The aim of this study was to explore the ethical foundations for a caring conversation. The analysis is based on the ethics of Paul Ricoeur and deals with questions such as what kind of person the nurse ought to be and how she or he engages in caring conversations with suffering others. According to Ricoeur, ethics (the aim of an accomplished life) has primacy over morality (the articulation of aims in norms). At the ethical level, self-esteem and autonomy were shown (...) to be essential for a person (nurse) to act with respect and responsibility. The ethical relationship of a caring conversation was found to be asymmetrical, because of the passivity inflicted by suffering. This asymmetry was found to be potentially unethical if not balanced with reciprocity. In the ethical context, the caring conversation is one in which the nurse makes room through the ethos of caritas for a suffering person to regain his or her self-esteem, and thus makes a good life possible. (shrink)

In policy-making the consumption of specially labelled products, and its role in improving the welfare of livestock, has attracted considerable attention. There is in many countries a diverse market for animal welfare-friendly products which is potentially confusing and may lack transparency. We ask whether special quality labels that involve medium levels of animal welfare, as compared with labels promoting premium levels of animal welfare, have a role to play in promoting improvements in animal welfare. The Danish pork market is our (...) reference case, but we also widen the context by comparing the markets for pork in three other European countries. Our findings suggest that in order to improve animal welfare through demand for welfare-friendly products it is important to maintain separate the market for products with strong animal welfare profiles from markets for products with medium levels of animal welfare where, often, animal welfare is bundled together with other food quality attributes. We conclude that such quality labels may indeed play an important role in promoting higher animal welfare standards provided that they offer real improvements in animal welfare as compared with standard products. They will be attractive to consumers with a positive, but not especially strong interest in animal welfare as an individual food attribute who would otherwise be inclined to purchase standard products. (shrink)

Kierkegaard's view of time and eternity.

Job characteristics play an essential role for the well-being of employees. When job characteristics are unfavorable, the experienced exchange relationship with one’s supervisor may become relevant to weaken negative consequences. We conducted a diary study over ten consecutive working days with 112 academics. Based on conservation of resources theory, we assumed that daily LMX constitutes a resource for employees that moderates the link between job characteristics and job satisfaction as well as emotional exhaustion. Additionally, we proposed lagged-effects of morning job (...) characteristics and LMX on next-day morning job satisfaction and emotional exhaustion. Findings from hierarchical linear modeling demonstrated that on the day-level higher perceived levels of job control in the morning were associated with higher perceived job satisfaction and lower perceived emotional exhaustion in the afternoon. The experience of increased time pressure in the morning was negatively related to perceived day-level afternoon job satisfaction and positively to perceived day-level afternoon emotional exhaustion. Within one day, perceived LMX moderated the relationship between perceived job control and perceived job satisfaction in the afternoon. We only found lagged effects of the interaction between afternoon job control and afternoon LMX on next-day morning job satisfaction. We discuss daily LMX as a resource for employees both within one day and from day-to day, along with future research directions on the buffering role of LMX. (shrink)

As a part of a research project on Dignity and Older Europeans Programme) I explore in this paper a set of notions of human dignity. The general concept of dignity is introduced and characterized as a position on a value scale and it is further specified through its relations to the notions of right, respect and self-respect. I present four kinds of dignity and spell out their differences: the dignity of merit, the dignity of moral or existential stature, the dignity (...) of identity and the universal human dignity. Menschenwürde pertains to all human beings to the same extent and cannot be lost as long as the persons exist. The dignity of merit depends on social rank and position. There are many species of this kind of dignity and it is very unevenly distributed among human beings. The dignity of merit exists in degrees and it can come and go. The dignity of moral stature is the result of the moral deeds of the subject; likewise it can be reduced or lost through his or her immoral deeds. This kind of dignity is tied to the idea of a dignified character and of dignity as a virtue. The dignity of moral stature is a dignity of degree and it is also unevenly distributed. The dignity of identity is tied to the integrity of the subject's body and mind, and in many instances, although not always, also dependent on the subject's self-image. This dignity can come and go as a result of the deeds of fellow human beings and also as a result of changes in the subject's body and mind. (shrink)

Experts have been claimed to perceive risks in a different way than the general public. It is likely that experts often see risks in their own field of expertise as smaller than the public does, but that does not imply that their risk perception is also driven by other factors. Topical experts and general risk assessors are two quite different types of experts. Still, common assertions as to the simple structure of expert risk perception, said to be related only to (...) technical or statistical risk estimates, builds on a meager database consisting of 15 general risk assessors. Results from a study reported here show that the factors explaining experts’ risk perception are similar to those of a comparable group of nontopical experts with a similar level of technological literacy and to the general public, and that the level of explained variance is quite comparable for experts and the general public. (shrink)

We consider an infinite hierarchy of systems of Alethic Modal Logic with so-called Levels of Perfection, and add to them suitable definitions of such interesting deontic categories as those of supererogation, offence, conditional obligation and conditional permission. We then state three problems concerning the proper characterization of the resulting logic(s) for our defined notions, and discuss two of these problems in some detail.

The basic work for this book was carried out during the spring of 1989 in Edinburgh, where I had been granted a research position at The Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities. I should like to express here my indebtedness to the Institute for the opportunity thus afforded me. I should also like to say how very grateful I am for the stimulating conversations I had there with Professor Timothy Sprigge and Dr. Elizabeth Telfer. Dr. Telfers’s own treatise Happiness (...) has been a major influence on my view of the questions involved. The basic view of health and illness presented in this book is more fully set out in my On the Nature of Health. As in the case of my previous larger projects, I have received a great amount of support and may wise comments from Professor Ingmar Pörn, Helsinki. Three Danish experts – Anton Aggernaes, Erik Ostenfeld and Peter Sandøe – have made valuable comments. Professor Heng ten Have, Nijmegen, has improved my reading of the philosophy of Jeremy Bentham. I should also like to thank my colleagues at the Department of Health and Society, University of Linköping, for helping me to avoid a number of the pitfalls that can so easily stumble into when it comes to a treatise like this. Especially I should like to mentioned Per-Erik Liss, Ingemar Nordin and Bo Petersson, all three of whom have read and commented on the entire manuscript. A Swedish version of this book, Livskvalitet och hälsa, came out in 1991. I have been made quite a number of corrections and additions, one type of addition being replies to critical points made in reviews of the Swedish version. I should like to thank Malcolm Forbes for valuable help putting my English into publishable condition. Linköping, May 1993 Lennart Noredenfelt. (shrink)

The main purpose of this paper is to clarify some senses of dignity that are particularly relevant for the treatment and care of the elderly. I make a distinction between two quite different ideas of dignity, on the one hand the basic kind of dignity possessed by every human being, and on the other hand the dignity which is the result of a person's merits, whether these be inherited or achieved. Common to both these ideas is that having a dignity (...) entails having a set of rights, in the case of basic dignity the set of rights which we call human rights, the rights which the United Nations, among others, has tried to determine. The dignities of merit also provide some rights, although normally rights with limited scope covering, for instance, a professional area. This observation gives my preliminary answer to the fundamental question of what distinguishes dignity from other high values that could be attached to humans. I discuss further a kind of value that might be mistaken for a kind of dignity, viz. what I call public status. This status is to be distinguished from social status (the status of e.g. kings, governors, and officials) that I take to be a proper dignity of merit. The public status is the status gained solely via public perception and not directly via any merits on the part of the dignified. Finally, I turn to the topic of the dignity of the elderly and try to determine whether there is some dignity peculiar to the elderly, and which is over and above the basicMenschenwrde. My two preliminary proposals are the following: the elderly have a dignity of wisdom and they have a highly general dignity of merit, which results from their life-long efforts and achievements, and for this they deserve our gratitude. (shrink)

This book is a contribution to the general philosophy of action and the philosophy of welfare. The author makes separate analyses of concepts such as action, ability, interaction, action-explanation, happiness, health, illness and disability. At the same time he explores and substantiates the idea of a strong interdependence between the concept of action and some of the central concepts of welfare, in particular health and illness and related concepts.

The 2021 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel was awarded to David Card “for his empirical contributions to labour economics”, and to Joshua Angrist and Guido Imbens “for their methodological contributions to the analysis of causal relationships”. Lennart B. Ackermans reflects on Card, Angrist, and Imben's work. -/- Ackermans argues, first, that advances in causal methodology from Angrist and Imbens have helped solve the credibility crisis in econometrics and revealed shortcomings in past and present (...) graduate textbooks in econometrics. Second, for the field to develop further, economists must resolve the current disputes surrounding causal frameworks. The article compares the merits of the three frameworks for causal modelling proposed by, respectively, Donald Rubin, Judea Pearl, and James Heckman. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophy of health has been quite focused on the problem of determining the nature of the concepts of health, illness and disease from a scientific point of view. Some theorists claim and argue that these concepts are value-free and descriptive in the same sense as the concepts of atom, metal and rain are value-free and descriptive. To say that a person has a certain disease or that he or she is unhealthy is thus to objectively describe this person. On (...) the other hand it certainly does not preclude an additional evaluation of the state of affairs as undesirable or bad. The basic scientific description and the evaluation are, however, two independent matters, according to this kind of theory. Other philosophers claim that the concept of health, together with the other medical concepts, is essentially value-laden. To establish that a person is healthy does not just entail some objective inspection and measurement. It presupposes also an evaluation of the general state of the person. A statement that he or she is healthy does not merely imply certain scientific facts regarding the person’s body or mind but implies also a (positive) evaluation of the person’s bodily and mental state. My task in this paper will be, first, to present the two principal rival types of theories and present what I take to be the main kind of reasoning by which we could assess these theories, and second, to present a deeper characterization of the principal rival theories of health and illness. (shrink)

One INTRODUCTION 1. Background The theory of the nature of health and disease, or of the concepts of health and disease, has been central in modem ...

In recent decades, economists have developed methods for measuring the country-wide level of inequality of opportunity. The most popular method, called the ex-ante method, uses data on the distribution of outcomes stratified by groups of individuals with the same circumstances, in order to estimate the part of outcome inequality that is due to these circumstances. I argue that these methods are potentially biased, both upwards and downwards, and that the unknown size of this bias could be large. To argue that (...) the methods are biased, I show that they ought to measure causal or counterfactual quantities, while the methods are only capable of identifying correlational information. To argue that the bias is potentially large, I illustrate how the causal complexity of the real world leads to numerous non-causal correlations between circumstances and outcomes and respond to objections claiming that such correlations are nonetheless indicators of unfair disadvantage, that is, inequality of opportunity. (shrink)

Suggestions for transforming ecological sustainability into operative social choice mechanisms can be viewed through the bifocal lens of limits on, and opportunities for, the ecological state. Using lines of reasoning brought in from the comparative study of environmental policy, this article tries to stake out how far the ecological state can go in pursuing objectives of sustainable development without intruding on values and objectives fundamental to democracy. The article discusses social choice mechanisms in terms of the ecological state's authority, management (...) capacities, effectiveness, and legitimacy, drawing up the image of the ecological state as a ' green fist in a velvet glove' with the ultimate objective of integrating 'ecological' evaluations into the public mind so that they become as 'natural' as those 'economic' criteria presently applied. Concluding that such 'ecological' consciousness involves a great leap in ecological information processing and dissemination within and throughout societies, the article invokes the sustainability and success of democratic social welfare states which base authoritative command on enlightened debate and deliberation as evidence that such a leap can be successfully made through processes of informed consensus. (shrink)

The last two decades have seen a heated debate between "halfers" and "thirders": those who believe Sleeping Beauty’s credence in a coin landing heads is 1/2 and those who believe it is 1/3 – as well as quite some alternative positions. This paper attempts to settle the debate in favour of thirdism. I present a new argument for thirdism which cannot be resisted using any of the previously used halfer strategies. My argument uses an analogy in which Sleeping Beauty has (...) a lucid dream on each day. To arrive at thirdism, she uses an unproblematic type of Bayesian conditionalisation, the principle of indifference, and the principal principle. I argue that all of these reasoning steps should be uncontroversial. Finally, I argue that all published defences of halfism are untenable. (shrink)

Emotions are an important clue for the characterisation of individuals in Xenophon’s “Hellenica”. Especially joy and schadenfreude have an important narrative function. Malicious joy and spite point at the flaws of the Spartan hegemony after the Peloponnesian War. However, pleasure at the misfortune of others is not negative in itself. Defeating hubristic enemies is a proper reason to rejoice for Xenophon. Emotions can be vices or virtues, it is the circumstances that define their moral value.

A great number of constructive suggestions for the analysis of the concepts and models treated are presented in this book, which mirrors a current debate within the theory of medicine by covering three central topics: the concepts of health and disease; definition and classification in medicine; and causal explanation in medicine. Among the issues dealt with are: How should the concepts of health and disease be characterized in order to be of relevance to clinical practice? Should we try to define (...) particular diseases in explicit terms? What should be the criteria for selecting causes when explaining disease or death? These problems are treated from various points of view, the contributors being drawn from the fields of clinical medicine, epidemiology, psychiatry, social medicine, philosophy, and history of medicine. (shrink)