This edited collection addresses the problem of how the creation of novel spaces of governance relates to imaginaries of connectivity in time.

IN THE first chapter of the second book of the Analytica Posteriora Aristotle offers a fourfold classification of objects of inquiry He refers to each of them by means of a shorthand expression.

Respect for human embryos is often defended on the basis of the potentiality argument: embryos deserve respect because they already possess potentially the features that in adults are fully actualized. Opponents of this argument challenge it by claiming that if embryos should be respected because they are potentially adults, then gametes should be respected because they are potentially embryos. This article rejects this reductio ad absurdum argument by showing that there are two different types of potentiality involved so that the (...) transitivity of potentiality does not hold up in this case. Respect for embryos does not logically entail respect for gametes. (shrink)

A concise and accessible introduction to natural law ethics, this book introduces readers to the mainstream tradition of Western moral philosophy.

This commentary considers the viability of ovarian tissue cryopreservation (OTC) in the case of an adult who qualified for brain death. Although there has been some success with OTC in achieving pregnancy when the tissue is reimplanted in the original donor, attempting OTC in the case under discussion would have not been medically feasible.

The era of post-modernity has completely changed the way that we see, recognize and question the world, and what we accept to be true. During and after the 1960s many witnessed the rise of a greater multiplicity of local narratives. Prior to this, the grand narratives of the past, such as religion, the Enlightenment, and science were taken as whole, singular truths. However, such metanarratives tend to ignore the individual experiences that do not fit neatly into categories constructed by major (...) institutional authorities. This disconnection from the personal pushed more people to doubt, in favour of the narrative where the Self is visible and heard. It can be argued that this revolution in thought, and meaning and narrative-making in America grew after the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in 1963. By examining Jean-Francois Lyotard’s theory of postmodernity, and those who expanded on his ideas, we can highlight how the assassination of JFK marked the onset and rise of the postmodern conspiracy theory. This includes the deconstruction of trust, the breakdown of “objective” reality and identity markers as well as the use of new mass media technologies, such as the film camera and the television. (shrink)

In order to understand the nature of human embryos I first distinguish between active and passive potentiality, and then argue that the former is found in human gametes and embryos (even in embryos in vitro that may fail to be implanted) because they all have an indwelling power or capacity to initiate certain changes. Implantation provides necessary conditions for the actualization of that prior, active potentiality. This does not imply that embryos are potential persons that do not deserve the same (...) respect as actual persons. To claim that embryos become persons is to understand the predicate person as a phase sortal, roughly equivalent to adult person. This entails that we would not be essentially persons. In order to explain the traditional understanding of person as a proper sortal rather than a phase sortal, the author distinguishes between proximate and remote potentiality, and shows that, unlike feline embryos, human embryos, by their genetic constitution, possess the remote potentiality to later exercise the typically human activities. It follows that they are already persons essentially. (shrink)

I would like to challenge this view on various grounds, but before I do so, I wish to provide a broader setting for the problems discussed in this paper.

The relation between aisthesis and interiority manifests in Wittgenstein’s account of the subject and his private language argument. But it is also an overlooked leitmotif in Dostoevsky’s novels—one of Wittgenstein’s favorite authors, and in W.G. Sebald’s work—who was inspired by Wittgenstein’s philosophy. This book reflects on the role literature can play in answering the philosophical question of an adequate presentation of intention and pain.

: This response to Nikolaus Knoepffler's paper in the same issue of the Journal agrees that if the arguments supporting the first two of the eight human embryonic stem cell research policy options discussed are unsound, as Knoepffler argues, then it seems natural to move to the increasingly permissive options. If the arguments are sound, however, then the more permissive options should be rejected. It is argued that three of the rejected arguments, taken together, constitute very good reasons to hold (...) that a human embryo is endowed with dignity from fertilization onward. Thus, countries that want their public policies to match the moral imperative of respect for human beings should refrain from allowing destructive human embryo research and should devote considerable energy and public funds to research and clinical trials using non-embryonic ("adult") stem cells. (shrink)

Num sentido comum, o pensamento dogmático e/ou ideológico pode ser entendido como uma degeneração de formas de pensamento religioso e/ou político. Neste artigo, argumento que a filosofia tardia de Ludwig Wittgenstein permite fazer sentido desta ideia através das noções de “imagem do mundo” e de “dobradiças”, que explicam o modo como as nossas práticas racionais decorrem contra o pano de fundo de determinados compromissos não-epistémicos. Porque o valor de tais compromissos é dado pela sua capacidade de promover a agência racional, (...) o pensamento dogmático e/ou ideológico distingue-se categorialmente de outras formas de pensamento religioso e/ou político e é condenável filosoficamente. En un sentido común, el pensamiento dogmático y/o ideológico puede entenderse como una degeneración del pensamiento religioso y/o político. En este artículo, sostengo que la filosofía tardía de Ludwig Wittgenstein nos permite dar sentido a esta idea a través de las nociones de "imagen del mundo" y "goznes", que explican cómo nuestras prácticas racionales tienen lugar con el telón de fondo de ciertos compromisos no-epistémicos. Dado que el valor de tales compromisos viene dado por su capacidad de promover la agencia racional, el pensamiento dogmático y/o ideológico se distingue categorialmente de otras formas de pensamiento religioso y/o político y es filosóficamente condenable. (shrink)

Departing from modal logic, Jean-Yves Girard, as a logician interested in philosophy, presented a distinction between essentialism and existentialism in logic. Carlos Lobo reflected about the Girard’s concept to reinterpret the Husserlian Platonism in regard of the status of logical modalities. We start rescuing the notion of modal logic in the Edmund Husserl’s works, especially Formal and Transcendental Logic and First Philosophy. Developing this reflexion, we propose a new contribution to this discussion, reinterpreting the platonic influence in the Husserlian (...) notions of eidos and science, light of some readings of Lee Hardy and Johanna M. Tito. As a conclusion of this dialogue between Husserl and Girard, the method of eidetic variation is presented as a tool to review the idea of science, in a manner consistent with the phenomenological approach. (shrink)

Wittgenstein and Dostoevsky both ridicule a hypostasizing and fetishizing picture of interiority: viewing sensations and intentions like discrete material objects. The symbols for this misleading view in their respective works are a beetle and a sachet containing thousand five hundred roubles. The beetle in the box passage in the Philosophical Investigations discredits a Cartesian picture of pain as akin to a thing-like entity. The sachet in Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov represents Dmitry’s intention to be honourable. Dostoevsky achieves a perspicuous view (...) of entangled webs of intentions, as opposed to labelling them like object-like entities. I show that Wittgenstein’ account of first-personal thought, including intentions, is not based on the Cartesian dualism of the inner and the outer, the mind and the body. To underscore my argumentation, I refer to The Brothers Karamazov, one of Wittgenstein’s favourite novels. I especially focus on Dmitry’s sachet, which inspired Wittgenstein’s beetle in the box example. I show parallels both in content and in form of Wittgenstein’s and Dostoevsky’s approach to intention as a species of first-personal thought. (shrink)

: This paper starts from three assumptions: that we are essentially human organisms, that we start to exist at conception, and that we retain our identity throughout our lives. The identity claim provides the background to argue that it is irrational for a person to claim that it would be impermissible to kill her now but permissible to have killed her at an earlier age. The notion of "full moral status" as an ascertainable property is questioned and shown to be (...) dependent on previously accepted moral norms. It is concluded that the exclusion of the very young from the scope of the norm o f common morality that prohibits the killing of the innocent amounts to discrimination on the basis of age. (shrink)

Following Derrida’s late analysis of the multifarious concept of resistance, this article aims at detecting the motives that lead him to install from the start a tension between two methods of analysis of consciousness (phenomenological and psychoanalytical), that many would have considered, if not affectively unbearable, at least logically unsustainable. Yet this general logical and affective attitude remains describable, and in order to do so, the author proposesto delve into some underestimated and hence underexploited resources of transcendental phenomenology, particularly those (...) related to the analysis of affectivesyntaxes of consciousness, which are part of the “realm of positionality”. (shrink)

Miranda Fricker’s account of what is involved in cases of hermeneutical injustice has been criticised for neglecting the existence of alternative hermeneutical resources developed by non-dominant groups and consequently overlooking its members’ cognitive agency. I argue that this critical strand might be extended to consider what I call “uncontroversial cases of hermeneutical injustice”, i.e. cases in which no alternative resources are available, but marginalized subjects can still be said to resist dominant interpretations of their experiences. Following Alice Crary, I trace (...) the limitations of Fricker’s original account of hermeneutical injustice back to her reliance on a neutral conception of reason and argue that widening the realm of rationality to accommodate affective responses authorizes a revaluation of marginalized subjects’ agency under ideological systems. To illustrate this point, I indicate that Ludwig Wittgenstein’s reflections on hinges present a notion of objectivity that serves liberatory projects and might guide a more adequate response to cases of hermeneutical injustice. (shrink)

This book investigates Hermann Weyl’s work on the problem of space from the early 1920s onwards. It presents new material and opens the philosophical problem of space anew, crossing the disciplines of mathematics, history of science and philosophy. With a Kantian starting point Weyl asks: among all the infinitely many conceivable metrical spaces, which one applies to the physical world? In agreement with general relativity, Weyl acknowledges that the metric can quantitatively vary with the physical situation. Despite this freedom, Weyl (...) “deduces”, with group-theoretical technicalities, that there is only one “kind” of legitimate metric. This construction was then decisive for the development of gauge theories. Nevertheless, the question of the foundations of the metric of physical theories is only a piece of a wider epistemological problem. Contributing authors mark out the double trajectory that goes through Weyl’s texts, from natural science to philosophy and conversely, always through the mediation of mathematics. Readers may trace the philosophical tradition to which Weyl refers and by which he is inspired, and explore the mathematical tradition that permitted Weyl to elaborate and solve his mathematical problem of space. Furthermore, this volume analyzes the role of the interlocutors with whom Weyl discussed the nature of physical space. This volume features the work of top specialists and will appeal to postgraduates and scholars in philosophy, the history of science, mathematics, or physics. (shrink)

In this provocative new work, Alfonso Gomez-Lobo proposes that the earliest Platonic writings, in particular Apology, Crito, and sections of Gorgias, contain an underlying moral philosophy that can be attributed to Socrates with some degree of assurance. His aim is to show that Socratic moral philosophy is a reasonably systematic construction generated by a small number of principles or axioms.

The aim of this paper is focused on presenting the method of historical analysis built by Michel Foucault in his book Histoire de la Folie à l’Âge Classique as a “History of the Other”. Such term appears for the first time at Les Mots et les Choses’s Preface, in which Foucault analyses his method in the quoted book on madness (but also in La Naissance de la Clinique). In this sense, firstly we have to verify the hypothesis of this relation (...) between Foucault’s archeological method as a Thought of the Otherness, precisely concerning to that “Other History” proposed by the philosopher. Secondly, we need to analyse specifically Histoire de la Folie as a privileged work, as far as the approach on the relation with the other is concerned. KEY WORDS – Archeology of knowledge. History. Alterity. Madness. (shrink)

We propose to discuss about the possession and expression of a capacity that empowers individuals to act as citizens. First, elements of Aristotelian politics are presented as arguments for civility as a capacity inherent in the social nature of human beings. Then, according a contractualist interpretations, the individual becomes a citizen to the extent that he forms an agreement with the other members of society. A first finding refers to the fact that with contractualism, the individual has lost the inherence (...) of his civic action and must define himself as a citizen if he meets the extrinsically given requirements Likewise, it is indicated that the expression of civility has been interfered with by an idea of individual freedom understood in negative terms. However, before returning to Aristotelian perspective, it is necessary to redefine the idea of freedom that guides civic interaction, advocating for a social and intrinsically motivated citizenship. Proponemos discutir sobre la posesión y expresión de una capacidad que faculta a los individuos para actuar como ciudadanos. Primero, se exponen aspectos de la política aristotélica como argumentos en favor de la civilidad como una capacidad inherente a la naturaleza social de los seres humanos. Luego, desde una interpretación contractualista, el individuo se convierte en ciudadano en la medida en que establece acuerdos con los demás miembros de la sociedad. Así, una primera constatación se refiere a que, con el contractualismo, el individuo ha perdido la inherencia de su acción cívica y es definido como ciudadano en la medida en que cumple requisitos dados extrínsecamente. Asimismo, se indica que la expresión de civilidad se ha visto interferida por una idea de libertad individual entendida en términos negativos. Sin embargo, antes de retomar una perspectiva aristotélica, es necesario redefinir la idea de libertad que guía la interacción cívica, abogando por una ciudadanía social e intrínsecamente motivada. (shrink)

Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Volume 51, Issue 6, Page 555-573, December 2021. John Searle’s social ontology distinguishes between linguistic and non-linguistic institutional facts. He argues that every instance of the latter is created by declarative speech acts, while the former are exceptions to this far-reaching claim: linguistic phenomena are autonomous, their meaning is “built in,” and this is necessary, Searle argues, to avoid “infinite regress.” In this essay I analyze Searle’s arguments for this linguistic exceptionalism and reveal its flaws. (...) My method is to follow Searle’s argument closely and comprehensively so as to avoid, insofar as is possible, a selective reading of his argument in my favor. Against Searle’s position, I argue that linguistic phenomena are not exceptions to his general theory of institutional facts, for they too always require supplementary representations in order to exist. Language itself is analogous to all other institutions and infinite regress turns out to be unavoidable. (shrink)

The main claim of this paper is that the ergon inference (NE I 7) does not entail a step from the characteristic activity of man to the good of man. The speciílcation of the ergon is required for the evaluation of anything that has a function, but the evaluation itself is logically independent of that specification.

Este trabajo versa sobre la teoría de la acción de Hannah Arendt tal como la encontramos en La condición Humana, obra de1958. En ella Arendt busca recuperar la identidad y el sentido de la acción humana como actividad del hombre qua hombre y como materia prima de la política. Para ello, recurre a dos experiencias fundamentales de la cultura política occidental: la polis griega y la res publica romana. El resultado es una teoría de la acción que se ha considerado (...) una gran contribución al pensamiento ético político contemporáneo. Nos proponemos focalizar nuestra reflexión en dos aspectos de la acción humana históricamente olvidados o confundidos y que Arendt logra recuperar: la acción como revelación y como enérgeia. (shrink)