Lara Buchak sets out a new account of rational decision-making in the face of risk. She argues that the orthodox view is too narrow, and suggests an alternative, more permissive theory: one that allows individuals to pay attention to the worst-case or best-case scenario, and vindicates the ordinary decision-maker.

The purpose of this article is to elaborate on the concept of prefiguration by outlining the necessity of its contribution to a progressive public philosophy for the 2020s. In the introduction, I explain how the object of critique for many social theorists has shifted over the course of the last decade from neoliberal globalization to capitalism understood as an encompassing form of life. In light of this, I enumerate the features that should define a progressive public philosophy: radical, emancipatory, and (...) decolonized. The introduction is followed by an overview of the academic debates emerging after the North Atlantic financial crisis of 2007–8. Among these, accelerationism fundamentally rejects the incorporation of prefigurative politics in any emancipatory political agenda. To better understand this position, I examine the origin and meaning of prefiguration and prefigurative practices in more detail in Section III. In it, I argue that prefigurative politics entails a holistic approach to social change that digs its roots in feminist and ecological thought and focuses on social reproduction and the preservation of life rather than solely economic production. Subsequently, I deploy the case of Occupy Wall Street to show that a growing number of contemporary social movements are implementing a dualistic strategy that simultaneously combines repertoires of action typical of protest movements with prefigurative practices focused on the embodiment of alternatives. This dualism, along with the limited success of Occupy Wall Street in concretizing its claims and goals, has led prefigurative politics to being labelled as incompatible with, if not even hindering, any emancipatory strategy. My argument instead is that prefigurative politics constitutes a fundamental and necessary component of any political strategy aimed at transcending contemporary capitalism since it conceives progressive social change in an ontologically and epistemologically different way with respect to political parties and protest movements. Taking this into consideration, I conclude that conventional politics and prefigurative politics can be seen as having the potential to mutually reinforce each other and that prefigurative politics should be acknowledged as a pivotal concept in establishing a progressive public philosophy for the 2020s. Only by doing so, will this philosophy be truly radical, emancipatory, and decolonial. (shrink)

In this book, Lara Ostaric argues that Kant’s seminal Critique of Judgment is properly understood as completing his Critical system. The two seemingly disparate halves of the text are unified under this larger project insofar as both aesthetic and teleological judgment indirectly exhibit the final end of reason, the Ideas of the highest good and the postulates, as if obtaining in nature. She relates Kant’s discussion of aesthetic and teleological judgment to important yet under-explored concepts in his philosophy, and (...) helps the reader to recognize the relevance of his aesthetics and teleology for our understanding of fine arts and genius, the possibility of pure judgments of ugliness, Kant’s philosophy of history, his philosophy of religion, and his conception of autonomy. Ostaric’s novel and thoroughly integrative presentation of Kant’s system will be of interest not only to Kant scholars but also to those working in religious studies, art history, political theory, and intellectual history. (shrink)

It is sometimes said that faith is recalcitrant in the face of new evidence, but it is puzzling how such recalcitrance could be rational or laudable. I explain this aspect of faith and why faith is not only rational, but in addition serves an important purpose in human life. Because faith requires maintaining a commitment to act on the claim one has faith in, even in the face of counter-evidence, faith allows us to carry out long-term, risky projects that we (...) might otherwise abandon. Thus, faith allows us to maintain integrity over time. (shrink)

There are currently two robust traditions in philosophy dealing with doxastic attitudes: the tradition that is concerned primarily with all-or-nothing belief, and the tradition that is concerned primarily with degree of belief or credence. This paper concerns the relationship between belief and credence for a rational agent, and is directed at those who may have hoped that the notion of belief can either be reduced to credence or eliminated altogether when characterizing the norms governing ideally rational agents. It presents a (...) puzzle which lends support to two theses. First, that there is no formal reduction of a rational agent’s beliefs to her credences, because belief and credence are each responsive to different features of a body of evidence. Second, that if our traditional understanding of our practices of holding each other responsible is correct, then belief has a distinctive role to play, even for ideally rational agents, that cannot be played by credence. The question of which avenues remain for the credence-only theorist is considered. (shrink)

Resumen Este trabajo se centra en la relación que se establece en el discurso entre argumentación y cortesía. Mi propósito es demostrar que la estructura argumentativa puede funcionar como un recurso que sirve de regulador de la imagen del hablante así como, en otro plano, un recurso que refuerza la actividad cortés. La mayoría de los estudios llevados a cabo hasta el momento han reparado en la función persuasiva de la cortesía, con lo que, en cierta manera, el acto cortés (...) se ha contemplado como un recurso “al servicio” de la argumentación. En este estudio intento demostrar que la relación entre ambos aspectos no es monodireccional, y que en ocasiones y, más precisamente, en determinados tipos discursivos, es la estructura argumentativa la que sirve al objetivo de la cortesía, sin menoscabar en absoluto la importancia de la finalidad persuasiva presente, a mi juicio, de forma más o menos marcada, en cualquier realización discursiva. De esta forma, se puede hablar de una relación de bifuncionalidad entre argumentación y cortesía. Para probarlo se utilizan textos de carácter persuasivo publicitarios y políticos. (shrink)

I reply to two commentaries—one by Johanna Thoma and Jonathan Weisberg and one by James M. Joyce—concerning how risk-weighted expected utility theory handles the Allais preferences and Dutch books.

In this paper I argue that, on Kant's view, the work of genius serves as a sensible exhibition of the Idea of the highest good. In other words, the work of genius serves as a special sign that the world is hospitable to our moral ends and that the realization of our moral vocation in such a world may indeed be possible. In the first part of the paper, I demonstrate that the purpose of the highest good is not to (...) strengthen our motivation to accept the moral law as binding for us but, rather, to strengthen our motivation to persist in our already existent moral dispositions. In the second part, I show that the works of genius exhibit the Idea of the highest good and, consequently, strengthen our hope in its realization. Drawing on the results of the second part, the third part of the paper demonstrates that beauty, of both art and nature, symbolizes morality in a more substantive sense than that suggested by Henry Allison's “formalistic” interpretation. Since, on my view, fine art in Kant serves as a sensible representation of an undetermined conceptual content, or the Idea of the highest good, the fourth part of the paper addresses the vexed question of whether Kant's account of fine art already anticipates the cognitive role later attributed to it by the German Idealists. (shrink)

This paper provides an account of what it is to have faith in a proposition p, in both religious and mundane contexts. It is argued that faith in p doesn’t require adopting a degree of belief that isn’t supported by one’s evidence but rather it requires terminating one’s search for further evidence and acting on the supposition that p. It is then shown, by responding to a formal result due to I.J. Good, that doing so can be rational in a (...) number of circumstances. If expected utility theory is the correct account of practical rationality, then having faith can be both epistemically and practically rational if the costs associated with gathering further evidence or postponing the decision are high. If a more permissive framework is adopted, then having faith can be rational even when there are no costs associated with gathering further evidence. (shrink)

Aby Warburg a accordé une attention particulière au monstre comme motif iconographique mais aussi comme notion abstraite impliquant un certain type de rapport du sujet au réel. Pour comprendre ce qu’il entendait par la « causalité monstrueuse » et la « dialectique du monstre », l’article fait retour sur ses Fragments sur l’expression (1888-1903) et les met en parallèle avec les « Mnemosyne Allgemeine Ideen » et les « Mnemosyne Grundbegriffe I et II » (1927-1929) qui devaient accompagner le célèbre (...) Atlas Mnémosyne. Le monstre apparaît alors non comme un innommable qui résiste à la rationalité mais comme un des points d’appui du sujet rationnel dans son effort pour élaborer un espace de pensée. (shrink)

O presente artigo analisa a leitura de Hannah Arendt sobre os textos de Franz Kafka, o que será feito a partir do prefácio de Entre o passado e o futuro, dos ensaios Franz Kafka: uma reavaliação e O judeu como pária: uma tradição oculta, além das narrativas kafkianas Descrição de uma luta, O Processo, O Castelo e da parábola Ele, identificando tanto o que as vincula como o definhamento do humano retratado pelo escritor. Porquanto o absurdo que reveste o cenário (...) descrito por Kafka é percebido por Arendt como um presságio dos horrores praticados pelos regimes totalitários, nossa hipótese é que discutir a leitura da autora sobre os textos kafkianos auxilia a compreensão sobre as consequências desastrosas que as relações sociais podem acarretar e a desfiguração fomentada pela burocracia como aparelho organizacional e forma de governo que normaliza os procedimentos de rotina, os massacres administrativos, a obediência cadavérica e os processos infindáveis baseados em legislações superiores, utilizados como meios de gerir indivíduos desarraigados, indistinguíveis e massificados. (shrink)

The article aims to identify as the main passions that run through the Hobbesian theoretical corpus. To this end, the exhibition will begin by analyzing the mechanism of the passions founded by the author. Next, it will be highlighted how unbridled passions make peaceful coexistence between individuals unfeasible, establishing a scenario in which conflicts are inevitable. Two passions will be analyzed in more detail: vainglory and fear. After emphasizing that the Hobbesian man tends naturally to his own benefit, to competition (...) and to domination, representing a threat to the other, it will be pointed out how the State asserts itself as the necessary that aims to discipline like passions. This part of the argument will analyze as desirable passions for the maintenance of civil life, with emphasis on hope, the desire for comfort and delight, the desire for knowledge and the arts, as well as for fear and vainglory itself. (shrink)

Raising awareness of the environmental impact of energy generation and consumption has been a recent concern of contemporary society worldwide. Underlying the awareness of energy consumption is an intricate network of perception and social interaction that can be mediated by technology. In this paper we argue that issues regarding energy, environment and technology are very much situated and involve tensions of sociocultural nature. This exploratory investigation addresses the subject by introducing the design of a Socially-inspired Energy Eco-Feedback Technology, which is (...) composed of an interactive system to trigger and mediate collective savings and a tangible device as a public feedback. Results of an evaluation situated in the context of a school in a socially disadvantaged area in Brazil are discussed, shedding light on the sociocultural aspects related to the subject. The role of the SEET to motivate energy awareness collectively among the social group is assessed, as well as the design characteristics that contributed to that. Outcomes bring to light social aspects and dynamics that would hardly have been predicted, evidencing critical factors related to a socially inspired design approach in the energy awareness domain. (shrink)

To perform an illocutionary act – e.g. to apologise – is it necessary, sufficient, or irrelevant that a hearer understand you to be performing that act? This issue is sometimes called the ‘problem of uptake’. Famously, Austin’s inaugural account makes uptake necessary for illocutionary force. For decades, critics have objected to this view: Some have sought to show that uptake is irrelevant; others have argued that uptake is important though not essential; while still others have argued that uptake is necessary (...) though must be radically reframed. Nevertheless, it is widely agreed that there is a problem of uptake in Austin. In this paper, I contend that this view is wrong. Austinian uptake, I argue, is essential; yet, contra the standard reading, it is not synonymous with understanding. Uptake is a narrow criterion pertaining to conventional-linguistic competencies, which rules out specific kinds of misunderstanding, not misunderstanding überhaupt. The importation of non-Austinian assumptions about uptake from subsequent speech act theorists – specifically, the mis-equivocation of uptake with understanding a speaker’s intention – I show, has muddied the water. This paper offers a novel reconsideration and salvaging of uptake and its significance, whose stakes I elucidate through intervention in the fraught issue of conceptualising sexual consent. (shrink)

It is essential to engage the public in conservation measures to conserve insects. We investigate the Protection Motivation Theory, as well as knowledge, attitudes, and sociodemographic variables as predictors of willingness to donate and actual donations to insect conservation for a representative German sample. The PMT subcomponents severity, self-efficacy, and response efficacy, as well as attitudes toward insects, income, and education level, significantly predicted WTD. In contrast, severity, response barriers, age, gender, and the WTD significantly influenced actual donations. Overall, components (...) of the PMT have high predictive power for both dependent variables. Our results suggest that an intention-behavior gap exists between the intention to donate and the actual donation toward insect conservation. Measures to increase WTD and actual donations for insect conservation are discussed. (shrink)

In the peer disagreement debate, three intuitively attractive claims seem to conflict: there is disagreement among peers on many important matters; peer disagreement is a serious challenge to one’s own opinion; and yet one should be able to maintain one’s opinion on important matters. I show that contrary to initial appearances, we can accept all three of these claims. Disagreement significantly shifts the balance of the evidence; but with respect to certain kinds of claims, one should nonetheless retain one’s beliefs. (...) And one should retain them even though these beliefs would not be supported by the new total evidence if one didn’t already hold them. (shrink)

Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte, Volume 45, Issue 3, Page 291-300, September 2022.

One phenomenon arising in epistemic life is allegiance to, and break from, a tradition. This phenomenon has three central features. First, individuals who adhere to a tradition seem to respond dogmatically to evidence against their tradition. Second, individuals from different traditions appear to see the same evidence differently. And third, conversion from one tradition to another appears to be different in kind from ordinary belief shift. This paper uses recent work on the nature and rationality of faith to show that (...) these features can all emerge from individuals acting rationally—in particular, from individuals rationally having faith in the core assumptions of their traditions. One upshot is that we don't need to employ the idea of incommensurability to explain these features. (shrink)

Some Kantian ethicists, myself included, have been trying to show how, contrary to popular belief, Kant makes an important place in his moral theory for emotions–especially love and sympathy. This paper confronts claims of Kant that seem to endorse an absence of sympathetic emotions. I analyze Kant’s accounts of different sorts of emotions (“affects,” “passions,” and “feelings”), and different sorts of emotional coolness (“apathy,” “self-mastery,” and “cold-bloodedness”). I focus on the particular way that Kant praises apathy, as “sublime,” in order (...) to argue that his praise of extreme emotional self-control is not incompatible with, but rather complementary to, his praise of sympathy. (shrink)

_Moral Self-Regard_ draws on the work of Marcia Baron, Joseph Butler and Allen Wood, among others in this first extensive study of the nature, foundation and significance of duties to oneself in Kant's moral theory.

This paper examines medical scientists’ accounts of their rediscoveries and reassessments of old materials. It looks at how historical patient files and brain samples of the first cases of Alzheimer’s disease became reused as scientific objects of inquiry in the 1990s, when a genetic neuropathologist from Munich and a psychiatrist from Frankfurt lead searches for left-overs of Alzheimer’s ‘founder cases’ from the 1900s. How and why did these researchers use historical methods, materials and narratives, and why did the biomedical community (...) cherish their findings as valuable scientific facts about Alzheimer’s disease? The paper approaches these questions by analysing how researchers conceptualised ‘history’ while backtracking and reassessing clinical and histological materials from the past. It elucidates six ways of conceptualising history as a biomedical matter: scientific assessments of the past, i.e. natural scientific understandings of ‘historical facts’; history in biomedicine, e.g. uses of old histological collections in present day brain banks; provenance research, e.g. applying historical methods to ensure the authenticity of brain samples; technical biomedical history, e.g. reproducing original staining techniques to identify how old histological slides were made; founding traditions, i.e. references to historical objects and persons within founding stories of scientific communities; and priority debates, e.g. evaluating the role particular persons played in the discovery of a disease such as Alzheimer’s. Against this background, the paper concludes with how the various ways of using and understanding ‘history’ were put forward to re-present historic cases as ‘proto-types’ for studying Alzheimer’s disease in the present. (shrink)

My book Risk and Rationality argues for a new alternative to the orthodox theory of rational decision-making. This alternative, risk-weighted expected utility maximization, holds that there are three important components involved in rational decision-making: utilities, probabilities, and risk-attitudes. This essay explains the basic outline of the theory and precisely how it differs from the orthodox theory. It also summarizes the main threads of argument in the book.

The ‘rollback argument,’ pioneered by Peter van Inwagen, purports to show that indeterminism in any form is incompatible with free will. The argument has two major premises: the first claims that certain facts about chances obtain in a certain kind of hypothetical situation, and the second that these facts entail that some actual act is not free. Since the publication of the rollback argument, the second claim has been vehemently debated, but everyone seems to have taken the first claim for (...) granted. Nevertheless, the first claim is totally unjustified. Even if we accept the second claim, therefore, the argument gives us no reason to think that free will and indeterminism are incompatible. Furthermore, seeing where the rollback argument goes wrong illuminates how a certain kind of incompatibilist, the ‘chance-incompatibilist,’ ought to think about free will and chance, and points to a possibility for free will that has remained largely unexplored. (shrink)

The moral enhancement of human beings is a constant theme in the history of humanity. Today, faced with the threats of a new, globalised world, concern over this matter is more pressing. For this reason, the use of biotechnology to make human beings more moral has been considered. However, this approach is dangerous and very controversial. The purpose of this article is to argue that the use of another new technology, AI, would be preferable to achieve this goal. Whilst several (...) proposals have been made on how to use AI for moral enhancement, we present an alternative that we argue to be superior to other proposals that have been developed. (shrink)

Curricular design that addresses residency physician competencies in communication skills and professionalism remains a challenge. Graphic Medicine uses comics, a medium combining text and images, to communicate healthcare concepts. Narrative Medicine, in undergraduate medical education, has limited reported usage in Graduate Medical Education. Given the time constraints and intensity of GME, we hypothesized that comics as a form of narrative medicine would be an efficient medium to engage residents.The authors created a novel curriculum to promote effective communication and professionalism, focusing (...) on empathy, compassion and cultural competency. A four-week curriculum was delivered in a neurology residency program. Excerpts from non-fiction graphic memoirs about neurological conditions were read, discussed, and paired with prompt-driven drawing exercises. Qualitative surveys were used to assess acceptability of comics, usefulness of comics to convey patient illness experience, and perception of patient needs for physician-patient communication.Ninety-seven percent of residents reported the sessions were a good use of their time. Residents identified new symptoms of neurologic disorders, articulated patient communication needs, and expressed increased empathy after participation. Residents participated in drawing exercises, but these were not formally analyzed. Graphic medicine is a well received format that may build communication skills and increase empathy. (shrink)

Resumen Este trabajo trata la relación entre la imagen social que las instituciones presentan, tanto de sí mismas como de los agentes sociales implicados en su discurso, y los contextos socioculturales en los que se hallan insertas creencias y premisas que intentan ser erradicadas. Nos centramos en discursos publicitarios institucionales de campañas contra la prostitución, la trata y el tráfico de personas con fines de explotación sexual. A través de ellos observamos cómo a lo largo de las diferentes campañas las (...) instituciones han mantenido una imagen inalterada de tutelaje social y liderazgo, mientras que han hecho fluctuar la imagen de las víctimas, de los explotadores y de la ciudadanía, en aras de conseguir el éxito comunicativo y social que se espera. En este trabajo nos acercamos a este aspecto comunicativo utilizando un marco teórico-metodológico combinado: el sociopragmático y el pragmalingüístico. (shrink)

Resumo: O presente artigo tem como objetivo propor uma hipótese para superação das críticas feitas por Robert Nozick e Michael Sandel à teoria da justiça de John Rawls, no que concerne à necessidade de se considerar aspectos históricos e práticos, na formulação de princípios na posição original. Para tanto, é preciso analisar inicialmente as correntes filosóficas do liberalismo, do libertarianismo e do comunitarismo, a fim de fundar as bases necessárias ao desenvolvimento do estudo. Na sequência, será apresentada a teoria da (...) justiça de John Raws, seguida das críticas formuladas pelo libertário Robert Nozick, no que se refere à necessidade de se levar em conta o princípio histórico. Nozick comprova, por meio do exemplo de Wilt Chamberlain, como aspectos históricos podem alterar as estruturas pré-estabelecidas pelas teorias de estado final. Após, serão examinados os apontamentos feitos por Michael Sandel, especialmente no que concerne ao individualismo metodológico. Sandel também chama a atenção para o fato de que, para garantir efetividade aos princípios, é preciso que os indivíduos se utilizem de sua experiência e das particularidades da comunidade e de seus integrantes. Ao final, será sugerida uma proposta de superação das críticas dirigidas a Rawls, mediante a relativização da abstração da posição original.: The present article aims to overcome the criticisms made by Robert Nozick and Michael Sandel of John Rawls’ theory of justice, specifically with regard to the need for considering historical and practical aspects in the formulation of principles in the original position. We first analyze the philosophical currents of liberalism, libertarianism, and communitarianism, in order to lay the foundations necessary for the development of the study. Next, Rawls’ theory of justice is presented, followed by the critique made by the libertarian Robert Nozick of the need to consider the historical principle. Nozick proves, through the example of the American basketball player Wilt Chamberlain, how historical aspects can alter structures that are pre-established by theories of final state. Michael Sandel’s observations are then analyzed, especially with regard to methodological individualism. Sandel draws attention to the fact that to ensure the effectiveness of principles, individuals need to draw on their experience and on the particularities of the community and its members. Finally, a proposal is made for overcoming the criticisms directed at Rawls; this is achieved by relativizing the abstraction of the original position. (shrink)

The article considers the history of electroshock therapy as a history of medical technology, professional cooperation and business competition. A variation of a history from below is intended; though not from the patients’ perspective (Porter, Theory Soc 14:175–198, 1985), but with a focus on electrodes, circuitry and patents. Such a ‘material history’ of electroshock therapy reveals that the technical make-up of electroshock devices and what they were used for was relative to the changing interests of physicians, industrial companies and mental (...) health politics; it makes an intriguing case for the Social Construction of Technology theory (Bijker et al., The social construction of technological systems: new directions in the sociology and history of technology. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1987). (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to expose a problem of application in John Rawls’ theory of justice. An examination of his treatment of the application of his principles in A Theory of Justice reveals an insensitivity toward the proper representation of minorities and women. This problem, which is rooted in Rawls’ conception of the relevant social position is not properly addressed by him, yet is grounded in inconsistencies which undermine the just practical implementation of his theory. A provisional solution (...) to this problem is to provide the original position with historical information, as well as to place within its jurisdiction the application of the two principles of justice. (shrink)

Existing accounts of the early history of Alzheimer’s disease have focused on Alois Alzheimer’s (1864–1915) publications of two ‘peculiar cases’ of middle-aged patients who showed symptoms associated with senile dementia, and Emil Kraepelin’s (1856–1926) discussion of these and a few other cases under the newly introduced name of ‘Alzheimer’s disease’ in his Textbook of Psychiatry. This article questions the underpinnings of these accounts that rely mainly on publications and describe ‘presenility’ as a defining characteristic of the disease. Drawing on archival (...) research in the Munich psychiatric clinic, in which Alzheimer and Kraepelin practised, this article looks at the use of the category as a diagnostic label in practice. It argues that the first cases only got their exemplary status as key referents of Alzheimer’s disease in later readings of the original publications. In the 1900s, the published cases rather functioned as material to think about the limits of the category of senile dementia. The examination of paper technologies in the Munich psychiatric clinic reveals that the use of the clinical diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease was not limited to patients of a certain age and did not exclude ‘senile’ cases. Moreover, the archival records reflect that many diagnoses of Alzheimer’s disease were noted in the medical records as suspicions rather than conclusions. Against this background, the article argues that in theory and practice, Alzheimer’s disease was not treated as a well-defined disease entity in the Munich clinic, but as an exploratory category for the clinical and histopathological investigation of varieties of organic brain diseases. (shrink)

This paper examines Kant's accounts of friendship and marriage, and argues for what can be called an ideal of “moral marriage” based on Kant's notion of moral friendship. After explaining why Kant values friendship so highly, it gives an account of the ways in which marriage falls far short, according to Kant, of what friendship has to offer. The paper then argues that many of Kant's reasons for finding marriage morally impoverished compared with friendship are wrong‐headed. The paper further argues (...) that a few of Kant's views about friendship are false. The main point is that, when we slightly revise Kant's account of friendship and jettison Kant's misguided notions about marriage, we see that marriages can aspire to much of the same moral richness as friendships. Finally, the paper argues that this friendship model of marriage does not obscure the important ways in which marriages and friendships differ. (shrink)

In “Can it be rational to have faith?”, it was argued that to have faith in some proposition consists, roughly speaking, in stopping one’s search for evidence and committing to act on that proposition without further evidence. That paper also outlined when and why stopping the search for evidence and acting is rationally required. Because the framework of that paper was that of formal decision theory, it primarily considered the relationship between faith and degrees of belief, rather than between faith (...) and belief full stop. This paper explores the relationship between rational faith and justified belief, by considering four prominent proposals about the relationship between belief and degrees of belief, and by examining what follows about faith and belief according to each of these proposals. It is argued that we cannot reach consensus concerning the relationship between faith and belief at present because of the more general epistemological lack of consensus over how belief relates to rationality: in particular, over how belief relates to the degrees of belief it is rational to have given one’s evidence. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungOnora O’Neill hat 1984 den Zusammenhang zwischen grundsätzlichen Bedenken gegenüber dem ethischen Autonomiebegriff und der Kritik an der paternalistisch geprägten medizinethischen Praxis hergestellt, nicht die tatsächliche Einwilligung des konkreten Patienten zu berücksichtigen, sondern die angenommene, hypothetische Einwilligung, die ein idealisierter, völlig rationaler Patient geben würde. Im Anschluss an experimentalpsychologische Studien zur subliminalen Wahrnehmung, zu Volition und Handlungskontrolle erfahren kompatibilistische Theorien menschlicher Freiheit innerhalb der theoretischen Philosophie neue Popularität. Eine Handlung ist demnach frei, wenn sie das Resultat bestimmter Fähigkeiten einer Person (...) ist. Der Artikel setzt sich mit zwei dieser Theorien, Henrik Walters Konzept „natürlicher Freiheit“ und Michael Pauens „Minimalkonzeption personaler Freiheit“ näher auseinander—und zwar vorderhand im Hinblick auf den Entwurf eines nichtidealisierten ethischen Autonomiekonzeptes. Als solches ist es an der aktualen bzw. faktischen Fähigkeit einer Person ausgerichtet, rekurrierend auf die spezifische Determiniertheit autonomer Entscheidungen und Handlungen sowie auf ein relativiertes Konzept menschlicher Vernunft. (shrink)

Decision theory has at its core a set of mathematical theorems that connect rational preferences to functions with certain structural properties. The components of these theorems, as well as their bearing on questions surrounding rationality, can be interpreted in a variety of ways. Philosophy’s current interest in decision theory represents a convergence of two very different lines of thought, one concerned with the question of how one ought to act, and the other concerned with the question of what action consists (...) in and what it reveals about the actor’s mental states. As a result, the theory has come to have two different uses in philosophy, which we might call the normative use and the interpretive use. It also has a related use that is largely within the domain of psychology, the descriptive use. This essay examines the historical development of decision theory and its uses; the relationship between the norm of decision theory and the notion of rationality; and the interdependence of the uses of decision theory. (shrink)

The situation caused by the 2019 coronavirus disease has been representing a great source of concern and a challenge to the psychological well-being of many individuals around the world. For couples in particular, this extraordinary rise in concern, combined with the stress posed by the virus containment measures, such as prolonged cohabitation and lack of support networks, may have increased the likelihood of couple problems. At the same time, however, COVID-19 concerns may have been a stimulus to activate couples’ stress (...) management processes. A couple’s resource, which may have an important role in dealing with COVID-19 concerns and stress, is dyadic coping, i.e., the process through which partners face stress together. Drawing on a sample of 1,823 Italian individuals involved in a couple relationship, the current study tested a serial mediation model in which concerns about COVID-19 predicted psychological well-being, through both explicit stress communication and perceived partner dyadic coping responses. In addition, the study explored whether this dyadic coping process functioned the same way in satisfied and dissatisfied couples. Results showed that concerns about the situation related to COVID-19 significantly threatened individuals’ psychological well-being. However, these concerns positively predicted explicit stress communication, which in turn positively predicted perceived partner’s dyadic coping responses, which finally positively predicted psychological well-being. In addition, in the group of dissatisfied individuals, the association between explicit stress communication and perceived partners’ dyadic coping responses was not significant. The present study adds to the research on couples’ coping by testing for the first time the whole theoretical model of dyadic coping and does so during a global emergency situation. The study also suggests key components of preventive interventions for individuals in couples. (shrink)

Kant’s ethics conceives of rational beings as autonomous–capable of legislating the moral law, and of motivating themselves to act out of respect for that law. Kant’s ethics also includes a notion of the highest good, the union of virtue with happiness proportional to, and consequent on, virtue. According to Kant, morality sets forth the highest good as an object of the totality of all things good as ends. Much about Kant’s conception of the highest good is controversial. This paper focuses (...) on the apparent conflict between Kant’s claim that we are autonomous, and passages in which he seems to suggest that we require belief in the possibility of the highest good to motivate moral action. I distinguish three distinct versions of these problematic claims that seem to be present in Kant’s texts: that the highest good serves as (1) a motivational supplement to respect for the moral law, (2) a fundamental spring of right action, and (3) a condition of the bindingness of moral requirements. I argue that the texts are better interpreted to yield alternatives to (2) and (3) that do not conflict with our autonomy. I also argue that, properly understood, (1) does not conflict with our autonomy. In arguing for the last claim, I explore Kant’s notion of radical evil and its implications for human agency and virtue. (shrink)

This paper explores the historical and palaeographical features linking together three manuscripts of Plato that bear - as previous researchers have shown - marginalia and textual corrections in the hand of the Byzantine humanist George Gemistos Pletho: Marc. Gr. 188 and 189 and Laur. 80, 19. There is, however, one more astonishing peculiarity associating precisely these three manuscripts: at several points there are erasures of passages dealing with ancient theology or with pagan myths and gods.The first part of this study (...) provides a general analysis of the censored passages, showing that they are part of a coherent project aiming at altering Plato's theology: in the manuscripts in his possession Pletho radically altered Plato's text, sometimes improving it, but sometimes censoring or entirely rewriting it; it is this very distinctive text of Plato that circulated in his school. In the second part, Pletho's acts of censorship as a whole are compared with his philosophical ideas as they can be reconstructed from the surviving portions of his Laws , proving that he tried to remove discrepancies between Plato and himself. In the third part of the essay, the ideological reasons for this censorship are investigated, with a special focus on the relations between Pletho's manuscripts and some miscellaneous codices belonging to his students or circulating in the platonic milieu of Mystra.The stemma codicum drawn up by Müller can thus be understood in its deeper cultural meaning, i.e. as an outline enabling us to understand how the philosopher propagated his ideas and to follow where and how they were received. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question of whether gathering additional evidence is always rationally required, both from the point of view of instrumental rationality and of epistemic rationality. It is shown that in certain situations, it is not instrumentally rational to look for more evidence before making a decision. These are situations in which the risk of “misleading” evidence – a concept that has both instrumental and epistemic senses – is not offset by the gains from the possibility of non-misleading evidence. (...) These situations also undermine a particular argument for the claim that it is epistemically rational to look for more evidence, though it is argued that the relationship between instrumental and epistemic rationality makes such arguments flawed to begin with. Furthermore, these situations show us that our epistemic and our practical goals sometimes point us in different directions, not merely because of our limited resources or because our desires are sometimes best served by being in particular epistemic states, but because of the nature of rational action. (shrink)