_ doi:10.1093/analys/anx072 _, published: 27 June 2017.

In this paper, we explore the idea that sets depend on, or are grounded in, their members. It is said that a set depends on each of its members, and not vice versa. Members do not depend on the sets that they belong to. We show that the intuitive modal truth conditions for dependence, given in terms of possible worlds, do not accurately capture asymmetric dependence relations between sets and their members. We extend the modal truth conditions to include impossible (...) worlds and give a more satisfactory account of the dependence of a set on its members. Focusing on the case of singletons, we articulate a logical framework in which to evaluate set-theoretic dependence claims, using a normal first-order modal logic. We show that on this framework the dependence of a singleton on its single members follows from logic alone. However, the converse does not hold. (shrink)

Human nature being what it is, individuals engaging in unlawful activity will often seek to avoid having their misconduct detected by law enforcement. This article provides the first legal analysis of what are termed detection avoidance measures, and evaluates whether, and how, they should be subject to criminalization.

In recent years, the phenomena of hormonal control, embryonic determination and pattern formation have been receiving intensive scrutiny from molecular biologists. In the following «Roots» contribution, Professor Sir Vincent B. Wigglesworth reviews some of the seminal work that he did on these subjects in the insect Rhodnius prolixus.

A dual-processing model of moral whistleblowing in organizations is proposed. In this theory paper, moral whistleblowing is described as a unique type of whistleblowing that is undertaken by individuals that see themselves as moral agents and are primarily motivated to blow the whistle by a sense of moral duty. At the individual level, the model expands on traditional, rational models of whistleblowing by exploring how moral intuition and deliberative reasoning processes might interact to influence the whistleblowing behavior of moral agents. (...) The model combines individual variables, organizational variables, and external, societal variables to explain the moral whistleblowing process and the impact of moral agents on organizations and society. (shrink)

Linnebo and Pettigrew have recently developed a version of non-eliminative mathematical structuralism based on Fregean abstraction principles. They recognize that this version of structuralism is vulnerable to the well-known problem of non-rigid structures. This paper offers a solution to the problem for this version of structuralism. The solution involves expanding the languages used to describe mathematical structures. We then argue that this solution is philosophically acceptable to those who endorse mathematical structuralism based on Fregean abstraction principles.

This essay will examine some rather serious trouble confronting claims that mathematicalia might be social constructs. Because of the clarity with which he makes the case and the philosophical rigor he applies to his analysis, our exemplar of a social constructivist in this sense is Julian Cole, especially the work in his 2009 and 2013 papers on the topic. In a 2010 paper, Jill Dieterle criticized the view in Cole’s 2009 paper for being unable to account for the atemporality of (...) mathematical existents. Cole’s 2013 paper addresses this objection, providing a modification of his 2009 paper allowing for atemporal mathematicalia. An unusual consequence of Cole’s account is that at least some existential claims about mathematicalia used to be false but now have always been true. By examining the semantics of such claims, we demonstrate that social constructivism is in fact, despite Cole’s attempts to rectify matters, incompatible with atemporal mathematicalia. In the course of examining these semantic details, however, an alternative hybrid view of fictionalism and social constructivism emerges. Those tempted by social constructivism, while perhaps disappointed by the negative results of the paper, may be encouraged by how much of their view can be recovered in this alternative account. (shrink)

King develops a syntax-based account of propositions based on the idea that propositional unity is grounded in the syntactic structure of the sentence. This account faces two objections: a Benacerraf objection and a grain-size objection. I argue that the syntax-based account survives both objections, as they have been put forward in the existing literature. I go on to show, however, that King equivocates between two distinct notions of ‘propositional structure ’ when explaining his account. Once the confusion is resolved, it (...) is clear that the syntax-based account suffers from both Benacerraf and grain-size problems after all. I conclude by showing that King's account can be revised to avoid these problems, but only if it abandons its motivating idea that it is syntax that unifies the proposition. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that there are patterns of innovation occurring in less economically developed countries (LEDCs) that have been historically overlooked by the innovation studies literature, including the literature on innovation systems and the triple helix. This paper briefly surveys cases in agriculture, banking, biomedicine and information and communications technologies that demonstrate organizational, scientific and technological innovation in Africa, South Asia, and Brazil. In particular, we track new developments in two distinctive patterns within LEDCs: (1) civil society as (...) a site of innovation and; (2) innovation through appropriation. By systematically uncovering patterns of innovation in LEDCs, science and technology policy scholars may make new theoretical gains in innovation studies that can potentially contribute to innovation policies in the global South. (shrink)

Darwinian Evolution and Classical Liberalism brings together a collection of new essays that examine the multifaceted ferment between Darwinian biology and classical liberalism.

In 1988, Kit Fine published a semantic theory for quantified relevant logics. He referred to this theory as stratified semantics. While it has received some attention in the literature, 1–20, 1992; Mares & Goldblatt, Journal of Symbolic Logic 71, 163–187, 2006), stratified semantics has overall received much less attention than it deserves. There are two plausible reasons for this. First, the only two dedicated treatments of stratified semantics available are, 27–59, 1988; Mares, Studia Logica 51, 1–20, 1992), both of which (...) are quite dense and technically challenging. Second, there are a number of prima facie reasons to be worried about stratified semantics. The purpose of this paper is to revitalize research on stratified semantics. I will do so by giving a ‘user friendly’ presentation of the semantics, and by giving reasons to think that the prima facie reasons to be worried about it are too simplistic. (shrink)

Relevant logics infamously have the property that they only validate a conditional when some propositional variable is shared between its antecedent and consequent. This property has been strengthened in a variety of ways over the last half-century. Two of the more famous of these strengthenings are the strong variable sharing property and the depth relevance property. In this paper I demonstrate that an appropriate class of relevant logics has a property that might naturally be characterized as the supremum of these (...) two properties. I also show how to use this fact to demonstrate that these logics seem to be constructive in previously unknown ways. (shrink)

Formal symptoms of relevance usually concern the propositional variables shared between the antecedent and the consequent of provable conditionals. Among the most famous results about such symptoms are Belnap’s early results showing that for sublogics of the strong relevant logic R, provable conditionals share a signed variable between antecedent and consequent. For logics weaker than R stronger variable sharing results are available. In 1984, Ross Brady gave one well-known example of such a result. As a corollary to the main result (...) of the paper, we give a very simple proof of a related but strictly stronger result. (shrink)

We all have an intuitive grasp of the concept of evidence. Evidence makes beliefs reasonable, justifies jury verdicts, and helps resolve our disagreements. Yet getting clear about what evidence is is surprisingly difficult. Among other possibilities, evidence might consist in physical objects like a candlestick found at the crime scene, propositions like ‘a candlestick was found at the crime scene,’ or experiences like the experience of witnessing a candlestick at the crime scene. This dissertation is a defense of the latter (...) view. Evidence, we will argue, consists in experiences or mental states called ‘seeming states.’ We begin with a look at why the logical positivists came to abandon the experiential or “phenomenal” conception of evidence and adopted what I call “the courtroom conception.” Despite its appeal, we argue that this latter view is too objective; it has trouble playing the role of subjective reasons-provider. Being more subjective, the phenomenal conception deserves another look. However, many have thought that the phenomenal conception itself is unable to fulfill other important roles of evidence. In chapter two we dispute this, arguing that the phenomenal conception can play all four of the chief roles of evidence. Examining the religious epistemology of Alvin Plantinga in chapter three we come to see that the phenomenal conception, while attractive, is in danger of being too subjective. If the phenomenal conception of evidence is to be tenable, it must be offered in conjunction with a conservative epistemic principle which tethers together experiences with the beliefs they evidence in an epistemically appropriate manner. Hence in chapter four we consider a number of conservative epistemic principles and argue for the superiority of one in particular. But these principles have themselves been subject to criticism. For this reason, in chapter five we close by responding to a recent and pressing challenge to conservative principles in epistemology (Michael Bergmann’s dilemma for internalism) which might prevent their deployment alongside the phenomenal conception. If our arguments are correct, the phenomenal conception of evidence is still an attractive account of evidence today. (shrink)

If${\cal C}$is a category whose objects are themselves categories, and${\cal C}$has a rich enough structure, it is known that we can recover the internal structure of thecategoriesin${\cal C}$entirely in terms of thearrowsin${\cal C}$. In this sense, the internal structure of the categories in a rich enough category of categories is visible in the structure of the category of categories itself.In this paper, we demonstrate that this result follows as a matter of logic – given one starts from the right definitions. (...) This is demonstrated by first producing an abstraction principle whose abstracts are functors, and then actually recovering the internal structure of the individual categories that intuitively stand at the sources and targets of these functors by examining the way these functors interact. The technique used in this construction will be useful elsewhere, and involves providing an abstract corresponding not to everyobjectof some given family, but to all the relevantmappingsof some family of objects.This construction should settle, in particular, questions about whether categories of categories qualify asautonomousmathematical objects – categories of categories are perfectly acceptable autonomous objects and thus, in particular, suitable for foundational purposes. (shrink)

There is a natural story about what logic is that sees it as tied up with two operations: a ‘throw things into a bag’ operation and a ‘closure’ operation. In a pair of recent papers, Jc Beall has fleshed out the account of logic this leaves us with in more detail. Using Beall’s exposition as a guide, this paper points out some problems with taking the second operation to be closure in the usual sense. After pointing out these problems, I (...) then turn to fixing them in a restricted case and modulo a few simplifying assumptions. In a followup paper, the simplifications and restrictions will be removed. (shrink)

To contribute to the continuing challenge of explaining how managers identify stakeholders and assess their salience, in this article, we chronicle the history, assess the impact, and evaluate the possibilities opened by Mitchell, Agle, and Wood (MAW-1997). We do so through two types of qualitative analysis, and also through utilizing a quantitative network analysis tool. The first qualitative analysis categorizes the major contributions of the most influential papers succeeding MAW-1997; the second identifies and compares the relevant issues with MAW-1997 at (...) the time of initial publication and today. We apply main path analysis, a quantitative tool, to map how this scholarly domain has evolved. These three analyses robustly depict the impact of MAW-1997 and the ensuing scholarly conversation, and they enable us to illustrate the current state and trajectory of stakeholder identification and salience scholarship. We close by discussing pressing topics related to the broader body of stakeholder theory literature. (shrink)

Abstraction principles provide implicit definitions of mathematical objects. In this paper, an abstraction principle defining categories is proposed. It is unsatisfiable and inconsistent in the expected ways. Two restricted versions of the principle which are consistent are presented.

Relevance logics are a misunderstood lot. Despite being the subject of intense study for nearly a century, they remain maligned as too complicated, too abstruse, or too silly to be worth learning much about. This Element aims to dispel these misunderstandings. By focusing on the weak relevant logic B, the discussion provides an entry point into a rich and diverse family of logics. Also, it contains the first-ever textbook treatment of quantification in relevance logics, as well as an overview of (...) the cutting edge on variable sharing results and a guide to further topics in the field. (shrink)

The alphabet effect that showed that codified law, alphabetic writing, monotheism, abstract science and deductive logic are interlinked, first proposed by McLuhan and Logan, is revisited. Marshall and Eric McLuhan’s insight that alphabetic writing led to the separation of figure and ground and their interplay, as well as the emergence of visual space, are reviewed and shown to be two additional effects of the alphabet. We then identify more additional new components of the alphabet effect by demonstrating that alphabetic (...) writing also gave rise to Duality, and reductionism or the linear sequential relationship of causes followed by effects. We then review McLuhan’s claim that electrically configured information reversed the dominance of visual space over acoustic space and led to the reversals of cause and effect, and figure and ground. We then demonstrate that General System Theory first formulated by Ludwig von Bertalanffy, which also includes chaos theory, complexity theory and emergence and Jakob von Uexküll’s notion of umwelt also entail the reversal of many aspects of the alphabet effect such as the reversals of cause and effect, and figure and ground. (shrink)

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

In this paper, I argue that academic institutions have a pro tanto obligation to delegitimize transphobic views, which in many contexts is undefeated. By this, I mean academic institutions generally should not take such views seriously as viable candidates for belief, though sometimes this obligation may be outweighed by other considerations. Three premises together justify this conclusion. First, if academic institutions do not delegitimize transphobic views, then they structurally perpetuate the subordination of trans people. Second, institutions have a pro tanto (...) obligation to avoid structurally perpetuating subordination, which can only be defeated when such avoidance is excessively burdensome. Third, academic institutions can delegitimize transphobic views in a manner that is not excessively burdensome, at least in many contexts. More specifically, delegitimizing transphobic views aligns with important institutional norms and a robust notion of academic freedom. (shrink)

This paper surveys some of the innovations introduced by USA Today during its first three and one?half years of publication. It finds that USA Today's innovations in design, market research, and news have not been widely accepted because these approaches have raised significant ethical dilemmas to many journalists. Professional reservations about USA Today are discussed as well as some of the newspaper's advances in color reproduction, use of information graphics, promotion, and sports coverage.

This paper describes a modal conception of sets, according to which sets are 'potential' with respect to their members. A modal theory is developed, which invokes a naive comprehension axiom schema, modified by adding `forward looking' and `backward looking' modal operators. We show that this `bi-modal' naive set theory can prove modalized interpretations of several ZFC axioms, including the axiom of infinity. We also show that the theory is consistent by providing an S5 Kripke model. The paper concludes with some (...) discussion of the nature of the modalities involved, drawing comparisons with noneism, the view that there are some non-existent objects. (shrink)

Often overlooked in studies of the corporation is the recognition that the modern corporate form and its power are rooted in the issue of race, and more specifically, in racial oppression. The racialized roots of the corporation become exposed when we acknowledge the significance of slavery and the Fourteenth Amendment to the evolution of the corporate form along with the discriminatory role corporations have traditionally played in shaping race relations in the U.S. This article draws upon several theoretical perspectives, primarily (...) critical race theory, management theory, legal studies, diversity management, and corporate social responsibility to introduce the corporate responsibility to race concept and establish it as a new basis for understanding why corporate persons have a responsibility for improving race relations. (shrink)

Fern Logan’s collection of photographic portraits documents the emergence of the African American artist into mainstream American art. The Artist Portrait Series captures sixty significant artists from the late twentieth century.

In this paper, I argue that academic institutions have a pro tanto obligation to delegitimize transphobic views, which in many contexts is undefeated. By this, I mean academic institutions generally should not take such views seriously as viable candidates for belief, though sometimes this obligation may be outweighed by other considerations. Three premises together justify this conclusion. First, if academic institutions do not delegitimize transphobic views, then they structurally perpetuate the subordination of trans people. Second, institutions have a pro tanto (...) obligation to avoid structurally perpetuating subordination, which can only be defeated when such avoidance is excessively burdensome. Third, academic institutions can delegitimize transphobic views in a manner that is not excessively burdensome, at least in many contexts. More specifically, delegitimizing transphobic views aligns with important institutional norms and a robust notion of academic freedom. (shrink)