Leibniz repeatedly states that there is a very close connection between reflection and rationality. In his view, reflective acts somehow lead to self-consciousness, reason, the knowledge of necessary truths, and even to the moral liability of the respective substances. Whereas it might be relatively easy to see how reflective acts lead to self-consciousness, it is much harder to understand how they are connected to rationality. Why should a substance which is able to produce reflective acts therefore be rational? How can (...) the having of reflective acts be responsible for the substance’s ability to reason correctly and to acquire knowledge of necessary and eternal truths? The aim of my paper is to understand better the required mechanisms and to make thus conceivable Leibniz’s bold claim that reflective acts lead to rationality. In order to accomplish this, I will proceed in three steps. First, I will specify what kind of self-consciousness is, according to Leibniz, produced by reflective acts. A substance must recognize itself as a unitary substance bearing perceptions. Second, I will argue that this type of self- consciousness can be seen as the basis for the ability to form judgments. This is possible because the subject-predicate structure of judgments is mirrored by the ontology of substances and their modifications. Third, I will point out that, together with the idea of identity (which we also acquire by reflection), the combination of judgments allows us to make inferences. This ability, in turn, is sufficient for rationality. Thus, I can explain how reflective acts and rationality are connected with each other. (shrink)

The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles —the principle that no two numerically distinct things are perfectly similar—features prominently in Leibniz’s metaphysics. Despite its centrality to his philosophical system, it is surprisingly difficult to determine what modal status Leibniz ascribes to the PII. On many occasions Leibniz appears to endorse the necessity of the PII. There are a number of passages,however, where Leibniz seems to imply that numerically distinct indiscernibles are possible, which suggests that he subscribes to a merely contingent (...) version of the PII. In this paper I attempt to resolve this apparent inconsistency. I argue that Leibniz consistently takes the PII to be necessary and that this view of his shines through even in his correspondence with Clarke. I also show that competing interpretations, on which Leibniz’s PII is contingent, misread a number of crucial passages from this correspondence. (shrink)

On Berkeley’s immaterialist ontology, there are only two kinds of created entities: finite spirits and ideas. Ideas are passive, and so there is no genuine idea-idea causation. Finite spirits, by contrast, are truly causally active on Berkeley’s view, in that they can produce ideas through their volitional activity. Some commentators have argued that this account of causation is inconsistent. On their view, the unequal treatment of spirits and ideas is unfounded, for all that can be observed in either case are (...) mere patterns of regularity; Berkeley should therefore adopt a full-blown occasionalism and follow Malebranche in holding that God is the only true cause. Other commentators have argued that Berkeley denies the tenet that causes necessitate their effects – that is, the idea that causation involves necessary connection – and that in this way he can avoid inconsistency. This paper argues that Berkeley can subscribe to the thesis that finite spirits are truly causally active without falling into inconsistency, even if it is granted that Berkeleyan causes necessitate their effects. His differing treatment of spirits and of ideas is well founded, since ideas are transparent in a way our notions of spirits are not. (shrink)

Leibniz defends two apparently inconsistent doctrines. On the one hand, he holds that substances are independent entities and that God can, at least in principle, create any possible substance whatsoever no matter what else he creates. On the other hand, Leibniz insists that some possible substances are incompossible with one another and thus cannot coexist. I first discuss three attempts of dealing with this tension in Leibniz’s work that have recently been made in the literature: the logical approach, the lawful (...) approach, and McDonough’s tiling approach. I conclude that none of them solves the problem satisfactorily. I then argue that a modified version of the lawful approach, which also takes into account some of the insights of the two other options, is the most promising strategy. I believe that it is crucial to realize that it is, at least in principle, in God’s power to co-create incompossible substances. I do not take this to imply, however, that such substances can coexist. Since coexistence requires being in the same world, and because not all collections of possible substances are worlds in Leibniz’s sense, I argue that co-creation does not entail coexistence. Thus in order to get clear on Leibniz’s conception of compossibility, I suggest that we must better understand what a possible world is for Leibniz. What does it mean, then, for a collection of possible substances to form a world? I argue, first, that all complete concepts of the relevant possible substances need to have the same laws inscribed in them this is in line with some versions of the lawful approach). In addition, I argue that every complete concept in the relevant collection must also involve the concept of every other substance in the collection. Moreover, I maintain that these two requirements are not reducible to each other and that they are individually necessary and only jointly sufficient for a collection of substances to form a world. Only substances whose complete concepts fulfill both conditions can coexist and thus be compossible. (shrink)

In this blog entry, which addresses a broader audience, I wonder what exactly historians of philosophy do and how their work relates to non-historical work in philosophy. In particular, I raise the question why systematic philosophers and historians of philosophy are relatively close to each other. After all, they often publish in the same journals and work at the same departments. This is surprising, given that asking what X is seems to be rather different from asking what some person a (...) few hundred (or thousand) years ago thought what X is. I argue that systematic philosophers and historians of philosophy are so close because their work proceeds in a similar way. To be sure, they have very different starting points. Historians of philosophy may start, for instance, with a number of texts from one and the same author which appear to be in conflict. Systematic philosophers, in contrast, may start with a set of intuitions which seem to contradict one other. The way historians of philosophy and systematic philosophers operate upon those different starting points, however, is very similar. This explains at least in part, I maintain, why they are a lot closer than is the case in many other disciplines. (shrink)

Are we in imminent danger of extinction? Yes, we probably are, argues John Leslie in his chilling account of the dangers facing the human race as we approach the second millenium. The End of the World is a sobering assessment of the many disasters that scientists have predicted and speculated on as leading to apocalypse. In the first comprehensive survey, potential catastrophes - ranging from deadly diseases to high-energy physics experiments - are explored to help us understand the risks. (...) One of the greatest threats facing humankind, however, is the insurmountable fact that we are a relatively young species, a risk which is at the heart of the 'Doomsday Argument'. This argument, if correct, makes the dangers we face more serious than we could have ever imagined. This more than anything makes the arrogance and ignorance of politicians, and indeed philosophers, so disturbing as they continue to ignore the manifest dangers facing future generations. (shrink)

The orderliness of the universe and the existence of human beings already provides some reason for believing that there is a God - as argued in Richard Swinburne's earlier book Is There a God? Swinburne now claims that it is probable that the main Christian doctrines about the nature of God and his actions in the world are true. In virtue of his omnipotence and perfect goodness, God must be a Trinity, live a human life in order to share our (...) suffering, and found a church which would enable him to tell all humans about this. It is also quite probable that he would provide his human life as an atonement for our wrongdoing, teach us how we should live and tell us his plans for our future after death. Among founders of religions, Jesus satisfies uniquely well the requirement of living the sort of human life which God would need to have lived. But to give us adequate reason to believe that Jesus was God, God would need to put his 'signature' on the life of Jesus by an act which he alone could do, for example raise him from the dead. There is adequate historical evidence that Jesus rose from the dead. The church which he founded gave plausible interpretations of his basic message. Therefore Christian doctrines are probably true. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this article, we first document the virtually complete absence of infectious disease examples and concerns at the time bioethics emerged as a field. We then argue that this oversight was not benign by considering two central issues in the field, informed consent and distributive justice, and showing how they might have been framed differently had infectiousness been at the forefront of concern. The solution to this omission might be to apply standard approaches in liberal bioethics, such as autonomy (...) and the harm principle, to infectious examples. We argue that this is insufficient, however. Taking infectious disease into account requires understanding the patient as victim and as vector. Infectiousness reminds us that as autonomous agents we are both embodied and vulnerable in our relationships with others. We conclude by applying this reunderstanding of agency to the examples of informed consent and distributive justice in health care. (shrink)

This paper considers Pindar's diverse appropriations of elements of the sacred topography of Aegina for different purposes in epinikia composed for Aeginetan victors. It focuses on poems likely performed in the vicinity of the Aiakeion for their different mobilizations of a monument that we know from Pausanias stood beside the Aiakeion—the tomb of Phokos, an earth mound topped with the “rough stone” that killed him. The more speculative final part of the paper suggests that it may also be possible to (...) track a coherent ideology attached to the island's sacred topography across several Aeginetan odes, thereby detecting a broader structural unity that accompanies and frames the different individual appropriations of different poems. This part starts from Pausanias’ mythic narrative of the exemplary justice of Aiakos banishing his own son Telamon as the aetiology for a distinctive Aeginetan justice system inscribed in a whole set of man-made monuments that ring the island with concentric circles of rough stones. (shrink)

We begin our commentary by summarizing the commonalities and differences in cognitive phenomena across cultures, as found by the seven papers of this topic. We then assess the commonalities and differences in how our various authors have approached the study of cognitive diversity, and speculate on the need for, and potential of, cross-disciplinary collaboration.

Preston's (2011) challenge to the moral presumption against geoengineering is applied to carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) in Scotland, United Kingdom. Qualitative data is analysed to assess if and how Preston's arguments play out in practice. We argue that the concepts of ‘lesser evil’ and prioritising human well-being over non-interference in natural processes do bring different value positions together in support of CCS, but that not all people see short-term carbon abatement as the ‘least worst’ option or a suitable (...) way to prioritise human well-being. (shrink)

It is argued that there can only be a small-finite number of mathematical objects; that these objects range from the very concrete to the very abstract; and that mathematics is essentially not concerned with objects but with concepts. This viewpoint is described as mentalist and is upheld over Platonism, intuitionism, and formalism.

This paper introduces readers to the philosophical problems related to Chan Buddhist meditation practices. By looking at the Platform Sutra's teachings of “non-abiding” (wuzhu) and the Hongzhou Chan Buddhist's teachings of being “without seeking” (wuqiu), I illustrate how a major problem that the Chan Buddhists were attempting to deal with was of the dualism between practice and realization. To properly understand the Chan Buddhist attitude towards meditation, we need to see them as critical of a means/ends dualism operating in human (...) experience. Contrary to interpretations by recent scholars that believe the Hongzhou Chan Buddhists abandon meditation practices, the Hongzhou approach to meditation is to be “without seeking” or the freedom from a means/ends dualism structuring how we perceive the world. (shrink)

There is an enduring debate in nursing regarding the art–science dualism, involving an articulation of two distinct ‘kinds’ of disciplinary knowledge: objective/scientific and subjective/artistic. Nursing identifies both as necessary, yet unbridgeable, which creates problems in constructing a coherent disciplinary knowledge base. We describe how this problem arises based on an ontological assumption of two different kinds of ‘stuff’ in the world: that with essential determinate properties and that without essential properties. We experiment with a solution by ontologically understanding the world (...) as made from a single kind: That the most irreducible element of the world is process, in that reality is a continuous construction whereby subject and object are products, not independent constituents, of reality. Process philosophy overcomes nursing's ontological bifurcation and enables nursing's art–science dualism to be re‐conceptualized as a cohesive logic of skilled reality production. An unavoidable implication of a process turn in nursing philosophy is that the disciplinary goal no longer becomes a privileged ‘body of knowledge’ that authorizes, which has always been a defining challenge in nursing. Rather, and more productively perhaps, the aim is for greater sophistication and plurality in its ongoing commitment to attuning to reality in ways that shape disciplinary attainment. (shrink)

Feminist health activists and medical researchers frequently disagree on the adequacy of the informed consent processes in clinical trials. I argue for an informed consent process that reflects the central importance of patient-participant autonomy. Such a standard may raise concerns for medical researchers about their capacity to control the quantity and quality of the information they disclose to potential participants. These difficulties might be addressed by presenting potential participants with differently sized disclosure packages.

Despite growing advances in medical technologies, health status inequalities continue to increase across the globe. Developing countries have been faced with declining expenditures in health and social services, increasing burdens posed by both communicable and non-communicable diseases, and economic systems poorly geared to fostering sustainable development for the poorest and most marginalized. Under such circumstances, the challenges facing health practitioners in countries in transition are complex and diverse, and require the balancing of many conflicting imperatives. This is particularly so in (...) relation to the development of public health policy, where equity, redress of past inequalities, and the god of social justice may seemingly be pitted against macroeconomic adjustments required for national economic development in an increasingly globalized economic order.For example, pressures to deregulate as part of a market-oriented development philosophy will increase the risks from occupational hazards in populations desperate for paid employment. (shrink)

The Tang has often been considered the historical high point of Chinese “cosmopolitanism.” Recent scholarship, however, has been divided on the questions of just how tolerant the era actually was of ethnocultural difference and of whether it represented a turning point in Chinese history toward increasing xenophobia or, on the contrary, toward a less exclusive conception of Chinese identity. This essay suggests that surviving evidence is susceptible to contradictory interpretations on account of its preservation in textual genres characterized by complex (...) motivations that, moreover, changed dramatically over the course of the dynasty. We should not, therefore, uncritically accept statements concerning ethnocultural identity and difference in preserved texts as representative of the thoughts or feelings of even the literati class. A better understanding of the evolution of Chinese attitudes on these questions, instead, will require attention to the ways Tang ideas about texts shaped the attitudes literati felt worthy of expression in them, and how they did so differently in different periods. (shrink)

Symposium of Oakeshott on religion, science and politics.

In this study, I present the Chan Buddhist alternative to phronesis or ‘practical wisdom’. Instead of involving the skill or ‘know-how’ in applying moral principles to particular situations, the Chan Buddhist virtuously responds to situations because they understand how each situation is a ‘part’ of a larger whole or a ‘function’ (用) of the ‘body’ (體). Ultimately, this sensitivity to how each situation is meaningfully situated within a context of relationships is what motivates the Chan Buddhist’s spontaneous compassion towards the (...) suffering of existence in its entirety. (shrink)

Volume 28, Issue 1, January 2020, Page 204-207.

Many problems in environmental ethics are what have been called “global systemic problems,” problems in which what happens in one part of the world affects preservationist efforts elsewhere. Restoration of the Everglades is one such example. If global warming continues, the Everglades may well be flooded within the next quarter to half century and all restoration efforts will be for naught. Yet, the United States government is both pursuing restorationist efforts and withdrawing from the Kyoto Protocol on emissions of greenhouse (...) gases. One aspect of global systemic problems concerns whether there are interconnections between the preservationist obligations of the locals and the duties of others. There are three main lines of arguments for concluding that there are, indeed, interconnected obligations in such cases. First, the consequentialist case for imposing duties on locals assumes that others do not have inconsistent consequentialist obligations. In addition, a related consequentialist case can be made that when problems are systemic, others have positive supportive duties. Second, a weak principle of reciprocity supports the interconnectedness of obligations. Insistence that someone has an obligation that benefits you implies the duty not to act to undermine the efforts of that person to fulfill that obligation. Third, a weak principle of fairness—that it is only fair to expect one person to bear the burdens of producinga collective good if others have obligations to do their cooperative part—supports interconnected obligations with regard to global systemic problems. Because all three arguments point to the same conclusion, there is a very strong case for interconnected obligations as part of the solution to global systemic problems—problems that are all too prevalent in our world today. (shrink)

This study argues that Dōgen’s “Leaving Home Life” fascicle is not simply about leaving home/lay life to become a practicing monk. At first glance, the fascicle might not appear philosophically significant. To help bring the themes of that work into greater focus, I juxtapose Dōgen’s Shōbōgenzō and John Dewey’s later works on aesthetic experience and education. Both the teachings of Dōgen and the later Deweyan works on aesthetic experience are similar in the sense that both describe nature as a radically (...) plural and interdependent world without recourse to an underlying substance ontology or reality antecedent to and outside of experience. Both Dōgen and Dewey also claim that the experience of nature as... (shrink)