Rescue operations taking place in disaster settings can be fraught with ethical challenges. Further ethical challenges will likely be introduced by the use of robots, which are expected to soon become commonplace in search and rescue missions and disaster recovery efforts. To help focus timely reflection on the ethical considerations associated with the deployment of rescue robots, we have conducted a scoping review exploring the relevant academic literature following a widely recognized scoping review framework. Of the 429 papers identified by (...) the first screening, six fulfilled the selection criteria of our literature review. Quantitative data synthesis showed that a subset of the papers includes a qualitative experimental exploration of the ethical issues at hand, with workshops involving both experts and potential users. Most use simulations or scenarios to anticipate the ethical implications and other consequences of using robots in search and rescue missions. Qualitative text analysis identified seven core ethically relevant themes: fairness and discrimination; false or excessive expectations; labor replacement; privacy; responsibility; safety; trust. Our results suggest that the literature on ethics in rescue robotics is scant and disparate, but the papers identified uniformly endorsed a proactive approach to handling the ethical concerns associated with the use of robots in disaster scenarios. (shrink)

In this book, Linda Wetzel examines the distinction between types and tokens and argues that types exist (as abstract objects, since they lack a unique ...

The distinction between a type and its tokens is a useful metaphysical distinction. In §1 it is explained what it is, and what it is not. Its importance and wide applicability in linguistics, philosophy, science and everyday life are briefly surveyed in §2. Whether types are universals is discussed in §3. §4 discusses some other suggestions for what types are, both generally and specifically. Is a type the sets of its tokens? What exactly is a word, a symphony, a species? (...) §5 asks what a token is. §6 considers the relation between types and their tokens. Do the type and all its tokens share the same properties? Must all the tokens be alike in some or all respects? §7 explains some problems for the view that types exist, and some problems for the view that they don't. §8 elucidates a distinction often confused with the type-token distinction, that between a type (or token) and an occurrence of it. It also discusses some problems that occurrences might be thought to give rise to, and one way to resolve them. (shrink)

The statistical interpretation introduced by Born in mid-1926 is not the interpretation now associated with his name. Born's own understanding of that interpretation is revealed by looking at some of its roots in Born's earlier work with Franck on collisions, his collaboration with Jordan on that topic, his contributions to matrix mechanics, his attempt in collaboration with Wiener at an operator formulation of quantum mechanics, and at the exposition of the interpretation in Born's first papers on a wave mechanical treatment (...) of collisions. (shrink)

Peirce illustrated the type-token distinction by means of the definite article: there is only one word type “the,” but there are likely to be about twenty tokens of it on this page. Not all tokens are inscriptions; some are sounds, whispered or shouted, and some are smoke signals. The type “the” is neither written ink nor spoken sound; it is an abstract object. Or consider the Grizzly Bear, Ursus arctos horribilis. At one time its U.S. range was most of the (...) area west of the Missouri River and it numbered 10,000 in California alone. Today it numbers less than 1,000. Of course no particular bear numbers 1,000 and no particular bear ever had a range comprising most of the area west of the Missouri. It is a type of bear, a species of bear, that has both properties.We are all familiar with this way of talking about types of things. But—aside from being universals—what are types? What makes a token of one type rather than another? How do we know it is a token of that type? Do some types fail to have tokens? What, if anything, do all and only tokens of a particular type have in common other than being tokens of that type? The first half of the paper answers the last question (“Nothing beyond being a token of the type”). The second half contains sketches of answers to the other questions. (shrink)

The traditional Western understanding of life and death as a strict dichotomy is challenged by a more descriptively accurate model of life's progressive cessation. Dying can be defined by a bounded zone of residual states of life that fits better with moral intuition and more sensitively guides action toward the dying.

This paper examines whether the prospect of compensation may render otherwise disproportionate harms proportionate. It argues that we should reject this possibility. Instead, it distinguishes duties of compensation as a requirement of rectificatory justice from a harm’s degree of compensability, and argues that only the latter is relevant to proportionality. On this view, failing to compensate constitutes a distinct wrong, while harms that are not adequately compensable carry extra weight in proportionality calculations. This explains how the prospect of compensation affects (...) permissions to harm, without relying on the dubious assumption that disproportionate harms may be rendered proportionate by future compensation. (shrink)

This article draws on resource‐based theory and the literature on strategic intent to develop a theoretical model that explains the concept of mission drift in microfinance institutions . We argue that the differential strategic intents of commercially oriented, for‐profit, and socially oriented nonprofit organizations drive the acquisition of disparate resources and capabilities, which in turn drives distinct performance outcomes, including a focus on different markets within the overall base of the pyramid . The article suggests that it is the dynamic (...) aspects of changing strategic intent and the consequent timing delays in the development of associated resources and capabilities that lead to various issues of mission drift. Finally, we suggest that cross‐sector alliances between for‐profit and nonprofit MFIs may benefit from the unique capabilities of both types of organizations and deliver the most and broadest impact on poverty alleviation in BOP markets. (shrink)

Most democratic countries either limit or deny altogether voting rights for people with cognitive impairments or mental health conditions. Against this weight of legal and practical exclusion, disability advocacy and developments in international human rights law increasingly push in the direction of full voting rights for people with cognitive impairments. Particularly influential has been the adoption by the UN of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2007. Article 29 declares that states must ‘ensure that persons with (...) disabilities can effectively and fully participate in political and public life on an equal basis with others, directly or through freely chosen representatives, including the right and opportunity for persons with disabilities to vote and be elected’. This article also argues for the right of all people to vote, including people with cognitive impairments, by adopting a uniquely strategic approach. Firstly, some of the strategic limitations of existing arguments in favour of extending the franchise are highlighted. Most such arguments are flawed because they run the risk of inviting disparaging philosophical commentary which compares disabled people to animals, or because they are based on implausible empirical claims, or because they inadvertently tie the case for voting rights for the disabled to other cases unlikely to ever enjoy widespread acceptance. This article, instead, justifies extending voting rights to all people with cognitive impairments based on a simple cost-benefit analysis that avoids all of these problems. (shrink)

This paper uses social capital theory to explain contemporary slavery in the context of American professional sports leagues. While traditional slavery was legallyabolished in the United States (US) during the nineteenth century, using the label slavery to describe professional athletes is often dismissed because these athletes are wellcompensated performers with access to incremental compensation through commercial endorsements. As active players, athletes have opportunities to build and leverage social capital, yet, after they retire from competition, these opportunities frequently diminish. We contend (...) contemporary slavery exists for professional athletes and during their careers they are bound to their owners via “gilded cage” slavery, which is attractive to enter yet difficult to exit. We also contend that during this “bondage,” athletes build and maintain social capital; yet upon retirement, athletes are limited in opportunities to leverage socialcapital to improve their own situations or those of their communities. (shrink)

This is an edited collection that is intended both as a primer for core concepts and principles in research ethics and as an in-depth exploration of the contextualisation of these principles in practice across key disciplines.

In October 2012, the Loyola University Chicago Stritch School of Medicine amended its eligibility requirements for admission. In addition to U.S. citizens and permanent residents, persons who qualify for the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service are now eligible for admission. Simply put, we extended the educational opportunity of medical school to people who are in a particular category of undocumented immigrants. We became the first medical school in the United States to (...) have an intentional, transparent policy of eligibility for persons eligible for the DACA program. This expanded admissions policy has gained some attention in the popular press and brought us many expressions of support. It has also dismayed a few members of our school's circle of faculty and alumni.We wish to walk you through the history of our policy's development. We believe that viewing it as it developed will make clear three pertinent ideas: this policy flows directly from the mission of medical schools, it suits a positive notion of social justice and is also compelled by a duty not to discriminate on arbitrary grounds, and educators who steward educational institutions must have the moral courage to place considerations of institutional mission and social justice above the political views and negative responses of some alumni and donors. (shrink)

BackgroundThe aim of the present survey was to investigate newly discharged hospital patients’ opinions on secondary use of their hospital data and biospecimens within the context of health research in general and, more specifically, on genetic research, data sharing across borders and cooperation with the health industry.MethodsA paper questionnaire was sent to 1049 consecutive newly discharged hospital patients.ResultsThe vast majority of the respondents preferred to be informed or to receive no notification at all for secondary research on their health data (...) and biospecimens. The rest wanted to be asked for active consent. The same trend applied for the other aspects also. 81% of respondents were positive towards genetic research without active consent. 95% were positive towards cooperating with the health industry, and 90% were positive towards data sharing.ConclusionsThese results suggest that hospital patients generally are very positive to secondary research and support the concept of opting out rather than opting in. (shrink)

This paper illuminates a typically obscured ground for rectificatory obligations: harms justified as ‘lesser evils.’ Lesser-evil harms are not the result of overall morally prohibited acts but of acts permissibly carried out to prevent significantly greater harm. The paper argues that harms caused as unintended side effects of acting on lesser-evil justifications, notably in military rescue operations, may give rise to claims to compensation, even if (1) the military acts that caused the harms in question were justified on lesser-evil grounds (...) and (2) the victims in question are no worse off as a result; they may even owe their survival to the act of rescue. The paper defends three claims. First, being better off as a result of a harmful rescue than one would otherwise have been does not preclude claims to be compensated for harms suffered as a side effect. Second, identifying the relevant counterfactual for purposes of compensatory justice is sometimes a prescriptive, rather than a descriptive, matter. Rather than relying on empirical speculations about what _would_ have happened had a harm not occurred, we must, in certain cases, consider what agents _ought_ to have done. Finally, duties of compensation need not fall on those who caused the to-be-compensated harms. That infringing rights is permissible in certain cases does not imply that no compensation is owed, but merely that it is not necessarily rights-infringers on whom duties of compensation fall. (shrink)

First Published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Polls show that 45% of the American public believes that humans were created about 10,000 years ago and that evolution is a fictitious myth. Another 25% believes that changes in the natural world are directed by a supernatural being with a particular goal in mind. This thinking clashes head on with scientific findings from the past 150 years, and there is a dearth of public critical thinking about the natural world within a scientific framework. Evolution and Religious Creation Myths seeks (...) to educate and arm the public on the differences between myth and science, fiction and theory. The book begins with a whirlwind tour of creation stories from several religions. The authors then explore how certain forms of religious fundamentalism clash with the science of evolution. They review how creationists and intelligent design proponents misuse and misrepresent scientific terminology and conclusions to further their own agendas. How do scientists respond to this threat? Modern science, which includes a level of indeterminacy, or chance, cannot support the premise that a supernatural designer engineered nature for a particular purpose in a deterministic fashion. This holds true for the creation of the universe, the appearance of the first biological molecules, chemical evolution, and the evolution of life forms through mutation, natural selection, and genetic drift. Instead, human biological and cultural evolution is described within a genetic framework. Scientists use a barrage of genetic tests and DNA phylogenies to support the scientific basis for evolution. For anyone who has ever needed to argue why evolution and creationism are not both valid theories that deserve equal attention, this book clearly defines the difference between theory and myth. Scientists, teachers, and defenders of the truth should read this book in preparation for when they are called upon to respond. (shrink)

The field of organizational storytelling research is productive, vibrant and diverse. Over three decades we have come to understand how organizations are not only full of stories but also how stories are actively making, sustaining and changing organizations. This edited collection contributes to this body of work by paying specific attention to stories that are neglected, edited out, unintentionally omitted or deliberately left silent. Despite the fact that such stories are not voiced they have a role to play in organizational (...) analysis. The chapters in this volume variously explore how certain realities become excluded or silenced. The stories that remain below the audible range in organizations offer researchers an access to study political practices which marginalise certain organisational realities whilst promoting others. This volume offers a further contribution by paying heed to silence and the processes of silencing. These silences influence the choice of issues on organisational agendas, the choice of audience to which these discourses are addressed and the ways of addressing them. In exploring these relatively understudied terrains, Untold Stories in Organizations comprises an important contribution to the organizational storytelling space, opening paths for new trajectories in storytelling research. (shrink)

Wolfgang Pauli is known as one of the most famous physicists of the 20th century. Next to an intensive treatment of physics, his impressive correspondence with fellow physicists also demonstrates a vivid interest in psychology and biology. Reflections on the mind-brain problem and on topics such as causality and evolutionary theory are readily present. In this paper, some central passages in this correspondence are discussed and linked to more current debates in philosophy of science and philosophy of biology. It is (...) shown how Pauli speculatively explored how evolutionary theory can find inspiration in quantum theory and in its related concept of observer-dependency. Contra Kalervo Laurikainen's interpretation, it is argued that Pauli's criticism remains true to a naturalistic view on science and biology. (shrink)

Catherine Elgin has usefully diagnosed a "bipolar disorder" that continues to incapacitate philosophy and much of contemporary social theory and that inflicts its unwitting sufferers with a perpetual oscillation between equally unhappy alternatives. As she puts it.

We doubt that theory of mind can be sufficiently demonstrated without reliance on verbal tests. Where language is the major tool of social manipulation, an effective theory of mind must use language as an input. We suspect, therefore, that in this context, prelinguistic human and nonhuman minds are more alike than are human pre- and postlinguistic minds.