radical feminist theory of love power. While Bhaskar emphasises the essentially non-dual character of love, envisioning it as a ‘no-lose situation’, Jónasdóttir stresses the antagonistic features structuring love relations by conceptualising love as a productive power that men tend to exploit women of. Rather than seeing these accounts as mutually (...) exclusive I show that they can be reconciled by aid of the general ontology elaborated by Bhaskar in his philosophy of meta-Reality. (shrink)

Disputes about how to understand intersectional relations often pivot around the tension between separateness and inseparability, where some scholars emphasize the need to separate between different intersectional categories while others claim they are inseparable. In this article the author takes issue with the either/or thinking that underpins an unnecessary and unproductive polarization in the debate over the in/separability of intersectional categories. Drawing on Roy Bhaskar’s dialectical critical realist philosophy, the author argues that we can think of intersectional categories as well (...) as different ontological levels as both distinct and unified and elaborates on the issue of how significance of the dialectical notion of unity-in-difference for intersectional studies. As part of the argument the author addresses the issue of what it actually means for something to be distinct or separate as opposed to inseparable or unified with something else, demonstrating that lack of clarity about this is at the heart of polarized arguments about separateness versus inseparability in intersectionality theory. (shrink)

The internet has given rise to an informational landscape that challenges epistemological hierarchies between experts and lay people. Tensions regarding how to address the growing flora of counter-authority claims are pertinent in the context of health, where warnings about misinformation co-exist with notions of patient empowerment. This context accentuates the importance of revitalizing conceptualizations of how to assess the validity of knowledge claims. In this article, we put critical realist discussions on judgemental rationality into conversation with the case of a (...) group of women who claim that the contraceptive copper IUD may lead to side effects of a kind not recognized by medical authorities. Tracing our own path from radical uncertainty to regarding the women’s claims as a plausible hypothesis, we identify what we deem to be strengths and weaknesses of the women’s claims and pinpoint the judgementally rational grounds for this assessment. (shrink)

This paper is the work of two fictional authors, the late Johannes Philologus and Johannes Commentarius. One part consists of Philologus’s philosophical reflections on a fragment that, unbeknownst to him, is identical to the first four paragraphs of the Preface and the last two numbered propositions of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Commentarius writes a preface to Philologus’s article and a commentary on it, in which he, like Philologus, addresses the question of how a work consisting of nonsense can be elucidatory. By (...) publishing his contribution together with that of Philologus, Commentarius wants to produce a work mirroring the structure of the Tractatus itself. (shrink)

[A Hand on the Shoulder: Touch as a Posthuman Feminist Phenomenon] With a posthuman feminist perspective, we explore touch as a phenomenon in the philosophy of education. Our argument is that touch is one of the prominent phenomena in educational contexts and therefore it requires closer theoretical investigation. In this article, we seek to challenge a ‘subject centric’ and ‘anthropocentric’ perspective, proposing a posthuman approach where touch is relationally intra-active and constantly present with multiple directions. Inspired by the methodological approach (...) ‘concept as method’, we explore the phenomenon of touch through tracing-and-cartographing how it is used in educational texts. Two central aspects – body and ‘natureculture’– appeared in the intersection of touch, education and posthuman feminism. Touch as an educational phenomenon is seen as active in highlighting everyday activities in educational practices, and pushing them to be questioned and disrupted. To conclude, we raise a few questions and discuss some challenges that emerged while working with touch as a posthuman feminist phenomenon. (shrink)

In this comparative analysis of the UK and Sweden, we consider, if inherited wealth is most deserving of redistributive taxation, then what lessons, if any, may be learned from the difficult paths faced by this tax in these countries. We conclude that the political momentum behind the Swedish family business was distinct, and, possibly, capable of travel to the UK. The research for this article is part of the FairTax EU project, which is funded by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 (...) research and innovation programme 2014-2018, grant agreement No. FairTax 649439. (shrink)

It has long been taboo for feminist theorists to draw on notions of nature in their conceptualizations of gender relations. Objecting to this nature-phobia, I argue that we need to anchor our social theories in explicit notions of the natural necessities on which any social structure draws and must ultimately accommodate. Such a reference to a ‘natural ontological order’ is needed not only for explaining how power structures can get a hold over people, but also for specifying the ways in (...) which the natural necessities impose absolute constraints on the forms that oppressive structures can take, ultimately creating a conatus to getting rid of the oppressive structure. In the human-social realm a crucial aspect of nature is those basic human needs that any society must meet in order to reproduce itself. One such human need that has been theoretically overlooked, although often implicitly assumed, is the need for love. Drawing on Anna G. Jónasdóttir's theory of ‘love power’, I elaborate on the contradictions inherent in the power that men acquire by exploiting women's love, arguing that these contradictions can be understood only with reference to natural necessities. (shrink)

This article explores how during the period of 1997 to 2003 the signifier of Sisterhood came to serve as an empty signifier within and among a number of small Swedish feminist grassroots publications. It begins by positioning the Swedish feminist zine community within the larger context of so-called ‘second and third wave feminisms’ but argues at the same time that it is important to break with traditional feminist chronologies, and resist reductive generational narratives of feminist movement history. On the basis (...) of this particular empirical case the article introduces an analytic of sexual logics as an alternative for analysing feminist discourse. From here the article goes on to investigate how the notion of Sisterhood has come to serve as an empty signifier within this specific community. It concludes with a more general discussion of the function of empty signifiers in relation to recent feminist discussions of Sisterhood. (shrink)

In this article I explore love's relation to gendered power asymmetries by comparing Anna Jónasdóttir's, Jessica Benjamin's and Teresa Brennan's respective theorizations of this theme. Despite the considerable differences between these feminist frameworks, they can all be read in terms of what I call the figure of the Dominant and its Constitutive Other. This refers to the contradictory relation whereby the powerful and ‘independent’ existence of the one is premised on that which is other to it, as well as on (...) the denial and obscuring of this constitutive dependence. Via a dialogue with critical realist and metaReal themes I move from a concern with how the feminine ‘Other’ tacitly constitutes the masculine Dominant through practices of love, to thematizing the basic stratum of being as the constitutive Other of the oppressive economy of love. The structure of the self emerges as a central organizing principle in the oppressive relations considered, and the article explores what might be a non-violent mode.. (shrink)

The aim of this review is to assess the ethical implications of finfish aquaculture, regarding fish welfare and environmental aspects. The finfish aquaculture industry has grown substantially the last decades, both as a result of the over-fishing of wild fish populations, and because of the increasing consumer demand for fish meat. As the industry is growing, a significant amount of research on the subject is being conducted, monitoring the effects of aquaculture on the environment and on animal welfare. The areas (...) of concern when it comes to animal welfare have here been divided into four different stages: breeding period; growth period; capturing and handling; and slaughter. Besides these stages, this report includes a chapter on the current evidence of fish sentience, since this issue is still being debated among biologists. However, most biologists are at present acknowledging the probability of fish being sentient creatures. Current aquaculture practices are affecting fish welfare during all four of the cited stages, both on physical and mental levels, as well as on the ability of fish to carry out natural behaviors. The effect fish farming has on the environment is here separated into five different categories: the decline of wild fish populations; waste and chemical discharge; loss of habitat; spreading of diseases; and invasion of exotic organisms. There is evidence of severe negative effects on the environment when looking at these five categories, even when considering the difficulty of studying environmental effects, due to the closely interacting variables. The ethical arguments and scientific evidences here reviewed have not all come to the same conclusions. Nevertheless, the general agreement is that current aquaculture practices are neither meeting the needs of fish nor environment. Thus, the obvious environmental and animal welfare aspects of finfish aquaculture make it hard to ethically defend a fish diet. (shrink)

The article explores the complex and multi-dimensional relationship between organization and discourse, using interview data and written documents collected within banks in Sweden, Germany and Britain. The first part of the analysis, which examines the extent to which the organizations studied can be said to form discourse units in their own right, shows that management ideas, norms and values seem to have a considerable impact on bank discourse. Although the discourse found in different banks naturally has many features in common, (...) each organization is found to be created at least partly differently by its discourse. Analyses of sender markings, expressive illocutions and expressions of thanks to the staff show how discourse is part of the construction of an organizational culture in relation to ideas concerning leadership, hierarchy, centralization etc. The second part of the analysis focuses on the role of the national community in the formation of an organization. An analysis of the bank images disseminated in spoken discourse and documents points to differences which could be attributed to national cultural patterns. The interview data further show how much effort is devoted to internally and externally disseminated images; this could be seen as a sign of an awareness among management of the decisive role of the spoken and written word for their company. (shrink)

Drei Thesen verfolgt der Beitrag: Eine empirische, zirkuläre Theorie kann wichtige Probleme in der Diskussion um „personale Identität“ lösen. Eine Korrelatstheorie bietet die richtige Antwort auf die Frage „Was bin ich grundlegend?“: Ich bin grundlegend ein Akteur, der ein Korrelat zu den psychologischen Verbindungen ist, für die er minimal verantwortlich ist. Meine Identität kann auf Grund einer Festlegungstheorie erläutert werden, das heißt auf Grund der Relationen Festlegungsrevision und Festlegungserhalt.

It is commonly supposed that morality faces a justificatory crisis. Rationalism seeks to resolve this crisis by means of a direct response to the moral sceptic--to the person who doubts that there is a rational way of deciding what moral position to adopt or whether to be moral at all. I argue that the very aspirations of rationalism--to seek a refutation of the sceptic that concedes her initial standpoint and to base morality on a formal concept of rationality--are misguided. As (...) an alternative, I introduce an approach which has neither of these aspirations--the substantive approach--and argue that it offers a more satisfactory justificatory ideal than rationalism. When measured by this ideal morality does not face a justificatory crisis. ;I argue that both subjectivist and inter-subjectivist rationalists fail to refute the sceptic. I consider the possibility that there is something specific to subjectivism which gives rise to the appearance that morality faces a justificatory crisis and argue that the justificatory standards set up by inter-subjective rationalism--if not met--equally give rise to the same appearance. Thus, it might be thought that rationalism's failure to refute the sceptic reveals that morality does indeed face a justificatory crisis. Instead, I contend that the rationalistic standards themselves should be rejected. To demotivate rationalism, I argue that the substantive approach makes better sense of our lives. The task of making sense of our lives includes not only the task of making our lives intelligible but also one of rendering them meaningful. With regard to subjectivist rationalism, I argue that agents employ substantive reasons in the attempt to make sense of themselves, that this employment of substantive reasons is part and parcel of a meaningful life, and that rationalism's formal concept of rationality cannot capture this use of these reasons. In the case of inter-subjectivist rationalism, I claim that in criticizing others for, say, cruel acts it is the cruelty of those acts that we should focus on and that in its attempt to refute the moral sceptic rationalism distorts our view on such matters. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Internationales Jahrbuch für philosophische Anthropologie Jahrgang: 5 Heft: 1 Seiten: 73-86.

I argue for two theses: 1) An unconscious belief that p is not the same attitude as a conscious belief that p (here I am disagreeing with David Finkelstein and Richard Moran). 2) An unconscious belief that p is the attitude it is on account of its rational connection with the conscious belief that p (taking issue with Georges Rey). I defend parallel theses for emotions. I then argue that Wittgenstein can be understood as accepting both theses and that this (...) shows – contrary to the interpretations of Jacques Bouveresse and Donald Levy – that Wittgenstein can accept talk not only of descriptive but also dynamic unconscious states (in Freud's terminology). (shrink)

A subject who has a self-transformation behind herself—say, a conversion to Catholicism—may say of herself "before transforming myself, I was a different person�. How are we to understand such a claim? Obviously, there is a sense in which the subject takes herself to be the same as before and another sense in which she considers herself to be somebody else now. One possible way of understanding it would be the following: Despite the change involved in the selftransformation, there is enough (...) similiarity between the preconversion subject—S1—and the converted subject— S2—to say that they are numerically identical. And there is enough difference for the subject to speak of herself before the self-transformation as another person. (shrink)

Tim Henning, Person sein und Geschichten erzählen: Eine Studie über personale Autonomie und narrative Gründe Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-3 DOI 10.1007/s10677-012-9341-z Authors Logi Gunnarsson, Department of Philosophy, University of Potsdam, 14469 Potsdam, Germany Journal Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Online ISSN 1572-8447 Print ISSN 1386-2820.

In this paper we analyse and discuss the views of Swedish stakeholders on how to mitigate climate change to the extent it is caused by meat production. The stakeholders include meat producer organisations, governmental agencies with direct influence on meat production, political parties as well as non-governmental organisations. Representatives of twelve organisations were interviewed. Several organisations argued against the mitigation option of reducing beef production despite the higher greenhouse gas intensity of beef compared to pork and chicken meat (according to (...) life cycle analysis). Regarding feed production some organisations proposed use of the best available industrial fertilizers, others were against all use of such fertilizers. Several organizations suggested domestic production of more protein-rich fodder and use of manure for biogas production. Regarding meat consumption the focus was on throwing away less food as waste and on eating less meat but the best (most climate friendly) meat, which was considered to be Swedish meat in contrast to imported meat. There was agreement on many issues. Most disagreement was found regarding political steering. We find many of the stakeholders’ mitigation proposals regarding meat production and consumption acceptable. However, we are to some extent critical to their defence of Swedish beef production. We also point out certain problems with the suggestion to reduce consumption of imported meat but not of domestically produced meat. (shrink)

A frequent justification in the literature for using stated preference methods (SP) is that they are the only methods that can capture the so-called total economic value (TEV) of environmental changes to society. Based on follow-up interviews with SP survey respondents, this paper addresses the implications of that argument by shedding light on the construction of TEV, through respondents’ perspective. It illuminates the deficiencies of willingness to pay (WTP) as a measure of value presented as three aggregated themes considering respondents’ (...) unintentionality, their retraction once they understood that their WTP could be decisive in cost-benefit analysis and the inherent incompleteness of WTP. We discuss why the TEV discourse persists, how it conceals rather than reveals broader notions of value and in what ways our results support the development of alternative approaches that truly endorse plurality in environmental valuation and decision-making. (shrink)

In den Spuren Kierkegaards. Logi Gunnarsson philosophiert via William James über den Sinn des Philosophierens In einer Tagebuchaufzeichnung Sören Kierkegaards aus den 1830’er Jahren erfahren wir von der Suche des Verfassers nach einer Wahrheit, die “Wahrheit für mich ist” (Kierkegaard 1962: 16), und von seiner Einsicht, dies sei es gewesen, was ihm gefehlt habe: “ein vollkommen menschliches Leben zu führen, und nicht bloß eins der Erkenntnis, um dadurch so weit zu kommen, daß ich meine Gedank...

이 글은 양가가치에 관한 한 입장을 검토하고 그러한 입장이 지적하고 있는 문제점을 해소하고자 한다. 학자들 대다수는 소위 이상적인 인간이기 위해 양가적이기보다는 자기 통합적이어야 한다는 입장을 취하는데, 군나르손(Logi Gunnarsson)은 이 입장을 전면 거 부한다. 군나르손은 사람이 때로는 양가적일 수 있으며 심지어는 극단적인 양가가치가 자 기진실성을 위한 유일한 방식이라고 주장한다. 이 주장은 브래스코라는 가명으로 활동한 실제 FBI 요원 피스톤의 삶이 극단적으로 양가적이라는 데에 근거한다. 군나르손에 따르 면, 그는 잠입 요원과 범죄자의 삶 양자를 자기 것으로 받아들일 뿐만 아니라 양가적인 상 태를 자기 (...) 것으로 받아들인다. 그러나 나는 이 경우가 극단적인 양가가치라는 군나르손의 해석이 잘못되었으며, 적어도 그것의 양가적 가능성은 행위자가 처한 작위적 특수성에 달 려 있다고 본다. 군나르손의 주장과 달리, 브래스코의 양가가치는 그러한 양가가치에 도달 한 시간적 흐름을 따져 보았을 때 그 자신의 가치로만 구성될 수 없는 것들의 대립을 내포 한다. 가치의 대립을 포함하는 유사한 상황, 곧 안락사의 다양한 양가적 상황을 고려해보 더라도, 행위자의 양가가치는 극단적인 형태보다는 자기통합의 방향을 지향하는 것으로 보인다. (shrink)