Many meta-ethicists have thought that rationality requires us to heed apparent normative reasons, not objective normative reasons. But what are apparent reasons? There are two kinds of standard answers. On de dicto views, R is an apparent reason for S to \ when it appears to S that R is an objective reason to \ . On de re views, R is an apparent reason for S to \ when R’s truth would constitute an objective reason for S to \ (...) , and it appears to S that R. De re views are currently more popular because they avoid overintellectualizing rationality. But they face problems owing to the way in which they do so. Some assume that we can escape these problems by requiring more information to be apparent or by appealing to defeat. But these strategies fail. So, I defend a new view: apparent reasons are apparent facts that agents are competently attracted to treat like objective reasons, where competence is indirectly defined in terms of objective reasons and a competence/performance distinction is honored. Since one can treat X like an F without having the concept of an F, the view does not overintellectualize rationality. But it is also strong enough to dodge the pitfalls of de re views. (shrink)

This paper considers the place of reasons in the metaphysics of epistemic normativity and defends a middle ground between two popular extremes in the literature. Against members of the ‘reasons first’ movement, we argue that reasons are not the sole fundamental constituents of epistemic normativity. We suggest instead that the virtue-theoretic property of competence is the key building block. To support this approach, we note that reasons must be possessed to play a role in the analysis of central epistemically normative (...) properties, and argue that the relation of possession must be analyzed in terms of competence. But while we diverge with reasons-firsters on this score, we also distance ourselves from those who deny reasons any important role in epistemology. For we maintain that possessed reasons do help to ground deontic facts in the epistemic domain (e.g., facts about what one epistemically ought to believe, may believe, or is justified in believing). Indeed, we present an argument that the possession of sufficient epistemic reasons is necessary and sufficient for propositional justification, and that proper basing on such reasons yields doxastic justification. But since possession and proper basing are themselves grounded in competence, reasons are not the end of the explanatory road: competence enables them to do their work, putting them—and us—in the middle. (shrink)

The article gives a tentative interpretation of the history of the Churches in Germany starting 1945 to 1989. Crucial points are the relations oftheGerman Churches to questions of modern pluralism, to questions of peace and war and to questions of the transformation of Churchstructures. Common points are mentioned between the Churches of the older FRG and the former GDR-Churches just so differences between them.

In acht auf deutsch und zwei auf englisch geschriebenen Aufsätzen werden Themen aus der Forschungstätigkeit, dem Leben und der Lehre des Autors behandelt: das Schicksal eines Wiener Emigranten, die angloamerikanische und die österreichische Philosophie und manche ihrer hervorragenden Gestalten. Die Schriften sind autobiographisch, historisch und kritisch und vermitteln vor allem geistesgeschichtliche und kulturhistorische Aspekte unseres Jahrhunderts.

What does it mean to be a good ally to the LGBTQ community? Does it count if you attach a rainbow pin to your backpack or post occasional messages of support on social media? We argue that in order to be a good ally involves avoiding the vice of complacency and that allies need to ask themselves two distinct, but related questions: (1) Who are you an ally to?; (2) How are you an ally? While reflecting on these questions helps (...) allies examine what they have or have not been doing so far, these questions point towards future action by encouraging allies to consider what else they need to be doing to help and who else they need to help. (shrink)