The struggle over legal abortion access in the United States is a religious controversy, not a scientific debate. Religious activists who believe that meaningful individual life (i.e., “personhood”) begins at a specific “moment-of-conception” are attempting to pass laws that force this view upon all pregnant persons, irrespective of their medical circumstances, individual preferences, or personal religious beliefs. This paper argues that such actions promote a constitutionally prohibited “establishment of religion.” Abortion policy in a secular state must be based upon scientifically (...) accurate biology, not unprovable theological presuppositions. The scientific facts regarding human pregnancy do not support the position that personhood begins with fertilization—at which point a pregnancy does not yet even exist. Abortion policy should regard the embryo/fetus as part of the pregnant individual’s body until delivery. We argue that individual “personhood” only begins when the _latent_ potentialities of the fetal nervous system are _actualized_ in the newborn after delivery. The paper argues that instantiating non-scientific beliefs concerning embryonic/fetal “personhood” into the law as the basis for abortion policy establishes a state-sponsored religion. The protection of religious liberty requires that abortion be decriminalized. Abortion should be treated like any other medical procedure and regulated similarly. To protect both religious freedom and sound medical practice, individual legal personhood should be recognized as beginning only at birth. (shrink)

Conceptions of autonomy in western philosophy and ethics have often centred on self-governance and self-determination. However, a growing bulk of literature also questions such conceptions, including the understanding of the autonomous self as a self-governing independent individual that chooses, acts, and lives in accordance with her or his own values, norms, or sense of self. This article contributes to the critical interrogation of selfhood, autonomy, and autonomous decision making by combining a feminist focus on relational dimensions of selfhood and autonomy (...) with phenomenological philosophy of the embodied self as being-in-the-world. It offers a philosophical investigation of different dimensions of bodily relational autonomy by turning to phenomenological accounts of the lived body as self-reflexive. When so doing, we hope to contribute to bridging the gap that sometimes exists between discussions of autonomy in analytic moral philosophy and of freedom and facticity in phenomenological philosophy. We see this gap as unfortunate, and hold that a nuanced understanding of autonomy and autonomous decision making can be reached if these strands of philosophy are brought into dialogue. (shrink)

What is the identity of the best regime in Aristotle's Politics? Although there are a few references to the best regime in Book III, the obvious answer is the regime discussed in Books VII and VIII. Aristotle calls it the best regime on numerous occasions and discusses it at great length. Yet, this is not the complete answer. In Book IV Aristotle makes certain curious remarks on the best regime that, on examination, do not fit the best regime of Books (...) VII and VIII. They lead, instead, to the discovery of a systematic, though quiet, teaching on a very different best regime in Book III. The Politics actually contains a complicated yet coherent teaching on two best regimes. Grasping this teaching is key to arriving at a proper understanding of the distinctive character of Aristotle's political thought. (shrink)

Elwyn Richardson’s experimental approach to teaching and learning and Oruaiti was officially sanctioned, but the history of education in Aotearoa/new Zealand shows that teachers have been typically conformist. In this article, I suggest that positivist paradigms from the industrial age continue to shape classroom teaching, partly because of norms of individualism, and partly because neoliberal understandings have become central in the functioning of our schools and society. Teaching is an activity that promotes the ethics of a community or society by (...) promulgating some ideas and marginalising others. In Aotearoa/new Zealand, many of our students struggle with the collective orientation of their community traditions and the societal emphasis on individualism. Modernist beliefs in social progress through technology still permeate education policy. Promoting communitarian understandings requires more open-ended approaches to teaching such as Richardson demonstrated. With digital technologies gaining progressively greater influence in schools, the opportunities for social connectedness have been enhanced alongside an increasing emphasis on individual devices. This article briefly explores interconnections between experimentation, context and community. (shrink)

"(...) Felsefeye ilişkin Arapça ve Fransızca bazı eserleri mütalaa ettiğim sırada felsefi terimlerin bu iki dilde tesadüf ettiğim karşılıklarını bir mecmuaya kaydetmiştim. Bunların perişan bir halde kalmasına ve sarfettiğim emeğin bu şekilde heder olmasına gönlüm razı olmadı. Gerçekten de bu konuda sarfedilen mesai öyle pek kolay feda edilecek bir şey değildi. Çünkü bu işe en evvel, felsefeyi İbn Bâcce'nin en seçkin öğrencilerinden tahsil etmiş olan meşhur Musevi hakîm Ebû İmrân Musa bin Meymun'un Delâletü'l-Hâirîn başlıklı eserinden başlamış idim. Bu kitap İbrani (...) harfleriyle, Arap dili üzere yazılmış olduğundan felsefeye ait fasıllarının Fransızca tercümesiyle tatbikinde pek ziyade güçlük çekmiş idim. Bu eser Avrupaca Guide des Égarés başlığıyla tanınıp, mütekellimlerin mezhebi hakkında en önemli bilgi kaynağı sayılmıştır. Bunu müteakiben, bir taraftan Aristoteles'in bazı eserlerini ve diğer taraftan İbn Rüşd'ün bunlardan iktibâsen yazdığı Telhîsât'ı, Kütübhâne-i Hidivî'den istinsâh ettirerek mütalaa ettim. Sonra da Şehristânî'nin Kitâbü'l-Milel ve'n-Nihal'i, Zevzenî'nin Muhtasar Târîh-i Hukemâ'sı, Fârâbî ile İbn Sînâ'nın bazı eserleri, Ebû Abdullâh el-Kâtib'in Mefâtîhu'l-Ulûm'u, İbnu'n-Nedîm Bağdâdî'nin Kitâbü'l-Fihrist'i gibi Avrupa'da basılmış birtakım nadir kitapları ve diğer birçok mantık kitaplarını gözden geçirerek, bunlardan her ne buldumsa aldım. Bu şekilde cem ettiğim kelimeler ve tabirler büyücek bir mecmua teşkil etmiş ise de bunlar mantık ve eski felsefeye ait olduğundan yeni terimlerin de karşılıklarını bulmak lazım geldi. Bu noksanı da âcizâne kütüphanemde mevcut lûgat kitaplarından Fransız ve İngiliz ve Arap ve Fars dillerine ait olan kamuslara müracaat ederek ve bunlarla maksadın temini mümkün olamadığı halde kelimelerin etimolojik anlamlarına nazaran birer tabir bulmak suretiyle mümkün mertebe ikmal etmek üzere bu Lûgatçe'nin tertip ve tanzimine başladım. Ve Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie başlığıyla yayınlanmakta olan süreli yayının bazı numaralarında, 1904 senesinden beri yer almış ve bu kere son bulmuş ise de henüz ayrıca kitap şeklinde toplanmamış olan Yeni Felsefe Lûgatçesi'ni başlıca kaynak kabul ederek, buna dâhil edilmiş olan yeni terimlerin hemen hepsini aldım. E. Goblot'nun Felsefe Lûgatçesi'yle diğer lûgatçelerde mananın açıklık kazanmasına hizmet ediyor gördüğüm özet bilgileri de ait oldukları kelimelere ilave ettim. Kısacası bu naçiz eser, diğer lûgatlerin hiçbirine henüz geçmemiş olan yeni felsefe terimlerinden başka felsefeyle ilgili olan tıp bilimine ve sosyal ve ekonomik bilimlere ait bir hayli kelimeleri de içermektedir. Bununla beraber âcizâne eserimin pek noksan olduğunu ve ancak ilim ve irfan erbabının tashih kalemleri için hazırlanmış bir müsveddecik teşkil edebileceğini itiraf ederim. Yegâne emelim mütalaa erbabına naçizâne bir hizmette bulunarak hayır ile yâd olunmaya hak kazanmaktan ibaret olduğundan görülecek hataların iyi niyetime bağışlanacağı ümidindeyim". İsmail Fenni Ertuğrul. (shrink)

This article explores the relations between Leibniz and the French erudite Pierre-Daniel Huet in the context of their shared anti-Cartesianism. After an introductory survey of the available commentaries and primary texts, I focus on a publication by Leibniz in the Journal des sçavans from 1693, where he fully endorses the critique of Descartes developed by Huet in his 1689 Censura philosophiae cartesianae. Next, I provide some indications as to Leibniz’s motivations behind this public approval of Huet. First, I show how (...) Leibniz throughout the 1690s was attempting to have his 1692 Animadversiones in partem generalem Principiorum Cartesianorum and other anti-Cartesian items annexed to a reedition of Huet’s Censura. I finally show how these attempts to team up with Huet were prompted by Leibniz’s dislike of certain German Cartesians, in particular J. E. Schweling, and by his fear that orthodox Cartesianism might do irremediable damage to the intellectual ethics of the Republic of Letters. (shrink)

Conference held June 1990 under the auspices of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

In a recent article in this journal, Heidi Giannini (2017) has argued that the Christian doctrines of love and of hope require Christians to endorse universal, unconditional forgiveness, understood in terms of the renunciation of “negative reactive attitudes.” She also addresses criticisms of this interpretation. It is argued that Giannini has failed to provide a Christian justification for universal, unconditional forgiveness. Part of the problem is that she espouses a definition of forgiveness and an understanding of the nature of forgiveness (...) that, as a result of neglecting the teaching of the New Testament, exhibits a number of incoherencies and theological weaknesses. Her account is also vulnerable to philosophical and moral criticisms of a serious nature. (shrink)

As an empirical example of introspective conditions in which the normal sense of self is disrupted, the delusion of thought insertion is of special interest to philosophers investigating the epistemic and phenomenological structures of introspection. A common strategy is to use immunity to error through misidentification as a tool with which to pick apart the implications of thought insertion for our understanding of the faculty of introspection. In this paper I turn that strategy on its head: I draw on our (...) understanding of introspection and of thought insertion to make two correctives to the literature on immunity to error through misidentification. The first is the identification of a formal distinction between two phenomena sometimes conflated under the rubric of misidentification errors. The second is a weakening of the presumed significance of claims to immunity to error through misidentification. With these tightenings to the notion of immunity to error through misidentification in hand, we will be in a better position to turn again to questions about the epistemic and phenomenological nature of introspection. (shrink)

The practice of covertly administering medications to patients without their consent is often discussed in the framework of legal questions around the right of patients to consent and refuse medical treatment. However, this practice also raises significant questions surrounding the professional duties and obligations of health care professionals as it relates to the decision-making process of whether to engage in the covert administration of medications. In this paper, I present an overview of the origin of those duties and obligations, and (...) discuss how those duties and obligations when seen from different perspectives may either justify or prohibit the practice. Further, I discuss whether the duties and obligations of health care professionals as they are currently framed are suited to address the complexities of this issue both from the health care professional and patient perspectives. This analysis is conducted in the context of duties and obligations that arise from not only legal framework but also from the ethical requirements from professional codes of ethics. (shrink)

Commentators onEpode11 generally begin by comparing the opening couplet with Archilochus (frg. 215 West): κα⋯ μ' οὔτ' ἰ⋯μβων οὔτε τερπωλ⋯ων μ⋯λει, and sometimes also Catullus 68. 1–40. In both of these the poet explains that grief at the death of a loved one has expelled all desire to compose verses. According to the comparison, Horace, in 1–2, is stating that the onset of love (‘amore percussum gravi’, 2) has, similarly, so absorbed his attention that he cannot write verse. The translation (...) will then run ‘Pettius, I have no pleasure any longer in writing verse, smitten as I am with a heavy love’. (shrink)

In The Souls of Black Folk, W.E.B. Du Bois introduces double consciousness as a result of racial prejudice and oppression. Explained as a state of confliction felt by black Americans, Du Bois presents double consciousness as integral to understanding the black experience. Later philosophers question the importance of double consciousness to current race discussions, but this paper contends that double consciousness provides valuable insights into black and white relations. To do this, I will utilize the modern slang term, “Oreo,” to (...) highlight how a perceived incompatibility between blacks and whites could prevent America from achieving a greater unity. (shrink)

On this episode of The Owl, Lauren Ware sits down with host Ian Olasov to talk about how fear and other emotions shape our understanding of risk, about what fear is and when it's rational, and about why Halloween is a thing.

It has been pointed out to me that in my article on ‘The Augustan Rules for Dactylic Verse’ I misrepresented an observation of Maas as reported by Wilamowitz in his Griechische Verskunst, p. 53. Wilamowitz' words are: ‘Wenn Tibull und Ovid den Pentameter so bauen, dass die vorletzte Silbe betont wird, tun sie das nach dem Vorgange gleichzeitiger griechischer Epigrammatiker.’ This means, of course, that the Greek writers mentioned ended with a paroxytone word, not necessarily with a disyllable, as I (...) assumed it to mean, and I apologize for the oversight. (shrink)