"All political action has . . . in itself a directedness towards knowledge of the good: of the good life, or of the good society. For the good society is the complete political good. If this directedness becomes explicit, if men make it their explicit goal to acquire knowledge of the good life and of the good society, political philosophy emerges. . . . The theme of political philosophy is mankind's great objectives, freedom and government or empire--objectives which are capable (...) of lifting all men beyond their poor selves. Political philosophy is that branch of philosophy which is closest to political life, to non-philosophic life, to human life."--From "What Is Political Philosophy?" What Is Political Philosophy? --a collection of ten essays and lectures and sixteen book reviews written between 1943 and 1957--contains some of Leo Strauss's most famous writings and some of his most explicit statements of the themes that made him famous. The title essay records Strauss's sole extended articulation of the meaning of political philosophy itself. Other essays discuss the relation of political philosophy to history, give an account of the political philosophy of the non-Christian Middle Ages and of classic European modernity, and present his theory of esoteric writing. (shrink)

This uniquely fascinating volume is not merely a learned treatise in historical semantics; it is itself a stupendous display of world harmony as a creed-a vivid demonstration that "all is all.".

The age-old debate about what constitutes just punishment has become deadlocked. Retributivists continue to privilege desert over all else, and consequentialists continue to privilege punishment's expected positive consequences, such as deterrence or rehabilitation, over all else. In this important intervention into the debate, Leo Zaibert argues that despite some obvious differences, these traditional positions are structurally very similar, and that the deadlock between them stems from the fact they both oversimplify the problem of punishment. Proponents of these positions pay insufficient (...) attention to the conflicts of values that punishment, even when justified, generates. Mobilizing recent developments in moral philosophy, Zaibert offers a properly pluralistic justification of punishment that is necessarily more complex than its traditional counterparts. An understanding of this complexity should promote a more cautious approach to inflicting punishment on individual wrongdoers and to developing punitive policies and institutions. (shrink)

Contemporary HRM was introduced into Poland by the arrival of international corporations with their professional systems of Human Resource Management, which emphasizes ethical personnel management. This research is based on data collected from a questionnaire and interview of 40 women and men professional graduates of the 2004 Weekend MBA Program at Poznan University of Economics eliciting their perceptions of ethical issues in Polish HRM. The present Polish economic situation, with 19% unemployment, precipitates many ethical challenges. The questionnaire and interviews resulted (...) in 217 observations and specific examples of ethical HRM issues. Examples fall in two broad categories and five specific Human Resource areas. The broad external categories are: History and cultural attitudes and Exploitation of the current unemployment situation. Historical and cultural attitudes influence attitudes toward work; company discipline; property and ownership; law and social expectations at work. The history of personnel departments in Socialistic Poland explains many of these attitudes. The five specific categories are: Ethical issues in recruitment; Ethical issues in hiring ; Ethical issues in performance appraisals and promotions; Abuse of authority, and “Mobbing”. Ethical issues in these categories include correlation with appropriate Polish Labor and Penal Laws. This research reveals some HRM ethical challenges unique to Polish HRM. The research emphasizes professional HRM and ethical expectations, which are now being recognized and accepted as a strategic component of Polish management. (shrink)

In Homos, he studies the historical, political, and philosophical grounds for the current distrust, within the gay community, of self-identifying moves, for the ...

Christian Philosophy concerns the perennial paradox of reason/revelation and philosophy/theology by reflecting on: whether philosophy has ever been «pure» i.e., free of beliefs; how Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus helped prepare for Christian philosophy; how these practiced it: Bonaventure, Guerric, Albert, Aquinas, Maritain. As monists Marcel and Whitehead confirm that philosophy cannot be faith but must remain distinct and yet dependent on it if philosophy is to be Christian. This book closes by studying how Aquinas' positions are an antidote to current trends (...) such as Sartre's existentialism, Neo-kantian self-centered epistemology and ethics, Derrida's deconstructionism. (shrink)

Jennifer Lackey (2018) has developed an account of the primary form of group assertion, according to which groups assert when a suitably authorized spokesperson speaks for the group. In this paper I pose a challenge for Lackey's account, arguing that her account obscures the phenomenon of group silencing. This is because, in contrast to alternative approaches that view assertions (and speech acts generally) as social acts, Lackey's account implies that speakers can successfully assert regardless of how their utterances are taken (...) up by their audiences. What reflection on group silencing shows us, I argue, is that an adequate account of group assertion needs to find a place for audience uptake. (shrink)

This article explores the meaning of the task of teaching students to formulate critique in relation to the so-called ‘pedagogical paradox’, according to which the educational ideal of individual autonomy is contradicted by the practice of planning and control, which is particularly pronounced in the influential model of ‘constructive alignment’. Taking Kant’s idea of enlightenment and autonomy as a starting point, I introduce Luc Boltanski’s concept of reflexivity and link it to Jon Elster’s discussion of ‘states that are essentially by-products’. (...) In doing so, I advance the view that genuine critique typically emerges from a shift in perspective, from the pragmatic realization of goals according to institutionalized practices to a metapragmatic reflection on those practices. Since teaching is itself an institutionalized practice, personal reflexivity can only be understood as a by-product of teaching, and, contra the logic of models like constructive alignment, it cannot be set as a direct objective. Emerging from the subject itself, rather than from the influence of an educational technique, personal reflexivity should be recognized as an important aspect of the subject’s transition from youth to maturity. (shrink)

According Philip Pettit, suitably organised groups not only possess ‘minds of their own’ but can also ‘make up their minds’ and 'speak for themselves'--where these two capacities enable them to perform as conversable subjects or 'persons'. In this paper I critically examine Pettit's case for group personhood. My first step is to reconstruct his account, explaining first how he understands the two capacities he considers central to personhood – the capacity to ‘make up one’s mind’, and the capacity to ‘speak (...) for oneself’ – before showing how he thinks these can be manifested in groups. With Pettit’s account duly reconstructed, I then turn to criticism, arguing that Pettit’s construal of making up one’s mind does not do proper justice to our first-personal self-understanding, nor to our characteristic interpersonal forms of engagement. This leads me, finally, to consider an alternative construal of ‘making up one’s mind’ and ‘speaking for oneself’ that is associated with the work of Richard Moran and whichargue, could usefully be exteextended to groups. (shrink)

To speak of emergence in nature is to test a metaphor. Its content may vary, but the challenge is unchanging: to demonstrate something like a spiritual intent in nature, and a relation of nature to spirit. We could flesh out this metaphor by speaking of “Life” as uniting the two: inanimate nature evolving toward a vitality that is fulfilled in spirit. We might use an even grander concept for this unifying purpose: nature and spirit as two aspects of “God.” Or (...) we might see nature and spirit as metaphors for one another, and unite them in that way: “nature as spirit made visible, spirit as invisible nature.”. (shrink)

This essay offers a critique of Larry Temkin’s seminal new book, Rethinking the Good, at the heart of which is the highly counterintuitive claim that all things considered judgments are not transitive. I evaluate Temkin’s claims through the lens of social choice theory, pursue some of its larger implications and applications, and conclude with a very general worry having to do with the intimate connection between transitivity and logical consistency, namely whether, if Temkin is right, this would not bring all (...) moral reasoning to an abrupt halt. (shrink)

"Strauss gives us an impressive addition to his life's work—the recovery of the Great Tradition in political philosophy. The problem the book proposes centers formally upon Socrates.

On 4 and 5 April 1983 the Chicago Museum of Science and Industry celebrated its 50th anniversary with an invited conference titled, “Where Are We Going?;—Critical Issues in Science and Technology.” This article is a slightly revised version of Professor Marx's talk given there.—Ed.

Recent anxieties about the deterioration of the global environment have had the effect of intensifying the ambiguity that surrounds the social roles of scientists and engineers. This has happened not merely, as suggested at the outset, because the environmental crisis has made their roles more conspicuous. Nor is it merely because recent disasters have alerted us to new, or hitherto unrecognized, social consequences of using the latest science-based technologies. What also requires recognition is that ideas about the social role of (...) modern science and engineering are embedded in, hence mediated by, larger views of the world. Within such American worldviews, moreover, the status of science and engineering is closely bound up with their perceived effect upon the environment.In the dominant culture, accordingly, the respect given to scientists and engineers is in large measure dependent on their ability to play the central role assigned to them in the historical narrative about progress. As the ostensible heroes of that popular story, they are expected to lead the way in realizing the promise of prosperity and general well-being. The environmental crisis surely has diminished the credibility of that story, thereby causing the social role of science and engineering to seem more dubious — more ambiguous. To be sure, the crisis also may have the effect, for very different reasons, of increasing the power and responsibility of organized science. But the late twentieth-century task of damage control cannot possibly elicit anything like the respect accorded to organized science by the earlier belief in progress.It also is important to recall, finally, that the narrative of progress itself has undergone a disillusioning transformation. The early Enlightenment version of the story depicted scientists and engineers working in the service of a social and political ideal that all people could share. But the later technocratic concept of progress, with its sterile instrumentalist notion of advancing the power of science-based technology as an end in itself, is far less likely to inspire trust. Its patent inadequacies have had the effect of enhancing the appeal, if only by contrast, of the seemingly “anti-science” ideologies of pastoralism and primitivism. All of which might be taken to suggest that if the scientific and engineering professions want to recover some of the respect and status they once had, they would be well advised to join with sympathetic humanists and social scientists in recuperating some of the idealism that the project of modern science formerly derived from its place within the ideology of progress. That might entail the sacrifice of their technocratic posture of neutrality, dissociating themselves from people and institutions responsible for environmental degradation, and their help in formulating a new concept — which is to say, new criteria — of progress to which they might commit themselves. A primary test of any proposed social policy under this new dispensation surely would be whether it would improve, or at a minimum protect, the life-enhancing capacities of the global ecosystem. *** DIRECT SUPPORT *** A8402064 00011 *** DIRECT SUPPORT *** A8402064 00012 *** DIRECT SUPPORT *** A8402064 00013. (shrink)

A reissue of the 1975 edition, with four added essays, this collection offers a clear introduction to Strauss' views regarding the nature of political ...

Abstract: In responding to the cases that motivate epistemic contextualism, invariantists sometimes use a warranted assertability maneuver (WAM), according to which we mistakenly judge an assertion to be true because we confuse conversational propriety with truth. I argue that no invariantist WAM against Stewart Cohen's Airport Case can succeed. The problem is that such a WAM is inconsistent with the known ways of accounting for the evidence that motivates the knowledge account of assertion.

The arma virumque theme that this article identifies in the Punica is an important avenue through which to understand the meaning of Silius Italicus’ poem and its author’s relationship with Vergil. The text frequently uses combinations of the Aeneid ’s first two words, arma and vir, to suggest a common literary inheritance from Aeneas among its characters, large and small, Roman and Carthaginian. By pervasively characterizing most participants in the Second Punic War as versions, or poetic refractions, of Aeneas, the (...) poet recasts Rome’s glorious foreign war as a kind of civil war producing criminal corpses. More specifically, characters vie not for national dominance of the Mediterranean but for personal prestige as the most worthy heir to Aeneas. This process reconsiders the Republic’s history, aligns the text with the developments of 69 c.e., and comments critically on the Roman principate and its foundational literary text, the Aeneid. (shrink)

This article argues for two inter-related theses keyed to Plato’s Gorgias. Callicles does not represent a constitutional form, but political participation itself, characterised by ambition, competition among political candidates, and the psychological and ethical mechanisms entailed in the process of gaining political recognition. According to Socrates’s understanding, the political leader’s mirroring and internalisation of dominant character traits, held amongst those individuals transferring power, is decisive to the approval bestowed upon the political leader in question. This reading supplements that of Ober, (...) who has claimed that the would-be political leader’s conformity with the demos’ ideology is decisive. This article argues that Socrates’ point is that a would-be political leader needs to mirror the character traits of those exercising power in specific civic institutions, implying a more pluralistic and context-determined approach. Moreover, this reading connects Socrates’ notion of recognition with that of moral psychology. (shrink)

Role morality refers to the special obligations and rights that are associated with occupying certain professional roles—lawyer, doctor, journalist, soldier and others. There are a number of moral puzzles peculiar to this domain. To what extent can someone whose role involves acting in someone else’s behalf avoid being blamed for aiding him in actions he would be blamed for if acting outside that role? What is one to make of situations in which the performance of one’s role seems to call (...) for the actors to engage in conflicting behavior, for example, two lawyers representing two disputing clients? Is it coherent to speak of some roles as involving obligations to institutions rather than to people? In this chapter the problems are spelled out, the current debate surveyed and tentatively different conclusions from the established ones are suggested. (shrink)