Hegel's early philosophical essay demonstrates the need for a pure empiricism and complete formalism in scientific endeavor.

The article deals with the relationship between theological ethics and moral philosophy. The former is seen as a theoretical reflection on Christian ethics, the latter as one on secular ethics. The main questions asked are: Is there one and only one pre-theoretical knowledge about acting rightly? Does philosophy provide us with the theoretical framework for understanding both Christian and secular ethics? Both questions are answered in the negative. In the course of argument, four positions are presented: theological unificationism, philosophical unificationism, (...) theological separationism and Lutheran dualism. It is argued that the latter position is most convincing. It is dual in the sense of being both a theory of Christian ethics and of including a recognition of natural law. Hence, it unites a particularistic and a universalistic point of view. In the last section a reformulation of the Lutheran position is attempted in making use of the ethical theory of Knud E. Løgstrup''s The Ethical Demand. (shrink)

This article elucidates a unique metaethical theory implicit in the work of several thinkers associated with the Stone-Campbell Restoration Movement. After positioning that theory within a broader landscape of metaethical positions endorsed by several prominent contemporary Christian philosophers and theologians, we address the concern that, when attending to the Euthyphro dilemma, the Restoration-inspired combination metaethical theory inevitably collapses into either an unalloyed divine command theory or an unalloyed natural law theory. In explaining how this sort of worry can be (...) mitigated, we offer reason to think that the nonreductive, combination metaethical theory in question constitutes potentially fertile territory for further scholarly work in Christian ethics. (shrink)

Abstractabstract:Cardinal Sforza Pallavicino, SJ (1607–67), conceived a procedure for determining natural moral laws by voting under a veil of ignorance. Behind this veil, imagined possible people who are ignorant of their social position, personal characteristics, nation, and the historical period in which they live vote as equals. These possible people are asked to establish a moral law in pursuit of their own and collective happiness, which they are obligated by God to follow. This article discusses Pallavicino's innovative approach to (...) natural law and examines its reception in Southern Germany and (what is now) Austria. (shrink)

This book provides a critique of the three most prominent Australian "authorities" on Law and Ethics of the present day, namely John Finnis, Tracey Rowland, and Peter Singer. So far as the study of Natural Law is concerned the central figure is John Finnis. Peter Singer relates to it indirectly as adopting a position in Moral Philosophy that rejects Natural Law in any traditional sense and takes a naturalist position in a utilitarian sense. Tracey Rowland adopts a position (...) that downplays Natural Law as knowable by human reason or philosophy outside the theological order of grace. The works of these philosophers provide the occasion for bringing back into focus some of the great truths of ethical and legal philosophy and for showing up, as best as one can from within, the diabolically perilous situation for our modern culture that has developed since the general breakdown of Christian civilization now so long ago as to be practically forgotten. (shrink)

The extent to which God grounds normativity within natural law theory is analyzed. I examine Hugo Grotius’s understanding of natural law and human nature and show that Grotius makes few explicit metaphysical commitments which makes his view open to development in at least two different ways. Then a Thomistic view of natural law and human nature is developed. It is shown that Grotius’s position could be developed as a proto-new natural law theory, but this leaves it (...) open to powerful objections from Fulvio Di Blasi and other Thomistic philosophers. Finally, I argue that a view can be developed in such a way as to take on certain elements of the Thomistic view, particularly its metaphysics, but still maintain the famous Grotian claim that human nature can establish normativity without God. The key to this is the distinction between the order of knowing and the order of being. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to explicate the theological and epistemological elements of John Locke's moral philosophy as presented in the ‘Essay Concerning Human Understanding’ and ‘The Reasonableness of Christianity’. Many detractors hold that Locke's moral philosophy is internally inconsistent due to his seeming commitment to both the intellectualist position that divinely instituted morality admits of pure rational demonstration and the competing voluntarist claim that we must rely for our moral knowledge upon divine revelation. In this paper I argue (...) that Locke is guilty of no such contradiction. In doing so, I attempt to accommodate Locke's position in the ‘Essay’ that moral principles are demonstrable a priori with his views on the sanctity of Christian revelation. I then consider Locke's conception of moral ideas as a species of mixed modes, or arbitrarily constructed complex ideas, and attempt to navigate the mechanism whereby human understanding can recognize these ideas as conforming to, or straying from, divinely appointed natural law. I conclude that despite Locke's failure to actually provide a full-fledged moral theory, he lays a rationally coherent groundwork for the fulfilment of such a project that accommodates a-priori rational reflection and divine revelation as complementary paths to moral understanding. (shrink)

Natural law is a crucial subject in the twelfth-century debates among Roman and canon lawyers, but also among the exegetes and theologians. Starting from two verses of Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, the masters debated the natural capability of human being to achieve a moral knowledge and the features of the universal moral principle, that is the lex naturalis, which natural reason can understand. Through the analysis of Gilbert of La Porrée’s Glossa in epistolas Beati Pauli and (...) of Ps. Hugh of St. Victor’s Quaestiones in epistolas Beati Pauli, this essay examines the exegetical developments in the Parisian milieu of the mid-twelfth century. It shows how the doctrinal positions of Gilbert and the Ps. Hugh stand in their intellectual landscape and which influence they have in the development of the theological debate on natural law. (shrink)

Johannes Althusius, a German legal theorist and political thinker in the early 1600s, attempts in his Politica to create a chain of increasingly large communal associations that could constitute a universally applicable political order. He founds this system on a natural law theory of behavioral guidelines. Many elements of his body of work, from its federalist structure to the granting of a right of sovereignty to the people, bear marks of an early connection to modern Western thought meriting further (...) exploration. Upon close inspection, the natural law theory at play in Politica also contains oddities and inconsistencies worthy of note. His Theory of Justice, a work on law and ethics, contains a similar theory with slight yet significant variations at the core level. Ultimately owed to weaknesses in the derivation of duties to self and a lack of evidence for the reasoning of the hierarchy of duties to others in Politica, the Theory of Justice model, though not without its own internal inconsistencies in the moral authority of positive law, is found to present a more philosophically sound model. (shrink)

If Kant's account of rights had continued the "early modern Natural Law tradition", basing rights on some notion of human flourishing, there would be no difficulty about including socio-economic rights for the needy in his theory. However, his division of moral philosophy into Rechtslehre and Tugendlehre limits Rechtspflichten to duties that a moral agent can be coerced to fulfill. If a state is to give the needy statutory rights, the justification for using coercion on its citizens cannot be that (...) they have a duty of virtue to assist the needy. In order to determine whether such a justification can be found, the one innate socio-economic right Kant admits, a child's right to be cared for and educated, is examined and found to be a right against its parents, not against the state. Kant does, however, hold that a state should establish institutions to provide for abandoned children and for the poor in general. His justification for a state's use of coercion with regard to such statutory rights is considered and a criterion is suggested for the possible consent of its non-virtuous citizens to proposed measures for assistance to the needy. It is suggested that if advocates of aid to the needy cannot justify their proposals by such a criterion they will have to provide a very different account of rights than Kant gives in his Rechtslehre , which is concerned with the moral permissibility of using coercion. Wenn Kants Lehre von den subjektiven Rechten nichts anderes wäre als eine Fortsetzung der "ihr vorangehenden modernen Naturrechtstradition" und die subjektiven Rechte infolgedessen auf das eine oder andere Konzept von menschlichem Wohlergehen gestützt hätte, dann wäre es nicht sonderlich schwierig, sozio-ökonomische Rechte für die Bedürftigen in diese Lehre einzubauen. Nun schränkt Kants Einteilung der Moralphilosophie in Rechtslehre und Tugendlehre den Begriff der Rechtspflicht allerdings auf diejenigen Pflichten ein, zu deren Erfüllung ein Mensch gezwungen werden kann. Deshalb kann, wenn ein Staat den Bedürftigen durch ein positives Gesetz irgendwelche Rechte auf Hilfe gewährt, die Rechtfertigung der Anwendung von staatlichem Zwang nicht darin gesucht werden, daß die dadurch in Anspruch genommenen Personen die Tugendpflicht haben, die Bedürftigen zu unterstützen. Um festzustellen, ob sich staatlicher Zwang in bezug auf solche Hilfspflichten überhaupt rechtfertigen läßt, erörtert der Beitrag das Recht des Kindes auf Fürsorge und Ausbildung als das eine und einzige angeborene sozio-ökonomische Recht, das Kant akzeptiert. Freilich ist das Recht des Kindes ein Recht gegen seine Eltern und nicht gegen den Staat. Gleichwohl nimmt Kant an, daß der Staat Einrichtungen schaffen sollte, die für verlassene Kinder und für die Armen im allgemeinen zu sorgen haben. Der Beitrag untersucht die Rechtfertigung, die Kant für die Anwendung von staatlichem Zwang zur Durchsetzung solcher positiv-gesetzlicher Rechte gibt, und arbeitet die Gründe dafür heraus, warum der nicht tugendhafte Staatsbürger in die vorgesehenen Hilfsmaßnahmen für die Bedürftigen einwilligen könnte. Wenn sich die Verfechter von Hilfsmaßnahmen für die Bedürftigen außerstande sehen, ihre Vorschläge auf Gründe dieser Art zu stützen, dann werden sie mit einem Konzept von subjektivem Recht aufwarten müssen, das sich von dem Konzept Kants von Recht und Rechtslehre , bei dem es allein um die moralische Erlaubtheit von Zwangsmaßnahmen geht, ganz erheblich unterscheidet. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Natural Law and Thomistic Juridical Realism: Prospects for a Dialogue with Contemporary Legal Theory by Petar PopovicPius Pietrzyk O.P.Natural Law and Thomistic Juridical Realism: Prospects for a Dialogue with Contemporary Legal Theory. By Petar Popovic. Foreword by F. Russell Hittinger. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2022. Pp. xv + 307. $75.00 (hardcover). ISBN: 978-0-8132-3550-9.About a decade ago the former Cardinal Archbishop of Chicago, (...) H. E. Francis Cardinal George, one of the great theologian bishops of the American episcopate, issued a letter on a piece of pending legislation in the state of Illinois. The focus of the letter was on the teaching of the natural law, and why adherence to the natural law required opposition to the proposed legislation. In response, a well-known law professor at a prestigious secular [End Page 710] law school in the state wrote a public response for an online political website. The focus of his argument was to criticize the notion of natural law according to his understanding of the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas. It is not necessary to describe the details of his argument, other than to say it tended to understand natural law as mere naturalism that evinced a fairly glaring misreading of the Angelic Doctor. That is, the secular legal scholar argued, in essence, that since the activity in question was observable by animals in nature, that it was therefore part of the natural law, and could be defended as a right. To this, a Thomistic sed contra is perhaps the most fitting response.As this story makes clear, there is a great ignorance of what constitutes the natural law in the secular consciousness, even among the most respected of secular legal scholars, to say nothing of the application of the natural law to the juridic world of law and politics. Perhaps the last hurrah of natural law, at least in the American public consciousness, was then Sen. Joseph Biden’s famous grilling of Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas on the subject in 1991. Since then, legal positivism has become nearly universal, divorcing legal norms from any realistic understanding of a common human nature. It has become the dominant ideology in America’s legal academies, even if some adherents of natural law remain in positions of authority in the judicial system.Although it has faded from the world of secular law in the United States, the tradition of natural law has retained a firm hold in Catholic thought, especially by that religious order dedicated to the teachings of its most brilliant adherent, St. Thomas. Not only Thomistic natural law, but proponents of the so-called new natural law continue to provide a vibrant source of debate and insight into the understanding of the natural law in evaluating the goodness of human action. Pope John Paul II’s famous encyclical Veritatis Splendor represents the magisterial commitment to the natural law approach in moral thinking, even if some might believe that commitment has weakened in recent years.To a lesser degree, there has remained a strong current of natural law thinking within the currents of legal philosophy in canon law, even if the precise connection between natural law and its juridic instantiation has not always been the focus. Among recent ecclesiastical legal theorists, arguably the most influential proponent of a robust natural law approach to legal philosophy was the Spanish canonist Javier Hervada Xiberta, and especially his Introducción crítica al derecho natural, currently in its tenth Spanish edition. A disciple of Jose Maria Escriva’s Opus Dei movement, Hervada was a long-serving and internationally respected dean of the School of Law in Navarre. Through his teaching and the various journals he founded, he insisted on the link between law and justice—lex and ius. Hervada was firmly convinced of the realism of law: law is nothing less than the ipsa res iusta. That notion of ius was not simply an idea, but recognized a real relationship of debt and obligation between persons. [End Page 711]In this, Hervada saw himself as the proponent not of some novel theory, but merely of one... (shrink)

This paper addresses one aspect of the natural law theory of Germain Grisez. According to Grisez, practical reason identifies the goods of human life prior to the invocation of any moral or normative notions. It can thus provide a non-normative foundation for moral theory. I present Grisez’s position and argue that the apparently non-normative aspect of natural law cannot support the moral position built upon it. I argue, in particular, that practical principles, as Grisez understands them, are best (...) understood as speech acts. If this is correct, it is possible to develop a sceptical challenge to Grisez’s position. (shrink)

Law, we are told, is a system of rules, created by men to govern human behaviour. Students of law, introduced to legal systems, become familiar with varied sources of law – legislative, judicial and executive in character. There are undoubtedly prescriptive human rules that govern men set up by public authorities that are advertised as being for the common good. These appear as visible, socially constructed systems in different jurisdictions and even as international systems across jurisdictions. But is this all (...) there is to law? Is law merely a human construct subject to flux, different according to time and place? Or must law, in its fullest sense, be seen as an activity that needs to be interpreted aright, binds the human conscience and is answerable to certain universal and timeless demands? Is there any natural moral law common to all men, universal and timeless? (shrink)

The Natural Law Reader features a selection of readings in metaphysics, jurisprudence, politics, and ethics that are all related to the classical Natural Law tradition in the modern world. Features a concise presentation of the natural law position that offers the reader a focal point for discussion of ancient and contemporary ideas in the natural law tradition Draws upon the metaphysical and ethical categories put forth and developed by Aristotle and Aquinas Points to the historical significance (...) and contemporary relevance of the Natural Law tradition Reflects on a revival of interest in the tradition of virtue ethics and human rights. (shrink)

This article is based on a Lecture given as part of the Franklin J. Matchette Foundation Lecture Series on Truth at the Catholic University of America, School of Philosophy, in 2002. It explores what theorists in the natural law tradition and modern legal theorists have argued about what makes propositions of morality and law true, focusing on the rubric of "reason" as opposed to "will." It seems probable, and perhaps inevitable, that theorists about the nature of truth in morality (...) must choose between reason and will - that morality, at its core, is either one or the other. What makes law distinctive is that it is, as a practical matter if not by conceptual necessity, a mixture of both. And it is this intertwining of reason and will, of normative system and practical reasoning, which makes assertions about the nature of legal truth, and theories about the nature of law, so difficult. The arguments about truth in law are as much disagreements about what it means to say that a legal proposition is truth as they are about what makes legal propositions true. Are declarations of truth in law statements about legal norms and legal sources, or are they statements about the results of particular disputes or particularized inquiries? There are obvious complilcations in speaking of truth in a context like law, where there is simultaneously an effort to create a coherent normative system and a decision-making procedure that can modify that system in the course of resolving disputes. (shrink)

In this chapter, I argue that the laws of nature that comprise Hobbes’s moral philosophy and both ground and constrain his political philosophy articulate a requirement of reciprocity. Hobbes derives the reciprocity requirement as a theorem of reason from our human nature as rational agents necessarily concerned to make our agency effective. The laws of nature impose a demand to join political society, as well as impose duties on both subjects and sovereigns, and constrain behavior among nations. I explain the (...) relation that the laws of nature bear to civil law and to divine positive law and offer an account of the source of their normativity that contrasts with familiar scholarly accounts. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 841 message may seem, however clearly at odds with the Weltgeist. What Professor Mitchell's position calls for-to the delight I am sure, of Fr. Copleston-is a universal, unified, sanctificatory, and legitimate teacher of the Christian message: a Church which is one, holy, Catholic, and Apostolic. NICHOLAS INGHAM, O.P. Providence College Providence, Rhode Island Morals as Founded on Natural Law. By STEPHEN THERON. European University Studies. New (...) York: Peter Lang, 1987. 218 pp. $32 (cloth). This is a hard book to read, though it need not be. The author assumes a knowledge of other writings that few (apart from himself) are likely to have, and his English is sometimes tortuous in the extreme. A little more polishing of the sentence structure and a little more explanation of references would have made the book immeasurably. more readable. There would still be flaws in it nevertheless, flaws that concern the content of the book and not its form. Theron's aim is to establish morality on an external authoritative law, namely the authoritative law of God. Towards achieving this he devotes the first chapter to criticizing R.M. Hare, since Hare has a theory of autonomy in morals, or a theory where the prescriptiveness of a law or moral norm is self· imposed and not derived from something outside the autonomously choosing individual. Theron's criticism of Hare, apart from the obscurity of several of the references (obscure, that is, unless one already knows Hare's work more or less inside out), rests on distortions or unsympathetic interpretations of what Hare says. To say that, for Hare, " all that is essential to good living is the extrinsic, fortuitous character of its being commended" (p. 31) is to misrepresent Hare's whole point about the mea,ning of good, for which the a.ct of commending is of the essence and cannot be something extrinsic. And to say that, apart from what can be derived from logic, the rest of Hare's theory is "all a matter of who commends the loudest" (ibid..) is so gross a distortion that one can only wonder if Theron has paid any attention at all to what Hare has written about the nature of moral reasoning. As for Theron's own theory, he says that morality is grounded on a divine legislative authority to which, like children with respect to parents, we just ' find ' ourselves bound. But how are we bcmnd, or BOOK REVIEWS what persuades us that we should submit and obey this authority? Theron denies the applicability of this question, since he says that to seek a ground for this authority is to fall into an infinite regress. Yes indeed if authority can only be grounded by appeal to some other authority. But why should this be so? Because 0£ the nature of reason, says Theron, or how do we justify our acceptance 0£ and obedience to reason? Reason itself cannot do this. "... reason only has the authority of law and even truth if God gives it that authority," and "as one cannot appeal to reason to invalidate reason one cannot appeal to it to validate it" (p. 161). For Theron, what is :first for us. is not reason but divine authority, which is just somehow an ineradicable given. This would make morals, to say nothing of philosophy simply, dependent on divine law, not, as his title declares, on natural law. That title is indeed misleading since it is clear that, in Theron's eyes, natural law, or the law of our natural reason, is derivative and secondary, dependent for its lawfulness on the prior recognition of divine law. But all this must be false. Our recognition of divine law and of its binding force presupposes the validity of the workings of our own reason, for only by reason can we have this recognition. But if we could only admit the validity of our own reason after we have recognized the divine and reason's dependence on it, then we really are caught in an infinite regress, for this recognition would itself have to presuppose the prior validity of reason. And so on and so on. What is first for... (shrink)

The idea of natural law has a long history. It has had different meanings for different people and continues to occupy intellectual engagements as to the connotations of the expression ‘natural law’ in diverse and different contexts. This requires delving deep into the hoarypast and analyzing the gradual development of the idea of natural law through the ages. Understanding natural law necessitates exploring its relation with positive law, its application, and, notably, the import of the (...) word ‘natural’ in the expression ‘natural law’. Be that as it may, there is no denying the fact that there is an element of exclusivity in natural law that has kept it alive and going across generations. Even some of the jurists who adhered to the principles and tenets of legal positivism have shown an inclination towards the principles of natural law, especially as regards the relation between law and morality. It has survived the tests of time. The present paper seeks to explicate the various dimensions of natural law and explore its growth application. (shrink)

One of the best-known members of the United Nations Commission which drafted the 1948 "Universal Declaration of Human Rights," Jacques Maritain, famously held that the "natural rights" or "human rights" possessed by every human being are grounded and justified by reference to the natural law.' In many quarters today, the notion of the natural law, and arguments for a set of natural rights grounded in the natural law, have come under fierce attack. One common line (...) of attack is illustrated by the arguments of some utilitarians, for whom "natural law thinking" is mistaken insofar as it implies that there is an absolute moral prohibition against violating any human being's "natural rights." Even if there is such a thing as "natural rights," these utilitarians argue, such rights - including even the natural "right to life" - are necessarily relational, and thus have meaning only within the context of a larger social whole. As a result, the argument goes, the supposed "natural rights" possessed by individual human beings are never inviolable or unconditional, but instead always negotiable and subject to being "traded away" for the sake of greater social utility. Consider just one alleged counter-example to the notion that there are inviolable or unconditional "natural rights": it is well-known that approximately 36,000 people in the United States die every year as a result of influenza infections or influenza-related complications.' There is little doubt that hundreds, and probably even thousands, of human lives would be saved every year if local governments were to pass laws requiring flu vaccinations for all members of at-risk populations (e.g., the very young and the very elderly). It would seem that there would be broad support for mandated flu vaccinations- no matter what the expense - if human lives would be saved and if the natural "right to life" is inviolable or unconditional.' And yet no such life-saving laws exist, apparently because citizens and legislators believe that the social costs and inconveniences would be too great. According to the utilitarian position, this demonstrates - contrary to what Ronald Dworkin and others say about rights' - that rights do not trump utility, but in fact are quite regularly and reasonably trumped by utility. In light of such contemporary understandings and policies, can natural law thinking about natural rights be made credible? In what follows, I shall argue that utilitarian thinkers are correct to hold that rights are intrinsically relational; but they are wrong to conclude that the relational character of rights entails that "natural rights" are not inviolable or not unconditional. (shrink)

THE opening paragraph of the Declaration of Independence invokes, as every American should know, "the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God." The import of this invocation may be discerned by examining the appeals to natural law in the polemical literature of the American revolutionary period against the background of natural law/natural rights philosophy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, within the particular historical context of events constituting the (...) American Revolution. The phrase "the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God" in the Declaration is revealing. It simplifies what had, in earlier times, been referred to as "fundamental law," omitting and de-emphasizing, however, some rather essential elements. Historically, fundamental law had always been esteemed to be a law superior to statutory or positive law. Unless the latter conforms to the former, it is not valid, and invalid positive laws are null and void, so that there is no obligation to obey them. In the history of British jurisprudence, which includes colonial American jurisprudence, fundamental law embraced divine law, natural law, the British constitution beginning with Magna Carta, common law, and the colonial charters. Appeals to fundamental law were made when protesting statutory or positive laws and decrees. Thus the Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress in October, 1774, invokes "the immutable laws of nature, the principles of the British constitution, and the several charters and compacts" as the moral, rational, and ultimate legal basis for protesting alleged British encroachments on American rights. Yet less than two years later, the Declaration of Independence, abandoning the British constitution and dissolving the political band—the charters and compacts—between Great Britain and America, rests simply on "the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God.". (shrink)

The project : naturalist, theistic, and religious approaches to natural law -- Neo-Aristotelian naturalist ontology and anthropology and element 3) -- NAVE element 2) Anthropology and 3) the wish for wellbeing and its ingredients -- Element 4) Principles, precepts, and virtues -- Element 5) of NAVE -the method of determination in moral reasoning -- Physicalism is not proven -- Bringing back God and religion -- Select applications : organisational agency and ethics : states, churches, corporations -- Applying natural (...) law to violence : the NAVE and DGE positions -- Global poverty : the moral obligations of persons, organisations, and states to relieve poverty -- Natural law applications : sexuality and marriage -- Concepts of justice, benevolence and agape -- Justice and Satygraha/Agape Caritas : the rationality of unconditional non-violence (Ahisma). (shrink)

Leon Kass is much misunderstood. He is not simply a Republican ideologue who tailored his ideas to break out of the ivory tower and into the halls of power. Nor does he ook simply to use human nature as a moral guide. When the full range of his writings is considered and set in the tradition of his teachers, Hans Jonas and Leo Strauss, what emerges is a natural law position colored by religious revelation.

The weak natural law thesis asserts that any instance of law is either a rational standard for conduct or defective. At first glance, the thesis seems compatible with the proposition that the validity of a law within a legal system depends upon its sources rather than its merits. Mark C. Murphy has nonetheless argued that the weak natural law thesis can challenge this core commitment of legal positivism via an appeal to law’s function and defectiveness conditions. My contention (...) in the current paper is that in order to make good on the challenge, the defender of the weak natural law thesis should appeal explicitly to the common good, understood as the principal normative reason in the political domain. In section I I outline the main implications of the weak natural law thesis and clarify a common misunderstanding regarding its explanatory role. Section II then argues for the indispensability of the common good to the natural law jurisprudential thesis on the grounds that it has an essential role to play in a natural law account of law’s defectiveness conditions and the presumptive moral obligatoriness of legal norms. Finally, in section III I examine the compatibility of a strengthened version of the weak natural law thesis with legal positivism in light of the centrality of the common good to the natural law jurisprudential position. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:MARITAIN ON RIGHTS AND NATURAL LAW THOMAS A. FAY St. John's University Jamaica, New York T:HE WAY RIGHTS a11e viewed in our time creates urmoil in our society. But this one-sided view of rights ad ]ts origin in the philosophy of Jean Jacques Rousseaiu, in which the" Rights of Man" were divinized and hence made unlimited. In contrast, Maritain based his notion of rights on the natu:rail law, (...) and this phifosophic base can ground a more balanced view of rights, one which can protoot both against those who would assert arbitmry rights without any restraints whatever and against an authoritarian State which would subordinate an individual rights to its requirements. I. Maritain's Notion of the Natural Law For Marita:in, the ultimate groundiing of human rights is in the natural law.1 But just what does he mean by the term "natural law? " It is by no means obvious. Certa:inly from antiquity man has had some gmsp of a narturaJ faw, rthat is, of a law which transcends merely positive law, the law fashioned by men. In!J1an and the State, Maritain cites the case of Antigone, the heroine in Sophocles' pJ.ay of the same name. She breaks a positive faw in giving buriaJl to her brother 'and justifies her act by making an appeal to a law higher than any merely human law. And so she says " Nor did I deem Your ordinance of so much binding force, As that a mortal man could overbear The unchangeable unwritten code of heaven; 1 Les droits de l'homme et la, loi naturclle (New York: Editions de la Maison Frnncaise, Hl42), p. 84. 439 440 THOMAS A. FAY This is not of today and yesterday, But lives forever, having origin Whence no man knows...2 The Stoic philosophers spol{'e of a natural law; so did tnpian in the ancient Roman period, and St. Augus:tine in the early Middle Ages. The se-y;enteenth and eighteenth century saw the classical Law of Nature philosophers, such as Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, Benedict Spinoza, and John Locke. And of course, by no means least on our list, there was Thomas Aquinas. Mal11'tain takes Thomas's to be the most perfect statement of natural law. But even here there are certain ambiguities and problems. For example, with 11egard to the "primary " and " seconda,ry" precepts of natural law, the statements of St. Thomas in early work The Commentary On The Sentences are at variance with the vocabulary and the teaiching of the Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 94. Maritain attempts to clarify these obscurities by introducing what he rtakes to he the key to Thomas's 1 doctrine of natUl"al law-the notion of knowledge through inclination.3 As Maritain sees it, there are two aspects of natural law, one ontological and the other gnoseologicaL4 The ontological.aspect of natural law means that man has a being-structure which is the locus of inrtelligible necessities, that he possesses ends which necessarily correspond to his essential constitution and which are common to all men. This means that there is, by virtue of human nature itself, an order or a disposition which human reason can discover and accol'lding to which the human will should act if lit is to attain the necessary and essential ends of being human. This order or disposition is what he means by nrutural law. From this it follows that 001y being in nature, be it a tree or a dog or whatevier, has its own na.tural law, which is the normality of its funotioning, the proper way in which, by reason 2 Man and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 85. s Ibid., p. 91. 4!bill., pp. 85-94. MARITAIN ON RIGHTS AND NATURAL LAW 441 of its specific structure and specific ends, it " should " achieve the fullness of its being, The " shou1d " here is not a moral imperative but rather an ontological one, just as we say that a "good" eye" shou1d" be :able to perceive certain objects with clarity at a certain disrtance. But as soon as we enter the realm of free... (shrink)

In a series of impressive articles, Kenneth Westphal argues that Hegel should be understood as a natural law constructivist. In this essay, I examine what Westphal means by this, showing that any such position requires postulating rights or duties that exist prior to the formation of political institutions. I show that Hegel consistently denies the existence of any such natural rights or duties and conclude that he must have a fundamentally different, non-foundationalist conception of the fundamental task of (...) moral philosophy. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Traditional Natural Law Theory Modern Natural Law Theory Conclusion References.

ExcerptThe University of Notre Dame Kellogg Institute’s 2021 conference on “Inalienable Rights and the Traditions of Constitutionalism” was, for me, a breath of oxygen because it brought together many who understand that human rights are more than simply reflections of particular political preferences of some societies at particular times, and that to understand human rights that way reduces them to the level of arbitrary positive law. Human rights are based in human nature, and in nature itself, not simply in (...) international legislation. Today, the idea of human rights serves many masters: utilitarianism, consequentialism, communitarianism, socialism, postmodernism, intersectionality—not to mention numerous regimes that defend human rights violations with human rights rhetoric. But the conferees seemed to generally agree that human rights are principles, rooted in human nature, that can protect our moral and political freedom. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.1 (2002) 126-127 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Natural Law Theories in the Early Enlightenment T. J. Hochstrasser. Natural Law Theories in the Early Enlightenment. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. xiii + 246. Cloth, $54.95. In a worthy addition to Cambridge's Ideas in Context series, T. J. Hochstrasser undertakes an excavation. His aim is to provide a description, (...) and to demonstrate the importance within the German Frühaufklärung, of a largely forgotten philosophical approach: eclecticism. Hochstrasser argues that the triumph of Wolffian rationalism in the Protestant universities in the middle of the eighteenth century occluded the importance of eclecticism for Kant, who in turn occluded it for everyone afterward. But the price of forgetting eclecticism is high. Not only are we left with no account--or a skewed account--of the development of German thought from the first stirrings of the Enlightenment to the emergence of the Critical philosophy, but our understanding of the development of the historiography of philosophy is badly compromised. For among their many accomplishments--in natural jurisprudence, in university reform--the eclectics were the first critical historians of philosophy, their distinctive genres being historically aware treatises on natural law and Whig histories of natural jurisprudence. Hochstrasser's study traces the development of eclecticism, from the work of its founders, Samuel Pufendorf and Christian Thomasius, through a devolution in the hands of Thomasius's later disciples, to the eventual oblivion in the middle of the eighteenth century. This review will focus on the beginning of this narrative, as Pufendorf is the leading figure in the book.Eclecticism began with Pufendorf's attempt, in his mature work on natural law, to reconcile his conflicting inheritances from Grotius and Hobbes without simply endorsing the work of either. He was impressed both by Grotius's explanation of the law of nations in terms of human sociability--but also by Hobbes's criticisms of Grotius, rooted in the latter's analysis of the state of nature. At the same time, he wished to reject Grotius's method of induction from sociological observation and Hobbes's minimally constrained voluntarism. Contributing further to his perplexity was his increasing disaffection from the geometric approach he had adopted in his Elementa Jurisprudentiae Universalis.The way out of this impasse, Hochstrasser contends, was revealed to Pufendorf in correspondence with Hermann Conring, the leading constitutional lawyer of his time, and Johann Böcler, Grotius's most erudite commentator. Böcler chastised Pufendorf for his neglect of history, and both of Pufendorf's correspondents pointed out his need for some non-Hobbesian criterion by which he could validate his first principles, whatever they turned out to be. Stung particularly by Böcler's remarks, Pufendorf returned to the Stoics and there discovered a via media between Hobbes's pessimism and Grotius's optimism: a synthesis anticipating Kant's doctrine of "unsocial sociability." For the purposes of Hochstrasser's study, the key aspects of Pufendorf's solution are these: first, it avoids mere voluntarism; second, it does this by means of a moral epistemology that sharply distinguishes natural law [End Page 126] from moral theology; finally, the validating criterion for Pufendorf's first principles is located in critical appropriation of the history of moral philosophy. These were to be hallmarks of Pufendorf's school.On the first and second points, Hochstrasser seems to me substantively correct, though I think he misunderstands the nature of Pufendorf's escape from mere voluntarism and thereby underplays the religious dimensions of Pufendorf's theory. Among recent Anglo-American commentators on Pufendorf, only Robert Adams has in my view properly construed Pufendorf's thought: that it involves a command theory of obligation proper, but posits the natural advantageousness of some hierarchies as a buttress against mere voluntarism. Hochstrasser is thus right to insist, against Leibniz, that Pufendorf's account of obligation is coherent. But he is wrong to suggest that "there was nothing in Pufendorf's theory... to oblige him to introduce fear of punishment by a superior... " (105). He is... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Bioethics and Natural Law: The Relationship in Catholic TeachingJ. Bryan Hehir (bio)In the discipline of Catholic moral theology, bioethics (traditionally described as medical ethics) has held a major place. The systematic development of bioethics has drawn principally upon a natural law ethic, supported by broader religious arguments. The purpose of this essay is to examine the status and role of natural law in Catholic teaching as (...) it bears upon bioethics.Natural Law and Catholic TheologyThe role of natural law in Catholic theology is rooted in a prior conviction about the complementary relationship of faith and reason. The conviction finds initial expression in patristic authors, then preeminently in Thomas Aquinas and consistently in modern papal teaching of the twentieth century. Flowing from this conviction, as a premise of Catholic theology and teaching, is the [End Page 333] notion that a second source of moral wisdom exists along side the revealed wisdom of the Hebrew and Christian scriptures. This second source of wisdom is the product of rational reflection upon human nature and experience. In the tradition of natural law ethics (expressed in a plurality of versions), such reflection affirms an objective moral order, accessible to reason and based upon a conception of the person as both spiritual and social. The spiritual nature, expressed in the capacity for reflection and free choice, is the foundation of the natural law ethic, providing the human person a unique status in the created order. The social nature of the person locates each human being in a framework of social relationships, articulated in a complex of rights and duties and finding expression in three basic communities: the family, civil society, and the human community.The fully developed framework of a natural law ethic has five dimensions. It yields a theory of society, a doctrine of the state, a charter of duties and rights, a jurisprudence, and an applied ethic. At each level of this framework, the natural law ethic is contested by other contemporary philosophical positions. In this article, space demands that stress must be placed on the natural law affirmations without trying to engage the critics.The centrality of the social nature of the person yields a theory of society that is organic in character, laying strong emphasis on the social fabric of existence. Hence the theory has traditionally emphasized both order and justice more strongly than claims of freedom. The doctrine of the state, in contemporary natural law arguments, supports a limited yet activist state, limited by constitutional restraints and human rights claims, yet activist in its conception of a broad range of social obligations, particularly to the poor. The charter of rights affirms a range of both political-civil and socio-economic rights; the traditional natural law emphasis on a structure of duties has been complemented in the twentieth century by its stress on the role of human rights. The jurisprudential theory of natural law has been its most prominent aspect; it affirms a moral grounding for civil law, but distinguishes precisely between the comprehensive nature of moral law and the more limited scope of civil law, restricted to the maintenance of public order in society. Finally, the natural law framework finds expression in Catholic teaching in three areas of applied ethics: social ethics (civil society and international relations), sexual ethics, and bioethics.History and StatusWhile a natural law ethic has been a staple of Catholic social and bioethical teaching, it has not held similar status in the wider arena of contemporary philosophical or theological ethics. Through the 1950s, therefore, one could find a strong consensus supporting natural law within the Catholic community and ongoing debates within the wider world of philosophy and bioethics. Since the 1960s, any description of the status and role of natural law must consider the debates within Roman Catholicism itself about the role and status of natural law. [End Page 334]It is possible to distinguish two stages of these internal arguments in the church. In the period from 1960 to 1990, three events in Catholicism directly influenced the standing of a natural law position: John XXIII’s encyclical Pacem In Terris (1963), Paul XI’s encyclical Humanae Vitae (1968), and the teaching of... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:146 BOOK REVIEWS Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays. Edited by ROBERT P. GEORGE. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. Pp. 371. $39.95 (cloth). As the editor of this volume, Robert P. George points out in his foreword that this hook is yet another manifestation of the renewed and growing interest in natural law theory. But why this recent increased interest in natural law theory? What purpose is this (...) theory supposed to serve, or in what way do its proponents see it as an improvement on existing theories? First of all, it must be noted, as the variety of essays in this volume makes abundantly clear, that natural law theory, as it is presently conceived, most certainly does not represent anything like a unified, single theory of tightly knit principles and conclusions. In the present volume one can easily see a half-dozen or more different approaches to natural law theory. So different in tone and spirit are some of the essays that one can easily wonder if they have enough in common even to classify them as " family resemblances." But if they all in their different ways do indeed evidence, as the editor claims, an increased awareness of and interest in natural law theory, the question immediately arises, why this increased interest? What problems do the advocates of these theories hope to solve by them or what questions do they think their theories will better address than the theories currently in place? First of all, one may make a division which places the theories, however divers~ among themselves, into two general groups. The first of these groups wishes natural law theory to function as a general approach to morality. For this group natural law does the work of a moral theory. In this group I would place the essays of Joseph Boyle, Robert George, Russell Bittinger, John Finnis, and Hadley Arkes (probably). The second group uses natural law theory as a way of determining the connection between moral law and positive law or legal theory. The essays of Jeffrey Stout, Neil MacCormick, Jeremy Waldron, Michael Moore, Lloyd Weinreb, Joseph Raz, and Ernest Weinrib fall into this second category. In all there are twelve essays in this volume. Space will not permit me to give a detailed analysis and critique of each. At most I can only indicate very briefly some of their more salient features. The book is divided into four parts, the first of which is titled "Natural Law, Practical Reasoning and Morality." In the very illuminating first essay of this section, "Natural Law and the Ethics of Traditions," Joseph Boyle undertakes to clarify the question of the relation of natural law theory to tradition. Certain approaches to moral theory currently popular BOOK REVIEWS 147 which are called virtues ethics, of which Alasdair Macintyre would he an example, claim that natural law theory is tradition-dependent. If Macintyre and other virtues ethicists are correct, then since natural law theory is culture-hound, and since the culture in which it was horn and flourished, medieval culture, has irretrievably retreated into the pages of history, then natural law theory is equally dead, of interest, if at all, only in an antiquarian way. Boyle carefully points out that there is more than one sense of being tradition-dependent. It is true that natural law theory is tradition-dependent in the sense that it did indeed come into existence in a particular historic epoch and that its language and thought do indeed express the period of its flourishing, i.e. the medieval period. But this, Boyle is careful to point out, does not mean that its validity and meaning were exhausted with the end of that culture. Rather the tradition is a living tradition so that its rich resources can continue to be exploited as that tradition is enlarged by its application to present day moral problems. Boyle's conclusion then is that in some senses natural law is indeed dependent on an ancient and medieval tradition, hut not so totally dependent that it has lost all validity for contemporary moral theory. In the contribution by Robert George, "Natural Law and Human Nature," George tries to defend Germain Grisez's version of natural law... (shrink)

The author emphasizes the leading role of Kant's philosophy and neo-Kantianism in spreading the theory of natural law on Ukrainian territory. The article emphasizes that the idea of natural law was considered in the circles of the Ukrainian intelligentsia as a component of the general system of idealistic views. The intelligentsia was critical of positive law and called for the correction of its defects with the help of moral goals. The author compares rationalist and religious-ethical approaches to (...) issues of ethical origin and natural human rights. (shrink)

Legal theorists are familiar with John Finnis's book Natural Law and Natural Rights, but usually overlook his interventions in US constitutional debates and his membership of a group of conservative Catholic thinkers, the 'new natural lawyers', led by theologian Germain Grisez. In fact, Finnis has repeatedly advocated conservative positions concerning lesbian and gay rights, contraception and abortion, and his substantive moral theory derives from Grisez. Bamforth and Richards provide a detailed explanation of the work of the new (...) natural lawyers within and outside the Catholic Church - the first truly comprehensive explanation available to legal theorists - and criticize Grisez's and Finnis's arguments concerning sexuality and gender. New natural law is, they argue, a theology rather than a secular theory, and one which is unappealing in a modern constitutional democracy. This book will be of interest to legal and political theorists, ethicists, theologians and scholars of religious history. (shrink)

This paper takes the dichotomy between “exclusive” and “inclusive” positivism and applies it by analogy to natural-law theories. With John Finnis, and with Beyleved and Brownsword, we have examples of “exclusive natural-law theory,” on which approach the law is valid only if its content satisfies a normative monological moral theory. The discourse theories of Alexy and Habermas are seen instead as “inclusive natural-law theories,” in which the positive law is a constitutive moment in that it identifies (...) moral rules and specifies their meaning. The article argues that inclusive theories of natural law are better suited to expressing an authentic “republican” attitude.*In the seed of the city of the just, a malignant seed is hidden, in its turn: the certainty and pride of being in the right. (Calvino 1997, 162). (shrink)

ABSTRACT Pierre Bayle developed an expansive theory of toleration in his Commentaire philosophique by arguing that tolerance is a universal principle of natural law. However, by situating toleration in natural law rather than positive law, Bayle was brought into theoretical conflict with the Old Testament injunction that the state should punish idolatry. To resolve this conflict, Bayle drew upon the work of early modern Hebraists, particularly the Catholic biblical scholar Richard Simon. Bayle adapted Simon’s idea that theocracy (...) uniquely shaped the institutions of ancient Israel to argue that prohibitions against idolatry should be exclusive to the Hebrew republic. Bayle argued that the Mosaic Law did not punish someone for their sincerely held religious beliefs but only prohibited treason, and these circumstantial laws should not be emulated by other states. This allowed Bayle to contend for the moral veracity of the Old Testament and the notion that toleration is an unconditional principle of natural law. Bayle’s use of Simon displayed the revolutionary potential of textual critical scholarship in the early modern period, as he adapted Simon’s critical ideas to his own aims of promoting religious toleration within the ecclesiastical and civic spheres of his own confessional context. (shrink)

Kainz’s handling of natural law thinking in ancient Greece and Rome is precise, for although he uses as his chapter heading “Concepts of Natural Law in Ancient Greece and Rome,” he is careful not to ascribe explicit natural law thinking to the Presocratics, Plato, or Aristotle, though in the case of the latter two thinkers, especially Aristotle, they were arguing for what is the essence of natural law thinking: an eternal, unchanging, absolute standard for human conduct. (...) Kainz does use the caption, “Natural Law and Natural Justice in Aristotle”, but he qualifies it: “it is conceivable that natural human sociability itself constitutes a significant element of a latent natural law theory in Aristotle [but]... explicitly Aristotle neither enunciates nor expands on any natural law theory in the traditional sense”. This parsing is prudential since, if a thinker does not explicitly refer to a theory or position, it is not correct to say that he holds it. But when it comes to the Stoics, there is no need to temporize, as they were explicit, full-fledged natural law theorists. Kainz appropriately accords them the attention they deserve. It is remarkable to find overviews of natural law that omit the Stoics entirely. Chapters 2 and 3 reveal the bridge from natural law, as treated by Aquinas and Suarez, seen as part of divine law, to the secularization of natural law theory at the hands of Grotius and Hobbes. Although acknowledging that earlier thinkers like Robert Bellarmine and other scholastics had adverted to the possible validity of natural law without God, Kainz limns Grotius’s bold assertion of the independence of the natural law theory from any grounding in theological or religious premises as the decisive proclamation of the secularization of the natural law theory. Kainz’s discussion of Aquinas includes the very important question of whether Aquinas is “actually ‘deriving’ moral laws from natural inclinations—thus falling into the ‘naturalistic’ fallacy”? He puts that question to rest with the observation that Aquinas does not suppose that any deductions from natural law principles rely on the necessity used in theoretical reasoning but rather apply “for the most part” and thus have exceptions. Chapter 4 provides a glossary of frequently misunderstood concepts that are basic in natural law discussions, such as “nature,” “natural,” and “perversion.”. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue for a view that inclusive positivists share with Ronald Dworkin. According to the Moral Incorporation Thesis (MIT), it is logically possible for a legal system to incorporate moral criteria of legality (or “grounds of law,” as Dworkin puts it). Up to this point, the debate has taken the shape of attacks on the coherence of MIT with the defender of MIT merely attempting to refute the attacking argument. I give a positive argument for MIT. (...) I begin with an explanation of the logic of establishing possibility claims, such as MIT. At the outset, it is worth noting that the logic of establishing possibility claims is very different from the logic of establishing contingent descriptive claims or necessary claims. For this reason, some explication of the relevant features of the semantics of modal logic will be necessary here. Once the structural framework is adequately developed, the argument for MIT will be grounded on the strength of a thought experiment of a surprisingly simple kind. Indeed, the argument is inspired by a Razian argument for the possibility of a legal system without coercive enforcement machinery; on his view, a society of angels could still have a system of law without any coercive machinery. My argument will possess two theoretically important qualities that are also possessed by Raz’s powerfully simple, but ultimately unsuccessful, argument. (shrink)

It is natural for us to wonder what should I do, and why? And although a combination of common sense and upbringing aids us in answering our questions, it is also natural for us to seek answers that are grounded in something deeper and more enduring than our personal dispositions and those of our parents. We seek a genuinely good life and the practical wisdom necessary to arrive at happiness. In this Introduction to Ethics, Brian Besong presents a (...) comprehensive and contemporary introduction to the practical wisdom handed down to us by Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, and many others--a position now commonly called "natural law." Written as a beginner's guide, the book systematically explores a range of moral issues including moral knowledge, happiness, right and wrong action, and virtues, to name a few. Introduction to Ethics explains in a lively way how natural law provides principled and persuasive answers to our most fundamental moral questions. (shrink)

This article delves into the philosophical theses on law and ethics as presented by Thomas Hobbes and Immanuel Kant, with a focus on the notion of resistance in a legal context. It contrasts Hobbes’ advocacy for nearly unrestricted state authority and a morality closely tied to the state, against Kant’s emphasis on moral law and natural rights as the underpinnings of legality. A pivotal discussion point is Kant’s perceived contradiction in supporting a fundamental right to freedom while limiting the (...) right to resist laws that infringe upon this freedom. By comparing these philosophical authors, the article posits that Kant’s theory of resistance requires integration with his broader ethical views, suggesting that human rights should constrain positive law. (shrink)

Die Rechtstheorie von Thomas von Aquin ist vermutlich die einflussreichste Darstellung der Naturrechtstheorie in der Rechtsphilosophie. Die zeitgenössische Literatur zur Naturrechtslehre zeigt jedoch, dass es nicht nur eine Art von Naturrechtstheorie gibt. Philosophen wie Mark C. Murphy haben hilfreiche Unterscheidungen zwischen verschiedenen Versionen der Naturrechtstheorie getroffen, indem sie versuchten, eine gemeinsame naturrechtliche Position zu identifizieren. Ziel dieses Artikels ist es, die folgende Frage zu beantworten: Welche Version der Naturrechtstheorie repräsentiert die Rechtstheorie des Thomas von Aquin am besten, da es verschiedene (...) Arten von Naturrechtstheorien gibt? Zunächst analysiere ich kritisch einige herausragende Versionen der Naturrechtstheorie. Diese Analyse bietet einen theoretischen Rahmen, um zu bestimmen, welche Art von Naturrechtstheorie Thomas von Aquin vertritt. Ich argumentiere, dass Thomas von Aquins Darstellung der Tyrannei in De Regimine Principum zeigt, dass er eine hybride Version der Naturrechtstheorie vertritt. Nach seiner Naturrechtstheorie gibt es eine moralische Mindestanforderung, die Regeln erfüllen müssen, um rechtsgültig zu sein; sobald dieses Minimum erreicht ist, ist jede Steigerung ihrer Moral auch eine Steigerung ihrer Legalität. Ich behaupte auch, dass die Naturrechtstheorie des Thomas von Aquin trotz ihrer Subtilität eine Schwäche aufweist, nämlich dass sie schwer mit dem gewöhnlichen Rechtsleben vereinbar ist. Die Ansicht, dass ein Gesetz „mehr oder weniger“ Gesetz sein könnte, und die Überzeugung, dass es für die Rechtsgültigkeit notwendige moralische Anforderungen gibt, sind nicht ausreichend durch die tatsächliche Rechtserfahrung begründet. (shrink)

Thanks to Barbeyrac, Pufendorf and others, there is a long-familiar picture of Grotius as offering a groundbreaking account of natural law. By now there is also a familiar observation that there is no agreement what makes Grotius’s account innovative. Sometimes this leads to skepticism about how innovative Grotius’s account of natural law really is. Some scholars suggest that Grotius’s account of natural law resembles Suárez’s account. But others continue to argue that Barbeyrac is right to see Grotius (...) as breaking the ice of previous philosophy and laying the groundwork for a distinctively modern moral philosophy. I plan to contribute to the debate by arguing that, properly understood, Grotius’s position is similar to Suárez’s on a range of fundamental questions, and, furthermore, that seeing Grotius as making a radical break with the past violates his own self-conception. 1. (shrink)

In this volume Russell Hittinger presents a comprehensive and critical treatment of the attempt to restate and defend a theory of natural law, particularly as proposed by Germain Grisez and John Finnis. A Critique of the New Natural Law Theory begins by examining the positions of various moral philosophers such as Alasdair MacIntyre, Alan Donogan, Elizabeth Anscombe, and Stanley Hauerwas, who wish to recover particular facets of premodern ethics. Hittinger then explores the work of Grisez and Finnis, who (...) claim to have recovered natural law in a manner that avoids the standard objections brought against it since the Enlightenment; they thus claim to have recovered natural law theory available once again for moral theology. Hittinger examines this new theory for internal coherence and consistency. In addition, he examines whether it is sufficiently comprehensive to explicate the religious, anthropological, and metaphysical questions that bear upon natural law ethics. He argues that the new natural law theory fails because it does not take into account philosophical anthropology and metaphysics. It cannot show how and why "nature" is normative for human activity. Hittinger concludes that if natural law theory is to be recovered, we must discover how to constructively bring theoretical rationality to bear upon ethics and practical rationality. Until this is done, he asserts, we will not have a defensible theory of natural law. (shrink)

It is usual to classify the moral thinking of St. Thomas Aquinas as a theory of natural law. The purpose of the present article is to challenge such a classification. While the notion of natural law does play a part in Aquinas’s teaching on morality, this does not seem to me to be a central role. Indeed there are many reasons why it might be better, today, to stop talking about natural moral law, both in the context (...) of Thomistic philosophy and in the broader context of contemporary ethics. What I now advocate is the position that right reason is the key theme in the ethics of Aquinas. (shrink)

In this article I argue the relevance of natural law for framing and addressing ethical issues raised by the practice of business in a global context. There are historical, as well as systematic reasons for this. On the historical side, it can be argued that the origin of modern economics is linked to a cultural context, still influenced by modern natural law theories. Thus, even if Hume’s moral theory is everything but a natural law theory, either in (...) the traditional or the modern sense, his “laws of nature” (fixation of property, rules for its transference, and promises) represent a systematization of the rules of justice necessary to preserve the space of economic freedom required for development of a commercial society. This systematization is in line with the classical approach to natural law, which nevertheless presents further advantages for developing an ethical approach to economic activity, since it brings with itself a conception of economic agency richer than that of Hume: a conception that is not necessarily linked to pursuit self-interest, but rather is inspired by ethical motives right from the start. Indeed, on the systematic side, the classical natural law is seen as the law of practical reason: a set of principles in charge of inspiring both virtuous action and legal practice, so that we can realize the human good. Assuming the embodied and social nature of human beings, as well as the various cultural realizations of humanity, a natural law approach to ethics is in a position to stimulate a dynamic and bottomup articulation of the personal and common good, concern for progress and sustainable development, universal principles and cultural variations. (shrink)

Whenever sovereignty is defined as a supreme, absolute, unfettered and unlimited power, there is an obvious contradiction between two ideas: that states are sovereign and that they can or should be limited. Nevertheless, while many legal texts proclaim sovereignty, there are several signs that states are indeed limited by constitutional or international law. In light of this situation, some authors claim that those texts are mere proclamations and that sovereignty is an obsolete concept, while others argue that states are still (...) sovereign and that there are no real limits, but others still try to conceive of sovereignty as limited by morality or natural law. Professor Benvenisti’s remarkable theory of sovereigns as trustees of humanity is part of a very old tradition going back to the sixteenth century where sovereignty was defined as an absolute power, which is unlimited by positive law, yet based on and limited by natural law. This Article tries to show that this concept of sovereignty has emerged because of the necessity to provide a final point of imputation to the hierarchy of norms, and that the limitation by natural law was part of the original definition. Sovereignty so defined can usefully justify not only the power of kings and lawmakers but also that of courts trying to control kings and lawmakers. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Light that Binds: A Study in Thomas Aquinas's Metaphysics of the Natural Law by Stephen BrockAngel Perez-LopezThe Light that Binds: A Study in Thomas Aquinas's Metaphysics of the Natural Law by Stephen Brock (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2020), xv + 277 pp.How does the natural law fit the definition of law? Opinions clash among different interpreters of Saint Thomas Aquinas. Stephen Brock's book provides both (...) a magisterial and a definitive answer to this question.Like fine wine, this book has been fermenting and maturing for almost thirty years. Originally a doctoral dissertation, this recently published work has been rewritten, and to a certain extent, reworked by the author with respect to some of its content.Without disregard for nuances, the first chapter introduces the reader to four different groups of Aquinas's interpreters. The first two groups question the full legal character of the natural law in its dependence to the eternal law. The third one questions its naturalness. The fourth group, instead, upholds both the divine origin of the natural law's full legality in its dependence on the eternal law, as well as its natural character.Brock places Dom Odo Lottin, Wolfgang Kluxen, Germain Grisez, and John Finnis in the first group. They maintain that the natural law is a law only in a qualified sense and that it does not entirely fulfill the definition of law. The natural law would provide an intrinsic morality. It should be treated independently from the eternal law. The second group is composed by authors such as Frederick Copleston, Alan Donagan, or Gregory Stevens. Similar to the first group, they argue that the natural law is an autonomous self-standing law, legislated by human reason. Thus, it should be treated independently from the eternal law, except to point out its ultimate origin.The author who exemplifies the third position is Ernest Fortin. Reacting against Finnis, Fortin's position jeopardizes the natural character of the natural law. In his view, the legal force of the first principles of practical reason is not fully actualized until one recognizes the divine institution sanctioning them. [End Page 981]All the authors of the fourth group uphold that the natural law is fully a law on account of its divine origin and that it is also entirely natural insofar as it is naturally known by human reason. Herein Brock places commentators of Saint Thomas such as Francisco Suarez, Dominic Farrell, Lawrence Dewan, and himself. He also includes in this last group other philosophers such as G. E. M. Anscombe and Peter Geach. In the course of his whole study, Brock shows how Aquinas's true position differs from the other members of this group. Special attention is given to the differences between Aquinas's true mind and the interpretations offered by Suarez, Farrell, and, to a certain degree, even by Dewan. In order to better appreciate the depth of this process, I have found it very helpful to read Farrell's The Natural Law According to Aquinas and Suarez in conjunction with Brock's work.The second chapter targets the natural law's legal character in its dependence to the eternal law. It proves that Thomas provides a strict definition of the natural law when he says that it is nothing but a participation of the eternal law in the rational creature. This chapter opens with a historical study concerning the influence of the Summa Fratri Alexandri in the Summa theologiae (ST). Aquinas's understanding of the dependence of the natural law on the eternal law turns out to be more systematic and refined. It is based on a fuller comprehension and development of what law is (the ratio legis).The remainder of the second chapter consists in a superb commentary regarding ST, I-II, q. 91, a. 2, on whether something existing in man is fit to be called a natural law. Promulgation is the element of the definition of law that specifies the different kinds of laws. Hence, the natural law is differentiated from the others by its natural promulgation, namely, by the act through which the order of the eternal law (already instituted by God... (shrink)

Law and Morality has a basic objective: to analye interrelations between positive and intuitive law.

The argument laid out in this book discusses and interprets the work of Hobbes in relation to religion. It compares a traditional interpretation of Hobbes where Hobbes’ use of conventional terminology when talking about natural law is seen as ironic or merely convenient despite an atheist viewpoint, with the view that Hobbes’ morality is truly traditional and Christian. The book considers other thinkers of the age in tandem with Hobbes and discusses in detail his theology inspired by corporeal mechanics. (...) The position is that there are significant senses in which Hobbes can be said to be a traditional natural law theorist. (shrink)