It will be an essential resource for philosophers, mathematicians, computer scientists, linguists, or any scholar who finds connectives, and the conceptual issues surrounding them, to be a source of interest.This landmark work offers both ...

Natural selection causes adaptation, the fit between an organism and its environment. For example, the white and grey coloration of snowy owls living and breeding around the Arctic Circle provides camouflage from both predators and prey. In this Element, we explore a variety of such outcomes of the evolutionary process, including both adaptations and alternatives to adaptations, such as nonadaptive traits inherited from ancestors. We also explore how the concept of adaptation is used in evolutionary psychology and in animal behavior, (...) and the adequacy of methods used to confirm evolutionary accounts of human traits and behaviors. (shrink)

If faraway peoples have different ideas from our own, is this because they have different mentalities? Did our remote ancestors lack logic? The notion of distinct mentalities has been used extensively by historians to describe and explain cultural diversity. Professor Lloyd rejects this psychologising talk of mentalities and proposes an alternative approach, which takes as its starting point the social contexts of communication. Discussing apparently irrational beliefs and behaviour, he shows how different forms of thought coexist in a single (...) culture but within conventionally defined contexts. (shrink)

Long before science as we know it existed, sophisticated studies of the physical world were undertaken-in Mesopotamia, India, China, and Greece. G. E. R. Lloyd explores the methods, subject-matter, and aims of those studies. He illuminates the origins of human intellectual inquiry, finding similarities and differences across cultures.

We tend to assume that our map of the intellectual disciplines is valid cross-culturally. G. E. R. Lloyd challenges this in relation to eight main areas of human endeavour, namely philosophy, mathematics, history, medicine, art, law, religion, and science, by examining how the disciplines were conceived and developed in different times and places.

This book is a work of philosophy concerning how we should think about social life. Whereas social science has traditionally been a study of social physics it must become a study of social life.

This book brings together important essays by one of the leading philosophers of science at work today. Elisabeth A. Lloyd examines several of the central topics in philosophy of biology, including the structure of evolutionary theory, units of selection, and evolutionary psychology, as well as the Science Wars, feminism and science, and sexuality and objectivity. Lloyd challenges the current evolutionary accounts of the female orgasm and analyses them for bias. She also offers an innovative analysis of the concept (...) of objectivity. Lloyd analyses the structure of evolutionary theory and unlocks the puzzle of the units of selection debates into four distinct aspects, illuminating several mysteries in the biology literature. Central to all essays in this book is the author's abiding concern for evidence and empirical data. (shrink)

Purpose The digital divide has persisted in California and the USA as a whole at approximately the same level for the past decade. This is despite multiple programs being created and billions of dollars being spent to close it. This paper examines why the efforts to date have been ineffective and to offers policy alternatives that might be more successful. Design/methodology/approach Using data from three, variable constrained projects in California, this paper examines the effectiveness of information-based outreach efforts at closing (...) the digital divide. The projects tested various outreach and enrollment methods to see which, if any, could increase broadband adoption in low-income households. Findings This project found that providing low-income households’ information about low-cost broadband offerings was ineffective at closing the digital divide. The findings in this paper were similar to those of two other works that examined the federal Broadband Technology Opportunities Program grants under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. Practical implications The findings of this paper along with the works cited that evaluated the BTOP program should be enough to change public policy. For the past ten years, efforts to close the digital divide have focused on providing information to low-income households. However, two independent surveys show broadband adoption has remained virtually flat during that period. Social implications The digital divide brings concomitant economic and education harms and challenges that plague those unable to access information, services, educational and employment opportunities with the same ease, speed and sufficiency as their connected peers and neighbors. Those harms exacerbate the already existing education and income divides. This paper shows that without a change in strategy, those harms will persist. Originality/value This paper breaks new ground and addresses one of the weaknesses identified in existing research. To the best of author’s knowledge, this is the first paper of its type to use programs designed to generate data that can be empirically evaluated for effectiveness. Prior studies attempted to assess program effectiveness by using data generated from fully implemented government programs. However, those programs contained a vast number of unidentified variables and insufficient data collection. They were not designed to facilitate academic evaluation, and as such made a true effectiveness evaluation challenging. (shrink)

Ethics and Experience introduces students to the key topics in moral theory through provocative moral issues—just war, abortion, physician assisted suicide, the death penalty and more. Steffen helps students bridge the gap between ethical theory and experience through developing a “common agreement” ethical system that is applicable to a variety of moral problems and issues with clear language and real-life examples.

//static.cambridge.org/content/id/urn%3Acambridge.org%3Aid%3Aarticle%3AS0031819100063944/resource/na me/firstPage-S0031819100063944a.jpg.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:161 HUME ON RESPONSIBILITY For Hume, to hold a person morally responsible for an action is morally to approve of him or to blame him in virtue of the action. Moreover, as he says in the Treatise of Human Nature, "approbation or blame... is nothing but a fainter and more imperceptible love or hatred." How must an action be related to a person in order for the person to (...) be held morally responsible for the action? Since to hold a person morally responsible for an action is morally to approve of him or to blame him in virtue of the action, and since moral approval or blame is nothing but a fainter and more imperceptible love or hatred, the first stage in answering this question is to attempt to answer the following more general question: How must an action be related to a person in order for the person to be loved or hated because of the action? This question, in turn, requires one to consider some of the main features of Hume's account of the passions of love and hatred. One main feature of Hume's account of these passions is that he distinguishes between the object of love and hatred and their causes. Hume says: As the immediate object of pride and humility is self or that identical person, of whose thoughts, actions, and sensations we are intimately conscious; so the object of love and hatred is some other person, of whose thoughts, actions, and sensations we are not conscious (T 329). Though the object of love and hatred be some person other than one-self, the object is not, strictly speaking, the cause, that is, the sole and 162 sufficient cause. For if the other person were the cause, then he would cause both passions in oneself; and since love and hatred nullify one another, neither could ever exist. The causes of love and hatred are complex and diversified. The ingredients of such causes are as follows: First, there are certain general qualities or circumstances. These may be subdivided as follows: (a) mental qualities: qualities of a person such as virtue, knowledge, wit, tend to produce love; those such as vice, ignorance, dullness, tend to produce hatred; (b) bodily features: beauty, strength, swiftness are conducive to love; their opposites, to hatred; (c) external advantages and disadvantages, such as family position, possessions, clothing, etc., can contribute to the production of love or hatred. But, secondly, these qualities or circumstances, considered in abstraction, cannot cause love or hatred. They must be related to the person who is the object of love or hatred. For example, knowing of a beautiful palace cannot lead one to esteem a particular prince unless the palace is related to him by, for instance, being his property. Thirdly, in order for mental qualities, bodily features, or external advantages or disadvantages to produce love or hatred, they must not only be related to the object of these passions; they must also induce pleasure or displeasure. Without pleasure or displeasure, neither love nor hatred could arise. How, then, do actions figure in the causation of love or hatred? An action can cause pleasure or pain. But, for Hume, an action's production of pleasure or pain is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the production of love or hatred towards the person whose action it is. In addition, 163 the action must be related to the person. But an action is of relatively short duration. Thus, Hume argues: 'Tis not enough, that the action arise from the person, and have him for its immediate cause and author. This relation alone is too feeble and inconstant to be a foundation for these passions. It reaches not the sensible and thinking part, and neither proceeds from any thing durable in him, nor leaves any thing behind it; but passes in a moment, and as if it had never been. On the other hand, an intention shews certain qualities, which, remaining after the action is perform'd, connect it with the person, and facilitate the transition of ideas from one to the other (T 349). Now, as we have seen, Hume holds that 'approbation or blame... is... (shrink)

The contemporary American philosopher David Velleman recently noted, “Love is a moral emotion precisely in the sense that its spirit is closely akin to that of morality.”1 Although their kindred spirits are manifest, it is the tension between love and morality that at first glance is striking. Love seems to be supremely personal, unique to one individual and directed at another for highly contingent and possibly mysterious reasons. Even if Kantian or Utilitarian fantasies of objective morality are dismissed, the common (...) alternatives that put emphasis on community values or obligation to the Other are still distant from an affect directed…. (shrink)

Este artículo es una aproximación crítica e integradora de los procesos de subjetivación política en los trabajos de Antonio Gramsci, Michel Foucault, Raymond Williams y Stuart Hall. Para ello, se explicará, en primer lugar, el giro epistémico realizado por Michel Foucault a finales de 1970 que le conduce a buscar la estética de la existencia tras teorizar la relación de poder y libertad. Posteriormente se analizará qué entienden por subjetivación política estos autores. El análisis de la transformación teórica que lleva (...) a cabo Michel Foucault de la relación entre poder y libertad a partir de obras como El nacimiento de la biopolítica, El uso de los placeres o La hermenéutica del sujeto permitirá precisar el análisis comparativo entre hegemonía, cuidado de sí y contrahegemonía en los autores señalados. Por último, presentaremos la especificidad de la relación entre los trabajos de Gramsci y Foucault con Williams y Hall como mediadores epistemológicos. (shrink)

¿Cómo hacer un resumen de un escrito que problematiza el propio concepto de «sumilla»? En primer lugar, señalamos el carácter problemático de la sumilla, entendida como la pretensión de traer a presencia la ponencia y al mismo tiempo de postergarla. En segundo lugar, mostramos cómo en el proceder dialógico platónico acontece dicho carácter problemático de la presencia (eîdos) en términos del continuado fracaso respecto de todo intento de fijación del ser del ente, es decir, de su constante postergación. Más aún, (...) afirmamos que la pretensión meta-dialógica del diálogo platónico, es decir, de dar cuenta de aquello que en el diálogo mismo acontece, tiene lugar en términos de una toma de distancia respecto de su propio carácter escrito. En tercer lugar, escenificamos dicho carácter meta-dialógico mediante un tramo del Parménides, en el cual dicha toma de distancia asume la forma de la historia del robo del escrito de Zenón, lo cual quiere expresar que el eîdos no tiene lugar sino en su propio ausentarse. Y es que, en efecto, esto no habrá sido sino un resumen si remitimos al resumere latino, es decir, al re-asumir, a su vez reasunción del analambánein griego. Es precisamente dicho analambánein el que Platón liga con la anámnesis, es decir, con la reminiscencia, la cual a su vez remite a una ausencia constituyente. (shrink)

The transmission of ideas in ‘early-modern’ Europe has attracted wide interest in recent decades. In _The Reception of Bodin_ seventeen scholars investigate the jurist-philosopher Jean Bodin’s significance in processes that cross-fertilised European intellectual life from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment.

本书内容包括:理解古代社会、开拓疆域、信仰的可疑性、研究风格和共同本体论问题、对实例论证的支持和反对、对民主的一种批判等。.

According to Aristotle, "to be learning something is the greatest of pleasures not only to the philosopher but also to the rest of mankind," (Poetics 1448b). But even as he affirms the unbounded human capacity for integrating new experience with existing knowledge, he alludes to a significant exception: "The sight of certain things gives us pain, but we enjoy looking at the most exact images of them, whether the forms of animals which we greatly despise or of corpses." Our capacity (...) for learning is happily engaged in viewing representations of painful objects, but not, it seems, in viewing the objects themselves. When an experience is intensely painful, what then is a rational animal to do? We can neither disable our learning process, nor erase its traces. In the face of intense pain, horror, or terror, learning and remembrance cause no pleasure but rather persistent psychological pain and disruption. The memorious mind reverberates with trauma. (shrink)

The pressure of evil -- Out of the heart -- Satan, where is thy victory? -- The ethics of tragedy -- The tragic drama of today -- Tragedy and the gospel -- The sin against the Holy Ghost -- The society for corporate penitence -- The serene soul.

D. A. Lloyd Thomas; VIII—Political Decision Procedures1, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 70, Issue 1, 1 June 1970, Pages 141–160, https://doi.or.

Some interpretations of the term “coercion” entail that a person who is coerced is morally entitled to do what she does. But there is a vague spectrum of uses of this term, in which one use shades into another. “Coercion” can legitimately be interpreted in a way according to which it is possible for a person who is coerced not to be morally entitled to do what she does and indeed to be blameworthy for her action. In order to distinguish (...) between cases in which a coercee is not blameworthy for compliance and those in which a coercee is blameworthy, an account of moral blameworthiness is presented. The account does not deal, however, with the question of when one harm or evil outweighs another. A person is morally blameworthy if and only if she performs an action which is, on balance, morally wrong, and for which she is morally responsible. Three different standards of moral responsibility are considered. The first two are found to be susceptible to counterexamples. The third, which is claimed to be adequate, is that a moral agent is responsible for a morally wrong action if and only if, first, either she has the psychological capacity to refrain from doing what she does, or, if she lacks this capacity, she nevertheless had a Isecond-order) psychological capacity to prevent the lack of capacity in question; and, second, the moral agent knows what she is doing, under the description of her action according to which it is a wrong action. Thus, where a moral agent is coerced into doing an immoral action, and lacked the psychological capacity to refrain from performing the action, this standard of responsibility enables us to decide whether or not she is blameworthy on the basis of whether the lack of the capacity was due to ordinary human weakness or to a fault of character. (shrink)