L’envers de la psychanalyse, Séminaire XVII sur les quatre discours, est la réponse de Lacan aux événements de 1968. Son postulat est bien résumé par son détournement du célèbre graffiti anti-structuraliste lu sur les murs de Paris en 1968 : « Les structures ne marchent pas dans les rues ! »..

Expliciter un comportement, c’est spécifier les motifs de l’action. Ces motifs peuvent être rationnels ou non, conscients ou non, justes ou non, ce qui importe est non pas que soit spécifiée directement l’action effectuée par l’agent mais que soit explicitée la cause du choix de cette action, et donc, indirectement, que le soient les actions que..

The main task of the article is to propose a critical analyses of the thesis of François Flahault that homo oeconomicus – an abstract subject of the cleaved Western consciousness – is responsible of economism and its mischiefs. The author shows the positive aspects of Flahault's interpretation, but also his simplifications and errors, by traversing the historical backgrounds of the concept of homo oeconomicus leading to the sophisms of the new economic doxa and its erroneous values.

Malgré bien des réductions journalistiques, la rationalité économique fondée sur l’idée de l’homo oeconomicus – un individu atome qui maximise son propre intérêt à travers un calcul utilitariste de coûts et de profits – est aujourd’hui l’objet de nombreuses critiques. L’article analyse ainsi deux types de critiques : une critique externe et une critique interne. Les deux soulignent que pour comprendre la rationalité économique, nous avons besoin d’un horizon anthropologique plus vaste, apte à mettre en discussion l’image de l’homme (...) à l’œuvre dans les diverses déclinaisons de l’économie. L’article met alors l’accent sur les recherches de l’anthropologie philosophique portant sur la nature humaine, qui montrent le caractère intrinsèquement relationnel des êtres humains, et peut mettre en discussion l’individualisme méthodologique de l’homo oeconomicus. Finalement, en décrivant la rationalité en termes de rationalité, et en mettant l’accent sur la catégorie de biens relationnels développée par l’approche fondée sur « l’économie sociale », l’article met en avant une façon possible de repenser la rationalité économique. (shrink)

If POT (parieto-occipital-temporal junction) reorganization came earlier in australopithecines than in Homo, it is likely that the selective pressures were different, and not necessarily directed toward language. The brain endocast evidence for the POT in A. afarensis is actually better than it is for early Homo.

L’éthique gouvernementale s’est développée comme réflexion critique au cœur des institutions gouvernementales. L’auteur entend situer l’éthique gouvernementale dans ses rapports avec l’éthique sociale et l’éthique fondamentale après avoir défini ces notions. Au cœur de cette articulation, l’éthique gouvernementale se veut la gardienne de l’animal politique pour le respect du plus grand bonheur de tous et de chacun.

For quite a while homo religiosus has been marginalized and trivialized by homo techno-economicus, which gives more emphasis to the corporal and material dimensions of humanity. The negative effects of the techno-economicus paradigm engender the reemergence of homo ecologicus, which offers wisdom of life. Homo ecologicus has also been quite marginalized from the life of humanity. The reemergence of homo ecologicus, in turn, would give a new hope for the reemergence of the face of the (...) homo religiosus, because of its interrelated characteristics with the homo ecologicus. In fact, humans can be called homo eco-religiosus. The close tie between the two needs to be investigated more deeply with the help of philosophy. But, the philosophy we need is not just a Cartesian analytical philosophy, which means a merely intellectual exercise in the public domain. What we need is a philosophy as a philo sophia, love for wisdom, which will lead to an exercise of both feelings and soul in the private domain. Keywords: Homo techno-economicus (techno-economic humans), homo ecologicus (ecological humans), homo religiosus (religious humans), homo eco-religiosus (eco-religious humans), modernitas (modernitiy), religiositas (reli- giosity), filsafat (philosophy), cinta kebijaksanaan (love for wisdom), Henryk Skolimowski. (shrink)

Che relazione c’è tra capacità di ragionamento e felicità? Cos’è la democrazia, e perché dovremmo curarcene? Questo libro risponde a domande del genere, a partire da un’idea semplice e potente su cosa significa essere umani: l’idea che siamo costruttori, e che tra le cose che costruiamo ci sono le persone, le lingue, la capacità di pensare, gli obblighi morali, le istituzioni sociali e politiche. Insomma, ciò che è più importante per la nostra vita richiede un paziente lavoro di costruzione, e (...) di manutenzione. Questa costruzione di noi stessi, dell’ambiente e delle società in cui viviamo è guidata da processi simbolici e da pratiche linguistiche. Le pratiche linguistiche strutturano le nostre abitudini mentali: ci guidano nella soluzione di problemi, ci addestrano al pensiero, alla progettazione del futuro, alla mediazione tra i desideri individuali. L’educazione è l’insieme di questi processi di costruzione sociale del sé, orientata da entità linguistiche, da idee come “democrazia”, “felicità”, “bene comune” che sono a fondamento dell’identità personale e sociale. Filosofia e scienze cognitive ci aiutano a dare corpo a questa prospettiva, contro alcuni rischi attuali. In particolare, appare indispensabile recuperare l’idea di una “disciplina dell’attenzione”, strumento essenziale per trasformare il presente pieno di distrazioni in un presente denso di progetto. (shrink)

The article deals with a topic of the role of science in current society and focuses on the role of political economy. There has been a critical feedback to the fact that the social sciences subordinate themselves to the interests of power instead of looking for the models of healthy society. These models should correspond with the changes in the society and should not allow to be tied with unchanging paradigms and various ‘-isms‘. Political economy should deal with the topic (...) of human freedom and increasing social inequalities, which threaten the society. It is important to work with sustainable relationship of social-economical and natural environment and with the relationship of culture and nature.) It is a new way of understanding what production means and how the society should cope with it. It is not just about classic waste but also about negative externalities. The human cannot be reduced to ‘human resources‘ or ‘homo economicus‘. The emphasis is laid on humanity and taking human as an indivisible individual. The article emphasizes the importance of full responsibility preference over limited responsibility and preference of the individual and community over an economical corporation. The society cannot be reduced or administrated as an economical or accounting unit. Good governance includes taking care of reproduction, justice and safety. It is all about sufficiency, dignity and trust among people. The most important is the fight for human freedom and independent life, which is the meaning of itself. People who are free and can persist in such fight, which is held by a spirit of unity, are important but also more and more rare. Political economy should look for the possibilities how to follow up the Jewish-Christian tradition without the God. (shrink)

Stable adaptive strategy of Homo sapiens (SASH) is a result of the integration in the three-module fractal adaptations based on three independent processes of generation, replication, and the implementation of adaptations — genetic, socio-cultural and symbolic ones. The evolutionary landscape SASH is a topos of several evolutionary multi-dimensional vectors: 1) extraversional projective-activity behavioral intention (adaptive inversion 1), 2) mimesis (socio-cultural inheritance), 3) social (Machiavellian) intelligence, 4) the extension of inter-individual communication beyond their own social groups and their own species (...) in the rest of the world, 5) the symbolic system of communication (symbolic inheritance), 6) spiritualistic trans- formation of emotionally-shaped components of mentality, 7) the dominance of the rationalist thought mentality (enhancer of adaptive inverse 1), 8) a recursive distribution of projective-activity intentions on the man himself his genome, psyche and culture (Adaptive Inversion 2), 9) introversional reorientation of the vector of cognitive activity (adaptive inversion 3). (shrink)

The model of atonement presented in Anselm of Canterbury's Cur Deus Homo has aroused a host of worries from theologians. The gist of their criticism is that Anselm inscribes redemptive violence into theology and thus encourages passive acquiescence to abusive power structures or even licenses the violence of abusers. Some suggest that the way forward would be to jettison Anselm's account and develop alternatives that are not liable to the same abuses. This paper argues that while alternatives may be (...) desirable, Cur Deus Homo looms so large in theological imaginations as to defy jettisoning. We should instead try to perform better readings. This paper presents a close reading of this text as a monastic meditation on mortality oriented less toward resolving a problem of systematic theology than drawing readers into a renewed experience of devotion to God. To do that, Anselm works to rewrite the meaning of human mortality, making it less about the necessity of losing one's life and more about the possibility of a gift of death. The ethical paradigm that emerges is far from a complete moral vision, but is still more alluring than the one about which Anselm's contemporary critics worry. (shrink)

If species are the things that evolve at least in large part through the action of natural selection, then both genetic and phenotypic variability are essential to biological species. If all species are variable, then Homo sapiens must be variable. Hence, it is very unlikely that the human species as a biological species can be characterized by a set of invariable traits. It might be the case that at this moment in evolutionary history, all human beings happen to possess (...) a particular set of traits, but if so, this will be in large part an evolutionary accident. As a result, anyone who proposes to base anything, including ethics, on human nature is basing it on historical happenstance. (shrink)

L’article présente et analyse deux représentations de l’agent économique : celle de l’ homo œconomicus chez John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) puis celle de l’ animal laborans, expression que l’on trouve chez Hannah Arendt (1906-1975). Chacun des deux auteurs se situe en opposition à une conception de Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) qui identifie l’être humain à un agent économique, être rationnel, apte au calcul et au raisonnement logique pour son cas personnel mais qui n’est cependant pas un être raisonnable, c’est-à-dire susceptible (...) de vivre en harmonie avec les autres sans le couperet d’une législation qui borne sa liberté. Mill, en désaccord avec la conception du bonheur de Bentham, attribue à l’être économique des aspirations plus élevées, lesquelles seraient à même de se réaliser dans le futur, pourvu qu’une égalité politique authentique, notamment entre hommes et femmes, soit enfin établie. Arendt, née un siècle plus tard, s’inquiète, pour sa part, de la dégradation de l’image que l’être humain a de lui-même en s’identifiant à un animal laborans. Archétype de l’individu dont toutes les occupations se pensent sur le modèle d’une activité nécessaire à sa satisfaction personnelle, enfermé dans le privé de son corps, l’ animal laborans qui n’éprouve que des sensations, de la peine ou du plaisir, s’apparente tout à fait aux êtres insuffisants, non raisonnables, que Bentham avait en tête pour concevoir la législation comme un moyen de les faire vivre ensemble. Si l’on suit Arendt, il n’est pas exclu que la conception benthamienne de l’homme, contre laquelle Mill s’était élevé, puisse devenir la réalité de demain, autrement dit que le règne de l’ animal laborans, être esseulé, ayant perdu jusqu’au besoin de guider lui-même sa propre conduite à l’égard des autres puisse finir par s’imposer. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 36.3 (2003) 207-222 [Access article in PDF] Burke Contra Kierkegaard:Kenneth Burke's Dialectic via Reading Søren Kierkegaard G. L. Ercolini Isaac—to his children Lived to tell the tale— Moral—with a Mastiff Manners may prevail. —Emily Dickinson Kenneth Burke employs the term dialectic throughout his works and yet, despite its profuse recurrence, the term remains ambiguous. Much secondary scholarship has focused on Burke and dialectics, and still the (...) term in Burke remains—if not already complicated—cloudy. 1 Part of the difficulty regarding this term stems from Burke's own ambiguity; another part from critics' tendency to rely on Burke's own use and definitions for clarification of this concept. The arguments have been helpful and illuminating, yet Burke's dialectic can be further clarified by going beyond what Burke means by the term by focusing on how he deploys dialectical criticism in his own work. 2 This article focuses on Burke's appropriation of the existential thinker Søren Kierkegaard as a particularly clear and remarkable instance of the operation of Burke's dialectic in his criticism. I maintain that although Burke's reading of Kierkegaard is arguably a misreading, his strategic appropriation of Kierkegaard in A Rhetoric of Motives (1950) not only serves as a clear deployment of the dialectic, but also functions as a foil against which Burke defines his own critical method. Burke's reading of Kierkegaard emphasizes the function of resolution in Burke's critical project.The current literature, although quite informative, does not put Burke's dialectic in sharp focus. Rueckert argues that Burkean dialectics "is really a branch of what Burke was to later call logology, the study of words, of language, of symbol systems" (1994, 14). Heath claims that dialectic "is an analytical tool to help us diagnose perspectives so that we can [End Page 207] examine whether they make sense and consider their implications for social relations" (1986, 162). Crusius contends that, "dialectic for Burke is the study of verbal universes, the disinterested pursuit of a vocabulary's implications" (1986, 24). While Brummett and Crusius show similarity between Hegel's and Burke's dialectic, Heath and Wess distinguish Burke's dialectic from Hegelian idealism and teleological history respectively. 3 Most of the arguments concerning Burke and dialectic focus on "The Dialectic of Constitutions" in A Grammar of Motives (1969), while A Rhetoric of Motives (1962), where Burke identifies humankind as homo dialecticus, is hardly engaged with regard to this concept. 4 Burke's working through Kierkegaard in A Rhetoric of Motives demonstrates Burke's dialectical criticism—thus providing an operational account of Burke's dialectic—and allows for his revelation of the three motives in the realm of rhetoric: the Order, the Secret, and the Kill. 5 And yet, despite this centrality of Fear and Trembling, surprisingly little has been said about Burke's Kierkegaard beyond passing mention. 6Despite editorial advice to the opposite regarding an article that would later become a part of the book, Burke evidently regarded his reading of Kierkegaard as important. Joseph Bennett, editor of Hudson Review, responded as follows to Burke's 1948 submission of the article entitled "Imagery of Killing": "I would like to request that you eliminate Kierkegaard from the article in question, confining it simply to literary exegesis and excluding the philosopher theologian." 7 Although he complied for the article, Burke retained his reading of Kierkegaard in A Rhetoric of Motives. Despite the lack of attention given to it, Burke's engagement with Kierkegaard clearly demonstrates how Burke views ethical criticism as that which resolves opposition, negation, and paradox to a higher order. Burke contra Kierkegaard The section entitled "Order" in A Rhetoric of Motives contains a detailed, twenty-three-page discussion of Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling. In this discussion, Burke primarily attacks Kierkegaard for encouraging what Burke enigmatically and elliptically identifies as the "cult of the Kill."Burke's portrayal of Kierkegaard is hardly flattering: at the crescendo of his analysis in A Rhetoric of Motives he claims that thinking such as Kierkegaard... (shrink)

Malusa, L. Le origini moderne della storia della filosofia.--Tombolato, V. La "crisi" della filosofia della storia.--Piaia, G. Marsilio da Padova e Lutero.--Marcolungo, F. Principi e sistema: saggio sui rapporti Wolff-Leibniz.--Micheli, G. Il pensiero politico di Kant.--Snichelotto, G. Il pragmatismo irrazionalistico di G. Papini.--Accame, L. L'Ecce homo e il ritorno del linguaggio.--Sbisa, M. Metalinguaggio e atti linguistici.--Leonardi, P. Tre tipi di filosofia del linguaggio.--Rosada, G. I metodi della deduzione naturale.

The humanitarian thought did not encounter such challenges that we face today. Biotechnologies outline the perspectives of “posthuman” personology, while digitalization and robotization of almost all spheres of social practice bring to the fore the idea of homodicy – justifying the need for human existence. The article analyzes four blocks of challenges to humanitarian knowledge: (1) achievements in medicine, prosthetics, transplantology and genetic engineering, which outlined the separation of a sentient subject from traditional anthropomorphism (“posthuman” personology); (2) studies of the (...) brain neurophysiology, which advanced new arguments against free will; (3) costs of ill-considered propaganda of human rights; (4) digitization of almost all socio-cultural practices – from economics and military affairs to the formation and functioning of authority. Digitalization permeates all these “problematization fields,” setting their common conceptual and technological platform. In this regard, the question arises of the humanitarian expertise of modern technologies and the projects of education, communication and management, which implemented with their help. That expertise deals with not only the consequences, progress or even the possibility of implementing such projects, but also with their necessity. The focus and criteria of such expertise are important. Obviously, it cannot be directed only at the preservation of the biological species of homo sapiens and the conditions of its survival. Paradoxical choice arises in a situation where freedom and free will are questioned: which is more important – homo or sapiens? It is time for a clear distinction between the concepts of humanism and humanitarianism, including in the latter the posthuman personology. If humanitarianism is a personology of free spirit, then humanism seems to have a place next to economism and nationalism as forms of confined humanitarianism. This wide range of problems requires comprehension not only of their content but also of the methodology of the humanities and of the prospects of the humanities in modern society. (shrink)

It has long been claimed that Homo sapiens is the only species that has language, but only recently has it been recognized that humans also have an unusual pattern of growth and development. Social mammals have two stages of pre-adult development: infancy and juvenility. Humans have two additional prolonged and pronounced life history stages: childhood, an interval of four years extending between infancy and the juvenile period that follows, and adolescence, a stage of about eight years that stretches from (...) juvenility to adulthood. We begin by reviewing the primary biological and linguistic changes occurring in each of the four pre-adult ontogenetic stages in human life history. Then we attempt to trace the evolution of childhood and juvenility in our hominin ancestors. We propose that several different forms of selection applied in infancy and childhood; and that, in adolescence, elaborated vocal behaviors played a role in courtship and intrasexual competition, enhancing fitness and ultimately integrating performative and pragmatic skills with linguistic knowledge in a broad faculty of language. A theoretical consequence of our proposal is that fossil evidence of the uniquely human stages may be used, with other findings, to date the emergence of language. If important aspects of language cannot appear until sexual maturity, as we propose, then a second consequence is that the development of language requires the whole of modern human ontogeny. Our life history model thus offers new ways of investigating, and thinking about, the evolution, development, and ultimately the nature of human language. (shrink)

Beads and other ‘body ornaments’ are very widespread components of the archaeological record of early modern humans (Homo sapiens). They appear first in the Middle Stone Age in Africa, and somewhat later in the Early Upper Paleolithic of Eurasia. The manufacture and use of ornaments is widely considered to be evidence for significant developments in human cognition. In our view, the appearance of these objects represents the interaction of evolved cognitive capacities with changing social and demographic conditions. Body ornamentation (...) is a medium or technology for communication, particularly of socially-relevant information. The widespread adoption of beads and other discrete objects as media for communication implies changes in the complexity and stability of social messages, as well as the scale of social networks. The relatively sudden appearance of beads in the Paleolithic archaeological record coincides with genetic and archaeological evidence for expansion of human populations. We argue that these changes reflect expanding scales of social interaction and more complex social landscapes resulting from unprecedentedly large and internally differentiated human populations. (shrink)

Ayant depuis son premier livre exploré son hypothèse d'une naissance de notre langage articulé, humain, à partir de l'expérience de la mort d'autrui comme autre soi-même, Gérard Bucher expose dans un dernier ouvrage les raisons des travaux d'une vie entière. La poésie, pour Bucher, c'est ce qui reste (et qui, ainsi, nous est légué, génération après génération), d'une scène (ou archiscène) au cours de laquelle rien de moins que les clés de notre humanité nous sont données. Dans Homo divinans, (...) complété et relu avant sa disparition fin 2018, le philosophe nous propose les raisons pour lesquelles la poésie demeure notre avenir, dans et malgré nos temps difficultueux."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

No detailed description available for "L'Antéchrist suivi de Ecce Homo".

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Contradiction and Legislation Regarding the Right to LifeKevin L. Flannery, S.J.Unborn Human Life and Fundamental Rights: Leading Constitutional Cases under Scrutiny. Edited by Pilar Zambrano and William Saunders, with concluding reflections by John Finnis. Berlin: Peter Lang, 2019.The most fundamental principle of law is the principle of non-contradiction. This is Thomas Aquinas's position in the seminal article on the natural law, Summa theologiae I-II, question 94, article 2, where, (...) citing Aristotle, he formulates the principle as, "One should not simultaneously affirm and negate." Lafter in the same article, Thomas offers a practical formulation of the same principle, "Good is to be done and pursued and evil avoided"; but in law, since it is contained in propositions (airmations and negations) as distinct from ideas regarding the pursuit of goods, the prior formulation is the more immediately relevant of the two.The book under review is important in that, by going through the legal history regarding abortion and related issues in a number of different countries—the United States, Canada, Italy, Spain, Poland, Ireland (Eire), Costa Rica, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Peru—it causes to emerge any number of times the realization that legislation and judicial decisions in favor of abortion "rights" invariably infect a legal system with contradictions and inconsistencies of various sorts. The present essay is, therefore, not your typical book review. Its objective is simply to list some of the legal contradictions and inconsistencies identified by the book's various authors as they describe the legal status of the unborn in their respective nations. [End Page 1323]William Saunders's very clear and comprehensive first chapter is entitled, "Judicial Interference in the Protection of Human Life in the United States: Actions and Consequences." In it, he describes, among other things, the Human Cloning Prohibition Act passed by the U.S. House of Representatives in 2003, which prohibited "any person or entity, public or private" from performing human cloning (23). He speaks also of a bill proposed in the U.S. Senate once the Human Cloning Prohibition Act had passed in the House of Representatives. This Senate bill (which was entitle, "The Human Cloning Ban and Stem Cell Research Protection Act") would have prohibited "any person or other legal entity" from conducting human cloning, even while allowing nuclear transplantation, which it defines as "transferring the nucleus of a human somatic cell into an oocyte from which the nucleus... ha[s] been... removed or rendered inert." The problem here, as Saunders explains, is that this latter definition "is the very definition of cloning" (25). In other words, in the same year, two pieces of legislation were considered in the Congress of the United States, both purporting to ban human cloning, one of which would have permitted what the other described (correctly) as human cloning and so prohibited.In the second chapter, "Whither United States Abortion Law?" by Gerard V. Bradley, discussed, among other things, is the inconsistency between the United States Supreme Court's pro-abortion decision Roe v. Wade and various laws, both state and federal, prohibiting feticide. Bradley says of the 2004 federal Unborn Victims of Violence Act that, "in pertinent part it says that 'whoever' 'causes the death of or bodily injury to,' a 'child who is in utero' is guilty of an offense apart from any accompanying offense against the woman carrying the child." The penalty for such an act is the same as would be imposed if the act were inflicted upon the unborn child's mother: if, for instance, the mother was killed. "A child in utero," reports Bradley, "is defined as a member of the species homo sapiens, at any stage of development, who is carried in the womb'" (37).The problem here is that prosecutable under this law are acts identical with those performed legally by abortionists. Bradley mentions two cases in which a woman's male partner—in one case the woman's husband—effected by stealth the abortion of her child. In one case, the male purchased abortion pills and affixed to their container a pharmacy label indicating that it contained a common antibiotic; in the other, the husband obtained the same type of... (shrink)

This essay by Giorgio Agamben is based on a lecture given in central France in the summer of 2013. Responding directly to recent occupations and insurrections – from Cairo and Istanbul to London and New York City – Agamben builds upon his existing work in order to develop and clarify his understanding of the political, and in particular, the notion of destituent power. In contrast to attempts to affirm a constituent power independent of a relation to constituted power, which for (...) Agamben both reproduce the governmental structure of the exception and represent the apex of metaphysics, destituent power outlines a force that, in its very elaboration, deactivates the governmental machine. For Agamben, it is in the sensible elaboration of the belonging together of life and form, being and action, beyond all relation, that the impasse of the present will be overcome. Ultimately, Agamben points not only towards what it means to be ungovernable, but the potential of staying so. (shrink)

To explain the menstrual cycle and menopause, human biologists during the past several decades have developed new models of the evolutionary origins and maintenance of female reproductive patterns that address both ultimate and proximate causation. Hypotheses proposed for these processes generally offer explanations for menstruation or for menopause, but not for both; ultimately, these explanations must be integrated. Reviewing current explanations, this paper offers an energetics-based evolutionary rationale compatible with past adaptations of Homo sapiens and with ecological patterns in (...) small-scale, preindustrial social systems in which food resources vary and sometimes are scarce. (shrink)

Bien que la dichotomie classique homme/animal continue de sous-tendre la pensée scientifique occidentale, la génétique moléculaire prouve que les humains sont bien plus proches des chimpanzés et des bonobos que ne pouvaient le supposer les chercheurs en se fondant seulement sur l’évidence anatomique, il y a quelques décennies. Le degré de similitude de l’ADN entre humains, bonobos et chimpanzés autorise à nous classer tous trois comme espèces-sœurs. Ce qui signifie, aussi étrange que cela pui..

This article reads Cherokee academic/author Thomas King’s “The One About Coyote Going West” and Okanagan writer Jeannette Armstrong’s “This is a Story” to question whether these Aboriginal creation tales subvert the referential race codes and the kinds of hierarchical exclusion that take place in Caucasian discourses about Homo sapiens. To do so, it draws links between Slavoj Zizek’s post identity theories, and post-colonial and Indigenous literary and nationalist epistemologies, to challenge the implications of how the Coyote narratives transformation the (...) hegemony, or “the big Other.”. (shrink)

Aus dem Zusammentreffen der Philosophischen Anthropologie mit der interdisziplinären Rhetorikforschung sind heute zwei neue komplementäre Tochterdisziplinen entstanden. Die eine ist die fundamentalrhetorische Anthropologie, welche den Menschen generell als homo rhetoricus definiert. Die andere klärt als rhetorische Metakritik die Philosophie selbst über ihre eigene, immanente Rhetorizität auf. Der vorliegende Band präsentiert exemplarische Beiträge zu diesem neuen rhetorischen Denken in zwei Teilen. Der erste enthält unter dem Titel „Zur Philosophie der Rhetorik“ die Arbeiten zur fundamentalrhetorischen Anthropologie. Ausgehend von grundlegenden Thesen zur (...) Homo-rhetoricus-Anthropologie behandeln sie Themen wie z.B. Pithanologie, Pathelogie, Polypersonalität, Anthropotechnik, Autoinvenienz oder die Rekonstruktion des Subjektbegriffes durch interne Rhetorik. Der zweite Teil „Zur Rhetorik der Philosophie“ umfasst die Beiträge, welche der rhetorischen Metakritik der Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte zuzurechnen sind. Hier finden sich u.a. Abhandlungen zur Topographie der klassischen Metaphysik und ihren sophistischen und pararhetorischen Gegenspielern sowie metakritische Detailstudien zu Pseudo-Longin, Kant, Hegel, Fichte und Heidegger. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Will to Power in Nietzsche’s Published Works and the NachlassLinda L. WilliamsIt is universally acknowledged by scholars of Nietzsche’s work that will to power is one of the most important notions in Nietzsche’s writings, but strangely, like the other “central” notions of eternal recurrence and the Übermensch, there are relatively few aphorisms in either the published or unpublished material that include the term. In the case of will to (...) power, however, Nietzsche promises in a footnote in On the Genealogy of Morals to discuss and explore the notion of will to power in a book entitled The Will to Power. 1 Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, among others, have argued persuasively that Nietzsche abandoned this project. 2 Nevertheless, the phrase “will to power” remains the most notorious feature of Nietzsche’s philosophy, probably due to its unfortunate and mistaken connections with the Third Reich. As Walter Kaufmann notes, the notion of will to power did not “spring fully formed from Nietzsche’s brow like Pallas Athena.” 3 This was an idea that evolved over time. This paper examines both the published and his unpublished writings (the Nachlass) to gain a better understanding of how this important phrase developed.The Nachlass can be divided roughly into three different kinds of work. 4 The first kind is comprised of the works Nietzsche was editing right before his collapse. These works are Ecce Homo, Nietzsche Contra Wagner, and The Antichrist, and they were so polished that we can safely take them as [End Page 447] equal in status to the works that Nietzsche had already published or, like Twilight of the Idols, were being published at the time of his collapse. The second kind are Nietzsche’s early, finished pieces that were never published, the so-called Schriften, primarily his lectures and writings while he was employed at Basel. These pieces are presumably complete and polished, although Nietzsche chose not to publish them, but they do not affect this inquiry, since will to power was a relatively late concept for Nietzsche.The third kind of work consists of Nietzsche’s notes, which vary from sentence fragments or single sentences to sketchy outlines of various projects to several long paragraphs in essay form. Nietzsche’s notebooks looked like anyone’s notebook, with passages lined out, words jotted in the margins, and overwriting. Some of the entries in the Nachlass can be found with only minor revisions in the books Nietzsche had published, and since he painstakingly recopied his books in his neatest handwriting right before he sent them to his editor, these strikingly similar entries are most probably the penultimate copy drafts of the published aphorisms.The writings that did not find their way into publication in any form are problematic. Are they rough drafts of some future work which Nietzsche was unable to complete due to his illness? If so, some of these controversial notes would have been waiting for years. Are they ideas that Nietzsche entertained but ultimately rejected? If so, we should not place them on par with the ideas in his published works. Even if we consider these notes rough drafts of future works, it remains unclear whether we should consider what is written in these notes to be as indicative of what Nietzsche thought as the works he authorized for publication. Sometimes what is written in the unpublished notes on a particular topic is very different from what is written on that topic in the published works. Bernd Magnus made this kind of case against the Nachlass notes concerning eternal recurrence, 5 and I want to make a similar claim about the notes concerning will to power. Reviewing the Nachlass notes in conjunction with the published aphorisms will give us a better understanding of how the published and unpublished notes differ.The term “will to power” (Wille zur Macht) first appeared in publication in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. 6 In the aphorism “On 1001 Goals” Nietzsche describes a people’s tablets of good and bad as the voice of its will to power. Wille zur Macht appears in only two more aphorisms in the course of this long work, in “On Self-Overcoming” and in... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:LITERAL AND METAPHORICAL USES OF DISCOURSE IN THE REPRESENTATION OF GOD IN HIS SEMINAL work on the theory of signs, Charles Morris affirms that human beings are " the dominant sign-using animals" and that" the human mind is inseparable from the functioning of signs-if indeed mentality is not to be identified with such functioning." 1 By means of acculturation we learn to use and interpret signs, both linguistic and (...) non-linguistic; and by virtue of these capacities we can appropriately designate the human animal as homo symbolicus, homo loquens, and homo sapiens. Indeed, all forms of human culture presuppose the ability to use and interpret signs, including that form of human culture which leads us to speak of ourselves as homo religious. Over the years I have come to understand and speak of religion as a community with its cultus. There is the community, be it triba1, national, or universal with its polity or structure and ongoing history; and there is the cultus with its organic system of linguistic and nonlinguistic signs, encompassing ·such elements as stories, creeds, scriptures, doctrines, theologies, confessions, prayers, chants, songs, rites, rituals, sacraments, artifacts, etc. Like any other cultural system, scheme or network of signs one can characterize a religious cultus as an inter -subjective set of signs whose usage is determined by the implicit or explicit rules that govern the relations of signs to each other; the relations of the signs to the objects which the signs designate or denote, or stand for in some way; and the relations of signs to the users or interpreters of these signs and to those who are affected by these signs in some way. 1 Charles W. Morris, FoundatioJi of the Theory of Signs, in International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vol. I, No. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939), p. L 6~7 628 WILLIAM L. POWER: Given this understanding of community and cultus, one can describe a religion as an organized group of socially interdependent human beings which uses or employs ·a system of linguistic and nonlinguistic signs to represent reality in its various modalities and mixtures of good and evil and to affect human ways of life on the basis of that representation. Altering the terminology somewhat, one could say that a religious community uses its cultus to proclaim, enact, and display a comprehensive worldview.and to form and tr:msform the ethospathos of human beings in their solidarity and solitude. Expressed semiotically, there is the system of signs of a particular community, the intended signification of these signs, and the significance of these signs for those who use and are affected by them. What distinguishes a religion from other forms of human culture is that a rel·igious cultuml sy•stem or a religious community with its cultus is primarily concerned with ultimate or supreme reality or with that which is divine, holy, or sacred and that reality's bearing on and relevance for human life and well-being. In short, a religion is a cultural system which functions to map the whole of re.ality and to acculturate in desirable ways or to civilize. If a religion is a cultural system, then one can identify three distinct yet inseparably related dimensions of every religion. There is 1) the cultural dimension consisting of the interrelruted signs, symbols and expressions of a cultus; 2) the reality and value dimension consisting of the ontological and axiological purport of the cultus; and 3) the experiential dimension consisting of the existential import of the cultus. It is this thioo dimension which has led many in the past and in the present to speak of religion as piety, consciousness of things divine, ultimate concern, religiousness, etc. In the tradition of Peircian semiotics, one can speak of these three dimensions as the syntactic, semantic, and praigmatic dimensions of a religion; and they can be analyzed and studied with the aid of syntactics or syntax, semantics, and pr:agmatics, which as a unity LITERAL AND METAPHORICAL USES OF DISCOURSE 629 constitute the discipline of semiotics. As Peirce recognized, modem semiotics is continuous with the Medieval trivium of grammar, logic, and rhetoric-the semiotics of almost a millennium a;go... (shrink)

In recent decades, more and more works have appeared, the authors of which are trying to predict possible scenarios for the future development of mankind. This article discusses 5 such scenarios: F. Fukuyama believes that all peoples and countries of the globe in the XXI century will develop in the direction of building a liberal-democratic society; Representatives of the Club of Rome in their latest report, based on statistical data of industrial development, substantiate the idea that by the middle of (...) the XXI century. the Earth’s biosphere will become unsuitable for human life and humanity will begin to die out; representatives of the transhumanist movement in their “Manifesto” set themselves the goal of replacing the human biological body with an artificial body by 1245 and thereby saving people from diseases, from old age and even from death itself; English economist D. Susskind in his book “The Future Without Jobs” predicts that in the next two to three decades, robots and artificial intelligence will force people out of all areas of production and discusses the question of how people who are deprived of the opportunity to work will live; Finally, the Israeli historian Yu.N. Harari in his extensive work “Homo Deus” paints a picture of the fact that scientific and technological progress will turn “reasonable man” into “divine man” in the near future. Assessing all these scenarios for the future development of mankind, one involuntarily comes to the conclusion that they all speak of the death of mankind in the near future. (shrink)