In the wake of successive crises, novel politics and ethics are emerging around attempts to institute a ‘new’ world of finance in the name of social relations. Financial start-ups and development organizations, often working alongside established financial institutions, are experimenting with the ‘social’ in order to create markets and scale up their activities. At the same time, people continue to advance social claims in finance out of concern for others. This article examines the rise, politics and ethics of this experimentation (...) in what we call ‘relational finance’. Our argument is that by rendering the social dimensions of finance explicit, contemporary relational finance makes sociality available for marketization and politicization. We illustrate this claim with three examples of mobilizations of the social in everyday lending and borrowing: social collateral, social lending and social debt. Relational finance, we conclude, is far from an unproblematic ‘alternative’ but retains ethical and political potential. (shrink)

This special section explores the intersection of social finance and financial innovation in contemporary technologies of relational finance. The articles that follow study detailed cases of contemporary experiments in payments, money and credit-debt relations. By way of introduction, in this short piece we outline three paradoxes at the heart of these experiments: the feudal life of capitalist financial innovation; the social life of supposedly asocial crypto-currencies; and the market life of relational financial dissent.

This paper provides an analysis of explanatory constraints and their role in scientific explanation. This analysis clarifies main characteristics of explanatory constraints, ways in which they differ from “standard” explanatory factors, and the unique roles they play in scientific explanation. While current philosophical work appreciates two main types of explanatory constraints, this paper suggests a new taxonomy: law-based constraints, mathematical constraints, and causal constraints. This classification helps capture unique features of constraint types, the different roles they play in explanation, and (...) it includes causal constraints, which are often overlooked in this literature. (shrink)

Dispositional ascriptions do not entail the counterfactuals we might expect, as interfering factors may be poised to prevent the disposition from manifesting in its very stimulus conditions. Such factors are commonly called finks and masks. It is thought, however, that finks and masks cannot be intrinsic to the disposition bearer; if an intrinsic property of the object would prevent a particular response in certain conditions, the object fails to have the corresponding disposition. I argue that we should accept intrinsic finks (...) and masks if we think there are finks and masks at all, and also if we maintain that paradigmatic dispositions are intrinsic. This last point is particularly problematic for the claim that there cannot be intrinsic finks and masks, for if paradigmatic dispositions are not intrinsic then the central argument for the impossibility of intrinsic finks and masks is undermined. (shrink)

In this paper, I identify a form of epistemic insensitivity that occurs when someone fails to make proper use of the epistemic tools at their disposal in order to bring their beliefs in line with epistemically relevant evidence that is available to them. I call this kind of insensitivity agential insensitivity because it stems from the epistemic behavior of an individual agent. Agential insensitivity can manifest as a failure to either attend to relevant and available evidence, or appropriately interpret evidence (...) that is attended to. The concept of agential insensitivity allows us to conceptualize the kind of not-knowing involved in forms of ignorance that are cultivated and maintained by individual agents, especially when this ignorance is enabled or encouraged by social structures. I use the skepticism about racial disparities in policing practices that is displayed by many white Americans as a lens for exploring this connection. Understanding agential insensitivity thus provides insight into both social and epistemic phenomena. (shrink)

While there is now considerable anxiety about whether the psychological theory presupposed by virtue ethics is empirically sustainable, analogous issues have received little attention in the virtue epistemology literature. This paper argues that virtue epistemology encounters challenges reminiscent of those recently encountered by virtue ethics: just as seemingly trivial variation in context provokes unsettling variation in patterns of moral behavior, trivial variation in context elicits unsettling variation in patterns of cognitive functioning. Insofar as reliability is a condition on epistemic virtue, (...) we have reason to doubt that human beings possess the cognitive materials required for epistemic virtue, and thereby reason to think that virtue epistemology is threatened by skepticism. We conclude that while virtue epistemology has resources for addressing this challenge, exploiting these resources forces tradeoffs between empirical and normative adequacy. (shrink)

In this article, we analyse the novel case of Phoenix, a non-binary adult requesting ongoing puberty suppression to permanently prevent the development of secondary sex characteristics, as a way of affirming their gender identity. We argue that the aim of OPS is consistent with the proper goals of medicine to promote well-being, and therefore could ethically be offered to non-binary adults in principle; there are additional equity-based reasons to offer OPS to non-binary adults as a group; and the ethical defensibility (...) of facilitating individual requests for OPS from non-binary adults also depends on other relevant considerations, including the balance of potential benefits over harms for that specific patient, and whether the patient’s request is substantially autonomous. Although the broadly principlist ethical approach we take can be used to analyse other cases of non-binary adults requesting OPS apart from the case we evaluate, we highlight that the outcome will necessarily depend on the individual’s context and values. However, such clinical provision of OPS should ideally be within the context of a properly designed research study with long-term follow-up and open publication of results. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Response to C. Victor Fung and Leonard Tan, “‘Love of All Wisdoms’: Toward A Multiphilosophical Approach To Music Education”Lauren Kapalka RichermeFung and Tan’s arguments regarding the limits of our profession’s longstanding narrow focus on Eurocentric and American philosophical traditions are crucially important, and I think the majority of PMER readers will agree about the need to engage with philosophies written by those from diverse geographic locations and with (...) other forms of contrasting lived experiences. Additionally, this essay contains many thoughtful clarifications, including the importance of local and individualized needs, accruing philosophical wisdoms over time, and ongoing reflexivity. I found the conceptualization of boundaries “as a connecting agent rather than a separation device” particularly intriguing. Moreover, I applaud Fung and Tan for their work outside of this paper; their efforts to translate and extend various Asian philosophical ideas have certainly enriched the graduate philosophy classes that I teach.1 For me, the joy of any philosophical inquiry is the questions and imaginings it incites, and these authors have certainly given me a lot to contemplate. I begin this response with a couple of wonderments and then provide a possible extension of this valuable work. [End Page 185]One of my wonderments regards the relationship between culturally sustaining pedagogy and the proposed multiphilosophical approach. Fung and Tan write, “Ontological and axiological questions regarding the meaning of music in education and in the broader life are still unaddressed” and specifically ask “To what extent should musics of the students’ cultural tradition be customized and incorporated in the curriculum?” Culturally Sustaining Pedagogy or CSP, which is a primary contemporary outgrowth of the multicultural education movement, provides a clear response. Django Paris and H. Sami Alim write that Culturally Responsive Pedagogy:seeks to perpetuate and foster—to sustain—linguistic, literate, and cultural pluralism as part of schooling for positive social transformation. CSP positions dynamic cultural dexterity as a necessary good, and sees the outcome of learning as additive rather than subtractive.... Culturally sustaining pedagogy exists wherever education sustains the lifeways of communities who have been and continue to be damaged and erased through schooling.2Given the similarities between this explanation and Fung and Tan’s description of a multiphilosophical approach, I wonder if they could say more about points of alignment and disagreement. Might their arguments serve as an extension of CSP?Another wonderment I have is: What does a multiphilosophical approach exclude? I’m intrigued by Fung and Tan’s rich metaphor of a Chinese medicine cabinet and find it applicable to an array of philosophies. Yet, equating students to “patients” and a music educator to a “doctor” who “writes a prescription for a patient” is incompatible with some philosophies. For example, such language implies a banking model of education that undermines Brazilian philosopher Paulo Freire’s core tenets.3 Given that no metaphor or philosophical approach can address everything, I wonder if in addition to inclusions, a multiphilosophical approach necessarily relies on certain exclusions. I spend the remainder of this response positing three potential ways that exclusions might extend Fung and Tan’s ideas.First, inclusive approaches such as Fung and Tan’s multiphilosophy necessarily exclude philosophies resistant to openness and varying viewpoints. Philosophies that forward single prescribed educational ends or limited ways of being musical cannot function within a multiphilosphical approach and therefore must be excluded. Moreover, Fung and Tan’s references to democracy and use of Dewey suggest that a main purpose of a multiphilosophical approach is to propagate liberal pluralism. Such thinking aligns with Meira Levinson’s ideas about liberal education. She writes: “liberal citizenship does require certain habits and virtues, and pluralism is rightly restricted to individuals holding conceptions of [End Page 186] the good which are compatible with liberal citizenship.”4 Specifically, Levinson argues that these habits and virtues include respecting the democratic process, paying attention to public issues, and public involvement through voting and other forms of engagement. While I agree with Fung and Tan that “contemporary diverse needs are localized and always evolving,” those needs exist within larger socio-political-economic structures that inevitably rely on certain exclusions. The nature of those exclusions informs how “diverse needs” are understood and addressed... (shrink)

Slurring language has had a lot of recent interest, but the focus has been almost exclusively on racial slurs. Gendered pejoratives, on the other hand—terms like “slut,” “bitch,” or “sissy”—do not fit into existing accounts of slurring terms, as these accounts require the existence of neutral correlates, which, I argue, these gendered pejoratives lack. Rather than showing that these terms are not slurs, I argue that this challenges the assumption that slurs must have neutral correlates, and so that a new (...) approach to thinking about the meaning of slurring terms is required. (shrink)

Recent philosophical work has explored the distinction between causal and non-causal forms of explanation. In this literature, topological explanation is viewed as a clear example of the non-causal variety–it is claimed that topology lacks temporal information, which is necessary for causal structure. This paper explores the distinction between topological and causal forms of explanation and argues that this distinction is not as clear cut as the literature suggests. One reason for this is that some explanations involve both topological and causal (...) information. In these “borderline” cases scientists explain some outcome by appealing to the causal topology of the system of interest. These cases help clarify a type of topological explanation that is genuinely causal, but that differs from standard topological and interventionist accounts of explanation. (shrink)

As clinical trials end, little is understood about how participants exiting from clinical trials approach decisions related to the removal or post-trial use of investigational brain implants, such as deep brain stimulation (DBS) devices. This empirical bioethics study examines how research participants experience the process of exit from research at the end of clinical trials of implanted neural devices. Using a modified grounded theory study design, we conducted semi-structured, in-depth interviews with 16 former research participants from clinical trials of DBS (...) and responsive neurostimulation (RNS). Open-ended questions elicited motivations for joining the trial, understanding of study procedures at the time of initial informed consent, the process of exiting from research, and decisions about device removal or post-trial device use. Thematic analysis identified categories related to: limited preparedness for the end of research participation, straightforwardness of decisions to explant or keep the device, reconciling with the end of research participation, reconciling post-trial expectations, and achieving a sense of closure after exit from research. A preliminary theoretical model describes contextual factors influencing the process and experience of exit from research. Experiences of clinical trial participants should guide research practices to enhance the ethical design and conduct of clinical trials in DBS and other brain devices. (shrink)

In the United States, the dominant model of decision‐making capacity (DMC) is the “four abilities model,” which judges DMC according to four criteria: understanding, appreciation, reasoning, and communicating a choice. Some critics argue that this model is “too cognitive” because it ignores the role of emotions and values in decision‐making. But so far there is no consensus about how to incorporate such factors into a model of DMC while still ensuring that patients with unusual or socially disapproved values still have (...) their autonomous decisions respected. In this paper, we aim to give an account of the role of values in decision‐making which can answer some of the lingering questions about capacity. In the current literature, defenders of the inclusion of values in DMC tend to propose solutions which focus on the distorted or incoherent attributes of the values themselves. We argue that shifting the focus onto valuing as an ability is a better solution and that a complete picture of capacity includes understanding, appreciation, reasoning, communicating a choice, and the ability to value. On the basis of a conceptual analysis of the necessary conditions for autonomous decision‐making, we derive a conception of the ability to value. On our account, the ability to value has four components: the possession of values, the ability to access those values, the ability to engage in practical reasoning with one's values, and the ability to act on the result of that reasoning. We describe the positive components of the ability to value, some indicators of impairment, and some implications of our account. (shrink)

This article examines the multiple realizability thesis within a causal framework. The beginnings of this framework are found in Elliott Sober’s “Multiple Realizability Argument against Reduction,”...

This book draws on the hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer to inform a feminist perspective of social identities. Lauren Swayne Barthold moves beyond answers that either defend the objective nature of identities or dismiss their significance altogether. Building on the work of both hermeneutic and non-hermeneutic feminist theorists of identity, she asserts the relevance of concepts like horizon, coherence, dialogue, play, application, and festival for developing a theory of identity. This volume argues that as intersubjective interpretations, social identities are vital (...) ways of fostering meaning and connection with others. Barthold also demonstrates how a hermeneutic approach to social identities can provide critiques of and resistance to identity-based oppression. (shrink)

In vitro gametogenesis (IVG) might offer numerous research and clinical benefits. Some potential clinical applications of IVG, such as allowing opposite‐sex couples experiencing infertility to have genetically related children, have attracted support. Others, such as enabling same‐sex reproduction and solo reproduction, have attracted significantly more criticism. In this paper, we examine how different ethical principles might help us to draw lines and distinguish between ethically desirable and undesirable uses of IVG. We discuss the alleged distinction between therapeutic and non‐therapeutic uses (...) of assisted reproduction in the context of IVG, and show how it is both problematic to apply in practice and theoretically dubious. We then discuss how the ethical principles of reproductive justice and beneficence apply to IVG for opposite‐sex reproduction, same‐sex reproduction, and solo reproduction. We suggest that these principles generate strong reasons for the use of IVG for opposite‐sex and same‐sex reproduction, but not for solo reproduction. (shrink)

Finding things funny is a pervasive aspect of human mental and social life, but humor has been neglected in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Recently, however, there has been a swell of interest in the topic. This essay critically introduces and evaluates contemporary developments in the field, and generates an associated list of questions that a successful theory of humor should be able to answer.

This article discusses the new reproductive technology of egg freezing in the context of existing literature on gender, medicalization, and infertility. What is unique about this technology is its use by women who are not currently infertile but who may anticipate a future diagnosis. This circumstance gives rise to a new ontological category of “anticipated infertility.” The author draws on participant observation and a qualitative analysis of scientific, mainstream, and marketing literature to identify and compare the representation of two different (...) candidates for egg freezing: women with cancer and healthy young women. Although both populations experience anticipated infertility, their dichotomous portrayals as appropriate candidates are demonstrative of gender norms linking women to motherhood. Egg freezing is a concise illustration of how the medicalization of women’s bodies and bodily processes masks a host of cultural anxieties about aging, illness, reproduction, and risk. (shrink)

The idea that introspection is transparent—that we know our minds by looking out to the world, not inwards towards some mental item—seems quite appealing when we think about belief. It seems that we know our beliefs by attending to their content; I know that I believe there is a café nearby by thinking about the streets near me, and not by thinking directly about my mind. Such an account is thought to have several advantages—for example, it is thought to avoid (...) the need to posit any extra mental faculties peculiar to introspection. In this paper I discuss recent attempts to extend this kind of outwards-looking account to our introspective knowledge of desire. According to these accounts, we know our desires by attending to what in the world we judge to be valuable. This, however, does not deal satisfactorily with cases where my value judgments and introspective knowledge of my desires come apart. I propose a better alternative for the proponent of transparency, but one that requires giving up on the supposed metaphysical advantages. (shrink)

Unpaid care work, including child care, elder care, and housework, is unremunerated work essential to human survival and flourishing. Worldwide, women disproportionally carry out this work, impacting upon their ability to engage in other activities, such as education, employment, or leisure. Despite a growing number of businesses engaging in “gendered CSR,” in the form of women's empowerment projects, attention to unpaid care work remains little discussed in the literature, despite its importance to sustainable development. Applying Diane Elson's feminist economic framework (...) for alleviating unpaid care work inequality to a case study of gendered CSR in Ghana, I find that at present unpaid care work is (a) unrecognised in business’ CSR, (b) may be both reduced or exacerbated by CSR efforts, and (c) remains conceptualised as relevant only to the private sphere, therefore, missing a unique opportunity for business to contribute to gender equality and sustainable development. Connecting unpaid care work and business responsibility contributes to a more expansive understanding of what CSR may be. (shrink)

Eating disorders are debilitating diseases that have twin impacts on the body and mind and are associated with a number of physiological and psychological comorbidities (Blinder, Cumella, and Sanathara 2006; Casiero and Frishman 2006), including increased suicide risk (Arcelus et al. 2011; Lipson and Sonneville 2020). In addition, eating disorders are growing in prevalence (Gilmache et al. 2019) and impact women at much higher rates than men (Bearman, Martinez, and Stice 2006), especially in adolescence (Spriggs, Kettner, and Carhart-Harris 2021). Anorexia (...) nervosa (AN) is a particularly devastating eating disorder, with one of the highest mortality rates of any psychiatric disorder (Sullivan 1995). Despite the severity of the condition, current treatments for AN are limited in their efficacy (Khalsa et al. 2017). Based on the growing body of evidence demonstrating the short-term and long-term efficacy of psychedelic-assisted psychotherapy for the treatment of other mental illnesses, I argue that research into psychedelic-assisted psychotherapy for AN should be funded. (shrink)

We argue that Koch’s postulates are best understood within an interventionist account of causation, in the sense described in Woodward. We show how this treatment helps to resolve interpretive puzzles associated with Koch’s work and how it clarifies the different roles the postulates play in providing useful, yet not universal criteria for disease causation. Our paper is an effort at rational reconstruction; we attempt to show how Koch’s postulates and reasoning make sense and are normatively justified within an interventionist framework (...) and more difficult to understand within alternative frameworks for thinking about causation. (shrink)

In the last two decades few topics in philosophy of science have received as much attention as mechanistic explanation. A significant motivation for these accounts is that scientists frequently use the term “mechanism” in their explanations of biological phenomena. While scientists appeal to a variety of causal concepts in their explanations, many philosophers argue or assume that all of these concepts are well understood with the single notion of mechanism. This reveals a significant problem with mainstream mechanistic accounts– although philosophers (...) use the term “mechanism” interchangeably with other causal concepts, this is not something that scientists always do. This paper analyses two causal concepts in biology–the notions of “mechanism” and “pathway”–and how they figure in biological explanation. I argue that these concepts have unique features, that they are associated with distinct strategies of causal investigation, and that they figure in importantly different types of explanation. (shrink)

When developing computational models to analyze the tradeoffs between climate risk management strategies (i.e., mitigation, adaptation, or geoengineering), scientists make explicit and implicit decisions that are influenced by their beliefs, values and preferences. Model descriptions typically include only the explicit decisions and are silent on value judgments that may explain these decisions. Eliciting scientists’ mental models, a systematic approach to determining how they think about climate risk management, can help to gain a clearer understanding of their modeling decisions. In order (...) to identify and represent the role of values, beliefs and preferences on decisions, we used an augmented mental models research approach, namely values-informed mental models (ViMM). We conducted and qualitatively analyzed interviews with eleven climate risk management scientists. Our results suggest that these scientists use a similar decision framework to each other to think about modeling climate risk management tradeoffs, including eight specific decisions ranging from defining the model objectives to evaluating the model’s results. The influence of values on these decisions varied between our scientists and between the specific decisions. For instance, scientists invoked ethical values (e.g., concerns about human welfare) when defining objectives, but epistemic values (e.g., concerns about model consistency) were more influential when evaluating model results. ViMM can (i) enable insights that can inform the design of new computational models and (ii) make value judgments explicit and more inclusive of relevant values. This transparency can help model users to better discern the relevance of model results to their own decision framing and concerns. (shrink)

Poor Eliza -- Pax Americana : the case of Show boat -- National brands, national body : Imitation of life -- Uncle Sam needs a wife : citizenship and denegation -- Remembering love, forgetting everything else : Now, voyager -- "It's not the tragedies that kill us, it's the messes" : femininity, formalism, and Dorothy Parker -- The compulsion to repeat femininity : Landscape for a good woman and The life and loves of a she-devil.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Précis of Microaggressions in MedicineLauren Freeman (bio) and Heather Stewart (bio)Microaggressions in Medicine demonstrates that the harms of microaggressions are anything but micro. Guided by diverse patient testimonies and case studies, the book focuses on harms experienced by patients who are marginalized on the basis of race, gender, sexual orientation, body size, and disability. It amplifies their voices, stories, and experiences, which have too often been excluded from mainstream (...) bioethical, medical, and popular discussions. The novel account advanced in Microaggressions in Medicine illustrates that microaggressions in medicine are not rare, but frequent in the healthcare experiences of marginalized patients. Our hope is that the book helps patients better understand and make sense of their experiences. We also hope that it helps current and future healthcare professionals recognize the serious and enduring consequences that microaggressions can have on their patients. Finally, it introduces actionable strategies for healthcare professionals to reduce microaggressions in their practices and institutions.Microaggressions in Medicine argues that healthcare professionals have a moral obligation to prevent microaggressions as much as possible. It aims to make a positive difference in the lives of marginalized patients as they interact with medical practitioners and institutions. It also aims to support healthcare professionals in modifying their practices to ensure that they are always providing high-quality, patient-centered care to all patients. Its ultimate goal is to help increase health equity.More specifically, the book has two broad goals: one theoretical, one practical. The theoretical goal is to reconceptualize how microaggressions have been understood in the literature and to develop this new account within medical contexts. The practical goal is to provide healthcare professionals with a greater understanding of the serious and enduring consequences that microaggressions can have on members of marginalized patient groups and to introduce strategies and tools to help healthcare professionals reduce microaggressions experienced [End Page 142] by patients, thereby diminishing harm caused to patients. To set the context for the critical responses to follow, we briefly summarize each chapter of the book, highlighting the main arguments and novel contributions.Microaggressions can be defined as actions, gestures, or even material environments that subtly and often unintentionally harm members of marginalized groups. They are prevalent in medicine yet often go unnoticed by those who commit them. The introduction outlines the main problem with which the book engages: that there are subtle things that healthcare professionals commonly say and do to patients that do not register as serious to them yet that often cause major harms to patients in the short and long term. To set the stage to unpack this problem, we define what microaggressions are, provide examples of microaggressions in medical contexts, outline the aims and goals of the book, and explain key concepts (e.g., intersectionality, harm, structural oppression) that are necessary for understanding and engaging with the book's arguments. The introduction makes clear how and why a discussion of microaggressions in medicine is valuable to marginalized patients who want to better understand their own experiences interacting with healthcare professionals and institutions. It also underscores the book's value for healthcare professionals who want to improve their clinical interactions with marginalized patients and strategize about how to make their practices more inclusive, welcoming, and just.Chapter 1, "Microaggressions: A Brief History," provides a history of microaggressions. The term was coined in 1970 by a Black Harvard psychologist, Chester Pierce, to describe the "subtle blows" experienced by Black people that are not major or explicit yet that cause real harm. Although little was written about microaggressions for almost four decades, microaggressions gained traction in 2007 through the work of psychologist Derald Sue and his colleagues. We discuss Sue et al.'s work on microaggressions, tracing key revisions and developments the concept has undergone in the last fifteen years. The chapter also summarizes some of the main criticisms that have been launched against microaggressions and considers responses that have been offered. This chapter provides the groundwork for chapter 2, which lays out our novel critique of the dominant understanding of microaggressions. It also motivates our reconceptualization of microaggressions that unfolds over the remainder of the book.Chapter 2, "Microaggressions Reconsidered: A Critique of the Act-Based... (shrink)

Two decades ago, in 1994, in the context of the 4th EU Framework Programme, ELSA was introduced as a label for developing and funding research into the ethical, legal and social aspects of emerging sciences and technologies. Currently, particularly in the context of EU funding initiatives such as Horizon2020, a new label has been forged, namely Responsible Research and Innovation. What is implied in this metonymy, this semantic shift? What is so new about RRI in comparison to ELSA? First of (...) all, for both labels, the signifier was introduced in a top-down manner, well before the concept that was signified by it had acquired a clear and stable profile. In other words, the signifier preceded the research strategies actually covered by these labels. Moreover, the newness of RRI does not reside in its interactive and anticipatory orientation, as is suggested by authors who introduced the term, but rather in its emphases on social-economic impacts. (shrink)

The year 2020 has yielded twin crises in the United States: a global pandemic and a public reckoning with racism brought about by a series of publicized instances of police violence toward Black men and women. Current data indicate that nationally, Black Americans are three times more likely than White Americans to contract Covid-19, a pattern that underscores the more general phenomenon of health disparity among Black and White Americans. Once exposed, Black Americans are twice as likely to die of (...) the virus. Unsurprisingly, Black Americans report higher levels of fear of Covid-19 than their White peers, but they also report higher levels of hesitancy toward a Covid-19 vaccine. This paper explores why this apparent discrepancy exists. It also provides practical recommendations for how government and public health leaders might address vaccine hesitancy in the context of the twin crises of 2020. (shrink)

This paper explores a distinction among causal relationships that has yet to receive attention in the philosophical literature, namely, whether causal relationships are reversible or irreversible. We provide an analysis of this distinction and show how it has important implications for causal inference and modeling. This work also clarifies how various familiar puzzles involving preemption and over-determination play out differently depending on whether the causation involved is reversible.

Surveys are used extensively in social research and, despite a lack of conclusive evidence of their ‘representativeness,’ probability internet panel surveys are being increasingly used to make inferences about knowledge, attitude and behavior in the general population regarding a range of socially relevant issues. A large-scale survey of Australian public attitudes and behavior toward the red meat industry was undertaken. Samples were obtained using a random digit dialing telephone survey and a PIP survey to examine differences between the two samples (...) regarding attitudes and behavior relating to livestock use and welfare. There was little difference in demographics between the CATI and the PANEL surveys apart from highest level of education. However, there were differences between the two samples in both attitudes and behavior toward the red meat industry after controlling for education levels. The PANEL respondents gave generally more conservative responses than did the CATI respondents in the sense that they were more positive toward the livestock industries and animal welfare within these industries. Differences were also found between the respondents of the two samples regarding behavior that relates to the red meat industry, both community and consumer behavior. PANEL respondents were less engaged in community behaviors performed in opposition of the red meat industry when compared with the CATI sample. The majority of CATI and PANEL respondents were red meat eaters and there was no difference between respondents of the two samples in relation to red meat consumption, however, there were fewer vegetarians and vegans in the PANEL survey. Possible reasons for the observed differences are discussed, however, a definitive answer will depend on further research to identify the specific psychological factors that differ between samples derived from different survey methodologies. (shrink)

This paper aims to explore disciplinary variation in valuation practices by comparing the way research groups accumulate credibility across four epistemic cultures. Our analysis is based on case studies of four high-performing research groups representing very different epistemic cultures in humanities, social sciences, geosciences and mathematics. In each case we interviewed about ten researchers, analyzed relevant documents and observed a couple of meetings. In all four cases we found a cyclical process of accumulating credibility. At the same time, we found (...) significant differences in the manifestation of the six main resources that are part of the cycle, the mechanisms of conversion between these resources, the overall structure and the average speed of the credibility cycle. The different ways in which the groups use data and produce arguments affect the whole cycle of accumulating credibility. In some cultures, journal publications are the main source of recognition, but in others one can earn significant amounts of recognition for conference contributions or service to the academic community. Moreover, the collaboration practices in the respective fields strongly influence the connection between arguments and publications. In cultures where teams of researchers collaboratively produce arguments, it is more strongly embedded in the process of writing publications. We conclude that the credibility cycle can only be used as an analytical tool to explain the behavior of researchers or research groups when taking differences across epistemic cultures into account. (shrink)

Although case-based training is popular for ethics education, little is known about how specific case content influences training effectiveness. Therefore, the effects of (a) codes of ethical conduct and (b) forecasting content were investigated. Results revealed richer cases, including both codes and forecasting content, led to increased knowledge acquisition, greater sensemaking strategy use, and better decision ethicality. With richer cases, a specific pattern emerged. Specifically, content describing codes alone was more effective when combined with short-term forecasts, whereas content embedding codes (...) within context was more effective when combined with long-term forecasts, leading to greater knowledge acquisition and sensemaking strategy use. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Accurate self‐administration of antiretroviral medication therapy for HIV/aids is a significant clinical and ethical concern because of its implications for individual morbidity and mortality, the health of the public, and escalating healthcare costs. However, the traditional construction of patient medication adherence is oversimplified, myopic, and ethically problematic. Adherence relies on existing social power structures and western normative assumptions about the proper roles of patients and providers, and principally focuses on patient variables, obscuring the powerful socioeconomic and institutional influences on (...) behaviour. Some professionals advocate for alternate approaches to adherence, but many of the available alternatives remain conceptually underdeveloped. Using HIV/aids as an exemplar, this paper presents medication practice as a theoretical reconstruction and explicates its conceptual and ethical evolution. We first propose that one of these alternatives, medication practice, broadens the understanding of individuals’ medication‐taking behaviour, speaks to the inherent power inequities in the patient‐provider interaction, and addresses the ethical shortcomings in the traditional construal. We then integrate medication practice with feminist thought, further validating individuals’ situated knowledge, choices, and multiple roles; more fully recognizing the individual as a multidimensional, autonomous human being; and reducing notions of obedience and deference to authority. Blame is thus extricated from the healthcare relationship, reshaping the traditionally adversarial components of the interaction, and eliminating the view of adherence as a patient problem in need of patient‐centred interventions. (shrink)