Twenty years after the end of apartheid rule, the claim that democratic South Africa is founded on the 'spirit of law' (nomos) of our shared humanity is questionable, to say the least. Some would argue that all talk of Ubuntu (or African humanism) should be dismissed as a passing fad of an exhausted nationalism. But a different response to the present is possible, one that proceeds from a temporary suspension (epoché) of the nationalist matrix and all the dead-end questions that (...) have resulted from it, in order to reposition Ubuntu in the more cosmopolitan terms of a critical humanism that must always remain irreducible to the politics of the day. This is a project that has to return to, in order to retrace, the founding claim that a politics premised on our shared humanity is, after all, perhaps possible." -- Back cover. (shrink)

Skepticism about blameworthiness says that there is good reason to doubt that, in our world, humans are ever blameworthy for their deeds. A significant problem for the discussion of this view is that it is unclear how to understand the kind of blame that should be at issue. This paper makes a new proposal. The basic idea is that the kind of blame skeptics should be skeptical about is constituted by responses that can violate the targets’ claims and by the (...) responders’ thought that the targets have forfeited this claim because of their morally objectionable actions and because of how they were when they performed them. This view identifies an important part of our everyday lives and frames discussions about skepticism about blameworthiness in a new way. (shrink)

Even though the idea that privacy is some kind of control is often presented as the standard view on privacy, there are powerful objections against it. The aim of this paper is to defend the control account of privacy against some particularly pressing challenges by proposing a new way to understand the relevant kind of control. The main thesis is that privacy should be analyzed in terms of source control, a notion that is adopted from discussions about moral responsibility.

Many philosophers characterize a particularly important sense of free will and responsibility by referring to basically deserved blame. But what is basically deserved blame? The aim of this paper is to identify the appraisal entailed by basic desert claims. It presents three desiderata for an account of desert appraisals and it argues that important recent theories fail to meet them. Then, the paper presents and defends a promising alternative. The basic idea is that claims about basically deserved blame entail that (...) the targets have forfeited their claims that others not blame them and that there is positive reason to blame them. The paper shows how this view frames the discussion about skepticism about free will and responsibility. (shrink)

This paper discusses the idea that the concept of privacy should be understood in terms of control. Three different attempts to spell out this idea will be critically discussed. The conclusion will be that the Source Control View on privacy is the most promising version of the idea that privacy is to be understood in terms of control.

ABSTRACT Recently, many authors have argued that claims about determinism and free will are situated on different levels of description and that determinism on one level does not rule out free will on another. This paper focuses on Christian List’s version of this basic idea. It will be argued for the negative thesis that List’s account does not rule out the most plausible version of incompatibilism about free will and determinism and, more constructively, that a level-based approach to free will (...) has better chances to meet skeptical challenges if it is guided by reasoning at the moral level – a level that has not been seriously considered so far by proponents of this approach. (shrink)

This paper explores a paradox constitutive of transformation discourse in South Africa: the transformation of a fragmented society presupposes the existence of a collective Will ; but the creation of a collective will can only result from a process of transformation. While politicians and higher education administrators debate how best to conceive and implement transformation, committed lecturers have to find ways of teaching the reality of that ideal full knowing that it is in part through teaching that this ideal is (...) achieved. The 2010 HE Summit (HES) called on all universities to ‘purposefully address the issue of social cohesion as part of their transformation agenda’ (2010:20). In this paper the learning encounter is posited as the paradoxical site es reproductive of that subjectivity. This suggests a degree of ‘bootstrapping’ in the sense that the learning encounter necessarily posits a historical Subject that is paradoxically both cause and effect of transformation. This is an interpretative paper that reflects on what it means to practise philosophy in such a context. Taking Readings’s The University in Ruins (1996) as point of departure it starts with a general, historical reflection on the telos of higher education which is then contextualised with reference to the post-colonial university. Towards the end I briefly consider aspects of my own philosophy teaching praxis in light of that theoretical frame. I engage the ‘bootstrapping’ paradox by suggesting that teaching (as) transformation comprises four moments: making students aware of 1) the fact that they belong to specific socio-epistemic communities; 2) that this sense of community is an historical construct which 3) implies limitations on the possibility of knowing and being that can 4) only be questioned through an encounter with what is other to that socio-epistemic community. In short, it is argued that in a university context the possibility of ‘social cohesion’ is first and foremost a confrontation with the conditions for the possibility of inter-subjective learning. (shrink)

Climate change is one of the most important issues we are currently facing. There are many ways in which states can fight climate change. Some of them involve interfering with citizens’ personal lives. The question of whether such interference is justified is under-explored in philosophy. This paper focuses on a specific aspect of people’s personal lives, namely their informational privacy. It discusses the question of whether, given certain empirical assumptions, it is proportional of the state to risk its citizens’ privacy (...) or to risk infringing its citizens’ right to privacy to fight climate change. The main claim this paper argues for is that if fighting climate change and protecting our privacy conflict, we have good reason to fight climate change rather than protect our privacy. (shrink)

We are currently witnessing a fundamental structural transformation of the scientific public sphere, characterized by processes of specialization, metrification, internationalization, platformization and visibilization. In contrast to explanations of this structural transformation that invoke a technological determinism, we demonstrate its historical contingency by drawing on analytic concepts from organization theory and the case of the Open Access transformation in Germany. The digitization of academic journals has not broadened access to scientific output but narrowed it down even further in the course of (...) the ‘serials crisis’. For a long time, research institutions were not able to convince large academic publishers to adopt less restrictive forms of access to academic journals. It was only through the emergence of new and in part illegal actors (shadow libraries and preprint servers) that the existing path could be broken, and an Open Access path constituted. Following this analysis, we discuss consequences of the Open Access transformation for the public spheres of science and democracy. We conclude that Open Access publishing can only help to transform both communicative spaces towards the normative ideal of a public sphere when complemented by systematic support for non-profit publication infrastructures. (shrink)

Blame skeptics argue that we have strong reason to revise our blame practices because humans do not fulfill all the conditions for it being appropriate to blame them. This paper presents a new challenge for this view. Many have objected that blame plays valuable roles such that we have strong reason to hold on to our blame practices. Skeptics typically reply that non-blaming responses to objectionable conduct, like forms of disappointment, can serve the positive functions of blame. The new challenge (...) is that skeptics need to show that it can be appropriate (or less inappropriate) to respond with this kind of disappointment to people’s conduct if it is inappropriate to respond with blame. The paper argues that current blame-skeptical views fail to meet this challenge. (shrink)

A standard account of privacy says that it is essentially a kind of control over personal information. Many privacy scholars have argued against this claim by relying on so-called threatened loss cases. In these cases, personal information about an agent is easily available to another person, but not accessed. Critics contend that control accounts have the implausible implication that the privacy of the relevant agent is diminished in threatened loss cases. Recently, threatened loss cases have become important because Edward Snowden’s (...) revelation of how the NSA and GCHQ collected Internet and mobile phone data presents us with a gigantic, real-life threatened loss case. In this paper, I will defend the control account of privacy against the argument that is based on threatened loss cases. I will do so by developing a new version of the control account that implies that the agents’ privacy is not diminished in threatened loss cases. (shrink)

For a long time the dominant view on the nature of blame was that to blame someone is to have an emotion toward her, such as anger, resentment or indignation in the case of blaming someone else and guilt in the case of self-blame. Even though this view is still widely held, it has recently come under heavy attack. The aim of this paper is to elaborate the idea that to blame is to have an emotion and to defend the (...) resulting emotion account of blame. (shrink)

In the last two decades, blame has become a core topic in ethics, philosophical moral psychology and, more recently, epistemology. This chapter aims at clarifying the complex state of the debate and at making a suggestion for how we should proceed from here. The core idea is that accounts of blame are often motivated by very different background goals. One standard goal is to provide a unifying account of our everyday blame practices. The chapter argues that there is reason to (...) think that this goal is not achievable. Another goal is to provide the tools for solving or clarifying important social or philosophical problems. The chapter suggests that this is what theories of blame should focus on. (shrink)

The paper contributes to the current discussion on the role of participatory methods in the context of technology assessment (TA) and science and technology (S&T) governance. It is argued that TA has to be understood as a form of democratic policy consulting in the sense of the Habermasian model of a “pragmatist” relation of science and politics. This notion implies that public participation is an indispensable element of TA in the context of policy advice. Against this background, participatory TA (pTA) (...) is defended against recent criticism of procedures of lay participation which states that pTA is lacking impact on S&T decision making, that pTA instead of opening S&T policies to new perspectives is used as a means to support mainstream S&T policy and that in pTA procedure the authentic lay perspective is systematically contorted by dominant expert knowledge. (shrink)

In this response we address additions to as well as criticisms and possible misinterpretations of our proposal for a second-person neuroscience. We map out the most crucial aspects of our approach by (1) acknowledging that second-person engaged interaction is not the only way to understand others, although we claim that it is ontogenetically prior; (2) claiming that spectatorial paradigms need to be complemented in order to enable a full understanding of social interactions; and (3) restating that our theoretical proposal not (...) only questions the mechanism by which a cognitive process comes into being, but asks whether it is at all meaningful to speak of a mechanism and a cognitive process when it is confined to intra-agent space. We address theoretical criticisms of our approach by pointing out that while a second-person social understanding may not be the only mechanism, alternative approaches cannot hold their ground without resorting to second-person concepts, if not in the expression, certainly in the development of social understanding. In this context, we also address issues of agency and intentionality, theoretical alternatives, and clinical implications of our approach. (shrink)

Using the art-brut theory by Jean Dubuffet as a starting point, the text aims to give profile to the changes, the figure of the outsider has experienced since the collapse of the category of the avant-garde. Under the auspices of cognitive capitalism and with the help of social media, the concept of outsiderness has transformed itself from a figure of authenticity and resistance against oppressive social circumstances to the realization of the unmediated, tactless, and brutal universalization of particularities.

As academic subject African philosophy is predominantly concerned with epistemology. It aims at re-presenting a lost body of authentic African thought. This apparently austere a-historical concern is framed by a grand narrative of liberation that cannot but politicise the quest for epistemological autonomy. By "politicise" I mean that the desire to re-cover an authentic African epistemology in order to establish African philosophy as autonomous subject, ironically re-iterates Western, enlightenment notions of the autonomous subject. Here, in the pursuit of an autonomous (...) subject the terms of historical oppression are necessarily duplicated in the terms of liberation. In this study I use the term disfigurement to refer to the double-bind - peculiar to post-coloniality - in which the African subject finds itself when it has to establish and affirm a sense of apartheid (in order to confirm the assumption of difference) by inventing its own autonomy in a way that ironically conflicts with an African conception of the autonomous subject. The transcendental concern with epistemological authenticity and autonomy - indicative of an oppressive desire for Western style autonomy - necessary as it may be in a post-colonial context, is placed in an ethical framework that seeks to remain faithful to the African dictum of identity and autonomy "I am because we are". Whereas the first three chapters are concerned with the transcendental question 'what is African philosophy?', the fourth and last chapter situates the ethical framework within which this question arises in the context of the recently "completed" South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. (shrink)

Albrecht Dürers Meisterstich Hieronymus im Gehäus (B 60) darf als allgemein bekannt vorausgesetzt werden. Die Forschung hat vor allem ikonographische Details im Zusammenhang des Gelehrtenbildes diskutiert, denn zu selbstverständlich nahm man das Bildthema (,,Stubengelehrter“, Lieblingsheiliger der Humanisten”) hin. Aber das Hauptthema ist ein völlig anderes: man findet es formuliert von Dürers Freund Lazarus Spengler , der im Jahr des Meisterstichs 1514 seine Übersetzung des (Ps.-)Eusebius-Briefes in Nürnberg veröffentlichte. Neben dieser Übersetzung gewinnt der Kupferstich eine metaphysische Dimension, die freilich erst in (...) den Blick rückt, wenn man ihn auf die Philosophie des Pico della Mirandola und die Formel aus der Oratio (1487) vom plastes&fictor sui ipsius” bezieht. (shrink)

How do the fact that an agent is morally responsible for a certain morally objectionable action and the fact that she is an appropriate target of blame for it relate to each other? Many authors inspired by Peter Strawson say that they necessarily co‐occur. Standard answers to the question of why they co‐occur say that the occurrence of one of the facts explains that the other obtains. This article presents a third option: that they are one and the same fact. (...) There is no difference between the fact that a person is an appropriate target of blame for an objectionable action and the fact that she is morally responsible for it. This view has the advantage of being metaphysically more parsimonious and of answering, in an elegant and plausible way, an interesting question about which many standard theories of responsibility keep silent: what is it to be morally responsible simpliciter? (shrink)

This paper presents an account of the right to privacy that is inspired by classic control views on this right and recent developments in moral psychology. The core idea is that the right to privacy is the right that others not make personal information about us flow unless this flow is an expression of and does not conflict with our deep self. The nature of the deep self will be spelled out in terms of stable intrinsic desires. The paper argues (...) that this view has advantages over alternative accounts of the right to privacy, that it is extensionally adequate in interesting test cases, that there is a good reason to think that the right to privacy, thus understood, can be justified, and that this view helps identify what kind of information is protected by the right to privacy. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

This paper analyses and (tentatively) rejects Julian Fink's argument for the existence of normative process-requirements. According to Fink, only process-requirements allow us to give appropriate normative credit to a subject S who violates certain state-requirements but is undergoing a process that will eventually lead to their satisfaction. I will show that Fink's argument applies, at best, only to a restricted set of cases—namely, when S's undergoing a process has not resulted in the formation of new mental states. In these remaining (...) cases, however, it is implausible to give S normative credit for undergoing the relevant process. Thus, we can assign the correct degree of the corresponding normative property solely in terms of state-requirements. To the extent that this holds, Fink's argument does not entail that there are normative process-requirements. (shrink)

The Top-Down Argument for the ability to do otherwise aims at establishing that humans can do otherwise in the sense that is relevant for debates about free will. It consists of two premises: first, we always need to answer the question of whether some phenomenon (such as the ability to do otherwise) exists by consulting our best scientific theories of the domain at issue. Second, our best scientific theories of human action presuppose that humans can do otherwise. This paper argues (...) that this is not enough to establish the conclusion. The Top-Down Argument supports that humans can do otherwise _in some sense_. But it does not show that humans can do otherwise _in the sense that is relevant for debates about free will_. The paper then shows that the apparently best way to make the argument valid does not work. (shrink)

Meine Untersuchung geht der Frage nach: Was verbindet philosophisch in der Sache die Oratio des Pico della Mirandola mit dem Kupferstich von Albrecht Dürer. Dabei leitet mich die Annahme, dass Pico und Dürer ihre Gemeinsamkeit hinter Decknamen und Chiffren verstecken. Indem ich ein Pico'sches Verfahren zur Erkenntnisgewinnung auf die Inschrift ,,MELENCOLIA § I" anwende, komme ich zu dem erstaunlichen Ergebnis, dass Dürer dem philosophischen Ansatz des Mirandolaners mehr verpflichtet ist, als man bislang nachzuweisen vermochte.

Karl Leonhard Reinhold<br>Versuch einer neuen Theorie des Vorstellungsvermögens, Teilband 1<br>Einleitung, Vorrede, Erstes Buch<br><br>Mit einer Einleitung und Anmerkungen herausgegeben von Ernst-Otto Onnasch.<br>PhB 599a. 2010. CLVII, 210 Seiten.<br>978-3-7873-1934-3. Leinen 68.00<br><br>Karl Leonhard Reinholds Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens (1789) ist aufgegliedert in eine lange Vorrede und drei Bücher. In der Vorrede und im ersten Buch stellt der Autor die epochale Bedeutung der kritischen Philosophie heraus. Im zweiten Buch folgt die eigentliche Theorie des Vorstellungsvermögens, von der aus im dritten Buch (...) Kants wichtigste Entdeckungen in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft, nämlich die Unterscheidung von Sinnlichkeit, Verstand und Vernunft, neu dargestellt werden. Hier liefert Reinhold eine eigene und höchst originelle Ableitung der Kategorien und der Ideen.<br><br>In seiner Einleitung beschreibt der Herausgeber Reinholds philosophische Entwicklung und erweist ihn als einen eigenständigen Denker mit einer ganz eigenen philosophischen Agenda, die er allerdings auf eine sehr geschickte Weise mit dem philosophischen Anliegen Kants zu verbinden vermochte: Reinholds Philosophie war, entgegen der überkommenen Einschätzung, alles andere als epigonal und von enormer Bedeutung für die Ausprägung und Genese der Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus.<br><br>Bereits mit seinen populären Briefen über die Kantische Philosophie (1786/87) traf Reinhold den Nerv der Zeit und setzte damit die kritische Philosophie Kants für ein breiteres Publikum auf die philosophische Agenda (nur wenige der Zeitgenossen lasen Kant im Original, die meisten bezogen ihr Urteil über Kant aus den Briefen). Der Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens ist dann sein erstes großes theoretisches Werk mit eigenem Anspruch. Reinhold präsentiert es als einen Versuch, die kritische Philosophie auf der Grundlage des Vorstellungsvermögens allgemein verständlich zu machen.<br>. (shrink)