The philosophical classic explores the value and significance of leisure, arguing that it is the foundation of any culture, necessary for the development of religion and the contemplation of the nature of God, and issues a warning about the loss of insight due to our substitution of hectic amusements for nonactivity, silence, and true leisure.

We propose that typical schizophrenic delusions develop on the background of preexisting anomalies of self-experience. We argue that disorders of the Self represent the experiential core clinical phenomena of schizophrenia, as was already suggested by the founders of the concept of schizophrenia and elaborated in the phenomenological psychiatric tradition. The article provides detailed descriptions of the pre-psychotic or schizotypal anomalies of self-experience, often illustrated through clinical vignettes. We argue that delusional transformation in the evolution of schizophrenic psychosis reflects a global (...) reorganization of consciousness and existential reorientation, both of which radiate from a fundamental alteration of the Self. We critically address the contemporary cognitive approaches to delusion formation, often finding them inconsistent with the clinical features of schizophrenia or implausible from a phenomenological point of view. (shrink)

We use mental files to present an analysis of children's developing understanding of identity in alternative naming tasks and belief. The core assumption is that younger children below the age of about 4 years create different files for an object depending on how the object is individuated. They can anchor them to the same object, hence think of the same object whether they think of it as a rabbit or as an animal. However, the claim is, they cannot yet link (...) their files to one another to represent that they have the same referent. Without linking the information contained in one file is not available in the other file. Hence, when thinking of the object as a rabbit the information that it is also an animal is not available. For representing a person's belief about an object a vicarious file contains what the person believes about the object. To capture that the belief is about that object the vicarious file has to be linked to the regular file, which by assumption children younger than 4 years cannot do. This assumption can therefore explain why problems with alternative naming and understanding false beliefs are overcome at the same age. (shrink)

Blumenberg‘s phenomenological anthropology replaces the traditional question: What is the human being? with the following question: How is being human even possible? This question expresses a great mistrust over the ability of copying with human life. According to Blumenberg, man can survive only when he keeps distance from the threatening world in a literal as well as metaphorical sense. As an upright animal, who sees and can be seen, he can experience being hunted but also being the hunter in order (...) to bring himself into safety from what threatens him as well as succeeding in hunting. In a metaphorical sense, man takes distance from the almighty reality through myths, religion, science, technology, art, resp . culture as reliable ways to cope with anxiety and threats in this, for him, dangerous and nameless world. (shrink)

In der Reihe werden herausragende monographische Untersuchungen und Sammelb nde zu allen Aspekten der Philosophie Kants ver ffentlicht, ebenso zum systematischen Verh ltnis seiner Philosophie zu anderen philosophischen Ans tzen in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Ver ffentlicht werden Studien, die einen innovativen Charakter haben und ausdr ckliche Desiderate der Forschung erf llen. Die Publikationen repr sentieren damit den aktuellsten Stand der Forschung.

This article examines the structure of self-consciousness in people with schizophrenia. The findings indicate that our self-experience is not neutral with respect to the metaphysical status of the self and that it is important to attend carefully to the experience of the subject in order to understand schizophrenia. The results also suggest that the variable disruptions in the sense of self-presence, first-person perspective, and the phenomenality of experience in schizophrenics directly affect the minimal self and it may also have implications (...) for the narrative self. (shrink)

Our objectives in this article are to bring some theoretical order into developmental sequences and simultaneities in children’s ability to appreciate multiple labels for single objects, to reason with identity statements, to reason hypothetically, counterfactually, and with beliefs and desires, and to explain why an ‘implicit’ understanding of belief occurs before an ‘explicit’ understanding. The central idea behind our explanation is the emerging grasp of how objects of thought and desire relate to real objects and to each other. To capture (...) this idea we make use of the notion of discourse referents, as did Perner and Brandl (2005), to explain the developmental link between understanding beliefs and alternative naming. We present confirming evidence of the prediction from this analysis that children should have comparable problems with understanding identity statements. We explain the precociously correct answers in ‘implicit’ false belief tests based on indirect measures in the following way: From infancy children are able to keep track of other people’s experiences, to reason about counterfactual circumstances, and to reason about goal-directed (rational) action depending on given circumstances. Indirect tasks reduce the bias to use actual circumstances for reasoning about goal directed action compared to the traditional task, which leads to more correct answers. An emerging metarepresentational understanding helps overcome these biases and enables not only correct action prediction but also the explanation of erroneous actions. The common metarepresentational element explains why false belief tasks and the alternative naming task are mastered at the same time as children understand identity statements. (shrink)

We develop a criterion for telling when integrating two pieces of information, e.g. two pictures or statements requires an understanding of perspective. Problems that require such an understanding are perspective problems. With this criterion we can show that understanding false beliefs vis-à-vis reality pose a perspective problem, so does understanding spatial descriptions given from different viewing points (a classical example of what is commonly seen as a problem of perspective) and individuating objects with different sortals (naming objects). We use the (...) result that understanding false belief as well as alternative naming of objects are both perspective problems to explain the otherwise inexplicable developmental finding that children master these two tasks at about the same time, around the age of 4 years. (shrink)

We argue that episodic remembering, understood as the ability to re-experience past events, requires a particular kind of introspective ability and understanding. It requires the understanding that first person experiences can represent actual events. In this respect it differs from the understanding required by the traditional false belief test for children, where a third person attribution (to others or self) of a behavior governing representation is sufficient. The understanding of first person experiences as representations is also required for problem solving (...) with images. In support of this argument we review developmental evidence that children's episodic remembering is independent of and emerges after mastery of the false belief task but emerges together with the use of imagery for solving visual rotation tasks. (shrink)

When do children become consciously aware of events in the world? Five possible strategies are considered for their usefulness in determining the age in question. Three of these strategies ask when children show signs of engaging in activities for which conscious awareness seems necessary in adults , and two of the strategies consider when children have the ability to have the minimal form of higher-order thought necessary for access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness, respectively. The tentative answer to the guiding question (...) is that children become consciously aware between 12 and 15 months. (shrink)

We argue for teleology as a description of the way in which we ordinarily understand others’ intentional actions. Teleology starts from the close resemblance between the reasoning involved in understanding others’ actions and one’s own practical reasoning involved in deciding what to do. We carve out teleology’s distinctive features more sharply by comparing it to its three main competitors: theory theory, simulation theory, and rationality theory. The plausibility of teleology as our way of understanding others is underlined by developmental data (...) in its favour. (shrink)

In most developmental studies the only error children could make on counterfactual tasks was to answer with the current state of affairs. It was concluded that children who did not show this error are able to reason counterfactually. However, children might have avoided this error by using basic conditional reasoning (Rafetseder, Cristi-Vargas, & Perner, 2010). Basic conditional reasoning takes background assumptions represented as conditionals about how the world works. If an antecedent of one of these conditionals is provided by the (...) task, then a likely conclusion can be inferred based only on background assumptions. A critical feature of counterfactual reasoning is that the selection of these additional assumptions is constrained by actual events to which the counterfactual is taken to be counterfactual. In contrast, in basic conditional reasoning one enriches the given antecedent with any plausible assumptions, unconstrained by actual events. In our tasks basic conditional reasoning leads to different answers from counterfactual reasoning. For instance, a doctor, sitting in the park with the intention of reading a paper, is called to an emergency at the swimming pool. The question, “If there had been no emergency, where would the doctor be?” should counterfactually be answered “in the park”. But by ignoring the doctor's intentions, and just reasoning from premises about the default location of a hospital doctor who has not been called out to an emergency, one might answer: “in the hospital”. Only by 6 years of age did children mostly give correct answers. (shrink)

A method is presented for deciding whether correct predictions about other people are based on simulation or theory use. The differentiating power of this method was assessed with cognitive estimation biases (e.g. estimating the area of Brazil) in two variations. Experiments 1 and 2 operated with the influence of response scales of different length. Experiment 3 used the difference between free estimates that tended to be far off the true value and estimates constrained by an appropriate response scale, where estimates (...) became greatly more realistic. The critical question is how well observer subjects can predict these target biases under two different presentation conditions. Response scale biases (Experiments 1 and 2) were more strongly predicted when observer subjects were presented with the two scales juxtaposed, than when responses for each scale were given independently. This speaks for the use of a theory, since simulation should, if there is any difference at all, be made more difficult by the juxtaposition of conditions. The difference between free and constrained estimations (Experiment 3) was more strongly predicted under independent than under juxtaposed presentation. This speaks for the use of simulation since use of a theory should, if anything, be helped by juxtaposition of problems since it helps highlight the theoretically relevant factor. Results are discussed in view of recent proposals about when simulation is likely to be used, i.e. for belief fixation but not action prediction (Stich and Nichols, 1995b), for content fixation (Heal, 1996a), and for rational effects only (Heal, 1996b). (shrink)

In this response to Wiggins and Schwartz, Ratcliffe, and Stanghellini, we first wish to express our gratitude to Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology for providing us the space to clarify our views and to overcome certain misunderstandings. Ratcliffe notes that our critique is "harsh," whereas Wiggins and Schwartz lament the fact that the debate "has taken the form of sometimes acid formulations and rejoinders . . . that lack the tone of mutual appreciation" (2011, 31). We deplore the fact that this (...) exchange was at all necessary, and we share Wiggins and Schwartz's concerns. However, we need to recall here and emphasize that our article originated as a response. It originated as a response to an article that was .. (shrink)

We develop a new theory of the cognitive changes around 4 years of age by trying to explain why understanding of false belief and of alternative naming emerge at this age. We make use of the notion of discourse referents as it is used in File Change Semantics, one of the early forms of the more widely known Discourse Representation Theory. The assumed cognitive change exists in how children can link DRs in their mind to external referents. The younger children (...) check whether the conditions for a DR match the conditions of an external entity. The older children, in addition, have an explicit understanding of reference in virtue of making explicit identity assertions. This involves the metarepresentational ability of representing that different DRs represent the same external referent, which — we argue — is required for alternative naming and for the false belief task. (shrink)

The concept of autonomy is of crucial importance not only for philosophical but also for theological ethics. Referring to the contemporary debate on the universality or particularity of moral judgments the idea of universal moral principles is defended by reconstructing the fundamental similarities between J. Rawls's liberal theory of social justice and Aquinas's understanding of natural law. Despite this plea for a cognitivist approach in normative ethics and a strong concept of practical reason the communitarian movement has to be taken (...) seriously especially from a theological perspective. As both the concepts of happiness or human fulfillment and that of virtue need to be rehabilitated in post-Kantian ethics communitarianism could help us to overcome a too narrow and therefore partly blind understanding of moral theory. (shrink)

This volume brings together the papers published in Historiographia Linguistica 9:3 (1982), which was devoted to the history of linguistics in Italy, with Marazzini's paper first published in Historiographia Linguistica 10:1/2 (1983), and an original article by Franco Lo Piparo expressly written for this volume. The present volume provides in addition an index of subjects, as well as an index of names, which supplies bio-bibliographical references to authors discussed.

Das Wort "Kultur" wird verschiedenartig gebraucht. Wir sagen beispielsweise über ein Volk, das Grosses geleistet hat, dass es ein Kulturvolk sei, während ein anderes, das nicht so viel geleistet hat, nicht als Kulturvolk bezeichnet wird. Dagegen sprechen wir beispielsweise von der Kultur der Steinzeit, obwohl die Menschen der Steinzeit viel primitiver waren, als das Volk, das wir nicht als Kulturvolk ansehen wollten. Wir erhalten eine Bestimmung des Begriffes "Kultur" in derjenigen Bedeutung, die alle Arten und Stufen der Kultur umfasst, und (...) die uns auch in der Bezeichnung "Kulturwissenschaft" entgegentritt, wenn wir den Unterschied zwischen den Dingen, die nicht als Kulturgegenstände bezeichnet werden, und den Dingen, die wir Kulturgegenstände nennen, möglichst richtig formulieren. Der Autor möchte folgende Formulierung vorschlagen: Alle Objekte und Verhaltungsweisen (Handlungen und Dispositionen zu Handlungen) die (infolge ihrer Aenlichkeit mit anderen) als Symptome für das Vorliegen von Symbolen, Erkenntnissen (hauptsächlich kausalen Erkenntnissen) und Zwecken (beziehungsweise Wünschen) zu verwerten sind, gehören zur Kultur. Die Definition des engeren Kulturbegriffes müsste etwa lauten: Zur Kultur gehören Objekte und Verhaltungsweisen, die als Symptome des Schöpferischen (des Grossen und zugleich Neuen) gewertet werden. Es kann hier eine Parallele gezogen werden zwischen den Unterschieden von Mensch und Tier einerseits und Mensch und -- sagen wir -- Uebermensch andrerseits. Das Wesentliche ist das Auftauchen von individuellen und nicht gattungsmässigen Zügen; die Tatsache, dass das Verhalten des genialen Menschen neu ist. In diesem Sinne sprechen wir auch von einem "Kulturvolk" insofern die geschaffenen Werke des betreffenden Volkes und seine Verhaltungsweisen Symptome sind für das Schöpferische der diesem Volke angehörenden Individuen. (shrink)

Continuous magnitude estimation and continuous cross-modality matching with line length can efficiently track the momentary loudness of time-varying sounds in behavioural experiments. These methods are known to be prone to systematic biases but may be checked for consistency using their counterpart, magnitude production. Thus, in Experiment 1, we performed such an evaluation for time-varying sounds. Twenty participants produced continuous cross-modality matches to assess the momentary loudness of fourteen songs by continuously adjusting the length of a line. In Experiment 2, the (...) resulting temporal line length profile for each excerpt was played back like a video together with the given song and participants were asked to continuously adjust the volume to match the momentary line length. The recorded temporal line length profile, however, was manipulated for segments with durations between 7 to 12 s by eight factors between 0.5 and 2, corresponding to expected differences in adjusted level of −10, −6, −3, −1, 1, 3, 6, and 10 dB according to Stevens’s power law for loudness. The average adjustments 5 s after the onset of the change were −3.3, −2.4, −1.0, −0.2, 0.2, 1.4, 2.4, and 4.4 dB. Smaller adjustments than predicted by the power law are in line with magnitude-production results by Stevens and co-workers due to “regression effects.” Continuous cross-modality matches of line length turned out to be consistent with current loudness models, and by passing the consistency check with cross-modal productions, demonstrate that the method is suited to track the momentary loudness of time-varying sounds. (shrink)

De pessimistische zinnen, waarvan vele op het eerste gezicht klaar en begrijpelijk schijnen, blijken bij nadere beschouwing zinlooze woordenreeksen. De schrijver onderscheidt in zijn logische onderzoekingen drie stadia. In het eerste stadium -- dat van het naïeve begrijpen -- komen ons de pessimistische zinnen, vooral wanneer we in een slechte stemming zijn, zeer vertrouwd voor; in het volgende stadium -- dat der logische analyse -- ontpoppen zij zich als zinlooze woordverbindingen, terwijl in het derde stadium een verklaring wordt gezocht voor (...) het tegenstrijdig karakter der beide voorafgaande stadia. Schächter komt, na toepassing der logische analyse op eenige pessimistische zinnen, tot de conclusie, dat de uiterlijke vorm dezer zinnen misleidend is. Deze zinnen wekken namelijk den indruk, alsof de vertwijfeling, die door hen wordt uitgedrukt, op een gegeven toestand betrekking heeft. Zulk een pessimisme zou echter niet "echt" zijn, wijl daarbij toch stilzwijgend wordt verondersteld, dat een andere, mogelijke -- helaas niet werkelijke -- toestand begeerenswaardig zou zijn. Zoo is de verachting van alle aardsche goederen alleen bij die menschen echt, die rijk aan genotmogelijkheden zijn. Het pessimisme van arme menschen beteekent in den grond der zaak een bekrachtiging van de waardeering voor aardsche goederen. Van een symptomatisch gezichtspunt uit beschouwd, worden pessimistische uitingen niet als uitspraken aangezien, zooals de formuleeringen der omgangstaal en der wetenschap, die de een of andere zakelijke situatie beschrijven, maar als symptomen van bepaalde stemmıngen. Onze taal bestaat uit verschillende "lagen", tusschen welke "overeenkomsten" bestaan. Zoo kan men onderscheiden tusschen een -- met betrekking tot de "waardeeringen" -- neutrale taallaag en een laag, waarin alle dingen en verschijnselen met waardeeringsmaatstaven worden gemeten. Zoowel binnen de waardeeringsvrije, neutrale taal als binnen de waardeeringstaal onderscheidt Schächter een grammaticale en een toegepaste taal. Bij de analyse der taal stooten we op een laag, waarin alle gebeurtenissen uitsluitend van het gezichtspunt van den mensch uit worden beschouwd, waarin bij voorbeeld de zon geschapen is met het doel, den mensch goede diensten te bewijzen. Opvattingen als deze hebben tot het vaststellen van bepaalde regels geleid, die in onze taal, of liever in een van haar lagen, nog steeds gelden. Er zijn zinswendingen, die in de eene taallaag verboden, maar in een andere volkomen toelaatbaar zijn. Iedere taallaag heeft haar eigen regels, haar eigen logica. Binnen bepaalde taallagen hebben de pessimistische uitingen "zin". Het zijn de lagen, waarin vragen en zinnen worden "verstaan". Buiten deze lagen zijn de pessimistische formuleeringen zinloos. (shrink)

The question of whether homeopathy is a science is currently discussed almost exclusively against the background of the modern concept of natural science. This approach, however, fails to notice that homeopathy—in terms of history of science—rests on different roots that can essentially be traced back to two most influential traditions of science: on the one hand, principles and notions of Aristotelism which determined 2,000 years of Western history of science and, on the other hand, the modern concept of natural science (...) that has been dominating the history of medicine for less than 200 years. While Aristotle’s “science of the living” still included ontologic and teleologic dimensions for the sake of comprehending nature in a uniform way, the interest of modern natural science was reduced to functional and causal explanations of all phenomena for the purpose of commanding nature. In order to prevent further ecological catastrophes as well as to regain lost dimensions of our lives, the one-sidedness and theory-loadedness of our modern natural–scientific view of life should henceforth be counterbalanced by lifeworld–practical Aristotelic categories. In this way, the ground would be ready to conceive the scientific character of homeopathy—in a broader, Aristotelian sense. (shrink)

Evolution is a time process. It proceeds in steps of definite length. The probability of each step is relatively high, so self organization of complex systems will be possible in finite time. Prerequisite for such a process is a selection rule, which certainly exists in evolution. Therefore, it would be wrong to calculate the probability of the formation of a complex system solely on the basis of the number of its components and as a momentary event.

Die Wissenschaft besteht aus einzelnen Behauptungssätzen, aus Kausalsätzen, aus Naturgesetzen, die in mathematischen Formeln ausgedrückt werden, aus Regeln und Ableitungen; aus Hypothesen, Verifikationsmethoden, Verifikationen, beziehungweise Falsifikationen; aus Konstatierungen über die Verwendung sprachlicher Zeichen. All das wird mit dem gemeinsamen Namen "Wissenschaft" bezeichnet. Wir bemerken, dass hierdurch heterogene Satztypen zusammengefasst wurden und wir wollen nach dem gemeinsamen "Durchschnitt" aller erwähnten Satzarten suchen, damit wir den gemeinsamen Namen rechtfertigen und das Verhältnis dieser Zusammenfassung zu einer andern Zusammenfassung, die man als Religion bezeichnet, (...) untersuchen können. Die Religion umfasst überlieferte Erzählungen (historische Behauptungssätze), Kausalsätze. Wir bemerken hier aber etwas Neues: das Auftreten von Normen (von allgemeinen Befehlssätzen) wie auch von Wertungen, die einen integrierenden Bestandteil der Religion bilden. Es kommen auch Mahnungen und Vorwürfe vor. Es erscheint nun zweckmässig zu sein, das Auftreten der letzterwähnten Satztypen als charakteristisch anzusehn, um die Verschiedenheit der zwei Sphären mit ihrer Hilfe zu formulieren. Die Wissenschaft ist dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass ihre Sätze richtig oder unrichtig, wahr oder falsch sind, dass sie aber nicht fordern und nicht werten. Auch die sogenannten ethischen Sätze, insofern sie wissenschaftliche Sätze sind, verpflichten nicht zu Handlungen, sondern beschreiben und erklären bestimmte Verhaltungsweisen des Menschen. Wir wollen die Neutralität, den indifferenten Charakter als das Kennzeichen aller wissenschaftlichen Sätze betrachten: sie sind nicht normativ, sie tragen uns keine Handlungen auf und werten nicht. Die Wissenschaft ist sozusagen, "jenseits von Gut und Böse". Die Religion besteht dagegen hauptsächlich aus Normen und Wertungen. Ihrem eigentlichen Wesen nach stellt die Religion keine Dichtung, keinen Mythos und ebensowenig eine blosse Ethik dar, sondern sie ist etwas viel primäreres: die Veranlassung und die Reglung der menschlichen Handlungen und die Erzeugung von Hemmungen durch Normen und Wertsysteme. Ueberall dort, wo eine Motivquelle auf einen Teil der Menschen, beziehungsweise auf alle Menschen, von andauerndem Einfluss ist und irgend ein Gegenstand der Welt dazu ernannt wird, an das Bekennen zu dieser Motivquelle zu erinnern, dort liegt Religion vor. Die Religion umfasst auch Normenund Wertsysteme, die Handlungen und Hemmungen veranlassen, welche nicht im Dienste der menschlichen Gesellschaft stehen und dadurch ist sie von der Morallehre verschieden. Der Glaube an die "Wichtigkeit" der Normen und Werte wie an jene Behauptungssätze über die Welt, welche den tiefsten Wünschen und der Sehnsucht des Menschen entgegenkommen, ist die wichtigste religiöse Handlung. (shrink)