This paper argues that phenomenal consciousness is what makes an entity a welfare subject. I develop a variety of motivations for this view, and then defend it from objections concerning death, non-conscious entities that have interests (such as plants), and conscious entities that necessarily have welfare level zero. I also explain how my theory of welfare subjects relates to experientialist and anti-experientialist theories of welfare goods.

I develop and defend a sense-datum theory of perception. My theory follows the spirit of classic sense-datum theories: I argue that what it is to have a perceptual experience is to be acquainted with some sense-data, where sense-data are private particulars that have all the properties they appear to have, that are common to both perception and hallucination, that constitute the phenomenal characters of perceptual experiences, and that are analogous to pictures inside one’s head. But my theory also diverges from (...) conventional sense-datum theories in some key respects: on my view, (1) sense-data are first-person presentations of neural states, (2) the sensational qualities of sense-data differ in kind from the sensible qualities of external objects, and (3) sense-data are the vehicles in virtue of which we perceive, rather than the objects that we perceive. I argue that this package of claims is appropriately labeled ‘sense-datum theory’, and that the resultant view ought to be a live contender in contemporary philosophy of perception. (shrink)

An introductory level text designed to explain and review basic ideas concerning the role of law in society. Assuming no previous knowledge of the field, the volume examines the theoretical and empirical dimensions of law in society from political, sociological, psychological and philosophical perspectives.

Recent calls to address racism in bioethics reflect a sense of urgency to mitigate the lethal effects of a lack of action. While the field was catalyzed largely in response to pivotal events deeply rooted in racism and other structures of oppression embedded in research and health care, it has failed to center racial justice in its scholarship, pedagogy, advocacy, and practice, and neglected to integrate anti-racism as a central consideration. Academic bioethics programs play a key role in determining the (...) field’s norms and practices, including methodologies, funding priorities, and professional networks that bear on equity, inclusion, and epistemic justice. This article describes recommendations from the Racial Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion (REDI) Task Force commissioned by the Association of Bioethics Program Directors to prioritize and strengthen anti-racist practices in bioethics programmatic endeavors and to evaluate and develop specific goals to advance REDI. (shrink)

In this article, I critique the commonly accepted distinction between commercial and altruistic surrogacy arrangements. The moral legitimacy of surrogacy, I claim, does not hinge on whether it is paid (‘commercial’) or unpaid (‘altruistic’); rather, it is best determined by appraisal of virtue-abiding conditions constitutive of the surrogacy arrangement. I begin my article by problematising the prevailing commercial/altruistic distinction; next, I demonstrate that an assessment of the virtue-abiding or non-virtue-abiding features of a surrogacy is crucial to navigating questions about the (...) moral legitimacy of surrogacy; in the final part, I reject other moral heuristics that might be proposed as alternatives to the commercial/altruistic dichotomy, and reiterate that a virtue-ethical framework is the most suitable way forward. (shrink)

Rae Langton and Caroline West famously argue that pornography operates like a language game, in that it introduces certain views about women into the common ground via presupposition accommodation. While this pragmatic model explains how pornography has the potential to change its viewers’ beliefs, it leaves open how pornography changes people's desires. Our aim in this paper is to show how Langton and West's discourse-theoretic account of pornography can be refined to close this lacuna. Using tools from recent developments in (...) discourse theory, we propose that pornography issues implicit directives, and thereby introduces bouletic components into the discourse. (shrink)

The relative merits and demerits of historically prominent views such as the correspondence theory, coherentism, pragmatism, verificationism, and instrumentalism have been subject to much attention in the truth literature and have fueled the long-lived debate over which of these views is the most plausible one. While diverging in their specific philosophical commitments, adherents of these historically prominent views agree in at least one fundamental respect. They are all alethic monists. They all endorse the thesis that there is only one property (...) in virtue of which propositions can be true, and so, in this sense, take truth to be one. The truth pluralist, on the other hand, rejects this idea. There are several properties in virtue of which propositions can be true. The literature on truth pluralism has been growing steadily for the past twenty years. This volume, however, is the first of its kind—the first collection of papers focused specifically on pluralism about truth. Part I is dedicated to the development, investigation, and critical discussion of different forms of pluralism. An additional reason to look at truth pluralism with interest is the significant connections it bears to other debates in the truth literature—the debates concerning traditional theories of truth and the deflationism/inflationism divide being cases in hand. Parts II and III of the volume connect truth pluralism to these two debates. (shrink)

You ought to believe in accordance with available evidence. This evidential norm, as widely recognized, can be implausibly demanding by requiring you to hold pointless beliefs. In this paper, I first consider some seemingly promising versions of the positive evidential requirement to form beliefs in accordance with your evidence and argue that they either fail to avoid the problem of pointlessness or fail to bind you independently of practical requirements. I then show that even the negative requirement not to believe (...) against your evidence falls prey to the same problem: either it enjoins pointlessness or its binding force depends essentially on practical norms. This is puzzling, as our epistemic practice seems to presuppose evidential standards that are independent of practical rationality. I suggest that the alleged evidential “norms” are evaluative ‘ought’-statements about what it would be epistemically ideal for you to do, which, on their own, do not issue any genuine prescriptions or demands. (*published with open access). (shrink)

The growing demand for uterus transplantation (UTx) invites continued philosophical evaluation of the function of UTx (and what constitutes its ‘success’), as well as the recipient eligibility for UTx. Currently, UTx caters to partnered, cisgender women of childbearing age looking to get pregnant and give birth to a biogenetically related child. The medical justification for this—the treatment of uterine infertility—explains the primacy of this practice. However, this dominant conceptualization of UTx does not necessarily capture the diverse needs for which both (...) cis‐ and transgender women might take interest in UTx that are not strictly procreative, such as bodily integrity and gender identity reasons. In this paper, I argue that non‐procreative motivations for uterus acquisition ought to be taken seriously as a matter of non‐discrimination and consistency. (shrink)

East Asian countries such as South Korea have recently made headlines for experimenting with different methods to incentivise people to have (more) children, in a bid to reverse declining birth rates. Many such incentives—child benefits, cash bonuses, dating events, and so on—appear morally innocuous at first glance. I will demonstrate in this analysis, however, that they amount to stopgap measures which reveal fundamental shortcomings with the way various nation states are approaching the so-called ‘problem’ of fertility decline.

A global trend of institutionalised pronatalism situates low fertility as a site of demographic disaster – positioning primarily women’s bodies as both its cause and solution. In light of such demographic dread, assisted reproductive technologies (ART) may be utilized by pronatalist states as a strategy for fertility recovery, rather than as a benefit for individual aspiring parents. In other words, ARTs are at risk of being co-opted by nation-states for problematic demographic designs which do not advance emancipatory goals. The underlying (...) issue of pronatalism, however, is not always explicitly acknowledged in feminist bioethics as a barrier to ethical ART usage. In my paper, I argue that it would be a mistake to assume ART can be used for emancipatory ends if we do not, at the same time, critically investigate its connections to institutionalised pronatalism. (shrink)

Ascribing autonomous status to agents is a valuable practice. As such, we ought to care about how we engage in practices of autonomy ascription. However, disagreement between first-personal experiences of an agent's autonomy and third-personal determinations of their autonomy presents challenges of ethical and epistemic concern. My view is that insights from a dialogical rather than nondialogical account of autonomy give us the resources to combat the challenges associated with autonomy ascription. I draw on Andrea Westlund's account of dialogical autonomy—on (...) which autonomy requires a dialogical disposition to hold oneself answerable to external critical perspectives—to make my case. (shrink)

Explanation can be distinguished between linguistic practices and metaphysical relations. At least with respect to metaphysical explanation, some are skeptical that any knowledge gained via explanation qua linguistic practices confers knowledge of explanation qua metaphysical relation. I argue that this skepticism is unfounded. Engaging in the linguistic practice of explanation gives us no reason to skeptical in beliefs about corresponding metaphysical relations like causation or grounding. Moreover, those very linguistic practices can provide resources to justify beliefs in those relations. So, (...) exploring those practices can move us forward in developing an epistemology of grounding and metaphysical explanation. (shrink)

I defend the position argued previously by Germain Grisez and me that total brain death is a valid criterion of death on the grounds that a human being is essentially a rational animal, and a brain-dead body lacks the radical capacity for rational actions. I reply to Josef Seifert’s objection that our positions rest on a reductionist view of the human person, and to other objections concerning the inter-relation between the human soul, its powers, and functions of the brain. I (...) argue that a brain-dead body lacks the material dispositions needed for having the form or soul of a human being. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

This paper defends virtual veridicalism, according to which many perceptual experiences in virtual reality are veridical. My argument centers on perceptual variation, the phenomenon in which perceptual experience appears all the same while being reliably generated by different properties under different circumstances. It consists of three stages. The first stage argues that perceptual variation can occur in color perception without involving misperception. The second stage extends the argument to perceptual variation of space, arguing that it is possible for individuals to (...) perceive distinct physical spaces as having the same experiential space without suffering from systematic misperception. The final stage proceeds to argue that perceptual variation without misperception in color and spatial perception can occur across virtual and ordinary environments. In that sense, given that ordinary experiences are presumably veridical, experiences in virtual reality are also veridical. (shrink)

For over one hundred and fifty years G.W.F. Hegel’s ghost has haunted theoretical understanding and practice. His opponents first, and later his defenders, have equally defined their programs against and with his. In this way Hegel’s political thought has both situated and displaced modern political theorizing. This book takes the reception of Hegel’s political thought as a lens through which contemporary methodological and ideological prerogatives are exposed. It traces the nineteenth century origins of the positivist revolt against Hegel’s legacy forward (...) to political science’s turn away from philosophical tradition in the twentieth century. The book critically reviews the subsequent revisionist trend that has eliminated his metaphysics from contemporary considerations of his political thought. It then moves to re-evaluate their relation and defend their inseparability in his major work on politics: the_ Philosophy of Right_. Against this background, the book concludes with an argument for the inherent metaphysical dimension of political theorizing itself. Goodfield takes Hegel’s reception, representation, as well as rejection in Anglo-American scholarship as a mirror in which its metaphysical presuppositions of the political are exceptionally well reflected. It is through such reflection, he argues, that we may begin to come to terms with them. This book will be of great interest to students, scholars, and readers of political theory and philosophy, Hegel, metaphysics and the philosophy of the social sciences. (shrink)

This article explores the relationship between Gilles Deleuze's philosophical endeavours and Marxism, with a particular focus on his unfinished work, Grandeur de Marx. Despite the collapse of Soviet socialism, Deleuze acknowledged that his philosophical pursuits were profoundly intertwined with Marxist thought. His insistence on this connection was not a mere expression of regret or an apology for his political leanings. In the 1990s, as neoliberal globalisation spread beyond the United States and Europe, Marxism persisted as a rallying cry for resistance. (...) The ascendancy of global capitalism was not a consequence of Marxism's failure; rather, it was a manifestation of what Marx had presciently predicted in his works. Thus, Deleuze's unfinished project on Marx can be viewed as a response to anti-Marxist reactionism from a distinct vantage point. While several interpretations of Deleuze's unwritten Marx exist, the argument in this essay is that Deleuze attempted to recreate the conditions for Marx's critical analysis by employing communism as an event. (shrink)

A growing body of research highlights that adults with autism spectrum disorder have poor health outcomes, yet effective health interventions are lacking for this population. While mobile health applications demonstrate potential for promoting physical activity in adults with ASD, scientific evidence for supporting this tool’s long-term effectiveness on PA behavior change remains inconclusive. This study aimed to provide the latest information on PA research and the prospective role of mobile health applications for promoting PA in adults with ASD. A literature (...) review demonstrated that a few available studies show contradictory results regarding PA levels in adults with ASD, and behavior change techniques and gamification-guided mobile health applications can be promising tactics to leverage autism’s strengths and increase PA in these individuals. Optimizing design decisions based on needs analysis and user feedback is crucial to identifying and developing a sustainable mobile health intervention for PA promotion in adults with ASD. (shrink)

This paper deals with the phenomenon of retroactive continuity, or retcon for short, in which the truth-value of a proposition in an established fictional work is changed later. The primary aim of this paper is to provide the most compelling explanation for retroactive continuity. I first defend the metaphysical view about fiction, according to which when retconning occurs, a fictional work changes its property of containing a proposition while preserving its identity. I then argue that this view is theoretically preferable (...) to all other competing approaches. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to contribute to the substantial body of feminist scholarship on the place of women in Aristotle’s psychic and political hierarchy. Whereas the traditional point of departure for such analyses is more typically Aristotle’s Politics, mine is his hylomorphic or organizational/ecological account of what defines a living thing and its powers in de Anima. My primary claim is that although his de Anima account does offer a more promising view of what defines particular kinds of (...) living things, including human beings qua the power of intellection, it does not ultimately save him from the ambiguity endemic to his account of women’s capacity to deliberate in his Politics. Such a result is significant for feminists who, in seeking nondualistic accounts of embodied human existence, have sometimes turned to Aristotle’s hylomorphism for support, but, I suggest, might be better off to seek such support elsewhere. (shrink)

First published in 2012. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Leibniz's views on divine concurrence have presented interpreters with great difficulty. On the one hand, Leibniz thought that creatures have genuine causal powers, causing their own states. But he also believed that God is immediately involved in every aspect of the world by endorsing the 'conservation is but continuous creation' thesis . Accordingly, when faced with the question of how divine and creaturely causality relate, Leibniz held that God and creatures concur. It is not obvious, however, how this 'concurrence' is (...) supposed to work or even whether these two commitments can be consistently maintained. ;The key challenge comes from Malebranche who argues, rather persuasively, that occasionalism follows from CCC. Leibniz, thus, needs to avoid this inference if he is to maintain real forces in creatures. In chapter two, I show how he avoids the inference by holding a restricted version of CCC. I go on to propose that Leibniz's account of concurrence is basically a cooperation model, in which God produces the modifications of creatures in accordance with the reasons presented within each creature's nature. Though God is the sole efficient cause, the creature contributes and acts in the form of rational determination, i.e., it determines which particular modification God is to produce. ;This proposal raises the worry that Leibnizian reasons are uncomfortably similar to Malebranchean occasions. In chapter three, I examine Leibniz's own attempts to distance himself from occasionalism but argue that whatever the merits of these arguments are they fall short of addressing this problem. ;Chapter four concentrates on this issue of distinguishing reasons and occasions. I argue that their core difference lies in that Leibnizian reasons demand, unlike Malebranchean occasions. This demand consists in the creature's states having an intrinsic value and this inherent goodness accounts for why they function as reasons behind God's decision to act. Furthermore, reasons as such motivate but do not necessitate and this motivating power of the goodness of reasons is a genuine power for Leibniz. For Malebranche, however, that which does not necessitate is not a cause and I conclude that this is the core difference between Leibniz and Malebranche. (shrink)

This brief text assists students in understanding Marx's philosophy and thinking so that they can more fully engage in useful, intelligent class dialogue and improve their understanding of course content. Part of the "Wadsworth Philosophers Series," (which will eventually consist of approximately 100 titles, each focusing on a single "thinker" from ancient times to the present), ON MARX is written by a philosopher deeply versed in the philosophy of this key thinker. Like other books in the series, this concise book (...) offers sufficient insight into the thinking of a notable philosopher better enabling students to engage in the reading and to discuss the material in class and on paper. (shrink)

This study explores the identity construction of socioeconomically and educationally disadvantaged students who enter an elite university. This critical ethnography gathered qualitative data about the twenty-three participants through non-participant observation, in-depth interviews, and focus groups. Faculty, staff, and administrators were also interviewed.

This paper clarifies the phenomenon Edmund Husserl referred to as “solitary speech,” defending his account against the deconstructionist claim that it serves as a mere prop for his transcendental project. To do this, first, I examine how this idea has been misunderstood by Jacques Derrida in Speech and Phenomena. Second, I present Husserl's account of solitary speech as a strictly phenomenological-psychological analysis of a concrete unit of psychic experience, drawing on Husserl's broader view on the relationship between psychology and phenomenology. (...) Third, I compare Husserl's account to Lev Vygotsky's empirical psychological account of “inner speech” to demonstrate their affinity, and to re-establish the misunderstood theme of solitary speech as a concrete linguistic and cognitive phenomenon. This not only corrects the deconstructionist bias but sets a proper approach to the phenomenon of solitary speech, which can contribute to a broader account of the linguistic and cultural formation of human consciousness. (shrink)