Results for 'Knowability'

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Bibliography: Knowability in Epistemology
  1. Knowability and bivalence: intuitionistic solutions to the Paradox of Knowability.Julien Murzi - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (2):269-281.
    In this paper, I focus on some intuitionistic solutions to the Paradox of Knowability. I first consider the relatively little discussed idea that, on an intuitionistic interpretation of the conditional, there is no paradox to start with. I show that this proposal only works if proofs are thought of as tokens, and suggest that anti-realists themselves have good reasons for thinking of proofs as types. In then turn to more standard intuitionistic treatments, as proposed by Timothy Williamson and, most (...)
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  2. Factive knowability and the problem of possible omniscience.Jan Heylen - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (1):65-87.
    Famously, the Church–Fitch paradox of knowability is a deductive argument from the thesis that all truths are knowable to the conclusion that all truths are known. In this argument, knowability is analyzed in terms of having the possibility to know. Several philosophers have objected to this analysis, because it turns knowability into a nonfactive notion. In addition, they claim that, if the knowability thesis is reformulated with the help of factive concepts of knowability, then omniscience (...)
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  3. Transcendental Knowability and A Priori Luminosity.Andrew Stephenson - 2021 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 25 (1):134-162.
    This paper draws out and connects two neglected issues in Kant’s conception of a priori knowledge. Both concern topics that have been important to contemporary epistemology and to formal epistemology in particular: knowability and luminosity. Does Kant commit to some form of knowability principle according to which certain necessary truths are in principle knowable to beings like us? Does Kant commit to some form of luminosity principle according to which, if a subject knows a priori, then they can (...)
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  4. Discovering knowability: a semantic analysis.Sergei Artemov & Tudor Protopopescu - 2013 - Synthese 190 (16):3349-3376.
    In this paper, we provide a semantic analysis of the well-known knowability paradox stemming from the Church–Fitch observation that the meaningful knowability principle /all truths are knowable/, when expressed as a bi-modal principle F --> K♢F, yields an unacceptable omniscience property /all truths are known/. We offer an alternative semantic proof of this fact independent of the Church–Fitch argument. This shows that the knowability paradox is not intrinsically related to the Church–Fitch proof, nor to the Moore sentence (...)
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  5. Knowability Relative to Information.Peter Hawke & Franz Berto - 2021 - Mind 130 (517):1-33.
    We present a formal semantics for epistemic logic, capturing the notion of knowability relative to information (KRI). Like Dretske, we move from the platitude that what an agent can know depends on her (empirical) information. We treat operators of the form K_AB (‘B is knowable on the basis of information A’) as variably strict quantifiers over worlds with a topic- or aboutness- preservation constraint. Variable strictness models the non-monotonicity of knowledge acquisition while allowing knowledge to be intrinsically stable. Aboutness-preservation (...)
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  6.  17
    From Knowability to Conjecturability, and Back Again.Jan Heylen & Kristine Grigoryan - 2024 - Contemporary Pragmatism 21 (3):287-298.
    Chiffi and Pietarinen (2020) argue that the knowability paradox disappears if we adopt the concept of conjecturability instead of knowability within the framework of Peirce’s theory of science. They make two main claims: first, conjecturability plays an all-important role in scientific inquiry and it explains better scientific progress than knowability; second, conjecturability does not produce aparadox akin to the knowability paradox. However, based on our reading of Peirce, we contend that knowability plays an important role (...)
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  7.  10
    Inductive Knowability of the Modal.Sonia Roca-Royes - 2023 - Disputatio 15 (69):151-178.
    This paper scrutinises the limits of a posteriori induction in acquiring modal knowledge. I focus on my similarity-based account (Roca-Royes [2017]); an inductive, non-rationalist epistemology of modality about concrete entities. Despite the explanatory merits of the account in relation to a vast range of modal claims, this inductive epistemology has been found incapable of yielding knowledge of a certain, other range of modal claims. Here, two notions of knowability are distinguished which reveal some of these limitations to be not (...)
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  8.  69
    Knowability Paradox.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2006 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK.
    The paradox of knowability, derived from a proof by Frederic Fitch in 1963, is one of the deepest paradoxes concerning the nature of truth. Jonathan Kvanvig argues that the depth of the paradox has not been adequately appreciated. It has long been known that the paradox threatens antirealist conceptions of truth according to which truth is epistemic. If truth is epistemic, what better way to express that idea than to maintain that all truths are knowable? In the face of (...)
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  9. Knowability paradox, decidability solution?William Bondi Knowles - 2024 - Ratio 37 (2-3):102-111.
    Fitch's knowability paradox shows that for each unknown truth there is also an unknowable truth, a result which has been thought both odd in itself and at odds with views which impose epistemic constraints on truth and/or meaningfulness. Here a solution is considered which has received little attention in the debate but which carries prima facie plausibility. The decidability solution is to accept that Fitch sentences are unknowably true but deny the significance of this on the grounds that Fitch (...)
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  10.  40
    Knowability and a New Paradox of Happiness.Joe Salerno - 2018 - In Hans van Ditmarsch & Gabriel Sandu, Jaakko Hintikka on Knowledge and Game Theoretical Semantics. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. pp. 457-474.
    The paper examines the logic of the knowability paradox and a structural analogue, a new paradox of happiness. We develop a general understanding of what it is to be a Fitch paradox, and follow a natural thread in the literature that attempts to block or resolve Fitch paradoxes. We conclude that, in the case of the attitude of happiness, the new paradox remains even if one finds the knowability analogue non-threatening.
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  11. Counterfactual knowability revisited.Julian J. Schlöder - 2019 - Synthese (2):1-15.
    Anti-realism is plagued by Fitch’s paradox: the remarkable result that if one accepts that all truths are knowable, minimal assumptions about the nature of knowledge entail that every truth is known. Dorothy Edgington suggests to address this problem by understanding p is knowable to be a counterfactual claim, but her proposal must contend with a forceful objection by Timothy Williamson. I revisit Edgington’s basic idea and find that Williamson’s objection is obviated by a refined understanding of counterfactual knowability that (...)
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  12.  67
    The Knowability Paradox, perfectibility of science and reductionism.Massimiliano Carrara & Davide Fassio - unknown
    A logical argument known as Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability, starting from the assumption that every truth is knowable, leads to the consequence that every truth is also actually known. Then, given the ordinary fact that some true propositions are not actually known, it concludes, by modus tollens, that there are unknowable truths. The main literature on the topic has been focusing on the threat the argument poses to the so called semantic anti-realist theories, which aim to epistemically characterize the (...)
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  13. Transcendental Knowability, Closure, Luminosity and Factivity: Reply to Stephenson.Jan Heylen & Felipe Morales Carbonell - 2023 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 27 (1).
    Stephenson (2022) has argued that Kant’s thesis that all transcendental truths are transcendentally a priori knowable leads to omniscience of all transcendental truths. His arguments depend on luminosity principles and closure principles for transcendental knowability. We will argue that one pair of a luminosity and a closure principle should not be used, because the closure principle is too strong, while the other pair of a luminosity and a closure principle should not be used, because the luminosity principle is too (...)
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  14. KK, Knowledge, Knowability.Weng Kin San - 2023 - Mind 132 (527):605-630.
    kk states that knowing entails knowing that one knows, and K¬K states that not knowing entails knowing that one does not know. In light of the arguments against kk and K¬K⁠, one might consider modally qualified variants of those principles. According to weak kk, knowing entails the possibility of knowing that one knows. And according to weakK¬K⁠, not knowing entails the possibility of knowing that one does not know. This paper shows that weak kk and weakK¬K are much stronger than (...)
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  15.  69
    The Knowability Paradox in the light of a Logic for Pragmatics.Massimiliano Carrara & Daniele Chiffi - 2014 - In Roberto Ciuni, Heinrich Wansing & Caroline Willkommen, Recent Trends in Philosophical Logic (Proceedings of Trends in Logic XI). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. pp. 47-58.
    The Knowability Paradox is a logical argument showing that if all truths are knowable in principle, then all truths are, in fact, known. Many strategies have been suggested in order to avoid the paradoxical conclusion. A family of solutions –ncalled logical revision – has been proposed to solve the paradox, revising the logic underneath, with an intuitionistic revision included. In this paper, we focus on so-called revisionary solutions to the paradox – solutions that put the blame on the underlying (...)
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  16. Knowability as potential knowledge.André Fuhrmann - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7):1627-1648.
    The thesis that every truth is knowable is usually glossed by decomposing knowability into possibility and knowledge. Under elementary assumptions about possibility and knowledge, considered as modal operators, the thesis collapses the distinction between truth and knowledge (as shown by the so-called Fitch-argument). We show that there is a more plausible interpretation of knowability—one that does not decompose the notion in the usual way—to which the Fitch-argument does not apply. We call this the potential knowledge-interpretation of knowability. (...)
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  17. Knowability and the capacity to know.Michael Fara - 2010 - Synthese 173 (1):53 - 73.
    This paper presents a generalized form of Fitch's paradox of knowability, with the aim of showing that the questions it raises are not peculiar to the topics of knowledge, belief, or other epistemic notions. Drawing lessons from the generalization, the paper offers a solution to Fitch's paradox that exploits an understanding of modal talk about what could be known in terms of capacities to know. It is argued that, in rare cases, one might have the capacity to know that (...)
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  18. Distributed Knowability and Fitch’s Paradox.Rafał Palczewski - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (3):455-478.
    Recently predominant forms of anti-realism claim that all truths are knowable. We argue that in a logical explanation of the notion of knowability more attention should be paid to its epistemic part. Especially very useful in such explanation are notions of group knowledge. In this paper we examine mainly the notion of distributed knowability and show its effectiveness in the case of Fitch’s paradox. Proposed approach raised some philosophical questions to which we try to find responses. We also (...)
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  19. How to solve the knowability paradox with transcendental epistemology.Andrew Stephenson - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 13):3253-3278.
    A novel solution to the knowability paradox is proposed based on Kant’s transcendental epistemology. The ‘paradox’ refers to a simple argument from the moderate claim that all truths are knowable to the extreme claim that all truths are known. It is significant because anti-realists have wanted to maintain knowability but reject omniscience. The core of the proposed solution is to concede realism about epistemic statements while maintaining anti-realism about non-epistemic statements. Transcendental epistemology supports such a view by providing (...)
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  20.  95
    Knowability, closure, and anti-realism.Sven Rosenkranz - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (1):59–75.
    In light of the paradox of knowability anti‐realists ought to revise their wholesale equation of truth and knowability, lest they be committed to the absurd conclusion that there are no truths that will never be known. The task accordingly becomes to identify the problematic statements the knowability of whose truth would force that conclusion and to restrict the equation in appropriate ways to all but the problematic statements. This restriction strategy was first implemented by Tennant. However, recently (...)
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  21.  14
    Knowability and intuitionistic logic.David Vidi & Graham Solomon - 2001 - Philosophia 28 (1-4):319-334.
  22.  29
    From Knowability to Conjecturability.Daniele Chiffi & Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen - 2020 - Contemporary Pragmatism 17 (2-3):205-227.
    Arguments from knowability have largely been concerned with cases for and against realism, or truth as an epistemic vs. non-epistemic concept. This article proposes bringing Peirce’s pragmaticism, called here ‘action-first’ epistemology, to bear on the issue. It is shown that a notion weaker than knowability, namely conjecturability, is epistemologically a better-suited notion to describe an essential component of scientific inquiry. Moreover, unlike knowability, conjecturability does not suffer from paradoxes. Given fundamental uncertainty that permeates inquiry, knowability and (...)
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  23. Fitch's Paradox of Knowability.Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno - 2010 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The paradox of knowability is a logical result suggesting that, necessarily, if all truths are knowable in principle then all truths are in fact known. The contrapositive of the result says, necessarily, if in fact there is an unknown truth, then there is a truth that couldn't possibly be known. More specifically, if p is a truth that is never known then it is unknowable that p is a truth that is never known. The proof has been used to (...)
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  24. Kant, the Paradox of Knowability, and the Meaning of ‘Experience’.Andrew Stephenson - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15 (27):1-19.
    It is often claimed that anti-realism is a form of transcendental idealism or that Kant is an anti-realist. It is also often claimed that anti-realists are committed to some form of knowability principle and that such principles have problematic consequences. It is therefore natural to ask whether Kant is so committed, and if he is, whether this leads him into difficulties. I argue that a standard reading of Kant does indeed have him committed to the claim that all empirical (...)
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  25.  68
    (Un)knowability and knowledge iteration.Sebastian Liu - 2020 - Analysis 80 (3):474-486.
    The KK principle states that knowing entails knowing that one knows. This historically popular principle has fallen out of favour among many contemporary philosophers in light of putative counterexamples. Recently, some have defended more palatable versions of KK by weakening the principle. These revisions remain faithful to their predecessor in spirit while escaping crucial objections. This paper examines the prospects of such a strategy. It is argued that revisions of the original principle can be captured by a generalized knowledge iteration (...)
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  26. Logics for Knowability.Mo Liu, Jie Fan, Hans van Ditmarsch & Louwe B. Kuijer - 2022 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 31 (3):385-426.
    In this paper, we propose three knowability logics LK, LK−, and LK=. In the single-agent case, LK is equally expressive as arbitrary public announcement logic APAL and public announcement logic PAL, whereas in the multi-agent case, LK is more expressive than PAL. In contrast, both LK− and LK= are equally expressive as classical propositional logic PL. We present the axiomatizations of the three knowability logics and show their soundness and completeness. We show that all three knowability logics (...)
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  27. Knowability and epistemic truth.Michael Hand - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):216 – 228.
    The so-called knowability paradox results from Fitch's argument that if there are any unknown truths, then there are unknowable truths. This threatens recent versions of semantical antirealism, the central thesis of which is that truth is epistemic. When this is taken to mean that all truths are knowable, antirealism is thus committed to the conclusion that no truths are unknown. The correct antirealistic response to the paradox should be to deny that the fundamental thesis of the epistemic nature of (...)
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  28. Knowability, possibility and paradox.Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno - 2007 - In Vincent Hendricks, New Waves in Epistemology. Aldershot, England and Burlington, VT, USA: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 270-299.
    The paradox of knowability threatens to draw a logical equivalence between the believable claim that all truths are knowable and the obviously false claim that all truths are known. In this paper we evaluate prominent proposals for resolving the paradox of knowability. For instance, we argue that Neil Tennant’s restriction strategy, which aims principally to restrict the main quantifier in ‘all truths are knowable’, does not get to the heart of the problem since there are knowability paradoxes (...)
     
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  29. The Knowability Argument and the Syntactic Type-Theoretic Approach.Lucas Rosenblatt - 2014 - Theoria 29 (2):201-221.
    Some attempts have been made to block the Knowability Paradox and other modal paradoxes by adopting a type-theoretic framework in which knowledge and necessity are regarded as typed predicates. The main problem with this approach is that when these notions are simultaneously treated as predicates, a new kind of paradox appears. I claim that avoiding this paradox either by weakening the Knowability Principle or by introducing types for both predicates is rather messy and unattractive. I also consider the (...)
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  30.  12
    God knowable and unknowable.Robert J. Roth - 1973 - New York,: Fordham University Press.
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  31.  48
    The Knowability Paradox and Unsuccessful Updates.Arkadiusz Wójcik - 2020 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 62 (1):53-71.
    In this paper we undertake an analysis of the knowability paradox in the light of modal epistemic logics and of the phenomena of unsuccessful updates. The knowability paradox stems from the Church-Fitch observation that the plausible knowability principle, according to which all truths are knowable, yields the unacceptable conclusion that all truths are known. We show that the phenomenon of an unsuccessful update is the reason for the paradox arising. Based on this diagnosis, we propose a restriction (...)
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  32.  62
    Knowability and Other Onto-theological Paradoxes.Franca D’Agostini - 2019 - Logica Universalis 13 (4):577-586.
    In virtue of Fitch-Church proof, also known as the knowability paradox, we are able to prove that if everything is knowable, then everything is known. I present two ‘onto-theological’ versions of the proof, one concerning collective omniscience and another concerning omnificence. I claim these arguments suggest new ways of exploring the intersection between logical and ontological givens that is a grounding theme of religious thought. What is more, they are good examples of what I call semi-paradoxes: apparently sound arguments (...)
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  33. From the Knowability Paradox to the existence of proofs.W. Dean & H. Kurokawa - 2010 - Synthese 176 (2):177 - 225.
    The Knowability Paradox purports to show that the controversial but not patently absurd hypothesis that all truths are knowable entails the implausible conclusion that all truths are known. The notoriety of this argument owes to the negative light it appears to cast on the view that there can be no verification-transcendent truths. We argue that it is overly simplistic to formalize the views of contemporary verificationists like Dummett, Prawitz or Martin-Löf using the sort of propositional modal operators which are (...)
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  34.  34
    Knowability as De Re Modality: A Certain Solution to Fitch Paradox.Tomasz Jarmużek, Krzysztof Krawczyk & Rafał Palczewski - 2020 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 68 (4):291-313.
    Poznawalność jako modalność de re: pewne rozwiązanie paradoksu Fitcha W artykule staramy się znaleźć nowe, intuicyjne rozwiązanie paradoksu Fitcha. Twierdzimy, że tradycyjne wyrażenie zasady poznawalności opiera się na błędnym rozumieniu poznawalności jako modalności de dicto. Zamiast tego proponujemy rozumieć poznawalność jako modalność de re. W artykule przedstawiamy minimalną logikę poznawalności, w której zasada poznawalności jest ważna, ale paradoks Fitcha już nie obowiązuje. Logikę charakteryzujemy semantycznie, a także poprzez podejście aksjomatyczne i tabelaryczne.
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  35. The Paradox of Knowability and Factivity.Michael Shaffer - 2014 - Polish Journal of Philiosophy 8 (1):85-91.
    This paper shows that the knowability paradox isn’t a paradox because the derivation of the paradox is faulty. This is explained by showing that the K operator employed in generating the paradox is used equivocally and when the equivocation is eliminated the derivation fails.
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  36.  5
    The knowableness of God.Matthew Aloysius Schumacher - 1905 - Notre Dame, Ind.,: University press.
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  37.  49
    ‘Knowable’ and ‘Namable’ in Albert the Great’s Commentary on the Divine Names.Francis J. Catania - 1979 - Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 10 (3):97-128.
  38. Knowability and constructivism.Timothy Williamson - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 38 (153):422-432.
    There is an argument which seems to show that if all truths are knowable then all truths are known. It may be viewed as a "reductio ad absurdum" of certain forms of antirealism. However, The claim has been made elsewhere that the argument fails against antirealists who employ constructivist rather than classical logic. The paper defends and amplifies this claim against criticisms by crispin wright and others. Relations between knowability and time are discussed. Suggestions are also made about the (...)
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  39. Factivity, consistency and knowability.James Chase & Penelope Rush - 2018 - Synthese 195 (2):899-918.
    One diagnosis of Fitch’s paradox of knowability is that it hinges on the factivity of knowledge: that which is known is true. Yet the apparent role of factivity and non-factive analogues in related paradoxes of justified belief can be shown to depend on familiar consistency and positive introspection principles. Rejecting arguments that the paradox hangs on an implausible consistency principle, this paper argues instead that the Fitch phenomenon is generated both in epistemic logic and logics of justification by the (...)
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  40. The Paradox of Knowability and Epistemic Theories of Truth.Boris Rähme - manuscript
    The article suggests a reading of the term ‘epistemic account of truth’ which runs contrary to a widespread consensus with regard to what epistemic accounts are meant to provide, namely a definition of truth in epistemic terms. Section 1. introduces a variety of possible epistemic accounts that differ with regard to the strength of the epistemic constraints they impose on truth. Section 2. introduces the paradox of knowability and presents a slightly reconstructed version of a related argument brought forward (...)
     
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  41.  57
    Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability and the Knower Paradox: Against a Proposed Dialetheist Unified Solution.Ricardo Santos - 2017 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 73 (3-4):1001-1020.
    After introducing Fitch’s paradox of knowability and the knower paradox, the paper critically discusses the dialetheist unified solution to both problems that Beall and Priest have proposed. It is first argued that the dialetheist approach to the knower paradox can withstand the main objections against it, these being that the approach entails an understanding of negation that is intolerably weak and that it commits dialetheists to jointly accept and reject the same thing. The lesson of the knower paradox, according (...)
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  42. Analogues of knowability.David DeVide & Tim Kenyon - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):481 – 495.
    An interesting recent reply to the Paradox of Knowability is Neil Tennant's proposal: to restrict the anti-realist's knowability thesis to truths the knowing of which is logically consistent. However, this proposal is egregiously ad hoc unless motivated by something other than the wish to save anti-realism from embarrassment. We examine Tennant's argument that his restriction is motivated by parallel considerations in cases that are neutral with respect to debates about realism. We conclude that the cases are not neutral, (...)
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  43. Coherence and Knowability.Luis Rosa - 2022 - The Philosophical Quarterly 72 (4):960-978.
    Why should we avoid incoherence? An influential view tells us that incoherent combinations of attitudes are such that it is impossible for all of those attitudes to be simultaneously vindicated by the evidence. But it is not clear whether this view successfully explains what is wrong with certain akratic doxastic states. In this paper I flesh out an alternative response to that question, one according to which the problem with incoherent combinations of attitudes is that it is impossible for all (...)
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  44. Knowability and a modal closure principle.Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno - 2006 - American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (3):261-270.
    Does a factive conception of knowability figure in ordinary use? There is some reason to think so. ‘Knowable’ and related terms such as ‘discoverable’, ‘observable’, and ‘verifiable’ all seem to operate factively in ordinary discourse. Consider the following example, a dialog between colleagues A and B: A: We could be discovered. B: Discovered doing what? A: Someone might discover that we're having an affair. B: But we are not having an affair! A: I didn’t say that we were. A’s (...)
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  45. The Church–Fitch knowability paradox in the light of structural proof theory.Paolo Maffezioli, Alberto Naibo & Sara Negri - 2012 - Synthese 190 (14):2677-2716.
    Anti-realist epistemic conceptions of truth imply what is called the knowability principle: All truths are possibly known. The principle can be formalized in a bimodal propositional logic, with an alethic modality ${\diamondsuit}$ and an epistemic modality ${\mathcal{K}}$, by the axiom scheme ${A \supset \diamondsuit \mathcal{K} A}$. The use of classical logic and minimal assumptions about the two modalities lead to the paradoxical conclusion that all truths are known, ${A \supset \mathcal{K} A}$. A Gentzen-style reconstruction of the Church–Fitch paradox is (...)
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  46. Epistemic Contextualism and the Knowability Problem.Wolfgang Freitag - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (3):273-284.
    The paper critically examines an objection to epistemic contextualism recently developed by Elke Brendel and Peter Baumann, according to which it is impossible for the contextualist to know consistently that his theory is true. I first present an outline of contextualism and its reaction to scepticism. Then the necessary and sufficient conditions for the knowability problem to arise are explored. Finally, it will be argued that contextualism does not fulfil these minimal conditions. It will be shown that the contrary (...)
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  47. God Knowable and Unknowable.Robert J. Roth - 1975 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (2):131-132.
     
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  48. Everything is Knowable – How to Get to Know Whether a Proposition is True.Hans van Ditmarsch, Wiebe van der Hoek & Petar Iliev - 2012 - Theoria 78 (2):93-114.
    Fitch showed that not every true proposition can be known in due time; in other words, that not every proposition is knowable. Moore showed that certain propositions cannot be consistently believed. A more recent dynamic phrasing of Moore-sentences is that not all propositions are known after their announcement, i.e., not every proposition is successful. Fitch's and Moore's results are related, as they equally apply to standard notions of knowledge and belief (S 5 and KD45, respectively). If we interpret ‘successful’ as (...)
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  49. The Bishop’s Church: Berkeley’s Master Argument and the Paradox of Knowability.Stephen Kearns - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (3):175-190.
    We can find in the passages that set out the Master Argument a precursor to the paradox of knowability. That paradox shows that if all truths are knowable, all truths are known. Similarly, Berkeley might be read as proposing that if all sensible objects are (distinctly) conceivable, then all sensible objects are conceived.
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  50. The knowability paradox and the prospects for anti-realism.Jonathan Kvanvig - 1995 - Noûs 29 (4):481-500.
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